Policy-making in the PRC: A study of the variations in decision-making across three issue areas; 1969-1978. by Seckington, Ian Mark
19 1562106X
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON IHESIS
D eg ree T ^D ^ Year 2o o\ Name of Author 5&<Z<2 (NQ-To N , T .
COPYRIGHT
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an 
unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons consulting 
the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and 
that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the 
prior written consent of the author.
LOAN
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the University Library may lend a copy to 
approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the premises 
of those libraries. Application should be made to: The Theses Section, University of 
London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTON
University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written 
permission from the University of London Library. Enquiries should be addressed to 
the Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary 
according to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the 
author. (The University Library will provide addresses where possible).
B. 1962 - 1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C. 1975 - 1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright
Declaration.
D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.
This thesis comes within category D.
□  This copy has been deposited in the Library of
/
This copy has been deposited in the University of London Library, Senate 
House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
P:\Office\Standard forms\Copyright - thesis.doc
ProQuest Number: 10731726
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 10731726
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346
Policy-Making in the PRC: A Study of the Variations in 
Decision-Making Across Three Issue Areas; 1969-1978
Ian Mark Seckington
School of Oriental and African Studies
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy
Abstract
This thesis examines the policy-making process in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) between 1969 and 1978. By undertaking a study of three issue 
areas (agriculture, foreign policy and higher education), this thesis challenges 
many of the conclusions of earlier single-issue or broad band studies of the 
decision-making process in the PRC which failed to generate sufficiently 
detailed information to allow comparisons to be made regarding policy-making 
across issue areas.
This thesis highlights variations in the decision-making process which 
suggest that the pattern of decision-making in each of the three issue areas 
under study appears to be independent of most of the developments in the 
other fields. Policy-making in each area appears to follow its own internal logic 
such that a radical upsurge in one field is not necessarily matched by a similar 
upsurge in either, or one of, the other areas. Furthermore, the influence of the 
various groups competing over policy also appears to vary, both across each 
area and with time. So, for example, the radical Left dominated higher 
education policy from 1969 to their purge in 1976, but had little influence over 
foreign policy during this period.
This study suggest that the fundamental reason for these variations is that 
the senior Party leadership, and in particular Mao Zedong, made an 
assessment as to the possible consequences of failure for radical policies in 
each of the three issue areas, and that where the cost was seen as too great, 
the radical influence was restricted and a more pragmatic line adopted. So, for 
example, this research shows that throughout this period agriculture was 
characterised by a cyclical pattern whereby radical policies were curtailed 
during Spring and Autumn, periods of peak activity for agriculture. Similarly, 
radical activity in the foreign affairs system was stopped following the threat of a 
possible war with the Soviet Union in 1969.
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Chapter One Decision-making in the People’s Republic of 
China
As it emerges as a leading actor in world politics there is an ever greater 
need for a clearer understanding of the decision-making process in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). China now plays an increasingly important 
role both regionally and internationally and its political system has been the 
focus of considerable academic interest. As other countries engage with China 
over a wide range of issues it is important that this interest generates clearer 
insights into the decision-making process in the PRC which will both deepen 
our understanding of its political system and which can underpin western 
responses to that country.
The importance of this topic is compounded by the opacity of the decision­
making process in China, which has made any study of that process very 
difficult. Since its foundation in 1949, the political system in China has largely 
remained closed to outside observers, hampering foreign, as well as domestic, 
commentators. The failure to institutionalize the decision-making system and a 
restricted official media are leading factors behind the opacity of the policy­
making process which hamper further research: In the PRC, decision-making 
on key issues usually takes place in private, closed-door sessions, leaving the 
public meetings of bodies like the National People’s Congress to pass 
decisions that have already been taken.
This thesis attempts to illuminate the decision-making process in China 
through a study of policy-making in higher education, agriculture, and foreign 
policy during the period 1969-78. Using newly available material, newspapers 
and journals, this study will examine variations in the policy-making process 
across these three areas and suggest that there is a high degree of 
“compartmentalization” in the policy-making process in China, such that
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decision-making in each area had its own coherent logic and followed a 
pattern largely independent of the other areas. While drawing on the 
contributions of earlier studies of decision-making in the PRC, this thesis 
attempts to develop an explanation for this apparent “compartmentalization”, a 
phenomenon that has been ignored by these earlier works.
In attempting to explain this phenomenon this thesis underlines the 
importance of senior political leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping in setting the agenda in each of the three areas studied. The leading 
role of Mao in the decision-making process is recognized in line with the “Mao- 
in-command” and “Mao-as-arbiter” models as set out by authors such as 
Frederick Teiwes and Galen Fox, but this thesis also examines the role of other 
senior leaders and attempts to set out the factors that mediated Mao’s and their 
role to develop a new explanation of the policy-making process during the 
Cultural Revolution.
The findings of this thesis also question the view of decision-making during 
the Cultural Revolution that emphasizes the importance of informal 
relationships, that is factional ties, bureaucratic affiliation etc. over formal 
position and structures. Without completely over-turning this view, the findings 
of this thesis suggests that greater emphasis needs to placed on formal 
position, that is membership of leading decision-making and administrative 
bodies, as a means of influencing the policy-making process.
This thesis examines the period from 1969-78. Although developments in 
this period were not isolated from the mobilization phase of the' Cultural 
Revolution, I begin in 1969 as this year marked the start of a series of intense 
policy debates generated by concerns over China’s future direction during 
efforts to rebuild in the wake of the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution. 
As major policy debates were occuring in a number of sectors, this facilitates 
the approach of this thesis, which attempts to contrast policy-making across
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different areas, by providing examples of major policy decisions in each of the 
three areas chosen; higher education, agriculture, and foreign policy. 
Furthermore, newly available sources offer detailed insights into these debates 
and were a major reason'for chosing to study policy-making during the second 
part of the Cultural Revolution. Policy-making during this period has often been 
over-looked in studies which have only focused on factional conflict between 
competing groups at the expense of the policy process, or in general studies 
seeking to understand the origins of the Cultural Revolution.
It follows from the above that higher education, agriculture, and foreign 
policy were chosen as during the period 1969-78 they saw a number of major 
policy decisions which are reflected in the available literature and which can be 
used to illustrate the policy-making process in that area: In higher education 
there are the examples of the decision to reintroduce a form of the national 
university entrance exam, and later the reintroduction of key-point schools; in 
agriculture there was conflict over the significance of the model brigade at 
Dazhai and the introduction of responsibility systems; and in foreign policy 
there was the decision to improve relations with the US.
In this thesis higher education, agriculture and foreign policy are described 
as “issue areas". The term “issue area” is used to refer to the set of problems, 
goals and policies relating to each of the three areas chosen and the policy 
debate surrounding these. Developments in these three areas are not seen as 
always happening in isolation from each other (this is not the meaning of the 
“compartmentalization” of decision-making), so, for example, the importance of 
maintaining agricultural production to provide the raw materials for industry and 
the significance of the quality of higher education graduates for China's 
economic reforms are noted. However the main focus of each chapter is the 
policy debates around three or four key questions within that issue area rather 
than the inter-linkages between and among the various issue areas.
Within each issue area a set of three or four themes have been chosen to
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illustrate the policy debate. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but they do 
reflect some of the major debates within each issue area during the period 
1969-78 as shown in the Chinese media and highlighted by both Chinese and 
western writers. They provide illustrative examples which underline this 
thesis’s main argument that decision-making in each area had its own coherent 
logic and followed a pattern largely independent of the other areas.
The problem of definitions
The basic argument of this thesis is that there is a greater degree of variation 
in policy-making across the three issue areas than has previously been 
understood. If leading actors in the policy-making process adopt different 
policy positions in each of the three issue areas, then this brings into question 
the single definitions of actors as “moderates” or “radical” which have been 
adopted in previous works of policy-making in the PRC. The question of 
definitions is further complicated by the different connotations of western 
definitions of “conservative,” “moderate,” and “radical” when applied to the 
setting of socialist China.
In this thesis the terms “moderate” and “radical" are used to characterize the 
basic approach of individual and groups of actors. This thesis sees "radicals" 
as more reliant on the use of political campaigns as a means of mobilizing 
support, to be more willing to break down extant systems and organisations as 
a means of bringing about progress and to be more dismissive of the 
importance of experience. In contrast “moderates" placed greater emphasis on 
encouraging individuals through material rewards, they generally worked 
through the existing system (although the example of the introduction of 
responsibility systems in agriculture is an exception) and sought to develop 
and encourage expertise.
These general definitions are used to describe the basic positions of 
individuals and groups of actors, however they are not intended as an exact
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definition of their policy position across all issue areas. This thesis will 
highlight the flexibility, pragmatism, and inexperience that often led actors to 
accept or adopt different policy positions in each of the three areas and which 
underpins the notion o f the “compartmentalisation" of decision-making jn the 
PRC.
Conceptualizing the decision-making process in the PRC
Earlier works on the decision-making process in the PRC reflect a number of 
different approaches and adopt a variety of models to explain policy-making 
during this period. Some of these draw on models developed from earlier 
studies of the Soviet Union and from western political science. This section will 
review some of these earlier works, focusing in particular on those which look 
at the period from 1969 to 1978.
Type I Models: Mao-in-Command/Mao-as-Dictator
Any model of the decision-making process in China during the Cultural 
Revolution needs to take into account the role of Mao. It is clear from even a 
cursory glance at works on this period that Mao’s role was often pivotal and the 
first generation of scholarship, often influenced by the former Soviet Union 
stressed the importance of Mao.
Mao-in-command and Mao-as-arbiter models of the Chinese decision­
making process emphasize the importance of Mao Zedong as the head of the 
Chinese Communist Party as well as Mao’s charismatic authority as leader of 
the Chinese communist revolution. Frederick Teiwes has undertaken a short 
analysis of the Cultural Revolution using Mao-in-command and Mao-as-arbiter 
models.1 He sees the mobilizational phase as a triumph of Mao's charisma 
over Party norms:
1 Fredrick Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China. From a Charismatic Mao to 
the Politics of Succssion, (Armonk, New York, 1984), pp.68-76.
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Opposition to Mao on any issue under any circumstances, and beyond 
that any deviation from a highly idealized version of Mao’s Thought, was 
now judged culpable... The newly dominant view demanded the 
unqualified obedience characteristic of charismatic authority.2
This view clearly reflects the Mao-in-command model, and puts Mao at the 
centre of the decision-making process.
Type I la Models: Policy conflict - Mao-as-arbiter
In contrast to the first model, which sees any policy conflict as being largely 
subordinated to Mao’s own authority, most writers who have studied the 
decision-making process in the PRC during this period have described it as 
being characterized by a degree of conflict between competing groups who are 
organized along policy or ideological lines. However, some authors have 
continued to emphasize the importance of Mao's role, and portray the decision- 
making process as one in which Mao acts as a final arbiter, deciding between 
the “policy platforms" of the competing groups.
In his dissertation, “Campaigning for Power in China During the Cultural 
Revolution Era 1967-1976” Galen Fox employs the Mao-as-arbiter model. 
Rather than enforcing his own policy preferences, Galen Fox argues that Mao 
acted as an arbiter between competing coalitions. He writes that “China’s 
leaders responded to each question of how to fill vacant policy positions by 
dominating, reducing, and subordinating the conflicts that divided them until 
they had selected the two most important issues. Each of the two issues 
defined a coalition, or issue/leadership package, that was eventually 
presented to Mao, who decided between them” (emphasis added).3 
While the author believes that decision-making in the PRC at that time was 
characterized by a coalition-building process, it was Mao who held the ultimate 
authority to choose between these coalitions.
2 Ibid, pg.69.
3 Galen Wheeler Fox, Campaigning for Power in China During the Cultural Revolution Era 
1967-1976, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms international, 1978), pg.iv.
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Galen Fox’s argument highlights the role Mao sometimes played in deciding 
between coalitions (this is perhaps most apparent in his support for the radical 
line in higher education in 1975 and his backing of Hua Guofeng’s agricultural 
policies in the same year). However this argument cannot explain the apparent 
lack of conflict over foreign policy, where Mao repeatedly acted to suppress 
coalition politics rather than adjudicate between competing sides, or Mao’s 
frequent failure to intervene.
This thesis will develop a model of policy-making in the PRC during this 
period that recognizes Mao’s leading role and builds on the “Mao-in-command” 
and “Mao-as-arbiter” models, but which also attempts to account for the 
variations in the way Mao participated in and contributed to, the policy-making 
process across different issue areas. The works of Teiwes and Fox do not 
address this important point. It is also clear that other senior leaders played a 
leading role in the decision-making process, a factor that can be overlooked by 
those models which give almost omnipotent influence to Mao. This thesis will 
attempt to set out the way in which other leaders participated in the policy­
making process, how they interacted with Mao, and the factors which mediated 
Mao’s and their influence over policy outcomes.
Type lib Models: Policy conflict - Coaltion and Factional politics
In contrast to the Mao-as-arbiter model, which continues to emphasize the 
role of Mao, the majority of authors who have studied the decision-making 
process in China during this period have described this process as being 
driven by competition between groups of actors, who form along policy or 
ideological lines. Authors have characterized these groups in terms of 
“radical”, “moderate”, “reformist” or “conservative” coalitions or in terms of 
factional conflict. This approach reflected the way in which the Chinese 
themselves wrote about their system during the Cultural Revolution when the 
Chinese described their own political system in terms of a struggle between
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‘two-lines’ and although this characterization later proved to be too simplistic it 
highlighted the element of competition over policy that typified this period. This 
impression was reinforced by the Red Guard newspapers and wall posters 
published during the Cultural Revolution, which highlighted the degree of 
conflict within the political system in China at this time. This was in stark 
contrast to the image of unity that had characterized portrayals of the Chinese 
leadership prior to this event.
Harry Harding in his work China’s Second Revolution, identifies what he 
sees as three different policy positions which can be identified in the policy 
articulations of the main actors in the late-1970s and early 1980s:4 The 
revolutionary Maoists; the restorationists; and the reformers. After the fall of the 
revolutionary Maoists in 1975-1976, and the victory of the reformers over the 
restorationists, Harding claims that by the 1980s there were only two competing 
policy positions, those advocating radical reform, and those who supported 
more moderate reforms. For Harding political competition and policy-making in 
China during this period were driven by competition between the programs of 
these groups which were broad policy platforms incorporating both political 
and economic elements.
This early work by Harding was clearly influential for subsequent scholars of 
of the decision-making process in China. But these characterization of a 
coalition as “moderate” or “conservative” fail to capture the variations in the 
policy positions of each of the coalitions which I noted above, variation that 
occurs both across individual issue areas and through time. For example, a 
closer study of the position of, say, Harding’s “radical reformers”, shows that 
during the period from 1976-1978 they were successful in implementing radical 
reforms with regards to higher education, while generally supporting Hua 
Guofeng’s conservative line in foreign policy. Similarly, in the period to 1978,
4 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, {Washington: The 
Brookings Institute, 1987), pp.40-41.
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Hua’s agricultural line dominated policy, and it was only in the wake of the third 
plenum of the 11th Central Committee that this group were able to introduce 
“radical” reforms into agriculture.5
Carol Lee Hamrin’s refinement of the coalition-building model into the 
concept of ‘policy-pakages’ has been very influential.6 Hamrin identifies three 
groups, conservatives, pragmatic reformers and orthodox reformers who 
emerged as advocating different policy approaches. Each of these ‘policy- 
pakages’ has been formed through a process of coalition-building. According 
to Hamrin:
this process is characterized by cycles or rounds of competition in 
which the leaders of smaller personal factions and geographic or 
professional interest groups form alliances. These coalitions are formed, 
dissolved and reformed in new configurations as rounds are ‘won’ or ‘lost’. 
Policy ‘consensus’ is forged at private high-level meetings preceding 
public Party or government sessions where the compromise program is 
formalized and publicized. Dissension again emerges between meetings 
as winners press to expand their gains and losers point to the problems 
that arise in implementing policy. Coalitions are reconfigured around 
competing ‘solutions’ until the next consensus is hammered out.7
Carol Lee Hamrin is at pains to point out that the idea of a ‘package’ should 
not be seen as being a static concept.8 Rather that this “conceptualization 
should be viewed as dynamic, rather than static. Continual and sometimes 
rapid change was evident in individual and group positions on specific policy 
issues within a general shift between 1977 to 1984 away from the ‘left’ end of 
the political spectrum.”9
This dynamic element of the coalition-building process is one which must be
5 Richard Baum adopts a very similar approach in his analysis of Chinese politics in the post- 
Mao era. See Burying Mao Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994).
6 Carol Lee Hamrin, "Competing ‘Policy Pakages’ in Post-Mao China,” in Asian Survey, 
Vol.XXIV, No. 5 (May 1984) pp. 487-518.
7 Ibid, pp.488'489.
8 Carol Lee Hamrin, “Competing Politcal-economic strategies" in China’s Economy Looks 
Toward the Year 2000: Volume 1. The four modernizations, (Washington: US Q.P.O., 1986), 
pg-72.
9 Ibid, pg.73.
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captured in a model of the Chinese policy-making system and Hamrin is right to 
identify the general shift away from the “left” that occurred during this period. 
However as noted above, any successful model of the Chinese decision­
making process must also explain variations in the positions of the different 
coalitions across issue areas and why their influence varied in different issue 
areas.
Another model of elite politics in China which emerged from studies of the 
new material published during the Cultural Revolution was the factionalism 
model. In an important article in the China Quarterly, Andrew Nathan 
developed a comprehensive typology of factional politics in the PRC.10 Unlike 
those studies based on a coalition-building model, where actors align along 
policy lines, for Andrew Nathan, factions are based on “clientelist ties”, 
personal links between two people established for the mutual exchange of gifts 
and services. Within a faction these clientelist ties develop to form a wide 
network of interaction which engages in conflict in the political system in 
exchange for the potential benefits which may accrue to the winning faction.
For Andrew Nathan there are a number of important structural characteristics 
which have an effect on the way factional politics works. Factions are based on 
personal ties and as such are limited in size; communications proceed through 
sub-leaders and not directly to all members simultaneously, thus preventing the 
faction from becomig too large as information may then easily become distorted 
and slow to disseminate. A faction depends for success on the leaders 
continued ability to secure benefits for the faction as a whole. If however the 
benefits dry up temporarily, the faction is able to cease functioning until a better 
situation occurs. Finally, a faction is reliant on its leader, thus it cannot survive 
him or her and will breakdown following their death. This tendency towards 
breakdown may occur prior to the leader’s death if the faction is very large and
10 Andrew Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", in The China Quarterly, 53, (Jan- 
Mar 1973), pp.34-66.
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there are a considerable number of sub-leaders. These sub-leaders may feel 
removed from the centre of power of the faction, and have sufficient resources 
to break away and establish their own pattern of clientelist ties.
These factors, argues Nathan, meant that because of the relative limits on 
their size, no single faction will be able to dominate any other faction for an 
unlimited period of time. Also, because of their ability to act intermitently, it is 
impossible for one leading faction to extinguish another. Because of this, 
factional politics tends to be characterized by defensive strategies, any new 
policy approach will be prepared in secret and launched in a “surprise 
offensive”. The defensive nature of factional politics will ensure that the other 
factions unite to block any new initiative. If a policy decision is to be made, 
then, argues Nathan, it must be made by consensus between all of the factions.
These characteristics lead to a typical cycle of action. Following a political 
crisis, necessity means that the various factions realize the need to cooperate. 
Consensus leads to the formation of a faction, or an alliance in government, 
with the power to resolve the particular crisis. However, as a result of the 
decisions they take, decisions which usually benefit those in power, fighting 
between factions breaks out once more, thus factional politics is a cyclical one 
of cooperation and conflict. Nathan’s approach offers a detailed alternative 
model to those studies that see political alliances forming on policy lines. 
However his characterization of the policy-process as being based on 
consensus-building seems at odds with much of the policy conflict that 
dominated this period. Where there was “consensus”, as in foreign policy, this 
seems as likely to have been imposed from above as it was to have been 
reached by the coalitions themselves.
Type 111 Models: Structural explanations
In his study of politics in the PRC since 1949, Avery Goldstein describes the 
period between 1966 and 1978 as being characterized by balance-of-power
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politics, with actors or coalitions of actors engaging in a process which aimed at 
ensuring their political survival.11 He contrasts this type of politics to that during 
the period to 1966, which he sees as being a different process, namely 
“bandwagon" politics.
Goldstein argues that issues of political survival remained at the forefront of 
individual’s minds, even after the end of the mobilizational phase of the 
Cultural Revolution, and he characterizes this period as the “anarchic realm". 
Despite official statements that the 9th Party Congress of 1969 marked the start 
of a period of Party and government reconstruction, competing factions were 
"acutely aware of the potential threat they posed to one another”.12 Goldstein 
argues that the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had dispersed 
resources which had previously been concentrated in the hands of a few senior 
leaders. Individual and groups of actors were able to use these resources to 
ensure their political survival. Actors pursed this aim by engaging in balance- 
of-power politics, forming coalitions and seeking to enhance their resources to 
guarantee political survival.
Avery Goldstein’s work is useful as it is the only study of the Chinese 
decision-making process to identify a variation in that process through time. 
However, this variation is described only in very broad terms. His point about 
the dispersal of resources amongst the Party and government leadership 
during the mobilizational phase is also useful, and one I will return to.
However, here it is perhaps worth underlining that this redistribution was not 
even, both in terms of locus and personnel: Not all resources were 
redistributed and not all actors received an equal share. This point is closely 
related to the assessment of risk by the leadership I have described above.
11 Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Baiance-of-Power Politics Structural Constraints 
and Politics in China, 1949-1978, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 165-166.
12 Ibid, pg.167.
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Studies of policy-making in individual issue areas
There are fewer studies of policy-making in individual issue areas, 
especially in the period to 1976. Of these David Zweig’s Agrarian Radicalism 
in China, 1968-1981 is one of the most comprehensive. For Zweig, policy­
making in agriculture in China between 1968 and 1978 was “the direct result of 
struggles between different factions".13 Decision-making in agriculture was 
influenced by intense competition between these factions and the shifting 
personnel changes that characterized this period. Zweig argues that in this 
atmosphere, actors favouring a “radical solution to the rural problem in China" 
were seldom in the majority and were forced to use informal means, what he 
calls “policy winds”, to mobilize support for their policy program.
Radicals used political campaigns to mobilize support for their policy 
programs, “circumventing national-level bureaucrats to implement policies 
which were not advocated through official Party or government channels".
They also used their control over the media to mobilize support for their policies 
and used the political campaigns to pressure local-level leaders into ensuring 
their implemention. Political campaigns also offered an opportunity to replace 
any local-leaders who were not compliant to the radicals program
Other studies of decision-making in a single issue area include Kenneth 
Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg’s study of policy-making with regards to 
China’s energy policy.14
While all of these works have contributed to a better understanding of the 
policy-making process in the PRC there are significant limitations in the way in 
which they have approached the study of this issue. Works like that of Harding 
and Hamrin are broad studies which focus on the policy-making process as a
13 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989).
14 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China Leaders, Structures, 
and Processes, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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whole. Although they offer interesting insights and suggest ways in which we 
may characterize this process, they are not able to explain the apparent 
differences in policy-making across issue areas. As the subsequent chapters 
will show, at any given time, there are often distinct variations in the positions of 
the various coalitions in each of the three issue areas I examine, variations 
which a broad study cannot identify or explain. Definitions of policy in a given 
period as being characterized as “moderate” or "left" or “right” appear too 
simplistic as an adequate description of the complicated pattern that emerges 
from this research.
Similarly, works like that of Zweig cannot offer a complete picture of the 
policy-making process in China. These detailed studies of a single issue-area 
offer a far more accurate picture of the policy process in that area than is 
possible with a broader study. (Certainly the subsequent chapter on agriculture 
confirms many of Zweig’s findings, and Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s work on 
the energy sector is one of the most detailed studies of policy-making in any 
single issue area). However, as even Lieberthal and Oksenberg recognize, the 
findings for one issue area are not necessarily transferable to another.15
The review of earlier works and this research suggest three possible 
patterns to policy-making in the PRC during the period 1969-1980: Firstly, 
there are periods of across-the-board radicalization or moderation, such that a 
radicalization in agricultural policy is matched by a similar radicalization in 
higher education. This is the view of authors like Solinger, Baum and Hamrin; 
Secondly, there is the possibility that there is a balancing between different 
factions in different areas, with Mao playing a leading role in ensuring that no 
one faction dominates the policy-making process. This is the view of Galen Fox 
in his study of the Cultural Revolution; Finally, there is the possibility that there
15 Lieberthal and Oksenberg accept that the decision-making process in the energy sector 
are neither “typical” or “reprenstative” of other issue areas. Ibid, pg. 20.
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is variation in each policy arena such that each issue area had its own 
coherent logic and followed a pattern independent of other issue areas. This is 
the possibility suggested by this research.
The Compartmentalization of Policy-making
Two kinds of variation in the policy-making process emerge as a result of this 
research. Firstly, there is variation in the relative strength of the various 
groups in setting the agenda in each of the three issue areas under study. The 
strength of the radical Left in the field of higher education has been noted 
above, however members of this group appear to have had little influence over 
foreign policy and agricultural policy. Similarly, while Hua Guofeng and his 
coalition of Cultural Revolution beneficiaries dominated agricultural policy­
making from at least 1975 to 1977, they had less influence over policy in higher 
education at that time. Other examples will be highlighted in the course of the 
studies on the three issue areas.
Secondly, the relative strength of the various groups in setting the agenda 
for each of the three issue areas also varies over time, but not to a uniform 
degree, so that any increase or decrease in influence in one area was not 
necessarily accompanied by a similar reaction in other areas. While some 
general trends across different policy areas were noticeable, such as an 
upsurge in radical activity in the wake of the Tenth Party Congress, its impact 
varied in different issue areas. Similarly moderates were able to launch a 
series of reform programs in the wake of the 4th National People’s Congress in 
January 1975, but these reforms progressed at different rates in different areas. 
These examples suggest that developments in different policy areas were 
insulated from each other to a much higher degree than previous studies have 
suggested.
This research suggests that the leading variable which describes the two 
types of variation outlined above was the perception of a group of senior
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Chinese leaders of the consequences of the failure of radical policy in each of 
the policy areas. The assessment of the risk of failure by Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai, and, to a lesser extent, other senior Chinese leaders set variable 
parameters on the extent to which that policy area was allowed to become 
radicalized. In addition to this risk assessment, this research suggests that 
membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and 
previous experience in each of the three issue areas acted as intervening 
variables which could enhance or detract from an individual's influence and 
effect likely policy outcomes.
The perception of risk
That China’s senior leaders viewed the possible impact of radical policies in 
each of the three issue areas differently is shown in a number of ways. It is 
clear that the Party and government leadership sought to protect agriculture 
from the worst excesses of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, 
with the Central Committee initially issuing orders forbidding Red Guard units 
from travelling to the countryside where they might disturb production.16 
Subsequent to this, there is a noticeable cycle in agricultural policy which saw 
efforts to moderate policy during peak times of agricultural activity, only for 
policy to be re-radicalized following the successful completition of spring 
sowing or autumn harvest work. This suggests an acute awareness on the part 
of the senior leadership of the possible consequences of failure in agriculture, 
less than a decade after the devastating famine that followed the Great Leap 
Forward.
In contrast to agriculture, both higher education and foreign policy 
underwent a period of intense radicalization during the mobilizational phase of
16 See, for example, “Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great 
Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County Level”, in CCP Documents of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), 
pg.79.
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the Cultural Revolution. However, while higher education policy continued to 
be influenced by elements of the radical line even after Mao's death, this 
influence was eliminated in foreign policy very early on in 1969. While some 
members of the Party and government leadership sought to restrict the impact 
of the radical line on China’s universities and colleges, the closure of these 
institutions did not have immediate consequences for China’s political or 
economic environment. It was only after Mao’s death, when Chinese leaders 
like Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping began to place renewed emphasis on 
economic and technological development that significant measures were 
taken to ameliorate the radical line in education, highlighting that education 
was largely seen as a support for a greater good.
In foreign policy, as China’s relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated 
through 1969, China’s senior leadership were made aware of the threat of war 
and moved to end policy conflict in the foreign affairs system. By the end of 
1969, they had established a moderate line which sought to consolidate 
China’s international position by moving to establish relations with the United 
States. It seems that the importance of this line and the consequences of 
failure (the possibility of war) were such that the senior leadership in the form of 
Mao and Zhou and a small number of other officials sought to retain the 
decision-making authority in their own hands and thus control policy conflict.
Agenda setting bv the senior leadership
An important point in examining the way in which the senior leadership 
assessed the degree of risk is the role of Mao and to what extent he dominated 
this process. Was Mao the key individual making such an assessment as 
suggested by the “Mao-in-command" and “Mao-as-arbiter” models? To what 
extent were other members of the senior leadership involved in the 
assessment.
As noted above, this thesis sees Mao as being the leading figure in Chinese
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politics from 1969 until his death in 1976, but does not accept that he was able 
to dominate his colleagues to the degree suggested by authors such as 
Frederick Teiwes. Mao Zedong’s role in the assessment of risk was often 
pivotal, as befitted the Chairman of the Party, but it varied across issue areas 
and through time. This variation is not captured in the “Mao-in-command” and 
“Mao-as-arbiter” models. One important point which arises from this thesis is 
the ambivalence in Mao’s own thinking, which sought to both protect the 
“successes” of the mobilizational phase and promote economic growth. This 
gave scope for both “radicals” and “moderates” to promote their own views. As 
the review of literature showed, at times Mao often appears to have sought to 
balance the competing sides however, at other times, Mao’s influence appears 
decisive in granting access to either one side or another. However it is also 
important to note that he did not always play a decisive role and sometimes 
took a back seat in the policy-making process which allowed other individual or 
groups of actors to play the leading role.
Together with Mao, Zhou Enlai was influential in the assessment of risk in 
each of the three issue areas examined in this thesis. Zhou’s own stature and 
his position as head of the State Council meant he remained an important 
figure at the heart of the decision-making process. Zhou generally appears to 
have sought to moderate or prevent the introduction of radical policies, which 
sometimes set him in, generally non-confrontational, opposition to Mao.
Other senior leaders who can be identified as having some input into the 
process of risk assessment are Deng Xiaoping, Wan Li, Ye Jianying, Lin Biao, 
Hua Guofeng and members of the radical Left. Their input was not consistent 
during the period to Mao’s death, although after 1976, the influence of figures 
like Deng, Ye, Wan and Hua naturally grew. Membership of leading decision­
making and administrative bodies and previous experience in policy-making in 
a given issue area have been identified as significant for the way in which other 
individual or groups of actors participated in the decision-making process,
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however the ambivalence in Mao’s thinking noted above could also leave 
space for greater participation by other actors.
Groups such as the radical Left, the moderates, and the Cultural Revolution 
beneficiaries around Hua Guofeng appear to have identified a set of costs and 
benefits regarding the possible radicalization of policy in any given issue area, 
which fed into the assessment of risk and the wider conflict over policy. In 
agriculture, the famine engendered by the failure of the Great Leap Forward 
was fresh in many people’s minds and may have under-pinned the broad 
consensus on protecting agriculture that was apparent during the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. However, while the importance 
of agriculture for providing food and the raw materials for industry was 
accepted, the way to promote production was debated by each of the three 
groups.
The radical Left did not outline detailed agricultural policies, rather their main 
concern appears to have been with the political situation in China’s 
countryside, although this was implicitly linked to production. The main danger 
they identified was the decline in collective agriculture and the continued 
presence of the “small-producer” mentality which had resulted from the 
implementation of a moderate line in agriculture following the collapse of the 
Great Leap Forward. To this end they placed a strong emphsis on on-going 
political education in rural areas and advocated raising the level of 
collectivization, in contrast to the position outlined in the moderate “60 Articles", 
adopted in 1962 and which continued to form the basis of agricultual policy 
throughout the Cultural Revolution17.
Moderates opposed this line, fearing that the move to higher levels of 
collectivization, and the tendency towards egalitarianism this implied, together 
with the emphasis on political incentives, severely damaged peasant
17 “Regulations on the Work in the Rural People’s Communes (Revised Draft)" Issues and 
Studies, Vol.XV, No. 10, (October 1979).
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enthusiasm, with concomitant results for production output. They argued that 
the best way to increase production was by boosting peasant enthusiasm by 
increasing material rewards and increasing their influence by lowering the 
level of ownership and accounting to the production team level, the smallest 
unit of the Commune system.
The group of Cultural Revolution beneficiaries under Hua Guofeng outlined 
a clear alternative in agricultural policy which recognized the need to boost 
peasant incentives by incresaing material rewards but was also critical of 
capitalist tendencies in the countryside and emphasized raising the level of 
collectivziation. This group advocated raising the level of collectivization as a 
means of facilitating the mechanization of agriculture and the establishment of 
rural industries which would boost peasant incomes. Although they identified 
the threat of a “capitalist restoration” in the countryside, the main way to 
overcome this problem was to demonstrate the superiority of the collective in 
providing better incomes, rather than through increased political education.
In higher education, the radical Left identified the threat of universities and 
colleges becoming elite institutions, dominated by the interests of “bourgeois 
academics” and isolated from the realities of China’s factories and farms. Entry 
procedures, teaching material and the length of courses meant that universities 
no longer served the interests of workers and peasants, the “red" classes, who 
had been largely excluded from the higher education system. Reforms to the 
higher education system such as introducing a system of recommendation for 
potential university candidates, shortening courses, and reforming teaching 
material were intended to break the monopoly of the bourgeois academics, 
open universities for the working and peasant classes and align higher 
education more closely with the pressing needs of production.
Moderates saw these reforms as a threat to the quality of graduates 
produced by Chinese universities with potentially serious implications for 
China’s reforms. This threat became especially pressing when, under first Hua
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Guofeng, and then Deng Xiaoping, China emphasized the importance of 
science and technology and opening up to the outside world as part of the 
reform program. For moderates, the urgency of the reforms meant that 
resources should be focused in a number of key-point schools who would take 
the best students, judged on the basis of a national entrance exam. Only in this 
way could China hope to catch up with the outside world.
The Cultural Revolution beneficiaris around Hua Guofeng did not elaborate 
detailed higher education policies of their own. They appear to have favoured 
retaining elements of the reformed entry procedures which had dramatically 
increased the percentage of workers and peasants attending university, but the 
requirements of Hua Guofeng’s ambitious economic reform program appears 
to have led this group to accept the moderates policies.
In foreign policy the clearly identified threat of a Soviet invasion appears to 
have led to less open policy differences amongst the three groups who, at least 
in public, aligned behind the policy of rapprochement with the US. It is clear 
that some members of the radical Left did feel a sense of apprehension at 
aligning with an ideological enemy, but any conflict over foreign policy was 
largely isolated to debate over the extent to which China should rely on its own 
economy or engage in more international trade.
Membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies
While this thesis suggests that the assessment of risk by the leadership was 
the leading variable effecting the extent to which policy-making was allowed to 
become radicalized, it is apparent that membership of leading decision-making 
and administrative bodies and previous experience in policy-making in a given 
area were intervening factors in the policy-outcomes in each of the three issue 
areas.
The mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had destroyed many of 
the organizational norms of the Party and government structure and had led to
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the closure, or sidelining, of many government and Party organs. New ad hoc 
bodies like the Cultural Revolution Small Group and the Science and 
Education Group were established outside of the usual channels of control to 
replace the functions of ministries which had been closed or ceased to function 
on an effective basis.
The assessment of risk by the senior leadership was a significant factor in 
the formation of these new bodies and sometimes influenced the promotions 
and appointments to these bodies and subsequent promotions to the reformed 
ministries. Where the senior leadership were most aware of the 
consequences of failure, (such as in foreign policy) control over the decision­
making process was apparently retained at the highest level. In appointing 
four PLA marshals to look at China’s strategic position in 1969, it seems that 
Mao and Zhou deliberately excluded Lin Biao and individuals associated with 
the radical Left.
In agriculture too, where there appears to have been a general awareness 
of the high cost of failure, control over the decision-making process was 
concentrated in the hands of senior leaders, although here there appears to 
have been greater room for policy conflict and the main influence over policy 
passed through the hands of a number of different individuals. The State 
Council and the various ministries associated with agriculture also played a 
significant role. However in education, where the consequences of failure 
were not seen as serious, an ad hoc body, the Science and Education Group 
(SEG) was established which oversaw most of the decision-making process in 
higher education until it was disbanded in 1975.
Although the assessment of risk on the part of the leadership was an 
important factor in carrying out new appointments, once this redistribution of 
power had taken place in the late-1960s and early-1970s, membership of 
these bodies did give individual and groups of actors some ability to resist the 
will of Mao and other senior leaders like Zhou Enlai and were another way in
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which alternative views on the assessment of risk, in line with those outlined 
above, could enter into the policy-debate. A leading example is the radical 
Left’s domination of the SEG which strengthened their ability to resist Zhou 
Enlai and Zhou Rongxin’s efforts to introduce moderate reforms in higher 
education.
The importance of membership of these bodies implies that policy-making in 
the PRC during this period was more of a mixture of formal and informal 
structures than the current literature would suggest. The general picture of the 
political system in China during the Cultural Revolution is one of conflict 
between informally based groups. Without completely overturning this view, 
this research suggests that following the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-68) formal organs began to be an important means of 
mobilizing support for policy positions. These organs could act as the formal 
structures around which informal factional conflict was waged, with competing 
groups each seeking to place their “men” into leading positions on the key 
decision-making bodies.
Positions within administrative bodies were also important and it is 
significant here that the State Council continued to function throughout this 
period. Under Zhou Enlai, the State Council appears to have been able to 
dilute some of the influence of the radicals in both higher education and 
agriculture, however, as a non-decision making body, the State Council did not 
have the authority to overturn radical initiatives.
As China re-established Party and government organizational norms in the 
wake of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, organs such as the 
Politburo and the Secretariat began to function again. Ministries also began to 
function more effectively and often had a lot of input into policy-making. It is 
noticeable that the promotion of several members of the radical Left to the 
Politburo at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 led to renewed conflict over 
policy in higher education and agriculture, suggesting an increased influence
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within the policy-making process as a result of their promotions. Elsewhere 
the gradual promotion of supporters of Deng Xiaoping to the Politburo in the 
post-Mao period was effective in sidelining Hua Guofeng.
The importance of previous experience
In addition to membership of leading decision-making and administrative 
bodies, previous experience of policy-making in each of the three issue areas 
emerges as an important intervening variable. Here previous experience can 
refer both to the pre-Cultural Revolution period and, in the case of actors like 
Hua Guofeng, to experience gained during in the Cultural Revolution itself. It is 
clear that the radical Left had little experience in agricultural policy before the 
Cultural Revolution and this weakness continued through the period to 1976, 
restricting their influence over agricultural policy-making. Another clear 
example is that of Hua Guofeng. Hua sought to continue the policies of the 
Cultural Revolution in both foreign policy and higher education, areas where 
he had limited experience, but in agriculture, a field he had worked in since 
1971, he attempted to introduce radical reforms.
Experience in a particular field or decision-making body is probably 
significant as it allowed an individual to develop a network of personal ties in 
that system, or xitong, that can help develop and build support for new 
initiatives and policy positions at a later date. This informal relationship 
balances the role of formal position noted above in influencing policy 
outcomes, suggesting that both factors were significant.
In attempting to outline the compartmentalization of policy-making I have 
identified three factors that help to explain the variations in the decision-making 
process highlighted by this research. The main variable is the question of an 
assessment of risk by China’s senior leaders. I have identified Mao as the most 
important individual in making this assessment, however this is not the same as
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the traditional “Mao-in-command” and “Mao-as-arbiter” models. While Mao 
could dictate this process, other senior leaders were consistently involved. 
Furthermore, the ambivalence in Mao's own thinking appears to have left room 
for both radical and moderate figures to promote their own policy positions.
I have also identified two intervening variables that explain the variations 
across the three issue areas. The first of these, membership of leading 
decision-making and administrative bodies was in part linked to the 
assessment of risk. However, once bestowed, membership of these bodies 
could give an individual the additional stature to challenge senior leaders like 
Mao, Zhou and Deng. The importance of formal position suggests that models 
of politics during the Cultural Revolution which only emphasize informal power 
structures such as factional ties, present a one-sided picture. This thesis 
suggests that formal structures were more significant than previously assumed, 
although it recognizes that these were often an alternative means of waging 
factional struggle rather than an independent power structure of their own.
The second variable identified, the importance of previous experience, 
underlines the on-going importance of informal ties. This thesis suggests that 
previous experience allowed an individual to build up connections within a 
particular system, or xitong, which helped with policy innovations and 
implementation at a later date.
Together, these variables suggest that policy-making during the period 1969- 
78 did not automatically follow the top-down pattern of the” Mao-in-command" 
model. The decision-making process appears to have been much more of an 
interactive process than has previously been thought with some individuals 
“capturing” parts of the policy-making process in a way which varied across the 
three issue areas, but which gave them an input into the decision-making 
process in that area and which mediated the role of senior leaders like Mao 
and Zhou.
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Sources
Any study of efite politics in China is hampered by problems with sources.
As I noted in the introduction, the Chinese decision-making process has 
remained largely closed to outside observers and there are few accounts of the 
events studied in this thesis by the participants themselves. Nor is there an 
open account of proceedings o f meetings as there might be for a similar study, 
of policy-making in the US or the UK.
Problems with sources on the Chinese decision-making process have 
included: 1) A scarcity of information. Early studies were hampered by the 
availability of material and were limited to media sources such as the Renmin 
ribao and radio broadcasts picked up outside of China which effected the 
conclusions they were able to draw. 2) Editing to reflect the correct political 
line. This is evident in later accounts of the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, but 
speeches are frequently edited, both before publication and later. Given the 
on-going sensitivity of the Cultural Revolution for China’s leaders today, it is 
important to remain aware of this problem even with more recent material. 3) 
Accuracy. There is a general problem with the veracity of Chinese statistics 
and information. 4) Attribution. Many speeches were not written by the 
individual who delivered them. This leads to problems of attribution and 
whether the speech accurately reflect the views of that individual. 5y; Irregular 
coverage. Not all speeches from a particular meeting, or in a particular policy 
debate are available, which in the past has led to one-sided interpretations of 
particular events or decisions.
This study utilizes a wide-variety of sources and seeks to take advantage o f ' 
the large volume of recently published material on this period in order to over­
come these problems. Sources used include a number of newspapers as well
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as more recent collections of selected works18 and policy documents19, 
biographies20, and volumes of reminiscences.21
Official newspapers such as the Renmin ribao and the Guangming ribao 
and journals such as Hong qi have traditionally formed the backbone of most 
studies of Chinese politics. Caution is required in using these sourcs which 
generally reflect the official line of that time with little or no indication of the 
policy-debate that formed the background to the announcements they carry. 
There are also major problems with attribution regarding the speeches and 
articles they carry. (For example, this problem is evident with most of Lin Biao’s 
speeches and Zhou Enlai’s speech to the 10th Party Congress carried in the 
Renmin ribao). This can lead to major problems in continuity and attribution in 
the reporting contained in these sources.
Despite these problems newspapers and journals contain key editorials and 
articles which with detailed textual analysis provide important insights into the 
views of senior Party and government figures. Editorials and leading articles 
were an important way of putting over views on policy and as such can be used 
to determine the policy positions of individual and groups of actors. (The series 
of articles by Guo Dajiang on Dazhai and agriculture and the column “How 
Should We Manage a Socialist University” are leading examples used in this 
thesis).22 Newspapers are also an important source of basic factual information 
on meetings, conferences, overseas visits etc.
10 See, for example, Wan Li wenxuan, {Wm  Li's-Setected Works), Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1995, Ye Jianying xuanji, (Selected Works of Ye Jianying), Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1996, and Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, (Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao 
Zedong), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1994.
19 See, for example, Jianguo yilai nongye hezuo sbifiao huibian, \An anthology of hvstorvcal 
material on agricultural collectivization since the founding of the PRC), Beijing: 1992.
20 See, for example, Chen Yizhuan, (Biography of Chen Yi), Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo 
chubanshe, 1991, and Yang Quan, Chen Yongguizhuan, (Biography of Chen Yonggui), 
Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi chubanshe, 1996.
21 See, for example, Fan Shuo, Ye Jianying zai 1976, (Ye Jianying in 1976), Beijing: 
Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995, Zhang Hanzhi, Wo yu Qiao Guanhua, (Qiao Guanhua 
and t), Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1994, and Deng Zhirong (ed.), Deng Xiaoping 
waijiao, (The Foreign Policy of Deng Xiaoping), Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1996.
22 See Chapter Four on agriculture and Chapter Three on higher education for a detailed 
discussion of the articles contained in these columns.
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Because of their general value, newspapers are an important source for all 
of the chapters of this thesis, providing factual information, editorials, policy 
documents and speeches in all three of the issue areas studied and for 
Chapter Two on political developments during this period. In addition, the 
column “How Shoud We Manage a Socialist University” is of particular value 
for the chapter on higher education and the series of articles by Guo Dajiang 
are an important element of my analysis of agricultural policy in Chapter Four.
Selected works and collections of speeches are an important source of 
primary material and this study has benefitted from the publication of a number 
of new collections (see footnote 17 above). Like official newspapers, those 
volumes published in China have suffered from editing to reflect the official line 
of that time. Obvious gaps, such as Mao’s official Selected Works ending 
before the Cultural Revoltion have to some extent been overcome with the 
publication of unofficial Red Guard volumes and works overseas, however 
problems with selection remain, often dictated by political requirements. This 
has meant that there are only limited numbers of speeches available for 
leading individuals like Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and other members of the 
Gang of Four. In addition, many speeches have been excluded from those 
collections that have been published, for example Deng Xiaoping’s speech at 
the First Dazahi Conference, As noted above, questions regarding Jhe 
attribution of some of the speeches need to be considered.
Despite the above, volumes of selected works do provide a number of key 
texts, a leading example here is the publication of Wan Li’s Selected Works 
which has shed new light on the debate on agricultural policy in the post-Mao 
period. The publication of collections of speeches by Wan Li and other Cultural 
Revolution survivors such as Ye Jianying has served to highlight the 
differences of opinion within the policy-making process and overcome the one­
sidedness that was apparent when only Mao’s Selected Works and those of 
other members of the radical Left were available. New specialist volumes such
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as the Selected Foreign Policy Works of Mao Zedong and Comrade Deng 
Xiaoping on Education23 offer greater insights into the continuity of thinking of 
individual leaders on specific issues.
Volumes such as the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping and the Selected 
Works of Ye Jianying contain texts that are important for each of the three issue 
areas and are utilized throughout this thesis. However the specialist volumes, 
such as those noted above are of importance for one particular area. This is 
also the case for Wan Li’s Selected Works which is mainly of interest for the 
study of agriculture.
Policy documents share many of the problems of collections of selected 
works, however as statements of policy they are less likely to suffer form 
subsequent editing to reflect political line, rather, a new policy document is 
issued. The main problem remains availability with very irregular coverage, 
making it difficult to follow the evolution of policy through time.
This thesis uses all the traditional sources of policy documents, including 
newspapers and journals, as well as volumes such as An Anthology of 
Historical material on Agricultural Collectivization Since the Founding of the 
PRC 24 and Peter Seybolt’s Revolutionary Education in China Documents and 
Commentary.25 As with the collections of selected works, sources of policy 
documents such as newspapers are of value for all three issue areas while 
collections like those noted above are used in individual chapters.
The expansion in the number of biographies of leading individuals involved 
in this period is one of the most noticeable developments in the study of 
Chinese politics in recent years and this thesis utilizes biographies including 
Ye Yonglie’s impressive series on the Gang of Four and Chen Boda as well as 
Yang Quan’s biography on Chen Yonggui and the recent bigoraphies of
23 Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu (Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education), (Beijing: 
Renmin Chubanshe, 1990).
24 See footnote 18 above.
25 Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China Documents and Commentary, (White 
Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc. 1973).
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China’s marshals to help draw new conclusions regarding policy-making 
during the period 1969-78.26
In utilizing these new volumes it is important to note that problems of 
sources exist for Chinese writers almost as much as they do for western 
authors. When writing about the Cultural Revolution issus of the correct line 
also exist, although Ye Yonglie’s biographies do attempt a neutral analysis of 
the Gang of Four. In addition it is important to be aware of any attempt to 
portary the subject in the best light. A peculiarly Chinese problem is the 
tendency to avoid writing biographies of the living, so important figures like 
Hua Guofeng are not covered in detail.
Despite these problems authors such as Ye Yonglie are widely respected 
for their academic approach and much of the content of these volumes can be 
confirmed by cross-referencing with other sources. Biographies provide 
valuable insights into the activities behind the formal policy-making process 
which contrast to official sources such as newspapers, selected works and 
policy documents. Good examples in this thesis are the insights into the way 
in whch Mao and Zhou employed the four side-lined military leaders to 
oversee a change in foreign policy, and Deng’s position in the run-up to the 
First Dazhai Conference revealed in some of the new biographies.
Specific biographies are utilized in different issue areas: Yang Quan’s 
biography of Chen Yonggui is used in the chapter on agriculture and the 
biographies of the four marshals are used in the chapter on foreign policy. Ye 
Yonglie’s biographies of the Gang of Four and Chen Boda are mainly used in 
Chapter Two but also offer valuable insights for each of the individual issue 
areas.
Volumes of reminiscences share all of the main problems of biographies,
26 See, for example, Ye Yonglie, Jiang Qing zhuan, {Biography of Jiang Qing), Beijing: 
meitan gongye chubanshe, 1993; Yang Quan, Chen Yonggui zhuan, ( Biography of Chen 
Yonggui), Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi chubanshe, 1996; and Chen Yizhuan {Biography of 
Chen Yi), Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991.
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however, as these volumes were authored by individuals involved in the 
politics of the period, they can provide some of the most important insights.
The value of these volumes has been demonstrated by Sun and Teiwes’ use 
of Zhang Yunsheng’s study of Lin Biao to provide a radical reinterpretation of 
Lin’s involvement in decision-making during the Cultural Revolution.27 
Similarly Wang Dongxing’s account of his journey with Mao at the height of the 
Lin Biao affair also sheds new light on this period.28 This thesis uses this type 
of volume to provide general background into some of the major events of this 
period, while specific volumes such as Qiao Guanhua and I and The Foreign 
Policy of Deng Xiaoping are used in individual chapters, here foreign policy.29
By using as wide a selection of sources as possible I hope to overcome 
some of the difficulties noted above. While useful sources of information, 
newspapers, selected works, and policy documents provide authorized 
accounts of events which in the past have tended to lead to a one-dimensional 
portrayal of the decision-making process which often erased signs of dissent. 
However newly published material means that a wider spectrum of views on 
key issues is available leading to much more diverse picture where policy- 
conflict is often at the heart of the decision-making process. New sources such 
as some of the newly published volumes of selected works are significant here 
as they broaden the spectrum of views available for detailed study.
Biographies and volumes of reminiscences offer important insights into the 
background of key decisions which are not discussed in official sources like 
newspapers and journals. While information contained in these volumes
27 Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu, (True Account of Maojiawan: 
Reminiscences of Lin Biao’s Secretary), Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1998. Zhang was Lin 
Biao’s secretary during this time. His account portrays Lin Biao as isolated from the rest of the 
central leadership and demonstrating little interest in major policy issues. See Frederick C.
Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao Riding the Tiger During the Cultural 
Revolution 1966-1971, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996.
26 Wang Dongxing, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng (The Struggle 
Between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao’s Counter-revolutionary Clique), Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo 
chubanshe, 1998.
29 See footnote 20 above.
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needs to be treated with some caution, many of the details can be checked 
against other sources. These volumes can also help with problems of 
attribution, such as the detail surrounding the drafting of Zhou Enlai’s speech 
to the 10th National Party Conference contained in Ye Yonglie’s biography of 
Chen Boda.
Without interviews of key participants or auto-biographies it is clear that we 
cannot come to a perfect understanding of the background to the decision­
making process in China during this period, however by utilizing as wide a 
variety of sources a possible I believe that this study can offer significant new 
insights into the Chinese policy-making process.
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Chapter Two: Political Developments in the PRC, 1969- 
1978
1. Introduction
The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two clear phases: First the 
mobilization phase from mid-1966 to the end of 1968. This period was marked 
by the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, with the mobilization of the 
Red Guards, seizures of power across the country and fighting that bordered on 
civil war in some areas of China. The second phase, from 1969 to the death of 
Mao in October 1976, was marked by attempts to reconstruct Party and 
government organizations destroyed during the mobilization phase and to re­
establish order across China and reform China’s economy.
As outlined in the Introduction, this thesis concentrates on the period from 
1969 to 1978. This includes the reconstruction phase of the Cultural 
Revolution and the early post-Mao period from 1976 to 1978. Although by 
1969 the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution had ended, and the Red 
Guard movement had been disbanded, purges of Party and government 
officials continued. The 1969-78 period was characterized by an on-going 
tension between the issue of ideological purity and the need to mobilize 
China’s population for economic development. This tension was expressed in 
a series of intense policy debates within China’s senior leadership, some of 
which form the basis of the subsequent chapters on higher education, 
agriculture, and foreign policy. This chapter sets out the wider domestic and 
international developments which formed the backdrop to these policy debates.
This chapter is divided into five parts: First, the impact of the Cultural 
Revolution up to the 9th Party Congress in April 1969; Second, the period from 
the 9th Party Congress to the death of Lin Biao in September 1971; Third, the 
period from September 1971 to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973;
37
Fourth, from the 10th Party Congress to the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest 
of the Gang of Four in autumn 1976; and Fifth, from late-1976 to the Third 
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978.
2. The Impact of the Cultural Revolution in the PRC up to the 9th Party 
Congress
By April 1969 the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution was over.
The end of this phase of the Cultural Revolution is in effect marked by the 9th 
Party Congress, held from 1-24 April, 1969. The Congress maked an attempt 
by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to reassert its national leadership and 
return to normal working practices. Despite this, the 9th Party Congress 
revealed the devastation of the Cultural Revolution: Local Party organs, who 
normally elected delegates to the National Congress, had been so weakened 
by the Cultural Revolution that the usual selection procedure was abandoned 
in the majority of provinces. Most candidates were simply selected by the 
Provincial leaderships dominated by the PLA.
a). The impact on Party and government organs
As a result of attacks on provincial and municipal Party leaders, the civilian 
Party system had largely collapsed during the Cultural Revolution. Even where 
Party leaders had been successful in resisting Leftist organizations, they were 
frequently removed from office during February and March 1967 when regional 
military forces took over much of the responsibility for provincial matters. In 
many areas the Party stopped work altogether.
At the Centre the Party’s main decision-making bodies had also ceased to 
function effectively. The Cultural Revolution Small Group replaced the 
Politburo and the Secretariat as the main locus of decision-making (the latter 
was disbanded during the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution).
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Formally established on 28 May, 1966, the Cultural Revolution Small Group 
(CRSG) initially had eighteen members and was headed by Chen Boda. Other 
members included Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Li,
Guan Feng and Tao Zhu. At first, the group had acted as a ‘secretarial’ body, 
gathering documents and issuing directives, but through the course of the 
Cultural Revolution its influence had grown. With the purge of leading cadres 
from the Secretariat and Politburo, and as more and more senior cadres were 
side-lined, the work of these two leading bodies became paralysed. The 
CRSG largely took-over the powers of these two bodies and became the 
leading political body up to April 1969.
Government departments and ministries were similarly effected. For 
example, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, senior Chinese diplomats were 
recalled and junior officials left overseas often proselytized in the name of Mao. 
By the end of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution China’s circle 
of foreign friends was limited to Albania, Pakistan and a handful of African 
countries. At home the day-to-day work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
was hampered by power struggles between the radical Left and senior 
government and Party officials like Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, the Minister in 
charge of the MFA. The day-to-day management of foreign affairs work 
reached a low-point with the storming of the British Embassy in Beijing on 22 
August, 1967.
The collapse of the Party and government structures meant that the PLA was 
the only national organisation which had retained a coherent organisation and 
as a consequence it came to play a leading role in domestic politics. By April 
1969 the PLA dominated the provincial leadership. According to Jurgen 
Domes some 51 percent of the Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen and members of the 
Standing Committees of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees established 
during the ‘seizure of power’ were from the PLA. The PLA also sent ‘military 
representatives’ into virtually all sectors of society Usually PLA officers or
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political commissars, these representatives took on leadership roles in 
universities, factories, schools, agricultural units, communes, newspapers, 
radio stations and cultural units. 1
b). Effects on senior Party and government personnel
The Cultural Revolution had a devastating effect on the membership of Party 
and government organs. According to Domes only thirty-four of the ninety-two 
members of the 8th Central Committee were re-elected to the new 9th Central 
Committee. In all there were one hundred and thirty-six new entrants to this 
Central Committee. At the Politburo level there were fifteen new members out 
of a total of twenty-five. Either through being purged, or merely being side-lined 
from day-to-day work, many senior members of the Party and government had 
been forced out of office.
The main early targets of the radical Left were the Beijing Municipal Party 
Committee, the Secretariat, the original Cultural Revolution Small Group and 
the Propaganda Department of the CCP. Wu Han, author of the play Hai Rui 
ba guari, (Hai Rui petitions the Emperor) and one of the original targets of the 
radical Left, was also a Vice-Mayor of Beijing. By attacking Wu Han, the radical 
Left were indirectly attacking the Beijing Party Committee under Peng Zhen. 
Beijing was one of a number of areas that had been slow to publish Yao 
Wenyuan’s article criticizing Wu Han’s play, but the Beijing Party Committee 
was singled out for criticism by Mao Zedong during an expanded Poliburo 
meeting, held in Hangzhou in eastern China’s Zhejiang Province on 16 April 
1966. From this time on Beijing’s First Party Secretary Peng Zhen was forced 
to stop work.
As the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution continued, other senior 
leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Chen Yi, 
Ye Jianying and Tao Zhu were attacked or sidelined. Writing in 1970 Donald
1 JQrgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution Politics Between Two Party 
Congresses (Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 1975), pg.53.
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Klein notes that roughly half of China’s Ministers and Vice-Ministers were out of 
the press between spring-1966 and 1968, suggesting they had come under 
attack.2
c). Effects on Industry and agriculture
The effects of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution on industry 
and agriculture were mixed. The central leadership had passed a series of 
resolutions which sought to reduce the impact of the Cultural Revolution on 
production units, but these were not always effective. The '‘Resolution on the 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, passed at the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central 
Committee, clearly stated that maintaining production was as important as 
conducting the Cultural Revolution. On 14 September, 1966 the Central 
Committee passed the “Regulations [on conducting] the Cultural Revolution in 
Rural Areas Below the County Level". These regulations stated that students 
and Red Guards from Beijing or other areas could not go to communes and 
production brigades below the county level. They also restricted cadres and 
commune members from these levels from leaving their units to travel to the 
capital or other areas. During the autumn harvest, communes and brigades 
were to focus their efforts on harvest work and could temporarily suspend other, 
political, activities.3 Under the slogan of “grasp the revolution, promote 
production” the centre urged production units to continue normal work. On 2 
September, 1966 the Central Committee and State Council issued a directive 
instructing work units in the railway system to participate in the revolution in a 
staggered fashion in order to maintain order. The directive called the railway 
system the “lifeblood of the national economy”.4 However on 31 October 1966 
the Central Committe and the State Council issued an “Emergency Directive on
2 Donald Klein “The State Council and the Cultural Revolution”, in John Wilson Lewis (ed.), 
Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1978), pg.355.
3 Chen Mingxian, Xin Zhongguo sishi wu nian yanjiu, (Research on the 45 years of new 
China), (Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1994), pg 258.
4 Ibid, pg.258
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Maintaining Order in Railway Transport", indicating a deterioration in the 
situation.
In 1967, the combined value of industrial and agricultural output fell by 9.6 
percent. Disruption in factories, breaks in transport links and general unrest 
were the main reasons for the drop in value, although there was a slight growth 
in agricultural output value, showing that rural areas were less effected. The 
decline continued in 1968, with the total output value of agriculture and industry 
falling by 4.2 percent, of this industrial output value fell by 5 percent and 
agricultural output value by 2.5 percent.
The two consecutive drops in output value caused concern amongst the 
central leadership, and by 1969 they had taken a number of measures to 
improve the situation. I will look at the measures taken to improve agricultural 
output in more detail in the subsequent chapter, however in 1969 the 
production value of industry and agriculture rose by 23.8 percent, due mostly to 
a 34.3 percent rise in the value of industrial output, agricultural output value 
only rose by 1.1 percent.
3. From the Ninth Party Congress to the Downfall of Lin Biao
The events from the Ninth National Party Congress of the CCP, held in April 
1969, to the death of Lin Biao in a plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971 
are still shrouded in considerable mystery, and subject to numerous 
interpretations. Conventionally, and largely in line with the official Chinese 
interpretation, Lin Biao is portrayed by most western writers as having used his 
new position as Mao’s chosen successor to build a powerful clique from 
amongst his supporters within the military. Lin then challenged Mao Zedong, 
the radical Left and Zhou Enlai, both over issues of policy and re-establishing 
the position of State Chairman. He is also accused of attempting to prolong the 
military domination of Chinese politics. Following a number of policy reversals
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(notably over Chinese policy towards the United States), and public criticism of 
some of his closest supporters following the second plenum of the 9th Central 
Committee, Lin Biao is then said to have plotted a coup to overthrow Mao and 
seize power. Following the failure of these efforts, Lin then attempted to flee to 
the Soviet Union.5
It is only more recently with the emergence of personal accounts of events by 
people such as Zhang Yunsheng that this view has been challenged, most 
notably by Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, who claim that Lin was 
essentially passive, subject to clever manipulation by his wife and family, and 
that there is no evidence of a “Bonapartist” challenge to Mao.6
While I do not accept the argument that Lin was a bystander to most of the 
events of this period, my analysis does question the extent of Lin Biao’s direct 
opposition to Mao Zedong, and in particular the extent to which he resisted a 
de-militarization of Chinese politics. The extent of his participation in any 
planning for a coup is also unclear. This section will examine events from the 
Ninth National Party Congress in April 1969 to the death of Lin Biao in 
September 1971, focusing in particular on efforts to rebuild the Party structure 
and the activities of Lin Biao’s supporters in the two years following the 
Congress. I will also assess the various interpretations placed on these 
actions and to what extent the claims against Lin Biao are correct.
5 Works that adopt this approach include: Roderick MacFarquhar’s chapter in the Cambridge 
History of China (hereafter CHOC), “The succession to Mao and the end of Maoism”, in Volume 
15, CHOC, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and 
Fall of Lin Biao, New York: Penguin Books, 1976); and Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, ‘ Wenhua 
dageming' shinianshi 1966-1976 , (History of the ‘Cultural Revolution' Decade 1966-1976), 
(Hong Kong: Chaoliu chubanshe, 1989).
6 Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu, (True Account of Maojiawan: 
Reminiscences of Lin Biao's Secretry), (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988). Zhang was Lin 
Biao’s secretary during this time. His account portrays Lin Biao as isolated from the rest of the 
central leadership, and demonstrating little interest in major policy issues. See Frederick C. 
Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution 
1966-1971, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996).
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a). The Ninth Party Congress
The Ninth Party Congress was held in Beijing from 1-24 April, 1969. 1512 
delegates attended the meeting, most of them chosen by the military This 
reflected the on-going paralysis of Party organs outside of Beijing. Although 
the majority of the delegates to the Congress were military personnel, most 
came as representatives of civilian organizations, not the PLA. Although 
preliminary moves had been taken to rebuild Party organs outside of the 
capital, the extent to which Mao and the radicals were ready to re-establish 
Party control within the new power structure remained unclear as long as Mao 
continued to have doubts as to the loyalty of the Party’s membership.
Party re-construction touched on the on-going issue of finding successors to 
the revolution. “Three-in-one” revolutionary committees (made up of 
representatives from the military, the veteran cadres and the mass 
organizations) had been established in all provinces by the time of the Ninth 
Congress, but given the weakness of Party organizations, the issue of who 
would actually dominate these committees was less clear. The central Party 
did authorize the creation of provisional Party branches within the revolutionary 
committees. These new branches were expected to guide a “purification of the 
ranks", expelling those criticized during the Cultural Revolution and bringing in 
many of the activists who had proved themselves in the previous two years.7 
Party building was a key theme of the period immediately before and after the 
Ninth Congress, in particular the relative importance of the veteran cadres, with 
their administrative experience, continued to be debated. Despite the 
introduction of “new blood”, Mao clearly remained dissatisfied with the 
functioning of the revolutionary committees at the time of the Congress.
Lin’s work report to the Ninth Congress, entitled “On Preparations for the 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, focused extensively on the Cultural Revolution 
and criticism of Liu Shaoqi. Lin detailed the build-up to the Cultural Revolution
1 CHOC, Volume 15, pg.193.
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and devoted considerable time to praising Chairman Mao’s role in defeating 
Liu Shaoqi and his supporters. In the report Lin detailed some of Liu Shaoqi’s 
earlier errors as evidence of his capitalist line. Using quotes from Marx, Lenin 
and Mao, he developed the argument that a Communist Party must always be 
on the look out for those following the capitalist line, even within the Party. Lin 
concluded the first section of his report by saying that the Cultural Revolution 
was “absolutely essential and extremely timely”.8 Lin spoke at some length 
about Party building and rectification and stressed the importance of Party 
leadership for the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.
Elections for the new Central Committee, Politburo and other leadership 
organs took place at the 1st Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee, held 
immediately after the Congress. Official Chinese reports suggest these 
elections took place on the 28 April 1969. However Jurgen Domes suggests 
that elections for the new CCP took eleven to twelve days, indicating intense 
debate amongst the leadership about the composition of the new Committee.9
In his detailed analysis of the membership of the new Central Committee, 
Jurgen Domes notes two significant trends. First, was the rise in the number of 
representatives from the PLA. Of the 170 full members of the Ninth Central 
Committee, 85, or 5Q percent were from the PLA. (Roderick MacFarquhar, 
writing in the Cambridge History of China, suggests the figure is 45 percent10, 
while Philip Bridgham suggests only 40 percent11). The second trend was the 
increase in representation of cadres who worked in the provinces rather than at 
the centre, up from 30 percent at the 8th Central Committee to 58 percent. The 
biggest increase was the representation for regional military cadres, up from 
2.2 percent to 26.6 percent.12
6 "Work Report at the Ninth Congress of the CCP" in the Renmin ribao, 28 April, 1969.
9 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg 29.
10 CHOC, Volume 15, pp.306-307.
11 Philip Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Sieze Power”, in The China 
Quarterly (CQ), No. 41, January-March 1970, pg.16.
19 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg.36.
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The Ninth Congress is often portrayed as the springboard from which Lin 
Biao launched his bid for power. His election, together with that of many of his 
closest colleagues and his confirmation as Mao’s successor certainly 
suggested that Lin was growing in status. Writing in the Cambridge History of 
China, Roderick MacFarquhar describes the Ninth Plenum as “a triumph for Lin 
Piao individually and for the PLA institutionally”.13 However, both he and Harry 
Harding make little distinction betwen Lin Biao and military representation as a 
whole,14 and a more detailed analysis shows that Lin’s position was not as 
powerful as it first appeared.
Policy differences were later to emerge between Lin and some of the 
regional commanders, and senior military figures at the centre such as Ye 
Jianying owed little loyalty to Lin. Teiwes and Sun note that while Lin emerged 
from the Congress with his position enhanced, a number of veteran cadres 
were also rehabilitated and promoted.15 Both Bridgham and Sun and Teiwes 
suggest that as China moved towards reconstructing the political system there 
is evidence that Mao was increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the 
revolutionary committees, and in particular the military who dominated these 
bodies. There was continued controversy over the relative value of veteran 
cadres’ experience and the efforts to rejuvinate the Party with younger, but less 
experienced cadres. Overshadowing Party-building efforts was the role of the 
military who undertook most of the responsibility for this work. It is this role, 
and their presence in civilian institutions across China that appears to have led 
some authors to suggest that Lin Biao continued to resist the de-militarization of 
Chinese politics following the Ninth Congress, and that it was following the 
failure of this effort that he launched his abortive coup attempt.
Following the end of the Ninth Party Congress, work continued to re­
establish the Party system at lower levels. Starting in late-autumn 1970, the
13 CHOC, Volume 15, pg.306.
14 See Harry Harding’s analysis of the new Central Committee in CHOC, Volume 15, pg.198.
15 Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, pg.104.
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first provincial level Party Congress since the movement to seize power met in 
Hunan. It appointed a new Provincial Party Committee on 4 December. This 
process continued until the final Committees were formed in Sichuan, Ningxia, 
Tibet and Heilongjiang in August 1971. As the Party organs at lower levels 
were still in the process of being established, it is likely that delegates to the 
Committees were simply appointed by the Revolutionary Committees.
The PLA maintained its dominance of the new Provincial-level organs. Of a 
total of 158 members and alternate members of the secretariats of the new 
Provincial Party Committees, 98, or 62 percent came from the PLA.16 Six of the 
then ten Commanders of Military Regions became First Secretaries on the 
Party Committees, five Commanders of Provincial Military Districts became First 
Secretary and ten political commissars with PLA backgrounds were also 
appointed to the post of First Secretary. In all, twenty-one of China’s then 
twenty-nine major administrative units were headed by military personnel.17
The extent to which the military dominated the polity during this period is 
generally accepted by most writers, even Teiwes and Sun, who are sceptical as 
to whether there was any bid for power by Lin, agree that the military were in a 
very powerful position after the Ninth Congress.18 However, the significance of 
this domination is less clear. Teiwes and Sun see it merely as a process of 
necessity,19 in that there were no other forces available to Mao who could 
conduct this work. Roderick MacFarquhar suggests that Lin Biao and the PLA 
as a whole failed to accept Mao’s injunctions to rebuild the Party. However he 
offers little evidence to support this claim except their dominance of the new 
Party Committees.20 Domes and Philip Bridgham seem right when they argue 
that the PLA was essentially loyal, despite its dominant position.
The military were placed in a difficult position as they were expected to
16 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg.50
17 ibid, pg.50
18 Teiwes and Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, pg.128.
19 Ibid, pg.132.
20 CHOC, Volume 15, pg.313.
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balance the interests of the veteran cadres and the Cultural Revolution 
radicals. It is clear that during this period Mao vacillated in the significance he 
gave each side, twice being forced to reverse his decision to promote more 
radicals onto the revolutionary committees when disorder and attacks on 
veteran cadres followed.21 The military, particularly at the local level, appear to 
have favoured the stability and experience the veteran cadres represented.
This may be one origin of the idea that the military were somehow opposed to 
Mao, however in implementing the sometimes vague or contradictory directives 
on Party-building, there appears to be little evidence of any opposition to Mao, 
nor of a co-ordinated plot to resist Mao. If there was any resistance, it tended to 
be from the regional commanders who were seeking to ensure stability within 
their regions, and who had little connection with Lin Biao.
by To the Second Plenum of the 9th Party Congress
The Second Plenum of the 9th Party Congress was held at Lushan in 
Jiangxi Province from 23 August to 6 September, 1970. The Plenum saw an 
open split between Mao Zedong and some of Lin Biao’s supporters and clearly 
discredited Lin in the eyes of Mao. As attacks on Lin’s supporters continued he 
may have felt that it was increasingly unlikely that he would succeed Mao as 
Chairman of the Party. In the official Chinese line, and in many western 
studies, the failure of Lin’s supporters at Lushan led them to start planning for a 
military coup.
A number of Chinese and western accounts of Lin’s downfall focus on 
policy differences within the senior Chinese leadership and Lin’s bid to 
become State Chairman22. As part of this struggle, a number of studies address
21 See Philip Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Seize Power", in CQ, 
No. 41, pp. 1-25.
22 See Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, ‘Wenhua dageming’ shinianshi 1966-1976, (History of the 
'Cultural Revolution'decade 1966-1976), as well as Roderick MacFarquhar’s account in the 
Cambridge History of China, Volume 15 and Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao.
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Lin Biao’s alleged resistance to Sino-US rapprochement.23 The study by 
Jurgen Domes also suggests that Lin was personally associated with a radical 
agricultural policy based on the policies of the Great Leap Forward, and 
introduced in a speech he delivered on China's National Day 1 October,
1969.24 However the recent publication of Zhang Yunsheng’s memoirs have 
portrayed Lin Biao as showing little interest in policy matters and Teiwes and 
Sun have argued that there is little evidence of Lin ever advocating Leftist 
policies of his own.25
One area where Lin Biao does appear to have gone against the wishes of 
Chairman Mao was over the is$ue of the State Chairmanship. The official line 
is that in pressing for the re-establishment of this post, Lin Biao was seeking to 
have himself nominated, thus strengthening his position as Mao’s successor. 
This issue would dominate the second plenum at Lushan.
At a meeting in March 1970 Mao had proposed firstly that the centre should 
convene the Fourth National People’s Congress (NPC), and that secondly this 
meeting should revise the constitution and remove the position of State 
Chairman (this post had previously been held by Liu Shaoqi and had been 
vacant following his death). These proposals were discussed at a series of 
meetings through March and appear to have received general approval. Lin 
Biao, however, apparently continued to raise the issue of keeping the post of 
State Chairman. Right up to the eve of the second Plenum, Lin is reported to 
have proposed that the post be kept and that Mao Zedong be made State 
Chairman, but Mao continued to reject Lin’s proposals.26
Lin and his supporters were also pushing for the new constitution to include 
a phrase praising Mao as having ‘natural talent’, (tian cai) although Mao had 
already rejected a proposal that the work report to the Ninth Party Congress
23 Jaap van Ginneken in particular places emphasis on this issue.
24 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg.61.
25 Teiwes and Sun, Riding the Tiger, pg.116.
26 Chen Mingxian, (ed.), Research on the 45 Years of New China, pg.320.
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include this phrase.27
c). The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee
The agenda for this meeting had originally intended to discuss the revision 
of the Constitution, drawing up national economic plans and the question of 
“preparing for war” (in the face of the perceived Soviet threat). It is normal 
policy for Party Plenums to break up into regional groups following the main 
speeches to discuss them in detail. Lin’s supporters in the various regional 
groups appeared to be ready to demand a change in the agenda to discuss 
Lin’s own speech to the Plenum. Chen Boda also produced some pre­
prepared material at the regional meeting he attended. All this seems to 
indicate that this was a planned deviation from the agenda.
At the opening ceremony Lin Biao made a speech in which he discussed the 
question of “natural talent”, ignoring Mao’s rejection of the phrase. Lin praised 
Mao for having tian cai and said that anyone who did not agree with this point 
of view was going against the basic principles of Marxism. In the evening at a 
Politburo meeting which was discussing economic plans, Wu Faxuan, 
(Commander of the PLA Air Force) appears to have demanded that the whole 
Plenum discuss Lin’s speech, and that the agenda should be changed. Ye 
Qun, (Lin’s wife), passed Wu’s comments on to Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo , 
close military colleagues of Lin. She demanded that they raise the question of 
discussing Lin’s speech in their regional meetings. The next afternoon, Chen 
Boda, Ye Qun, Wu Faxuan, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo all called for their 
regional groups to study Lin’s speech. In the North China Group meeting Chen 
Boda called for the State Chairmanship to be re-established, and issued 
material on the question of “natural talent”. On the morning of the 25 August 
Chen’s speech was published and appears to have caused enough confusion
27 Ye Yonglie, Chen Boda zhuan, (A Biography of Chen Boda), (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 
1993), pp. 518-519. Right on the eve of the plenum Chen Boda is reported to have sent a 
colleague to a library in nearby Jiujiang to gather material.
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that the intended agenda was abandoned.
In the afternoon of the 25 August Mao called an enlarged meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo which resolved to recall copies of Chen’s 
speech and stop further discussion of Lin’s speech of the 23. On the 31 August 
Mao made an important speech of his own, later included in his Selected 
Works entitled “Some of My Opinions,” (Wo deyidian yijian.), which severely 
criticized Chen Boda and rejected the theory of “natural talent”. Mao also 
criticized the actions of Wu Faxuan, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo. At 
the closing ceremony Zhou Enlai announced that Chen Boda would undergo 
investigation for his activities.
While the activities of Lin Biao’s supporters certainly had the appearance of 
being an organized attempt to change the agenda for the plenum meeting, 
Teiwes and Sun have questioned whether this represented a direct attempt by 
Lin to be given the position of State Chairman. Teiwes and Sun quote Party 
historian Wang Nianyi as suggesting that it was Ye Qun who was responsible 
for promoting this issue,28 although they then contradict this statement by 
saying that in pushing the idea Lin and Chen Boda were only doing a job of 
“promoting Mao”.29 This seems one of the weaker arguements in what is 
otherwise an excellent study of these events. The challenge to Party norms 
that the activities of Lin’s supporters represented was considerable, indeed 
Lin’s own speech at the start of the plenum had not been cleared by Mao, as 
was usual, and as such represented an affront to the Chairman. If, as Teiwes 
and Sun suggest, Lin was essentially passive and sensitive to the concerns of 
Mao, it seems likely that he would have been reluctant to make such a 
provocative move. Chinese writers, sensitive to the niceties of Chinese politics 
make much of Lin’s bid30, however Lin’s move seems more in the line of a bid to
28 Teiwes and Sun, Riding the Tiger, pp. 135-136.
29 Ibid, pg.137.
30 See for example, Chen Mingxian’s Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shi, (History of the 
People’s Republic of China), (Beijing: Beijing ligong daxue chubanshe, 1993) pp.266-268.
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secure his own position as Mao’s successor at a difficult time, rather than a 
move to challenge the Chairman and the Central Committee.
Following the Second Plenum the Party launched a “movement to criticize 
Chen Boda" (Pi Chen Zhengfeng) and on the 16 November Mao’s speech 
“Some of My Opinions” was published. Following Mao’s instructions Zhou 
Enlai convened a meeting of the North China Conference which ordered the 
purge of Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan, (two close supporters of Lin) and at a 
meeting held on 29 April, Zhou Enlai also openly criticized Huang Yongzheng, 
Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo.
There appears to be sufficient evidence to prove that Lin’s son, Lin Liguo 
was involved in planning the overthrow of Mao Zedong to forestall the possible 
demotion of his father, however the extent of Lin Biao’s knowledge of their 
activities is unclear. Reports suggest that Lin, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo had begun 
to seriously discuss plans for a coup in February 1971.31 The planning is then 
said to have been left to Lin Liguo. On 18 March Lin Liguo and Yu Xinye 
travelled to Shanghai, where they met Li Weixin and Zhou Yuzhe. Between 22 
and 24 March these four young Air Force officers are alleged to have drawn up 
the so-called “Document 571” (in Chinese 571 is a homonym for “armed 
uprising”).
Mao himself appears to have been aware of at least some of this activity. On 
the 14 August he left Beijing and began a tour of southern provinces. In a 
series of talks with provincial civilian and military leaders Mao emphasized the 
need for unity and stressed that “the incident of the Second Plenum is not 
resolved yet". He openly criticized Lin Biao, saying that he should “shoulder 
some of the blame”.32 Mao’s behaviour during this tour, as revealed by Wang
31 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg 128.
32 See Wang Dongxing’s account of Mao’s meetings during his southern tour in Wang 
Dongxing, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng, (The Struggle Between 
Mao Zedong and Lin Biao's Counter-revolutionary Clique), (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo 
chubanshe,1998), pp.87-176. Wang Dongxing had formerly served as Mao’s bodyguard. He 
accompanied Mao on his tour as his secretary and personaly attended all of the meetings.
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Dongxing, shows that he was increasingly concerned not just with Lin Biao’s 
behaviour, but with the loyalty of the military itself and he castigated himself a 
number of times for not paying enough attention to military affairs in recent 
years.33
Mao’s comments during his tour were relayed to Lin’s family by Zhou Yuchi, 
Yu Xinye and Li Zuopeng and appeared to have caused alarm. When Mao’s 
train returned to Beijing safely on 21 September its arrival certainly caused a 
panic at Lin’s house in Beidaihe. Lin, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo and a number 
of their supporters boarded a Trident jet at Qinghuangdao airport and flew 
towards the Soviet Union. It is this flight that appears to be the most damning 
evidence against them, for such a dramatic step remains hard to explain unless 
they were fleeing from a serious situation. Having forced the plane to take off 
before fully refuelling, it then crashed in Mongolia, apparently having run out of 
fuel.
4. From the Death of Lin Biao to the Tenth Party Congress
In the wake of the fall of Lin Biao some 60 leading military officials were 
purged. The majority came from the two areas which had supported Lin Biao 
most closely, the central organs of the PLA, in particular the Air Force, and the 
4th Field Army (this was the Field Army Lin had commanded during the Civil 
War). However, although many military figures were purged, the PLA 
continued to maintain its strong influence within the Chinese political system.
In particular a number of regional military figures were promoted at the 
expense of Lin’s supporters. Ye Jianying became the new Minister of Defence 
and would play a leading role for the rest of the period under study.
In addition, Mao’s eventual successor, Hua Guofeng was promoted to the 
centre at around this time and appointed to lead the investigation into Lin
33 Ibid, pg 121
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Biao’s activities. This position demonstrates Mao’s trust in a figure who had 
previously been leader in Mao’s own bailiwick of Hunan. Hua makes a number 
of appearances in the media in the following years and clearly had a degree of 
influence within the leadership, however it is only with the first of the National 
Conferences to Study Dazhai in 1975 that he rose to greater prominence.
The period following Lin’s downfall was characterized by an intensifying 
conflict between members of the radical Left and moderates such as Zhou 
Enlai. Lin Biao’s dramatic overthrow appears to have given Zhou Enlai some 
room to organize a partial readjustment of industrial, agricultural and social 
policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution, and to begin to bring back 
some of the veteran cadres purged during the mobilization phase of 1966-69. 
As was later shown by his opposition to some of these reforms, Mao had not 
abandoned his backing for the Cultural Revolution’s line, however, in the wake 
of Lin’s death, he appears to have given his tacit approval for these actions, 
indeed on one occasion shortly after Lin’s death, Mao, speaking to Ye Jianying, 
went out of his way to praise the actions of the veteran cadres during the so- 
called “February adverse current”, saying they had been opposing Lin Biao.34
An editorial in the Renmin ribao 28 April, 1972 noted that the veteran 
cadres were “loyal in the majority”, had “considerable organization skills” and 
were “relatively rich in experience”.35 Statements such as these justified a wave 
of rehabilitations including Marshal Zhu De in 1972, and culminating with the 
reappearance of Deng Xiaoping in Beijing in April 1973.
a). Policy Readjustments
With Lin’s fall, and the return of many of the purged cadres, moderates, 
under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, initiated a period of policy readjustment. 
According to Domes this was aimed primarily at reducing the burden of
34 Zheng Qian and Han Gang, Mao Zedong zhi lu Wan nian sui yue, (Mao Zedong's Road 
His Later Years), (Beijing: Zhongguo qingniarvchubanshe, 1993), pg. 481.
35 Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg.144.
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demands that had been placed on the masses by Lin’s mobilizational policies, 
however it would be more accurate to say that they challenged a much wider 
range of Cultural Revolution policies. Efforts to reform higher education would 
prove particularly controversial, and directly challenged many of the initiatives 
of the radical Left, not Lin Biao.
In general these new policies were part of a broader revision of the extreme 
leftist position of the Cultural Revolution. From the beginning of 1972 the 
Chinese media carried attacks on “egalitarianism’’ and “ultra-left deviations”. It 
is also clear that there was a decline in the Mao cult that had emerged during 
the Cultural Revolution. A number of provinces stopped reading quotes from 
the Chairman before the news broadcasts as had been customary before.
Even the little Red Book, the symbol of the Red Guard movement, came in for 
some criticism. The provincial Party newspaper in Guangdong carried an 
article in June 1972 which called for a more detailed study of Mao’s original 
works, claiming that “one should not be content to read only ‘sayings and 
quotations’".36
The reforms of 1972 arid 1973 were strongly opposed by members of the 
radical Left. Although the position of the leftists at the provincial level had been 
weakened, they still dominated the central propaganda apparatus and had 
close contacts with sections of the military (most notably the People’s Militia) 
and leaders in a number of provinces and municipalities. Most importantly, 
they continued to enjoy the support of Mao Zedong. Mao’s position upto his 
death in September 1976 remained unchanged: He recognized the superior 
administrative skills of the veteran cadres, and recognized the need for a 
degree of readjustment, while continuing to defend the Cultural Revolution and 
the radical Left. His continued support for both groups gave room for policy 
conflicts to emerge and intensify, and it was only with the second purge of Deng
36 Nanfang ribao, 2 June, 1972, in Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolutionx 
pg.172.
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Xiaoping in 1976 that Mao came down decisively on either side.
Although the rehabilitated cadres continued with the new policy drive 
through 1972 and 1973, the media began to carry a series of critical articles 
sponsored by the Left. In March 1973 Hong qi issued an appeal to “defend 
and develop the fruits of the victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
which was both 'necessary and opportune’”.37 The radical Left also attempted 
to launch an attack on Zhou Enlai using a campaign to criticize the writings of 
Confucius. Although this campaign was to have little impact in the run-up to the 
10th Party Congress, it indicates the Left’s growing confidence that they could 
attack one of the most senior figures in the leadership.
by The Tenth Party Congress
The Tenth Party Congress met in secret from 24 to 28 August 1973 in 
Beijing. The downfall of Lin Biao and the purge of his supporters had 
necessitated that this Congress meet early. In all some 1,249 delegates 
attended the meeting.
In his Political Work Report Zhou Enlai concentrated mainly on an account of 
the Lin Biao crisis, publically naming Lin and Chen Boda as Party enemies for 
the first time and announcing their expulsion from the Party. Zhou also 
discussed China’s foreign policy, and set out his arguments for China’s 
growing rapprochement with the United States. He called for planning and 
co-ordination to be strengthened and for Party organizations to pay close 
attention to questions of economic policy, and to concern themselves with the 
well-being of the masses.
In contrast Wang Hongwen in his Report on the Revision of the Party 
Constitution launched a strong attack on ‘revisionism’ and repeated Mao’s 
quote that it was “a Marxist-Leninist principle” to “swim against the tide”. He 
criticized the tendency to suppress criticism of the Party:
37 Hong qi, No. 3 1973, in Jurgen Domes, China after the Cultural Revolution, pg.175.
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There are still after all a small number of cadres, especially some 
leading cadres, [my emphasis] who will not tolerate the differing 
views of the masses inside or outside the Party. They even suppress 
criticism and retaliate, and it is quite serious in some individual 
cases.38
Jurgen Domes claims that both the make-up of the new Central leadership 
organs, and the language of the new Party Constitution suggests that a 
compromise was reached between the radical Left and the advocates of the 
readjustment policy. However, Frederick Teiwes suggests that “the balance of 
forces in the Politburo selected at the Tenth Congress in August 1973... if 
anything underestimated the overall dominance of the old-line administrators 
and exaggerated the radicals’ strength in the elite as a whole”.39 An 
examination of the make-up of the new Politburo suggests that Teiwes’ 
comment is correct, for while the radical Left and the veteran cadres were 
largely balanced on the new Politburo, the Congress failed to reverse the 
moderates’ policy readjustment.
5. From the 10th Party Congress to the Autumn of 1976
Immediately following the 10th Party Congress in August and September, 
more articles appeared in the Chinese press criticizing Confucius and 
Confucian thinking. On 15 September 1973 the first edition of Xuexi yu pipan 
(Study and Criticism ), (a magazine established under the auspices of Zhang 
Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan) published an article entitled “On Honouring 
Confucianism and Opposing Legalism” (Lun zunrui fanfa). The article, which 
was published in the name of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee’s 
Writing Group, stated:
Resolutely criticizing the ideological trend of honouring 
Confuciansim and opposing legalism is a struggle which posseses
38 Ibid, pg.186.
39 Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China From a Charismatic 
Mao to the Politics of Successor, (New York: MacMillan Press Ltd. 1984), pg.113.
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great importance for the ideological realm. Thoroughly carrying out 
this struggle will help us to further recognize and carry out the real 
class and line struggles, it will help us recognize those conspirators 
who are engaged in capitalist restoration... and will help to strengthen 
the proletarian dicatatorship and resist capitalist restoration. 40
Further articles appeared in the Renmin ribao 27 September 1973, in the 
second edition of Xuexiyu pipan, in the 11th edition of 1973 of Hong qi, the 
Beijing ribao 12 September and in the Wenhui Bao 26 September.41 The latter 
article, entitled “Is Confucius a rebel or a conservative?” (Kongzi shi zaofanpai 
haishi baoshoupai?), claimed “[Confucius] was an ultra-conservative who was 
opposed to innovation, and advocated the restoration of the old ways; he was 
an obstinate diehard who had been defeated once but wanted to try again".42 
Other articles appeared in both the central and local press.
On 18 January 1974 a collection of material entitled “Lin Biao and the 
Doctrine of Confucus and Mencius” (Lin Biao yu Kong Meng zhi dao) was 
published as the Party Central Committee’s Document No 1. The material had 
been collected by units at Peking and Tsinghua universities at the instigation of 
Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen who wrote to Mao on 12 January urging him 
to have the material published.43 The Central Committee’s Document No 1 
stated:
The capitalist careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and 
traitor Lin Biao is an out-and-out follower of Confucius. Like 
all...reactionaries in history, [he] honours Confucius and opposes 
Legalism, attacks Qinshi Huangdi, and turns the Doctrine of Confucius 
and Mencius into a counter-revolutionary weapon to secretly usurp 
the Party’s power and restore capitalism.44
Following the publication of Document No.1 the campaign to ‘Criticize
40 Li Qichen, Qian qiu gong guo, (Successfully cross one thousand autumn’s ), (Beijing: 
Guangming Ribao Press, 1994), pg.53.
41 Ibid, pp.54-56.
42 Ibid, pg.55.
43 Ibid, pg.58.
44 Ibid, pg.59.
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Confucius and Lin Biao’ became more widespread. In the first half of 1974 
articles appeared in the Renmin ribao, Hong qi and many other central and 
local newspapers. The radical Left, who had widespread support throughout 
the propaganda organs were able to use these articles not only to criticize Lin 
Biao, but to launch attacks on current leaders, notably Zhou Enlai, and the 
‘readjustment’ policies. Many of the attacks used historical allusion and 
allegory rather than directly naming Zhou, but increasingly the articles began to 
criticize “modern Confucianists” and warned of the continual threat of 
revisionism.
a). From the 4th National People’s Congress to Zhou Enlai’s death: 1975
In the run up to the 4th NPC the radical Left continued to attack both Zhou 
Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who, as Zhou became increasingly frail, was taking 
on more of Zhou’s administrative responsibilities. Despite these attacks, during 
the summer of 1974, the decision was made to appoint Deng Xiaoping as first 
Vice-Premier, placing him in line to succeed Zhou Enlai. The left would have 
hoped that Zhang Chunqiao would become Premier and Deng’s appointment 
must have been a significant blow to them. However Mao had praised Deng 
on a number of occasions, and his appointment highlighted the failure of the 
Left to find a suitable successor to Zhou Enlai with the necessary administrative 
experience.
At a Politburo meeting held on 17 October 1974, the radical Left launched 
an attack against Deng for worshipping foreign goods, (the attack, known as 
the Fengqing incident was sparked by the first successful voyage of a large­
sized merchant vessel built in China). Wang Hongwen flew to Changsha the 
next day to report the incident personally to Mao but he was critical of the 
actions of Jiang, Zhang and Wang. Later, on 23 December 1974, during a 
meeting between Mao, Wang and Zhou Enlai, Mao told Wang that “the Premier 
[Zhou] is still our Premier”. He told Zhou “you are unwell, after the 4th NPC,
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you must rest carefuliy... We can let Deng Xiaoping manage the State Council’s 
work”.45 On 5 January, 1974 The Central Committee’s Document No 1 
appointed Deng Xiaoping Deputy-Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission and Chief of the General Staff Department of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). Zhang Chunqiao was appointed to the post of Director 
of the Political Department of the PLA.40
The first plenary session of the 4th NPC was held in Peking from 13-18 
January 1975, the first NPC meeting in some ten years. In his Government 
Work Report to the meeting, Zhou Enlai outlined his goal of “all-out 
modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and 
technology”, the so-called “four modernizations”.47 Zhou’s call was used by the 
moderates, to press for further policy reforms following the Congress.
Despite the significance of the meeting, Mao Zedong did not appear at any 
of its sessions, nor is he reported to have sent any messages, this is despite 
the fact that he held a meeting with a visitor from Germany on the 16 January, 
while the Congress was in session.40 Domes suggests that Mao did not attend 
because he was displeased its proceedings.
While ideological attacks by the radical Left on the moderates’ reform 
program increased in the wake of the NPC meeting, they were still able to 
launch an extensive reform package in industry and education. Despite some 
criticism of elements of these reforms by Mao Zedong, the moderates were 
able to continue their program through 1975. The contradiction inherent in 
Mao’s stance lay at the heart of the intensifying conflict, with Mao backing the 
administrative experience of the veterans, but unhappy at any challenge to the
45 Ibid, pg.121.
46 Ibid, pg.122.
47 Zhou Enlai, “Report on the work of the government,” Zhonghua Renimin Gongheguo di 
Sijie Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui di Yici Huiyi Wenjian, (Documents of the first meeting of 
the Fourth National People's Congress of the PRC), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1975), 
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40 Jurgen Domes, “The ‘Gang of Four’ and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 
1975-76”, CO pg.480.
60
fundamental policies of the Cultural Revolution. As the moderates’ reforms 
progressed, he would become increasingly concerned on this latter point.
Shortly after the NPC meeting closed, The Renmin ribao published an 
“important directive”. In the directive Mao called for a “restriction of bourgeois 
rights” and launched a strong attack on the eight-grade wage system then 
being implemented in industry in China.49 Mao’s directive went directly against 
the decisions recently made by the NPC. The March and April editions of 
Hong qi published articles by Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao which 
developed Mao’s ideas. Their articles called for vigilance against "capitalist 
roaders in the Party,” and called for an equalization of wages, the restriction of 
private activities by the peasants and a gradual transmission of powers from 
the production team to the brigade and the commune.
Although the official media focused on ideological rhetoric, in the fields of 
economic and social policy the line of the 4th NPC continued to be 
implemented. It appears that moderates, under the leadership of Zhou were 
able to resist calls from the radical Left and Mao to reverse the policy decisions 
of the 4th NPC. Zhou’s own stature is important, (his subsequent death in 
January 1976 marked a temporary end to the reform program), however Mao’s 
increasing isolation was also significant. If Mao had attended the sessions of 
the 4th NPC it seems likely that the views he expressed in his later directive 
would have prevailed. Mao’s apparent refusal to attend the Congress 
meetings gave the reformers the opportunity to introduce the moderate 
policies. What is more, his withdrawl from day-to-day decision-making allowed 
senior Party figures like Zhou and Deng to oversee policy implementation 
through the State Council which they controlled.
Deng led an “all-round rectification”, trying to make progress on a number 
of fronts simultaneously. From 15 February 1975 to 8 March 1975 a National 
Meeting of Industrial Secretaries was held in Beijing. Speaking at the meeting
49 Ibid, pg.480.
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Deng pointed out: “at the moment some comrades only dare to grasp 
revolution, they don’t dare grasp production....This is wrong”. 50 While the 
meeting was in session the Central Committee issued the “Resolution 
Concerning Strengthening Railway Work” which set out guidelines for 
improving the management over China’s rail network which had suffered 
considerably during the Cultural Revolution.
With the support of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, Minister of Education 
Zhou Rongxin chaired a series of meetings which sought to improve the 
situation in China’s universities and schools. Zhou Rongxin appears to have 
launched a strong attack on the leftist influence over education policy. At one 
meeting he is reported to have criticized the policy of allowing workers and 
peasants to attend university on the basis of their political background:
Workers, peasants and soilders who attend university are unable to 
become technicians, they are unable to become cadres, they only 
return to become workers and peasants. What is the worth in this?51
A number of articles appeared which criticized the attitude of the radical Left 
that ‘hardwork could replace study’, (y/gan daixue).
As the policy reforms deepened, Mao clearly became concerned that they 
threatened some of what he saw as the “achievements” of the Cultural 
Revolution; Teiwes states that the 1975 reforms simply “arouse[d] Mao’s 
suspicions”.52 In talks with the Danish Prime Minister on 20 October, 1974 Mao 
commented that the eight grade pay system, reintroduced during the reforms 
and which allocated wages according to work, not need, were similar to the 
wage system of pre-Liberation China.53 Mao returned to this theme when 
discussing preperations for the 4th NPC with Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen. 
Quoting Lenin, Mao emphasised that there will always be those who engage in
50 Li Qichen, Successfully cross one thousand autumns, pg.130.
51 Ibid, pg.136.
52 Frederick C. Teiwes, Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China^pg.118.
53 Li Qichen, Successfully cross one thousand autumns, pg.150.
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capitalism and capitalist classes, even amongst the Party and workers and that 
it is only by implementing the proletarian dictatorship that this phenomena can 
be restrained. Mao urged Zhou and Wang to commission Zhang Chunqiao 
and Yao Wenyuan to study Lenin’s writings on proletarian dictatorship and 
publish articles.54
This theme was continued in the media and in a number of Central 
documents published after the 4th NPC had closed. On 9 February 1975 the 
Renmin ribao published an editorial entitled “Study the Theory of the 
Proletarian Dictatorship”. On the 18 February the Central Committee published 
the “Circular on Studying Mao’s Directives on Ideological Questions” and on 22 
February the Renmin ribao published an article written by Zhang Chunqiao 
and Yao Wenyuan entitled “Marx, Engels and Lenin on Proletarian 
Dictatorship”.
In the second half of 1975 indirect crticism of Zhou and Deng increased, 
linked to a campaign to criticize the classic Chinese novel “The Water Margin"
(Shuihu Zhuan). The campaign appears to have been launched as a result of 
discussions Mao had in August 1975 with a teacher from Peking Univiersity’s 
Chinese Literature Department concerning the novel. Mao is reported to have 
criticized the novel for only opposing corruption within the traditional imperial 
system and not the system itself.
On 28 August, 1975 Hong qi published an article entitled “Attach Importance 
to Commentaries on the Water Margin’”. The article stated “Song Jiang’s [the 
leading character in the novel] counter-revolutionary path proves: if you 
engage in revisionism, then you will inevitably be a capitulationist, sell out the 
revolution and be a running dog of the reactionaries. These are all the 
characteristics of revisionism”.55 The Hong qi article was reprinted in the 
Renmin ribao 31 August with a much longer commentary, “Criticize The Water
54 Ibid, pg 151.
55 Ibid, pg.166.
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Margin’”, written by Zhu Fangming. This commentary stated “During the 
historical stage of socialism, we must guard against and prevent revisionism, 
continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and we must 
recognize the capitulationists and oppose the capitulationists".56
At the First Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai, held at the Shanxi 
brigade in September 1975, Jiang Qing is reported to have linked the 
Campaign to Criticize The Water Margins’ to the present day. Jiang used her 
speech to the conference to indirectly attack Deng: “Capitulationists and 
revisionists in our party are able to do things an open enemy could not do....By 
criticizing The Water Margin’ we know that there are capitulationists in our 
Party”.57
Significantly, this meeting also saw the emergence of Hua Guofeng onto the 
national political scene. Hua appears to have gained the support of a group of 
figures including Dazhai’s former Party Secretary Chen Yonggui and other 
supporters of the Shanxi brigade. Both Deng and Jiang gave speeches during 
the Conference, however Mao selected Hua to deliver the key-note speech. 
Mao also appeared to support Hua’s line (based on the experiences of Dazhai) 
against that of both Deng and Jiang. I will discuss these developments in more 
detail in the chapter on agriculture.
Deng Xiaoping, who directed the 1975 reform program owing to Zhou 
Enlai’s ill-health, came under increasing pressure in late-1975 and by the end 
of the year the reforms had been brought to a stop, as a result of continued 
criticism from the radical Left and the ultimate withdrawal of Mao’s support. On 
8 November Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have attacked Deng’s education 
reforms, saying: “One [system] raises educated exploitationists with capitalist 
consciousness; one [system] raises uneducated workers with [class] 
conciousness. Which would you want? I would rather have an uneducated
58 Ibid, pg.168.
57 Ibid, pg,169.
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worker than an educated expioitationist’’.58 The Minister of Education, Zhou 
Rongxin was forced to undergo a number of struggle sessions and on 12 April 
1976 he collapsed and died.
On 4 December 1975 the Renmin ribao published an article entitled “It is not 
Easy to Distort the Direction of the Educational Revolution”. The article, 
published in the name of a joint-criticism group based at Peking and Tsinghua 
universities, launched a strong attack on the education reforms, stating:
Today, the strange theories of the educational field are trying to 
reverse cases on behalf of the revisionist education line and are 
denying [the policies of] the Cultural Revolution and changing the 
revolutionary line of Mao Zedong. Revisionism is still the most 
important danger at this moment. The struggle over the educational 
line is a part of the struggle going on in society betweeen the two 
classes, the two paths and the two lines”. 59
Deng Xiaoping was placed in a difficult position, trying to continue with the 
readjustment policies, while being criticized in the media. A joint commentary 
published in the Renmin riabo, the Jiefangjun ribao (Liberation Army Daily) 
and Hong qi, to mark the New Year applauded the successes of the Cultural 
Revolution and warned of the need to continue vigilence against capitalism. 
Less than a week after the publication of this editorial, Deng’s most important 
political patron, Zhou Enlai, died on the morning of 8 January, 1976.
Deng delivered the eulogy for Zhou on 15 January, but this was the last time 
he was seen in public until July 1977. The death of Zhou, and the withdrawal 
of Mao’s support left him vulnerable to the radical Left’s attacks. Criticism of 
him increased, and he was named on critical wallposters that appeared in 
Peking University. Two editorials that appeared in the Renmin ribao 10 and 28 
March appeared to be directly aimed at Deng, although they still did not name 
him:
58 Ibid, pg,178.
59 Ibid, pg.180.
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While making socialist revolution, we still do not know where the 
bourgeoisie really is - it sits right in the Communist Party - the 
bourgeoisie are the power-holders within the Party who take the 
capitalist road!
This man does not understand Marxism-Leninism, he represents 
the capitalist class....He said he will “never reverse verdicts,” yet this 
cannot be trusted. What does that mean, “Three directives as the 
link”? - class struggle is the link, everything else hinges on i t !60
On 2 February it was announced that Hua Guofeng, not Deng Xiaoping, had 
been appointed acting-Premier, replacing Zhou Enlai. The radical Left would 
have hoped that with Deng Xiaoping sidelined their candidate, Zhang 
Chunqiao, might have been nominated. Instead the leadership, at the behest 
of Mao Zedong, adopted a figure who was largely unknown outside of China, 
but somebody who could be seen as both a compromise candidate and a 
proven administrator.
b). The Tian’anmen Incident
Starting on 29 March 1976 there were a series of demonstrations in 
Tian’anmen Square in Beijing of people wishing to remember the late-Zhou 
Enlai. These followed earlier demonstrations in memory of Zhou in Nanjing.
As well as paying their respects, demonstrators also used this opportunity to 
attack figures of the Left, in particular Jiang Qing, and express support for Deng 
Xiaoping. There were a series of clashes with security forces, peaking on 5 
April, the date of China’s Qingming festival, when Chinese people traditionally 
went to clean and worship at the graves of their ancestors. On that day as 
many as 2 million people demonstrated in the Square. The protest later turned 
to violence when police and militia members clashed with the demonstrators. 
38 people were arrested. Other incidents occured in cities across China.
In the morning of 6 April a Politburo meeting, which, critically, was not
60 Renmin ribao 10 and 28 March, quoted in Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of 
the PRC, pg.132.
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attended by the key central figure Ye Jianying61, criticised the rioting of the 
previous day and labelled it a “counte-revolutionary” incident. Deng was 
blamed for instigating the protests. In the evening of the same day in a speech 
to a meeting at the Great Hall of the People Zhang Chunqiao said: “The 
Tian’anmen Incident is in reality China’s Hungarian incident, those people who 
support Deng Xiaoping really want to use him as China’s Nagy [Imre]”.62 In the 
evening of the 7 February, at the behest of Mao, who had now fully abandoned 
Deng Xiaoping, the Politburo announced that Hua Guofeng had been 
appointed as First Vice-Chairman of the Party and Premier, and that Deng had 
been expelled from all of his posts.
The purge of Deng Xiaoping strengthened the position of the radical Left by 
removing their leading opponent. They were able to use their influence over 
the central media to launch a campaign against Deng, accusing him of an 
“attempt to ‘whip up a Right deviationist wind of reversing correct verdicts.”63 
However the stagnation in policy-making that characterized the period up to 
Mao’s death suggests an intensifying power struggle within the Party and 
government organizations between the radical Left, and an emerging coalition 
of central “survivors" (including Ye Jianying), the new Premier Hua Guofeng 
and his supporters, and the veteran cadres.
Following Zhou Enlai’s death, a series of calamitous events struck China.
On July 28 1976 a powerful earthquake struck the city of Tangshan in Hebei 
Province, killing over a quarter of a million people. This event had been 
preceded by the death of Marshal Zhu De on July 6. Finally, events in 1976 
came to a head with the death of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976.
c). The Beiiinq ‘Coup d’Etat’
Members of the Gang intensified their manoeuvres to succeed Mao shortly
61 Richard Baum, Burying Mao Chinese Politics in the Age of Mao, (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), pg,36.
62 Li Qichen, Successfully Cross one thousand autumns, pg.244.
63 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg.31.
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after he died. It seems that it was these actions which galvanized support 
against them, leading to their eventual arrest. The Gang of Four are reported to 
have tried to establish a ‘Central Office’ (zhongyang gongting) under the 
control of Wang Hongwen with the intention of establishing a new 
communications link between the centre and provincial leaders, circumventing 
the normal Party and government channels.64 Elsewhere, Yao Wenyuan 
organized the Gang’s supporters at Peking and Tsinghua universities to 
petition the Central Committee, urging them to appoint Jiang Qing as the new 
Party Chairman.65
As early as the day after Mao died Ye Jianying is reported to have visited 
Hua Guofeng and warned him that he must take resolute action. Ye had 
already held talks with Nie Rongzhen, Wang Zhen, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian66 
and a powerful coalition of veteran and military cadres was forming in support 
of Hua Guofeng. Jurgen Domes argues that it was Hua Guofeng who 
“changed sides” and “joined the military-bureaucratic complex in a new 
coalition,’’67 however Ye Jianying’s subsequent actions do not suggest that he 
was acting against Hua Guofeng, rather he was seeking to protect Hua’s 
position from the radical Left.
On the evening of the 6 October 1976 Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and 
Yao Wenyuan were arrested as they arrived for what they had thought would 
be a meeting of the Politburo in the leadership compound of Zhongnanhai. 
Jiang Qing was arrested separately at her residence. In Shanghai, the main 
stronghold of the Gang of Four, the Municipal Party had mobilized the 
Shanghai workers’ militia, however troops of the PLA under the temporary
64 Li Qichen, Successfully cross one thousand autumns, pg.288.
65 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg.40.
66 Fan Yingshuo’s Ye Jianying zai 1976, (Ye Jianying in 1976) (Beijing: Zhonggong 
zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1995) offers an interesting account of Ye’s efforts to mobilize 
support to oust the Gang of Four and is used by Richard Baum in his analysis of these events.
See also Nie Rongzhen Zhuan, (Biography of Nie Rongzhen), (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo 
chubanshe, 1994 ), pg.686 and Ting Wang, Chairman Hua, (London: C. Hurst, 1980), pp.114- 
115 for other accounts of Ye’s activities.
67 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, pg.137.
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command of Guangzhou Military Region Commander Xu Shiyou, entered 
Shanghai on the 6 October and disarmed the militia. The Politburo met quickly 
on 7 October and appointed Hua Guofeng to the posts of Party Chairman and 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission;68 these were in addition to the 
post of Premier which he already held. Owing to the continued uncertainty in 
the internal situation, these appointments were not announced publicly until 24 
October.69 Moving to consolidate their position, on 20 October the new 
leadership established a special investigation unit under Wang Dongxing to 
investigate the Gang’s activities. At the same time the Propaganda Department 
of the Central Committee was re-established, strengthening the new 
leadership’s hold over an area formerly dominated by the Gang’s supporters.
6. Autumn-1976 to winter-1978
Hua Guofeng’s position following his accession to power was delicate. As 
Richard Baum points out he had had to rely heavily on the coalition of veteran 
civilian and military cadres to oust the Gang of Four. Although figures like Ye 
Jianying continued to offer their full support to Hua, they were also more 
interested in rehabilitating Deng Xiaoping, recognizing his administrative skills, 
and in many cases, having worked with him in the past. Hua reportedly 
rebuked Ye and Li Xiannian for suggesting that Deng be returned to power.70 
His major dilemma was that having been so closely involved in the original 
decision to label the Tian’anmen incident “counter-revolutionary", he and 
supporters such as Beijing Mayor Wu De, could not easily reverse their 
decision. Speaking to members of the Party propaganda organs on 26 
October, Hua called for the continued criticism of Deng Xiaoping.71
A second problem for Hua was his close association with Mao. Beginning in
68 A dictionary of major events of the CCP, pg.465.
69 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg.42.
70 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg. 42.
71 Ibid, pg 43.
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October 1976 a story appeared which claimed that in April that year, Mao had 
told Hua that "with you in charge, I am at ease!”, (Nibanshi, wo fangxin) 72 The 
story was used to boost Hua’s standing and a series of paintings appeared 
which showed Hua at Mao’s bedside, apparently at the point of receiving this 
“benediction”.73 Hua’s association with Mao made it difficult for him to directly 
question Mao’s legacy, and in particular the events of the Cultural Revolution 
(although he did revise a number of its policies). He was left defending a line 
that in the course of the next two years would becoming increasingly isolated.
In his speech of 26 October, Hua offered a justification of his policy of 
upholding Mao Zedong’s general line, claiming that there should be “no 
criticism of whatever Chairman Mao instructed or approved’’’.74 Later, Hua’s 
comments were developed in a joint-editorial published by the Renmin ribao, 
Hong qi and the Jiefangjun ribao on 7 February. The editorial stated:
[Our] Great Leader and Teacher Chairman Mao led our struggle for 
over half a century, [he led us] through ten major struggles over the 
Party’s line. The history of this 50 years has repeatedly demonstrated 
that at whatever time, if we uphold Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, 
adhere to Chairman Mao’s directives, then the revolution will be 
victorious; If, at whatever time, we leave Chairman Mao’s 
revolutonary line, violate his directives, then the Revolution will fail, 
and [we] will suffer defeat.75
Whatever policies Chairman Mao formulated we shall all resolutely 
defend, whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave we shall all 
steadfastly abide by !76
This line, which came to be known as the Two Whatevers’ (Hang ge fanshi) 
was later used by Deng to attack Hua Guofeng, but in the period immediately 
following Mao’s death Hua sought to use this approach to consolidate his
72 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, pg. 143.
73 Ibid, pg.143.
74 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg. 43.
75 Li Qichen, Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns, pp.353-364.
76 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, pg. 145.
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position by drawing on the charismatic appeal of Mao Zedong.
a). The Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping
Criticism of Deng Xiaoping had continued after the arrest of the Gang of 
Four. Speaking at a rally held in Tian’anmen Square on 23 October, 1976 Wu 
De had said “we shall continue to criticize Deng”.77 As I noted above, Hua had 
repeated this message three days later. Elsewhere, speaking at a National 
Propaganda Work Meeting Wang Dongxing is reported to have opposed a 
reassessment of the Tian’anmen incident and, in a speech to the third session 
of the 4th NPC on 30 November, 1976, Wu De said: “the opposition to the Gang 
of Four at the time of the Tian’anmen incident was wrong. At that time they 
were members of the central leadership and [the opposition] was aimed at 
splitting the Central Committee”.78 Wu went on “we must link criticism of the 
‘Gang of Four’ with criticism of Deng”.
Despite these statements of support for Hua’s policy, the media slowly 
stopped calls for continuing the criticism of Deng Xiaoping. The last of these 
appeared in a radio broadcast in Hunan, Hua’s own bailiwick, in early January 
1977.79 On the anniversary of Zhou Enlai’s death a number of posters 
appeared in Beijing criticising Chen Xilian and Wu De (both close supporters of 
Hua Guofeng) for following the Gang of Four in suppressing the Tian.anmen 
movement and calling for the rehabilitation of Deng.
On 1 February, 1977 two Politburo members, Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing 
apparently sent a letter to the Party Central Committee which called for the 
rehabilitation of Deng and other veteran cadres.80 The two generals, who had 
close ties to Deng, reportedly wrote in their letter that Mao had made mistakes 
and that he had been wrong to brand everyone who disagreed with him as a
77 Ibid, pg.145.
78 Li Qichen, Successfully Cross One Thousand Autumns, pg.355.
79 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRCX pg. 145.
80 Ibid, pg.147.
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‘class enemy’.81
At a central work meeting held in Beijing from 10-22 March, Hua Guofeng 
was apparently criticized by a number of veteran cadres. Speaking at the 
meeting Chen Yun, whose own rehabilitation had been blocked by Hua, said:
I believe that the vast majority of the masses that went to 
Tian’anmen Square went to mourn Premier Zhou Enlai, we must 
investigate whether or not the Gang of Four played a part in the 
Tian’anmen incident, whether or not there was some ruse. Deng 
Xiaoping had no connection with the Tian’anmen incident. It is 
absolutely right and essential that for the needs of the Chinese 
Revolution and the Party’s cause, Deng Xiaoping should be allowed 
to take part in the central leadership’s work once more.82
Hua reportedly resisted the calls for Deng’s rehabilitation made at the 
Central Work Conference, allegedly saying “Criticising Deng and counter­
attacking the rightist wind to reverse verdicts were [policies] laid down by 
Chairman Mao, criticism is necessary”.83 However, under the intense pressure 
from senior Party figures it appears that Hua Guofeng was forced to give way. 
Ye Jianying reportedly devised a compromise whereby Hua Guofeng would 
agree to a reassessment of the Tian’anmen Incident while Deng would write a 
letter to the Central Committee accepting Hua’s leadership.84
Ye’s role is widely recognized in Deng’s rehabilitation, but perhaps his 
motives were less than alturistic. Ye may have recognized the inevitablity of 
Deng’s return, and so moved to act sooner rather than later so as to garner 
favour with Deng.85 Certainly, Ye Jianying was unwilling to accept a challenge 
to Hua Guofeng’s position as Chairman, and continued to speak in support of 
Hua.
Deng was formally rehabilitated at the third session of the 10th Party
81 Ibid, pp. 146-147.
82 Li Qichen, Succesfully Cross One Thousand Autumns, pg.359.
83 Li Jian, Deng Xiaoping san-jin, san-chu Zhongnanhai,_(Deng Xiaoping's three entrances 
and three exits from Zhongnanhai), (Beijing: Zhongguo dadi chubanshe, 1993), pg.314.
84 Richard Baum, Burying Mao^pg.45.
85 Benjamin Yang, Deng A Political Biography, pg.203.
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Congress, held 16-21 July 1977. He was reinstated as Vice-Chairman of the 
CCP, Vice-Premier, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and 
Chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA.06 A few days later on 31 July 
Deng appeared together with Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying at a reception 
marking the anniversary of the founding of the PLA. The appearance of these 
three leaders demonstrated the new power-balance at the top of the CCP.
b). The Eleventh Party Congress 
The three leaders made the key speeches at the Eleventh Congress of the 
CCP, held from 12-18 August, 1977 in Beijing. Deng’s speech at the closing 
ceremony of the Congress confirmed his rehabilitation, but the proceedings 
were dominated by Hua’s political work report, which lasted for over seven 
hours. During his speech Hua proclaimed the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
although he commented that this kind of political revolution would continue in 
the future.
In his speech on the reform of the Party Constitution Ye Jianying affirmed the 
leadership of Hua Guofeng:
Comrade Hua Guofeng was chosen by Chairman Mao himself as 
his successor... Chairman Hua is worthy of being called Chairman 
Mao’s good student and successor, the wise leader of our Party and 
people and the brilliant supreme commander of our army. Chairman 
Hua can certainly continue to carry forward our proletarian 
revolutionary cause pioneered by Chairman Mao and lead our Party, 
our army, and the people of all nationalities triumphantly into the 
twenty first century.87
Ye also supported Mao’s decision to launch the Cultural Revolution, saying it 
was a “vital weapon against capitalist restoration” and he too warned that 
similar movements may be needed in the future.88
86 A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP, pg.470.
87 Ye Jianying, “Speech on the Reform of the Party Constitution”, in Jurgen Domes, The 
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In contrast to Hua and Ye, Deng's speech was extremely brief, lasting only 
eight minutes, however it contained a number of subtle rebukes of Hua and his 
idea of the “two-whatevers":
We must restore and give full play to the fine traditions and style of 
seeking truth from facts, the mass line, criticism and self-criticism ... 
which Mao Zedong established for us....80
In suggesting that the Party’s traditional work style needed to be 
“restored”, Deng was going against statements by supporters of Hua 
Guofeng who said only that it needed to be upheld. In taking this line Deng 
was apparently supported by Chen Yun.00 Furthermore, his revival of Mao’s 
own statement that the Party should "seek truth from facts” offered a more 
pragmatic solution to solving China’s current problems than Hua’s “two- 
whatevers” and was clearly raised as a direct challenge to that policy.91
In the aftermath of the Eleventh Party Congress Hua Guofeng sought to 
bolster his image. A biography of Hua was published, billboards of Hua at 
Mao’s bedside were put up, and songs and dances were commissioned in 
praise of the new Chairman.92 At the 5th NPC held from 26 February-5 March, 
1978, Hua used his political work report to set out a new ten-year economic 
plan in which he “sought to fashion a reputation as a forward-thinking leader 
and economic strategist”.93 Between the years 1978 and 1985 Hua called for 
an annual growth rate of 4-5 percent in agriculture and over 10 percent in 
industry, more than double recent averages in some cases.94 At the heart of his 
plan was the completion of some “120 new large-scale capital construction
89 Deng Xiaoping / ’Closing speech at the 11th Party Congress”, in Li Qichen, Successfully 
Cross One Thousand Autumns, pg.372.
90 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg.50.
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projects’’. The intended investment in capital construction in the ten year period 
was expected to at least equal the amount invested in this area in the whole of 
the period 1949-1976.95 In order to equip these and other projects, Hua 
abandoned the long-standing tradition of self-reliance and proposed to rely 
heavily on technological imports. These developments severely over-taxed 
China’s financial and technical capailities and led to widespread criticism.
c). Practice is the sole criterion of truth
Immediately following the Party Congress Deng Xiaoping intensified his 
criticism of Hua Guofeng. A theme which he repeatedly returned to, and which 
was used to challenge the ‘two whatevers’ formulation was the idea first 
enunciated by Mao, of ‘Seeking Truth from Facts’, (shishi qiushi). Deng called 
for a complete understanding of Maoist thinking, and the need to balance 
ideology and practice.
An article by the veteran Marshal Nie Rongzhen in support of Deng’s line 
appeared in the Renmin ribao 5 September 1977:
If we want to uphold Marxism-Leninism, uphold Mao Zedong 
Thought, we must uphold the concept of seeking truth from facts. If we 
depart from the revolutionary style of seeking truth from facts then we 
will depart from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and we will 
become idealists, separated from reality and our revolutionary work 
will fail. Therefore whether or not we uphold the revolutionary style of 
seeking truth from facts will become a basic criterion for distinguishing 
between real and false Marxist-Leninists and [upholders] of Mao 
Zedong Thought.99
A further article by Chen Yun in support of the concept of ‘seeking truth from 
facts’ appeared in the Renmin ribao 28 September. Elsewhere, in a series of 
meetings held in the first half of 1978, Deng spoke at length on China’s 
scientific and technological backwardness. He called for China not just to
95 Dorothy Solinger, "The Fifth National People’s Congress and the Process of Policy 
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import western technologies, but to study Western science and he called for 
China’s scientists and technicians to be reclassified as "working people”, so as 
to “give full play to... creative energy and initiative”.97
Differences within the leadership over rhetorical issues surfaced at a 
National Army Political Work Conference which was held in Beijing 27 April to 
6 June, 1978. While the meeting was in session the Guangming ribao 
published an article which argued that all ideological guidelines always had to 
stand the test of whether they correspond to political, economic, and social 
realities.98 As Roderick MacFarquhar notes, this “struck at the roots of Cultural 
Revolution doctrine... that Mao’s writings and statements were eternal verities 
that should not be tampered with, whatever the circumstances”.99 Although the 
article was published anonymously, it is now known that it was edited under the 
guidance of Hu Yaobang, a close supporter of Deng's line.
On 29 May Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying addressed delegates to the 
meeting. Both Hua and Ye avoided mentioning the phrase “practice is the sole 
criterion of truth”, however in a speech to the meeting on 2 June Deng 
reiterated his call to seek truth from facts and launched a stinging attack on the 
“two-whatevers":
Some comrades... talk about Mao Zedong Thought every day, but 
often forget, abandon, or even oppose Comrade Mao’s fundamental 
Marxist viewpoint and method of seeking truth from facts.... Some 
people even go further: They maintain that those who persist in 
seeking truth from facts... are guilty of a heinous crime. In essence, 
their view is that one need only parrot what was said by Marx, Lenin, 
and Comrade Mao Zedong - that it is enough to reproduce their words 
mechanically.... This issue... is no minor one.100
Support for Deng’s line grew throughout the summer and autumn of 1978,
97 Richard Baum, Burying Mao, pg.57.
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backed by figures such as Hu Qiaomu, who had been appointed President of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Hu Yaobang, who used his old 
links to the Communist Youth League to get their newspaper Zhongguo 
qingnian (China Youth) to publish a number of pro-Deng articles. Aside from 
this high-level support, it is also clear that Deng enjoyed considerable support 
amongst ordinary people.
Linked to criticism of Hua’s regime was the continuing question of a 
reassessment of the Tian’anmen incident. Two of the staunchest supporters of 
Hua Guofeng, Wu De, Chairman of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and 
Chen Xilian, Commander of the Beijing Military Region, had been closely 
involved in suppressing the demonstrations. In late-1978 Deng Xiaoping 
appears to have managed to rally a majority of the senior leadership to remove 
both Wu and Chen from their posts in Beijing. Speaking at a Central Work 
Conference which opened on 10 November, Chen Yun now affirmed that the 
Tian’anmen incident had been “revolutionary”, he also criticized Wang 
Dongxing for being too close to the Gang of Four in the past.101 On 15 
November Xinhua News Agency published a resolution passed at an enlarged 
meeting of the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee 
which publically reversed the verdict on the “incident”.102
This reassessment led to an immediate public reaction. A number of wall 
posters appeared in Beijing criticizing Wu De. Deng appears to have given his 
tacit support to these demonstrations and the public security forces stopped 
interfering with those putting up these posters.103 This marked the start of the 
so-called ‘Democracy Wall’ movement which developed over the next few 
months into criticism of Hua Guofeng and the “whateverists” and questions 
about Mao’s role in the Cultural Revolution.104
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d). The Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress
Meeting in this highly charged atmosphere the leadership held the Central 
Work Conference in preparation for the third plenum. The meeting lasted a full 
month, from 11 November to 15 December and debated a wide range of policy 
issues. Under intense pressure, Hua Guofeng and his supporters were forced 
to concede to implementing a series of reforms, along the lines proposed by 
Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other reformers. These policies were formally 
implemented at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Commitee which was held 
from 18-22 December. This plenum was clearly a significant victory for Deng 
Xiaoping, but both Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang were important in mobilizing 
support for Deng.105 The plenum’s communique, issued on 22 December 
endorsed Deng’s formulation, stating “the plenum has highly evaluated the 
discussion of whether reality is the only norm of truth, which has given the Party 
a new, lively guideline”.100 The communique, in its evaluation of Mao Zedong, 
also began to question his legacy, and in particular the issue of the Cultural 
Revolution:
The great merits which comrade Mao Zedong has established in 
long years of revolutionary struggle cannot be extinguished. He was 
indeed a great Marxist....However, to expect a revolutionary leader to 
be without faults and mistakes would not be genuinely Marxist.
The Plenum also posthumously rehabilitated Peng Dehuai, who had been 
purged in 1959 following his criticism of the policies of the Great Leap Forward.
Personnel changes increased support for Deng in both the Central 
Committee and on the Politburo. Chen Yun was appointed to the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo, and Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai’s widow), Hu 
Yaobang and Wang Zhen were appointed to the Politburo. Hu Yaobang was 
also named as the new head of the CCP’s Propaganda Department, replacing
105 Ibid, pg.64.
106 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, pg.162.
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Zhang Pinghua, a close supporter of Hua Guofeng. Baum suggests that Deng 
stopped short of ousting Hua at the plenum in order to win support for his new 
policies from veterans like Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, who were not ready to 
see a wholesale break from the Maoist past.107 Roderick MacFarquhar suggests 
that it was only after the new promotions to the Central Committee had been 
completed that Deng was in the ascendency, and so any purge would have to 
wait.100 Given the sweeping nature of many of the new policies, it certainly 
seems that Deng was in the ascendency, however, even with this degree of 
support, to oust the incumbent Party Chairman would not have been simple, 
and it seems that Deng may just have been biding his time.
The plenum introduced wide-ranging policy changes. Most significantly, the 
communique announced that the Party was shifting the focus of its work from 
class struggle to “socialist modernization”. The plenum announced the 
decentralization of much of the economic decision-making powers to 
provincial- and local-levels and introduced “responsibility systems, [and] 
performance-based rewards and punishments.109 As Roderick MacFarquhar 
notes, the plenum marked a significant shift away from the pro-collectivization 
policy advocated by Hua,110 but it also represented a wider end to revolutionary 
politics in the PRC.
7. Conclusion
The above description of political developments in the PRC highlights how 
coalitions of political actors competed over economic and social policy during 
this period and shows the importance of the utopian and bureaucratic themes 
inherent in Mao’s thinking. The dichotomy between these two strands created 
a space in which political actors were able to express a wide variety of views.
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Mao’s apparent support for both the economic reform program of moderates 
tike Zhou and Deng and the more ideologically oriented position of the radical 
Left only exacerbated policy conflict as both sides were able to claim his 
support. Even after Mao’s death these twin themes continued to dominate elite 
politics in China.
The intensity of the political conflict between these coalitions also served to 
hide the emergence of alternative policy postions. It is noticeable, for instance, 
that many writers begin a study of post-Mao agricultural policy in 1978, ignoring 
the fact that by the end of 1975 Hua Guofeng had a clearly enunciated, and 
radically different, agricultural policy which dominated this issue area for the 
next three years.111 The following chapters will undertake a detailed 
examination of this policy conflict in three issue areas: Higher education, 
agriculture, and foreign policy.
111 Even Richard Baum’s otherwise excellent book, Burying Mao is silent on this issue. 
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Chapter Three: Higher Education
1. introduction
More than any other sector education, and in particular higher education, 
suffered as a result of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. 
Universities and colleges across China closed as many students joined rival 
Red Guard units and teachers and other staff were often subject to brutal 
attacks and ritual humiliation. In the wake of the mobilizational phase, higher 
education policy became the focus of an intense debate within the senior 
leadership.
This focus on higher education was clearly a result of its inherently political 
nature. Education was directly related to training successors and imparting the 
values and lessons of the revolutionary generation. In the early stages of the 
Cultural Revolution Mao had expressed concern about how this successor 
generation was being educated and raised the fear that higher education 
(along with the “cultural” realm in general) continued to be dominated by 
bourgeois academics. Mao saw the Cultural Revolution itself as a means of 
regenerating and re-invigorating the Party through participation in the Cultural 
Revolution. Thus educational issues lay at the heart of the burgeoning 
movement.
The debate over the direction of higher education reflected the wider political 
issue of how far ideological issues should influence economic and social 
policy. The views of the various coalitions on this issue are clear from the 
debates over access to education, quality of education, and the extent to which 
students should be expected to participate in manual labour. Concerns that 
China’s universities should train enough qualified engineers or scientists to 
support economic development often clashed with the ideal of wider access for 
workers and peasants. In education, this debate had been summarized in the
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phrase, “Red versus expert” and the extent to which each element should be 
emphasized. The period from 1969 to 1978 was characterized by a constantly 
shifting content of just what this phrase meant.
a. The significance of a study of higher education
In terms of policy making, higher education contrasted with both agricultural 
and foreign policy in the extent to which it was allowed to become radicalized. 
The radical Left’s influence over higher education during the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution has been widely commented upon. This study 
will show that they retained this influence all the way through to their ouster in 
1976, despite a number of reform initiatives from senior moderate figures like 
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in the early 1970s.
Mao’s support for the radical Left was clearly important for the radicals’ 
continued domination of educational policy. After the mobilizational phase of 
the Cultural Revolution, Mao continued to be concerned with ideological issues 
and this found expression in his views on higher education policy. Higher 
education was one area where Mao did see the need for policy to be led by 
ideological concerns to a far greater extent than he did in either agricultural or 
foreign policy.
Higher education is significant as the only major policy area where major 
decision-making bodies were controlled by the radical Left throughout the 
Cultural Revolution period. Higher education had suffered considerably during 
the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and had been the scene of 
intense activity by the radical Left. Supporters of the Left had gained control of 
a number of key institutions within the government that controlled higher 
education policy, in particular the State Science and Education Group (SEG), 
which effectively replaced the Ministry of Education as the locus of decision­
making in the period 1969-1975.
The radical Left had also gained control of a number of leading universities,
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most notably Tsinghua and Peking universities, as well as universities in their 
bailiwick of Shanghai, such as Fudan. Together with their control of the SEG, 
this presence gave the radical Left access to the policy debate on higher 
education in a way that they failed to achieve in any other field (except perhaps 
propaganda work) and allowed them to develop and publicize prominent 
models.
Despite this apparent influence, this study highlights the apparent weakness 
of the radical Left in the field of policy implementation, even in an area in which 
they seemingly dominated the propaganda debate. Zhou Enlai's control over 
the State Council and the authority of senior figures like Deng Xiaoping are 
significant as it gave them the ability to resist many of the more radical policy 
initiatives of the Left and to push their own policies which were more concerned 
with issues of quality and training than with increased access and political 
correctness. The apparent strength of both sides led to periods of stalemate, 
characterized by limited or stagnated reform: The contrasting examples of the 
introduction of a limited entrance exam for would-be university students and the 
radical Left’s attempts to overturn it are instructive.
Finally, this study of higher education shows the apparent weakness of Hua 
Guofeng in this field. With no experience of working on higher education, Hua 
Guofeng appears to have been unable to resist the reform initiatives of 
moderates under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the period 1977-1978. 
Hua’s weakness in this area and in foreign policy was in stark contrast to 
agriculture where he launched a major policy programme and dominated the 
decision-making process at the centre throughout 1977 and early-1978.
b. Policy issues in the debate over higher education
Although there are a number of important issues that made up the debate 
over higher education policy this chapter will focus on three key themes: 
Changes in the aims of education; selection procedures for universities; and
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issues relating to the curriculum. These lay at the heart of the competing lines 
in higher education during this period.
Education received a high priority after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
assumed national power in October 1949 and was initially charged with 
fulfilling two main aims. Faced with administering a vastly expanded territory, 
the CCP had an acute personnel shortage, and graduates from schools, 
colleges and universities were expected to fill the gap as quickly as possible.
In addition, schools and universities were expected to play an integral role in 
transforming the ideological outlook of the population and ensuring their 
political loyalty.1
In the early 1950s, under the influence of the Soviet Union, Chinese 
universities were reorganized following the Soviet model. The rationale 
behind this restructuring was simple, to transform higher education in China so 
that it could support “the economic and social goals of the First Five-Year Plan” 
and to train the personnel necessary to achieve these goals.2 To meet these 
practical aims, curricula in Chinese universities underwent wholesale reform, 
adopting the Soviet model of focusing on training students in specific 
specialities which accorded with the needs of the economic plan.
During the Great Leap Forward and the period leading up to the Cultural 
Revolution this wholesale adoption of the Soviet model came in for criticism 
from Mao and members of the radical Left. Mao expressed concerns about the 
need for a greater emphasis on political education, shortening courses, 
adapting teaching material to better reflect China’s conditions and combining 
study with labour. Above all else, Mao became concerned that higher 
education was under the influence of ‘bourgeois academics’ and that the
1 A number of authors have recognized these two functions. See, for example, Theodore 
Hsi-en Chen, Chinese Education Since 1949, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pg.9, Stuart 
E. Fraser (ed.), Education and Communism in China An anthology of commentary and 
documents (London: Pali Mall Press, 1971), pg.9, and R.F. Price, Education in Communist 
China (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pg.28.
2 Ruth Hayhoe, CHINA’S UNIVERSITIES 1895-1995 A century of cultural conflict (New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), pg.78.
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reforms introduced in higher education after 1949 had led to the exclusion of 
China’s “revolutionary” classes, the workers, peasants and soldiers, from 
leading universities and colleges .
The reforms introduced by Mao and the radical Left during the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution sought to “re-radicalize” higher education 
policy by breaking the monopoly of the bourgeoisie by revolutionizing the 
leadership of China’s universities and changing enrollment procedures to 
benefit workers, peasants and soldiers. The Cultural Revolution saw renewed 
emphasis on political issues as a fundamental aim of higher education, 
however the radical Left remained aware of its role in training scientists and 
technicians to take part in China’s economic reforms. This is highlighted in the 
debate over academic quality that took place in 1970-71, and the radical Left’s 
efforts to demonstrate the quality of students enrolled under the new 
procedures.
In the post-Mao era, Hua Guofeng sought to balance the twin aims of 
revolutionizing higher education and improving access with the need to 
support economic reform, however, as China placed renewed emphasis on the 
‘Four Modernizations’ and opening to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping and 
other moderates placed far more empahsis on the issues of academic 
knowledge and learning. 1977-78 saw a return to the policies of the pre- 
Cultural Revolution period which once again focused on training students to 
support "the economic and social goals” of economic reform.
c. Higher education in the PRC. 1966-1969.
As part of the wider “cultural” sphere, education became a major focus for 
criticism from the radical Left during the Cultural Revolution. The “Decision of 
the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution” (the “16-Points”), adopted by the Central Committee 9 August,
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1966, explicitly targetted education for radical reform.3 Institutions of higher 
education played a leading role in the opening stages of the Cultural 
Revolution and the suffering of many academics during this period and the 
destruction of educational facilities has been well documented both by outside 
observers and those actually involved in the conflict.4
The “Decision on Enrollment in Higher Educational Institutions" of 13 June, 
1966 had envisaged universities and colleges closing for a period of six 
months while students took part in Cultural Revolution activities, however, as 
Theodore Hsi-en Chen noted, “it was far easier to close the schools down than 
to reopen them”.5 Students from China’s universities took advantage of free 
travel on China’s railways to spread their message of revolution across the 
country, or simply to engage in sightseeing or visit their families. In order to 
speed up the return of the students, Mao issued a new directive on March 7,
1967, which called on the military to help with the re-opening of the schools.6 
The military presence in China’s univesities after Mao’s directive was issued 
was instrumental in allowing classes to resume, although often they had to 
forcibly ensure calm on the campuses.
Workers and peasants were also given a direct role in the administration of 
universities and colleges in an attempt to ensure proletarian leadership over 
the institutions of higher education and prevent a return to what had been seen 
as the domination by “bourgeois" (professional) academics, at the expense of 
members of the proletariat. In a directive issued on 30 August, 1968, Mao
3 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, in the Peking Review, August 12, 1966, in Theodore Hsi-en 
Chen The Maoist Educational Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), Appendix B.
4 See, for example, Anne Thurston, Enemies of the People: The ordeal of intellectuals in 
China's Great Proletarian Revolutionx(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1988), Nien 
Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove Press, 1987), and William Hinton, 
Hundred Day War The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University, (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1972).
5 Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Chinese Education Since 1949, pg.90.
6 “Mao’s ‘March 7 Directive’ Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution”, translated in the Peking Review, March 15, 1968, reprinted in Chen, The 
Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix D.
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stated:
In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education it is essential 
to have working-class leadership; it is essential for the masses of 
workers to take part and, in co-operation with the Liberation Army 
fighters, bring about a revolutionary ‘three-in-one” combination, 
together with the activists among the students, teachers and workers 
in the schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution 
through to the end.7
In line with Mao’s directive, millions of workers and peasants were drafted in 
to take part in what were officially known as Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda 
Teams. Together with any military personnel based in the universities, these 
teams played a leading role in the re-opening and administration of China’s 
universities and colleges.
In the following section I will examine the radical assessment of higher 
education between 1969 and 1971, focusing in particular on some of the model 
institutions they developed in their attempt to influence higher education policy­
making.
2. The radical assessment of higher education in China: 1969-1971
The 9th National Congress of the CCP marked the end of the mobilization 
phase of the Cultural Revolution and the end of the worst of the violence 
directed towards China’s intellectuals. In his political report to the Congress,
Lin Biao summarized this trend somewhat crudely when, discussing the Party’s 
policy towards intellectuals and cadres, he said “[We] should expand the 
amount of education, and reduce the amount of hitting” (yao kuoda jiaoyu 
mian, suoxiao daji mian). Lin stated that when dealing with intellectuals and 
cadres, the Party should fully implement the more moderate policy of “learning
7 "Mao’s Directive on Working Class Leadership” translated in the Peking Review, August 
30, 1968, reproduced in Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix E.
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from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the 
patient” (chengqian bihou, zhibing jiuren). He also talked at length on the 
significance of Mao Zedong’s 1957 speech “On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People", which Mao had used to try and launch the 
'100 Flowers’ movement. Lin repeated Mao’s earlier message that it was 
important to distinguish between the two kinds of contradictions, antagonistic, 
and non-antagonistic, when handling the cases of intellectuals and cadres and 
treat the latter with leniency.8
HoweM^, while intellectuals found themselves subject to less direct violence, 
the emerging Party line emphasized the need for intellectuals to undergo “re­
education” (zai jiaoyu )9 This work was to be led by the military and the Mao 
Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams, and the newly established ‘Three-in- 
one’ revolutionary committees. While offering intellectuals an opportunity to 
reform, literally a “way out" (chulu), in practice re-education often meant 
undergoing lengthy sessions of study and self-criticism and long periods in 
May 7th cadres schools located across the countryside of China.
a. The new leadership in China's institutions of higher education
As described above, millions of workers, peasants and soldiers had entered 
China’s schools at all levels during 1968 and 1969 as part of the Mao Zedong 
Thought Propaganda Teams. The activities of these teams received prominent 
media coverage, and together with the military personnel also based in China’s 
universities and the ‘revolutionary’ students and teachers, they exercised a 
dominant influence over China’s instutions of higher education during the 
period 1969-71, indeed, speaking in August 1968, Mao Zedong had envisaged 
a permanent role for the teams:
8 Lin Biao, “Report at the 9th National Congress of the CCP", in the Renmin Ribao, 28 April, 
1969, pg.3.
9 Only a month after the 9th National Congres closed, the Renmin Ribao carried a front page 
article, “Jiji reqing de dui zhishi fenzi jinxing zai jiaoyu” (Vigourously and enthusiastically carry out 
the re-education of intellectuals), in the Renmin Ribao, 29 May, 1969, pg.1.
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The workers’ propaganda teams should stay permanently in the 
schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism- 
transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools.10
In a highly publicized display of support for the activities of the teams, Mao 
donated a gift of mangoes he had received from the visiting Pakistani Foreign 
Minister, Arshad Husain to the Work Team stationed at Tsinghua University.11
While the majority of the members of the teams were poorly educated and 
had been chosen mainly for their loyalty to Mao Zedong and the Party centre, 
some of the team members were senior Party and military cadres. Many of 
these figures assumed leading roles in the administration of the various 
universities and colleges as the regular Party committees were re-established 
in schools across China after the 9th Party Congress. Beneficiaries of the 
Cultural Revolution in higher education, these figures were natural allies to the 
radicals within the Party who had promoted that line.
Two figures in particular, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, both members of the 
propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University in 1968, were strong 
supporters of the radical Left and close to Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. 
They were subsequently purged following the Gang’s arrest in October 1976.
It is worth looking at their background’s as they were probably typical of many 
of the senior members of the propaganda teams (although without 
comprehensive biographical material this is difficult to confirm). The 
propaganda team that entered Tsinghua University was drawn largely from 
members of the elite 8341 central bodyguard unit of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), highlighting the concern the leadership felt with regards to 
Tsinghua’s successful reopening. At that time Chi Qun was the Head of the 
Propaganda Section of this unit, a significant post in such a prestigious unit.
10 “Mao’s Directive on Working Class Leadership" translated in the Peking Review, August 
30, 1968, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix E.
11 Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pg.455.
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Xie Jingyi also worked in Unit 8341, “handling confidential material”.12 Chi 
Qun later went on to serve as Secretary of the Party Committee of Tsinghua 
University and dominated the political scene at Tsinghua in the first half of the 
1970s. He was also a leading figure in the Central Science and Education 
group formed in 1970 to lead work in education. Xie Jingyi served as Deputy- 
Director of the Revolutionary Committee of Tsinghua University and later 
became First Secretary of the Beijing Communist Youth League. Chi Qun in 
particular was active in support of the Gang of Four and played a leading role 
in the National Educational Work Conference of 1971 which I discuss below 
and the launch of the ‘Campaign to Criticize Confucius and Lin Biao’ in 1973. 
Both Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi were key figures in the "Peking and Tsinghua 
Universities’ ‘Criticism Group’”, a mouthpiece for the policies of the Gang of 
Four, which often published under the name “Liang Xiao”, a homonym for “two 
schools”, a reference to the two universities from which most of its members 
were drawn.
As the violence in China's universities and colleges subsided, it was under 
the guidance of figures such as Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi that the movement to 
“re-educate” the intellectuals took place. The presence of figures like Chi and 
Xie in some (but not all) of China’s universities, and their role on central organs 
like the Science and Education Group was significant in giving the radical Left 
access to, and influence over, the policy debate on higher education.
b. The “re-education” of intellectuals
Lin Biao, in his report to the 9th Congress, had emphasized the need for the 
Party to conduct re-education amongst intellectuals and that where-ever 
possible they should be offered a “way out” (chulu). The Party’s line had 
emerged in a series of directives and newspaper articles published towards the
12 Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting (ed.), 'Wenhua Dageming’ zhong de mingren zhi sheng 
(The Rise of Famous People during the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’), (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu 
xueyuan chubanshe, 1993), pg. 338.
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end of 1968.
A joint commentary by the Renmin ribao and Hong qi on 21 September, 
1968 set out the main ideas behind the policy of “re-education” :
The great leader Chairman Mao teaches us that the remolding of 
the intellectuals remains a question of major significance throughout 
the course of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. After 
seizing political power, the proletariat should remold the intellectuals 
in acordance with its own outlook and build up an army of proletarian 
intellectuals that serves it. This is essential for consolidating and 
developing the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the 
restoration of capitalism; it is essential for establishing the proletariat 
in the position of absolute domination in all spheres of ideology and 
culture.
The commentary expressed confidence in the intellectuals willingness to 
undergo “remoulding”, and emphasized the need to adopt more moderate 
tactics during the re-education process.13
However, on 29 January 1969, only four months after this commentary was 
published, the CCP Central Committee approved a report by the propaganda 
team stationed at Tsinghua University on work to re-educate intellectuals at that 
institution which appeared to adopt a more confrontational tone in its 
assessment of the failings of the intellectuals and in the numbers who had 
‘taken the capitalist road’. The report stated that before the Cultural Revolution 
the large majority of teachers at Tsinghua University had a “bourgeois world 
outlook”. It went on to say that students whose parents had been labelled as 
“traitors”, "spies”, or those who “took the capitalist road” had been required to 
go through a process of differentiating themselves from their families, 
eliminating the influence of Liu Shaoqi from their own actions, and standing on 
the side of Mao Zedong’s revolutionary line, (hua-qing-zhan ).14
13 “On the Reeducation of Intellectuals", Hong Qi, No 3, 1968 (September 10, 1968) in 
Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix A.
14 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Dashiji, 1949-1982, (Chronicle of Major Events in 
Education in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-82), (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe
1983), pg.425. (Hereafter, Chronicle of Major Events in Education).
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The tougher line towards assessing the intellectuals’ mistakes in the 
Tsinghua report was an early indication of the position of radicals within the 
Party and of their supporters such at Chi Qun who as head of the propaganda 
team at Tsinghua University would have played a leading role in drafting this 
report. It also appears to presage his role in the National Education 
Conference of 1971 and in the drawing-up of what became known as the ‘2- 
estimates’ which were adopted at the 1971 conference and which echoed 
some of the language of this report.
The most visible manifestation of the campaign to re-educate intellectuals 
was the mass departure of 1,258 cadres and intellectuals from the Ministry of 
Education and its associated organs to a May 7th Cadre school located in 
Fengyang County, Anhui Province. Only a handful of military personnel were 
left behind to guard the Ministry’s buildings and property. In Anhui the 
intellectuals were expected to “temper [themselves] through labour and 
continue [the movement] to struggle, criticize and transform”.15 They were led in 
this work by the workers’ propaganda team stationed in the Ministry of 
Education.16
While intellectuals and administrators in China’s universities and colleges 
were no longer subject to indiscriminate violence, the dispatch of cadres and 
intellectuals from the Ministry of Education symbolized the continuing 
persecution of higher education personnel in China and the marked lack of 
trust shown towards these figures. It also marked the effective disbandment of 
the Ministry, which had ceased to function during the Cultural Revolution. 
Without a national administrative and policy-making body there was a lack of 
co-ordination over higher education policy in the period following the end of the 
mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution and the years 1968-1971 were 
marked by a series of articles published under the auspices of members of the
15 Ibid, pg.428.
16 /bid, pg.428.
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radical Left, which attempted to popularize the experiences of a number of 
model institutions of higher education in a bid to promote their own line in 
higher education. In the following section I will look in more detail at some of 
these models, and how members of the radical Left took the lead in promoting 
them.
c. Radical models for institutions of higher education
While the radical Left promoted the experiences of a number of different 
institutions of higher education as worthy of emulation, these various models 
tended to be placed into one of three categories: Colleges of science and 
engineering {li-ke-gong daxue)', arts and humanities universities (wenke 
daxue)] and agricultural colleges (nongye xueyuan ). In describing the 
experiences of these model institutions the various articles attempted to set out 
simple policy guidelines for each type of university or college, in science and 
engineering it included “selecting students from among the workers”, in the 
arts and humanities it was to “treat the whole of society as one’s factory”. The 
Left used these articles to repudiate the old higher education policy and 
promote their own educational line by highlighting the success of the changes 
popularized by these institutions. With strong support from the official media, 
the radical Left were able to dominate policy discussion. The example of these 
models were highly influential, and their example was a significant factor in the 
regulations adopted outlining enrollment procedures, curriculum content and 
administration in the universities once they reopened in 1970-71.
i. Science and engineering.
Many of the radical Left’s initiatives were based on often brief statements or 
directives from Mao Zedong. This was certainly the case with regards to 
science and engineering colleges. In a new directive issued on 21 July, 1968, 
Mao had said:
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It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to 
colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to 
shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put 
proletarian politics in command and take the road of the 
Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in training technicians from 
among the workers. (My emphasis). Students sould be selected 
from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they 
should return to production after a few years’ study.17
Four days after Mao’s comments the Renmin Ribao published an 
investigation report “The Way to Train Engineering and Technical Personnel as 
Viewed from the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant”. The report outlined the 
experiences of the factory in training its own workers as advanced technicians 
and designers, and contrasted the university graduates the factory employed 
unfavourabley against these new “revolutionary technicians”. The “bookish” 
knowledge of the university graduates was said to be ill-suited to the practical 
conditions found in the factory and these technicians apparently made little 
contribution to the effective running of the factory when compared to the 
technicians promoted from the ranks of the workers. The latter were better able 
to understand the practical requirements of their colleagues, and the limitations 
that the scant resources available to the factory posed on technical design and 
development within the factory.
By highlighting the inadequacies of the graduate students, the report sought 
to underline the perceived deficiencies in higher education policy before the 
Cultural Revolution. It went on to suggest four proposals for the “revolution in 
education” based on its own experiences:
1. Schools must educate “workers with socialist consciousness and culture.” 
This would prevent a reccurance of the situation before the Cultural Revolution 
when schools were said to train “‘intellectual aristocrats’ who were alienated 
from proletarian politics, the broad masses of workers and peasants, and
17 “Chairman MaoTse-tung’s Latest Directive", translated in the Peking Review, 2 August, 
1968, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educaitonat Revolution, Appendix F.
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production work.
2. The combination of “school education" with “productive labour”. As well 
as reforming intellectuals’ "world outlook", engaging in productive labour would 
overcome the problem that was felt to exist under the old education system 
where theory was separated from practice. The report claimed that “only by 
doing practical work can one master theory quickly and thoroughly, and apply it 
creatively".
3. The report also recommended that workers from the factory should be 
selected to attend university. The report cited practical, as well as political 
reasons for adopting this policy. Although workers were said to “have a better 
political background", the report also argued that having already engaged in 
productive labour, after graduation the student would be able to “work 
independently", whereas a graduate of university "generally will be able to 
work independently only after two or three years of internship”. (This was a 
somewhat specious argument as under the new regulations, graduates would 
still have to undergo a period of internship, only it would be before graduation, 
not after).
4. Finally, the report suggested organizing technicians at the factory who 
had attended college or university before 1949, or when universities were 
subject to “revisionist educational policy” to undergo re-education to enable 
them to adopt the right world outlook.18
By drawing students from the ranks of the workers and placing the education 
of their technicians in the hands of the factory staff, the school had broken what 
was perceived as a monopoly over higher education controlled by the 
‘bourgeois’ (professional) academics and their political backers that had 
hindered workers, peasants and soldiers from entering university and made the
18 “The Way to Train Engineering and Technical Personnel as Viewed from the Shanghai 
Machine-Tool Plant", in the Renmin Ribao, 22 July, 1968, reprinted in Peter J. Seybolt, 
Revolutionary Education in China , (White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences 
Press, Inc., 1973) pg.250.
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education on offer at these institutions irrelevent to their practical needs. In 
addition, by placing the school in the factory, they fulfilled the concept of 
combining theory with practice.
On 29 March, 1969, the Renmin Ribao carried an article written by the 
Workers’ Propaganda Team stationed at Tsinghua University under the 
leadership of Chi Qun. The article “How Should [We] Manage a Socialist 
University?” (Shehuizhuyi daxue yingdang ruhe ban?) marked the start of a 
special column of the same name which ran intermittently for the next five 
years. That the first article was written by such a prominent supporter of the 
radical Left shows that it was launched under their auspices and the column 
acted as a mouthpiece for the radical Left and provides more detailed 
information on their higher educational policies. The article “How Should [We] 
Manage a Socialist University?” discussed the issue of working class 
leadership in China’s schools and the work of the propaganda team since it 
entered Tsinghua University in July 1968:
In this proletarian educational revolution, the working class must 
firmly grasp leadership authority over the educational revolution and 
transform the field of education that has long been under the control of 
the bourgeoisie.
At the moment we are acting in accordance with Chairman Mao’s 
great instruction to “follow the path of the Shanghai Machine Tool 
Factory and train technicians from the ranks of the workers” and 
organizing revolutionary teachers and students to go right into 
factories and the countryside and be subject to the workers’, 
peasants’, and military's “re-education”.19
The Shanghai Machine Tools Factory was not the only model promoted by 
the radical Left during this period. Starting in late-1967, the experiences of 
Tongji University in Shanghai were discussed in the Chinese media. A number 
of departments of Tongji University had combined with a construction unit in
19 “Shehuizhuyi daxue yingdang ruhe ban?” (How should [we] manage socialist 
universitites?) in the Renmin Ribao, 29 March, 1969, pg 1.
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Shanghai to form the “May 7th Commune” (named after Mao’s May 7th 
directive of 1966 which had urged students “to learn other things” and study 
“industrial work, farming and military affairs”). An article in the Peking Review 
claimed that the formation of the May 7th Commune would form "an integrated 
whole having [the] three-fold function of tuition, designing and building. This 
will change the present phenomenon of education being divorced from 
production”.20 A second article from 17 May, 1968 claimed:
In accordance with Chairman Mao’s teaching to “learn warfare 
through warfare,” Tongji’s revolutionary teachers and students, in 
addition to necessary classroom studies, also take part in designing 
and building together with the workers and designers, learning as 
they work... this has fundamentally changed the previous state of 
affairs when bourgeois intellectuals monopolized the teaching 
platform.21
As classes resumed in 1970-71, Tsinghua University would also be promoted 
as a model science and engineering institution.
The culmination of the radical Left’s activities to promote these models 
during 1969-71 was the publication of the article “Strive to Build Socialist 
Universities of Science and Engineering”, written by the Qinghua Propaganda 
Team under Chi Qun. While this article was still in the process of being drafted, 
members of the radical Left convened the Discussion Meeting on the Education 
Revolution in Science and Engineering Universities in Shanghai on 2 June, 
1971. The meeting discussed a draft of the Tsinghua article and the 
experiences of a number of universities of science and engineering in 
Shanghai. A summary of the discussion meeting and the final article were 
published in Hong Q i issue 8, 1970 and together these two documents 
represent the clearest description of the Left’s policy toward these types of 
universities.
20 “Some Tentative Programmes for Revolutionizing Education”, translated in Peking 
Review, November 7, 1967, in Theodore Hsi-en Chen, op cit, Appendix G.
21 “Tongji University’s Programme for Revolutionizing Education: Six Month’s Practice", 
translated in the Peking Review^ May 17, 1968, in ibid, Appendix G.
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“Strive to Build Socialist Universities of Science and Engineering" set out a 
number of policies which these universities were expected to adopt. These 
expanded on many of the points of the articles already described above. I 
outline the key suggestions of the article below under the five original sub­
headings:
1. “The Working Class, Through Struggle, Must Maintain Firm Leadership 
Over the Revolution in Education". Working class leadership would ensure the 
complete eradication of the influence of the bourgeoisie in China’s universities 
and colleges, and would guarantee the success of the education revolution. 
The article did note that working class leadership should not “mean the 
monopolization of everything or the use of crude methods to overwhelm 
everything”. The Workers’ Propaganda Teams were expected to cooperate 
with, and develop the initiative of, all ‘revolutionary’ teachers and students.
2. “While Making Use of the Original Teaching Staff, Transform it; Form a 
Three-in-One Teacher Corps". Establishing a new corps of teachers which was 
made up of workers, peasants, soldiers, the new “revolutionary technicians” 
and “members of the original teaching staff” was seen as the most important 
policy in carrying out the education revolution, and in “putting a complete end 
to the domination of our schools by the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals”. 
Workers and peasants were to be recruited as teachers in universities. Their 
participation so far was said to have “advanced working class leadership in 
schools, effectively assured the proper political orientation of teaching, and 
promoted the remolding of intellectuals and the transformation of education”. 
Former members of staff were to be employed, once they had undergone re­
education. It was recognized that much of the professional knowledge of this 
group continued to be vital for China’s economic success.
3. “Establish a New Three-in-One System Combing Teaching, Scientific 
Research, and Production”. Higher education policy was expected to
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implement the line that “education must serve proletarian politics and be 
combined with productive labour”. Education policy before the Cultural 
Revolution had been criticized for being isolated from the practical needs of 
China’s factories and communes. Under the new system, education, research 
and production were to be closely integrated, with factories running schools, 
and schools running factories, bringing workers and students together and 
ensuring students take part in manual labour. Under the new system, 
education and research would directly cater to the needs of industrial 
production.
4. "In Training Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Students It Is Imperative to 
Maintain Class Struggle as the Principal Part of the Curriculum and to Maintain 
the Unity of Theory and Practice”. The residual influence of the bourgeoisie in 
China’s universities and colleges was felt to be strong, and new students 
drawn largely from the workers and peasants and enrolling in 1970 and 1971 
were still to be subject to continued political education to ensure the success of 
the education revolution. The article warned against the viewpoints of having 
been “born red” and having “entered school to learn an occupation and that 
they would patch up their politics after they returned home.”
5. “Destroy Slavish Comprador Philosophy and the Doctrine of Trailing 
Behind at a Snail’s Pace; Complete New, Proletarian Teaching Materials”. 
Original science and engineering textbooks were thought to reflect the 
worldview of the borgeoisie. Consequently it was necessary to draw up new 
teaching materials. Material was thought to be overly-complicated, with 
numerous superflous or duplicated material. In re-writing the material, it would 
simultaneously be simplified, and courses could be radically shortened to 
reflect the new material, speeding up the training of new graduates.22
22 “Wei chuanban shehuizhuyi likegong daxue erfendou" (Strive to Build Socialist 
Universities of Science and Engineering), Hong Q i issue 8, 1970 (21 July, 1970), in Peter J. 
Seybolt, Revolutionary Education in China, pp. 272-300.
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The discussion meeting held in Shanghai probably had only a small impact 
on the eventual content of the article, however it undoubtedly served to 
demonstrate the strength of support for the radical Left’s policy line and the 
content of the article. 19 people attended the meeting, including students and 
teachers from Tongji University’s ‘May 7th Commune’, and the Party Secretary 
of the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory’s school, now renamed the ‘July 21st 
Workers’ University’ after the date of Mao’s directive.23
While a number o f further articles discussinqjhese issues were printed prior 
to the National Educational Work Conference, these two articles represented 
the clearest expression of the radical Left’s policy towards science and 
engineering colleges. Their publication in Hong qi was celebrated two days 
later by a front page article in the Renmin Ribao which declared that they 
marked the start of “a new high tide in the proletarian educational revolution”.24
ii. Arts and Humanities Universities
Mao’s July 21st directive had focussed on universities of science and 
engineering. In the period immediately prior to the 9th Party Congress there 
were few articles discussing policy for arts and humanities universities along 
the lines of those describing the experiences of Tongji University and the 
Shanghai Machine Tools Factory. Aside from the influence of Mao’s directive, 
the difficulty of linking liberal arts courses to practical, hands-on labour in the 
way in which it was possible to link, for example, engineering courses, may 
also have prevented the early establishment of experimental programs. Some 
liberal arts courses may also have been seen as less ideologically sound, 
touching as they did on subjects such as literature, music, and art, which had 
all been targeted by the radical Left in the early-stages of the Cultural
23 “Shanghai likegong daxue jiaoyu geming zuotanhui jiyao” (A Summary of the Shanghai 
Discussion meeting on the Educational Revolution in Universities of Science and Engineering), 
in Hong Qi, Issue 8, 1970 (21 July, 1970), pg. 23.
24 “Juexin zai Mao Zhuxi jiaoyu geming luxian zhiling xia xianqi wuchanjieji jiaoyu geming de 
xin gaochao" (Under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s line on the education revolution, resolve to 
set of a new high tide in the proletarian education revolution), Renmin Ribao, 27 July, 1970, pg 1.
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Revolution. It is clear from a number of the articles discussed below that the 
influence of those opposed to the radical line was seen to be strongest in 
liberal arts institutions. For these reasons, the main institution promoted by the 
radical Left as a model for arts and humanities universities, Peking University, 
only really emerged as a model much later, in the summer of 1971, after 
students had begun to return to class. Prior to this, media discussion had 
focused only on general policy suggestions for these institutions.
An article in the first edition of the special column, “How should [we] manage 
socialist universities”, in the Renmin Ribao 29 March 1969 discussed policy 
towards “comprehensive universities” (zonghe daxue) rather than arts and 
humanities universities (wenke daxue). In line with the debate on colleges of 
science and engineering at that time, it was suggested that they adhere to 
Mao's July 21st directive and “shorten courses, revolutionize education, place 
proletarian politics in command and follow the line of the Shanghai Machine 
Tools Factory in training technicians from the ranks of the workers”.25
A second article appeared in the 12th edition of the same column, published 
in the Renmin Ribao 15 October, 1969. The article, written by the Education 
Revolution Group of the South China Normal College, developed a new theme. 
It described how the college had used “mass criticism” to reform the thinking of 
its teachers involved in liberal arts courses, and to “eliminate” what the article 
called the “venom of revisionism” (suqing xiuzhengzhuyi iiudu ) in the various 
classes.26 The article claimed that “politics was in command of professional 
work”, with students being organized to study Mao Zedong’s speeches and 
articles. In this way they learnt that writing essays was inherently political, and 
that “all essays had a political aim, and served a particular political
25 The Workers’ and PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Fudan 
University "Women zhuzhang chedi geming" (We advocate carrying the revolution through to 
the end),, in the Renmin Ribao, 29 March, 1969, pg.1.
26 Education Revolution Group of South China Normal Colleap./1 Daxue wenke yao ba 
dapipan lie wei zhengshi kecheng”, (Mass criticism should be made a part of the formal 
curriculum), in the Renmin Ribao  ^15 October, 1969, pg.3.
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standpoint”.27
The theme of “mass criticism” was picked up in a much fuller and more 
significant article, written by the Shanghai Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing 
Group and published in Hong Qi Issue 1, 1970. The article discussed the 
difficulty of reforming the liberal arts because of the continuing influence of the 
“bourgeoisie" in these institutions. It clearly sets out the thinking of the Left, 
who felt that this influence was particularly strong in the liberal arts as courses 
such as economics, politics, education, philosophy and literature were all seen 
as being closely tied to the overall worldview and political line of the 
bourgeoisie. Because of this arts and humanities needed to undertake mass 
criticism not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the thinking that lay behind the 
content of their courses and the courses themselves. Quoting Mao Zedong 
that “liberal arts should take all of society as their factory”, the article went on:
Society is a society of class struggle, and taking society as a 
workshop [factory] means linking the liberal arts intimately with the 
class struggle of society and with criticism of the bourgeoisie.
Therefore revolutionary mass criticism is not only the fundamental task 
of socialist arts and humanities universities, it is also an urgent militant 
task in the current reform of the old arts and humanities universities.
We should not only criticize the bourgeoisie in society but also carry 
revolutionary mass criticism into the liberal arts themselves to criticize 
the reactionary bourgeois ideological systems in philosophy, history, 
literature, politicial economy, journalism, education, and other fields.
Only in this way can the old arts and humanities universities gain new 
life through criticism.28
As with the colleges of science and engineering, the old arts and humanities 
universities were criticized for not combining theory with practice, and of being 
too isolated from the masses. In the new colleges and universities, students 
would better themsleves in the course of mass criticism, participating in the
27 Ibid, pg.3.
28 Shanghai Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing Group, "Wenke daxue yiding yao gao 
geming dapipan’’, (Arts and humanities universities must carry out revolutionary mass criticism), in 
Hong Qi, Issue 1, 1970 (1 January, 1970), translated in Peter J. Seybolt, Revolutionary 
Education in China, pg.303.
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repudiation of the old structures and the creation of new, more revolutionary 
ones. The article cited the example of students who had participated in work to 
create new ‘revolutionary’ operas under Jiang Qing:
The ranks of revolutionary literature and art workers that emerged 
in the course of the work of Comrade Chiang Ch’ing [Jiang Qing] in 
fostering revolutionary model operas under the guidance of Chairman 
Mao’s revolutionary line, and with the help of Mao Tse-tung thought, 
have reformed, tempered, and improved themselves in the course of 
acute class struggle, in the course of penetratingly and persistently 
developing revolutionary mass criticism in connection with artisitic 
practice, in the course of criticism of the counterrevolutionary 
revisionist line and foreign and conventional dogmas, and in the 
course of detailed scientific criticism against a batch of ancient and 
contemporary Chinese and foreign works. This sort of criticism is not 
only acute class struggle but is also very good study and self­
transformation.29
As students began to return to the arts and humanities universities and 
colleges in 1970 and 1971, the experiences of a number of institutions in 
“taking the whole of society as their factory” began to be published. In 
particular, Peking University emerged as a model promoted by supporters of 
the radical Left. In June, 1971, the workers’ propaganda team stationed at 
Peking University published an article “The Liberal Arts Should Take the Whole 
of Society as Their Factory”,30 which set out their experiences of applying Mao’s 
and the radical Left’s line in the liberal arts. The article is one of the clearest 
descriptions of how the Left saw these types of colleges and universities being 
run.
In line with the earlier Hong Qi article, the Peking University article claimed 
that “only by taking society as your factory, could you conduct thoroughgoing 
mass criticism of the bourgeoisie". It was necessary to "thoroughly eradicate 
the feudalistic, capitalist and revisionist ideological system in the liberal arts’’.31
29 Ibid, pg. 307.
30 Workers’ and PLA Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Peking University, 
“Wenke yao ba zhengge shehui zuowei ziji de gongchang” (The Liberal Arts Should Take the 
Whole of Society as Their Factory), in the Renmin Ribao, 19 June, 1971, pages 1 and 4.
31 Ibid, pg.1.
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According to the article, “taking society as your factory" meant that students 
should also engage in labour as well as studying, however the article did 
recognize the need for classroom teaching to continue and the importance of 
the teachers’ role. Students at Peking Univesity were said to have conducted 
visits to factories and villages, listening to the experiences of workers and 
peasants. They also engaged in social surveys, trying to relate their courses to 
the real conditions found in China’s cities and countryside.
d. The restoration of administrative control and the resumption of enrollment
A major obstacle to the normal resumption of classes was the lack of a 
central administrative body which could coordinate the implementation of a 
new higher education policy. As described above, the entire staff of the Ministry 
of Education had been sent to a ‘May 7th’ Cadre School in October 1969 for re­
education, and they were only allowed to return to Beijing at the start of 1971.
In the absence of a central body to coordinate higher education policy, the day- 
to-day administration of many of these institutions was left in the hands of the 
propaganda teams that had entered the universities in 1968 and 1969. As the 
situation stabilized on campus, revolutionary committees, and later Party 
committees were established, (or in the case of the Party committees, re­
established), however personnel from the propaganda teams often continued 
to dominate these new organizations. Without a central governing body it was 
difficult to coordinate the various institutions.
I have described above how the radical Left sought to dictate the line in 
higher education by publicizing the experiences of model institutions that were 
under its control. With their control over much of the media, the Left were able 
to dominate most of the policy debate. However the radical Left lacked a 
strong position within the State Council, which might have given them more 
influence over the actual implementation of policy. While they were able to 
press successfully for a higher education policy which largely reflected their
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views, the extent to which they were able to ensure its implementation in 
institutions not under the control of their supporters is less clear. Zhou Enlai 
was the senior State Council figure to survive the mobilization phase of the 
Cultural Revolution, and at the start of 1970, much of the administrative control 
over higher education policy probably lay in his hands, and his more moderate 
outlook, backed by the surviving cadres of the State Council, offered some 
balance to the views of the radical Left.
In June 1970 it appears that the Party Central Committee, and in particular, 
Zhou Enlai, moved to address both of the problems facing higher education in 
China at that time, announcing, only a few days apart, that Peking and 
Tsinghua Univiersities would once again begin to enroll students and the 
formation of the Science and Education Group (SEG) under the State Council 
which would oversee higher education policy.
Demonstrating the influence of the radical Left in policy formation, the 
resumption of classes in China’s universities was heavily influenced by the 
experiences of the model institutions outlined above. On 27 June, 1970, the 
CCP Central Committee approved the distribution of the “Report of Peking 
University and Tsinghua University Requesting Instructions on Enrolling 
Students (Pilot Projects)”. The "Report”, coming from two of the institutions 
under the control of supporters o f the radical Left, stated that havingjqone 
through the last three years of the Cultural Revolution, the two universities 
already possessed the necessary conditions to enroll students once more. The 
report made the following proposals which were intended to act as guidelines 
for the resumption of enrollment and the day-to-day functioning of the 
universities:
1. The objectives of training: “To train workers with both cultural and 
scientific knowledge and practical experience who will raise high the 
great banner of Mao Zedong Thought, and devote themselves absolutely
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to Chairman Mao, Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary line and devote themselves wholeheartedly to serving the 
socialist revolution and socialist construction”. (This placed the emphasis 
very much on “redness” over “expertese”).
2. The educational system: According to the specific needs of each 
speciality, it will be divided into either two or three year [courses]. There 
will also be advanced courses of one year.
3. The content of courses: Establish “political classes with Chairman 
Mao’s important works as the basic teaching material; implement the 
integration of study, research and production; and [establish] military 
training classes which take the preparation for war as their content” . All 
students must take part in productive labour.
4. Requirements for students: Workers, peasants, soldiers and young 
cadres with a good political background, who are healthy, and have three 
years practical experience [of work]. They must be around 20 years old, 
and have the equivalent of a lower-middle school education or better. 
Workers and poor and lower-middle peasants with a rich work 
experience are not subject to the age or education-level 
restrictions [my emphasis]. We must also pay attention to enrolling 
‘sent-down’ and ‘returned’ [hui xiang] youth.
5. Method of enrollment: We will implement the method of combining 
recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership, and 
ratification by the school.
6. Remuneration of students: Workers with over 10 years work 
experience will be paid by their original unit (however they must deduct 
the 19.5 Yuan issued by the school). All other students from factories and 
the countryside will receive a monthly subsidy of 19.5 Yuan. Students 
from the PLA will be paid for by their units.
7. Principles of allocation [of work after completion of studies!: After the
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completion of studies, in principle [students] should return to their original 
unit or original area to work. However, in accordance with the needs of 
the state, a number of students will be allocated [work] centrally.32
These guidelines were later formally approved and on 15 October, the State 
Council reportedly telegraphed local administrations across China to carry out 
enrollment work for 1970 in accordance with the content of the “Report”. In 
total, some 1,870 students from the ranks of the workers, peasants and PLA are 
reported to have enrolled in China’s universities that year in line with the new 
regulations.33 The figure for new enrollments rose to 42,420 in 1971, bringing 
the total enrollment in China’s institutions of higher education to 83,400, down 
dramatically from the total of 674,436 in 1965, the year before the Cultural 
Revolution broke out.34
Shortly after the first publication of the report, the formation of the State 
Council Science and Education Group (SEG) was announced. The SEG was 
to take over the work of the Ministry of Education and the State Science 
Commission. The initial make-up of the SEG suggested that Zhou Enlai and 
the radicals had compromised over its membership. When the formation of the 
SEG was announced, day-to-day management was said to be under the joint 
control of Li Siguang, Liu Xiyao and Chi Qun. Chi was clearly allied to the 
radical Left, and worked very closely with Zhang Chunqiao on educational 
matters at this time. However, Li Siguang was a veteran geologist who had 
served at Peking University in the 1920s. Since 1949 he had served on both 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and been deputy head of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS). As a long-standing academic, who had worked
32 “Report of Peking University and Tsinghua University Requesting Instructions on Enrolling 
Students (Pilot Projects)” in Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.433.
33 Ibid, pg.434.
34 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu dashiji 1949-1982, (Achievements of Education in 
China, 1949-1982), (Beijing: Jiaoyu kexue chubanshe, 1983) pg.50.
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in higher education before liberation, Li would not be expected to support the 
line of the radical Left. His time in the NPC, when he served in a number of 
high-ranking posts suggests he might have been closely allied with Zhou 
Enlai.35 Liu Xiyao had also served in the State Council under Zhou Enlai as 
Vice-Chairman of the Science and Technology Commision. He had apparently 
disappeared from public view in 1963, only reappearing at the 9th Party 
Congress when he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee. 
Liu later went on to serve as Minister of Education after the purge of the Gang 
of Four, so it also seems unlikely that he would have been a supporter of the 
line of the radical Left as the majority of these figures were purged after October 
1976. This initial balance may not have favoured the radicals, however Li 
Siguang’s health appears to have been failing at this time (he died in May the 
following year), and this appears to have allowed Chi Qun’s influence to 
dominate. Later a number of close supporters of the radical Left were also 
made members of the SEG, including Xie Jingyi, Xu Jingxian and Xu Haitao, 
underlining their influence within this body.
e. The National Educational Work Conference and the ‘2-Estimates’
The ability of the radical Left to dictate the policy and ideological line to be 
taken in higher education was demonstrated at the National Educational Work 
Conference, which opened in Beijing 15 April, 1971. The conference was 
convened by the State Council and coincided with the return of personnel from 
the Ministry of Education, however the influence of these figures appears to 
have been negligable.36 In all 631 delegates drawn from relevant departments 
in the State Council and the provinces, the military and people from 198 
institutions of higher education attended.37 As Suzanne Pepper notes, the 
intention of the conference was to institutionalize the experiences of the
35 Union Research Institute, Who’s Who in Communist China, (Hong Kong, 1965), pg.358.
36 Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-century China, pg.467.
37 Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.438.
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experimental models that had been implemented since 1968.38 Although the 
Left eventually dominated the outcome of the meeting, the fact that it lasted for 
over two and a half months and did not close until 31 July suggests that there 
was considerable internal debate over the final conclusions.
The most significant result of the meeting was the adoption of what became 
known as the "two-assessments”. At the start of the conference Xu Haitao,
(who was a close supporter of Zhang Chunqiao), and a number of other 
delegates from Shanghai are reported to have proposed the conference adopt 
the line that in the seventeen years before the Cultural Revolution (1949-1966), 
schools had been under the leadership of “traitors, special agents, and those 
who followed the capitalist road”. Also, that schools had been “places to train 
bourgeoisie intellectuals”. This line was set down in a summary (Jiyao) of the 
conference, drafted by Chi Qun and revised by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan.39 The summary, which was finally published on 13 August, 1971, 
set out the ‘two-estimates’, which “defined the first 17 years of education work 
(1949-1966) as being bourgeois dominated and decreed that the great majority 
of intellectuals were capitalist in their world outlook”.40 This was the line set out 
in the 27 June, 1970 report from Peking and Tsinghua Universities.
Elsewhere, the conference accepted the approach towards managing 
institutions of higher education set out in that report. The meeting was 
undoubtedly a success for the radical Left, as it adopted their policy package 
based largely on the experiences of the model institutins they had promoted. 
However, it also represented the peak of their attempts to define a radical 
approach to higher educational policy. Within a year of the conference,
Premier Zhou Enlai was leading attempts to undermine key elements of their 
policies, demonstrating his continued influence in the administration of policy. 
As more cadres, purged during the early phase of the Cultural Revolution
38 Suzanne Pepper, op cit, pg.467.
39 Chroncile of Major Events in Education, pg.438.
40 Suzanne Pepper, op cit, pg. 467.
109
began to be rehabilitated, the group of cadres around Zhou Enlai were able to 
move to challenge some of the basic elements of the radical line.
3. Criticism and defence of the radical policy in higher education: 1972-1974
The ideological significance of higher education policy during the Cultural 
Revolution, and the strength of support for the radical Left in a number of key 
educational institutions, meant that any attempt to reform the new line in higher 
education was likely to be subject to intense criticism. However, beginning in 
early-1972, concerns began to be raised by moderates about the quality of the 
new students being enrolled in China’s universities and colleges. This in turn 
led to calls for enrollment procedures to be reformed and for the emphasis to 
be placed once again on academic ability. By 1973, a limited examination that 
tested potential student’s knowledge in a range of subjects had been 
introduced, however, a number of articles were at pains to point out that this did 
not represent a return to the old examination system where “test scores were in 
command” (fenshu guashuai). The new examinations were described as a 
part of a wider examination of students abilities, which also tested their moral 
(i.e. political) and physical abilities. Articles in the official media were at pains 
to point out that more emphasis was placed on political standing, and that 
where test scores were identical, preference would be given to those with 
higher achievements in the other areas. In addition to the re-introduction of 
examinations, there were other signs of normalization in the day-to-day 
activities of China’s universities and colleges, with students once more going 
overseas to study, and universities that had been closed during the 
mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution re-opening through 1973 and 
1974.
The ability of moderates to introduce these limited reforms and the way in 
which a number of articles printed in the media reflect their views shows that
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although the radical Left could dominate the policy debate, they had less 
influence over policy implementation. Here, the State Council, controlled by 
Zhou Enlai appears significant.
a. The issue of academic quality
The academic quality of the new ‘worker-peasant-soldier’ students emerged 
as an issue very quickly. The first classes of students enrolled under the new 
regulations had entered university in 1970 and 1971. Robert McCormick 
reveals that even in the first year of enrollment, students entering Fudan 
University were required to spend two to three months reviewing their middle 
school work.41 Similarly, he reports that students entering Guangzhou’s 
Medical college were given a six month course covering politics, culture, 
language, mathematics, physics and chemistry.42
Even though numbers were low in these first two years, a report issued by 
the SEG in May 1972 revealed concerns about their low academic ability. The 
“Report by the Science and Education Group of the Beijing Revolutionary 
Committee on the Trial Running of Remedial Classes in Institutions of Higher 
Education”, published by the SEG 8 May, 1972, described the situation in 11 
colleges and universities in Beijing. Of the ‘worker-peasant-soldier’ students 
enrolled in these institutions, only 20 percent had an educational level above 
junior-middle school level, 60 percent had received a junior-middle school 
education, and 20% had only attended primary school. The report claimed that 
the Beijing Revolutionary Committee had demanded these schools lay on 6 
month remedial classes for those students whose academic ability did not 
match the demands of their courses. In an announcement published at the 
time of the release of the report, the SEG stated that “All institutions of higher 
education can demand that students whose educational levels do not meet the
41 Robert McCormick, ‘“Revolution in Education’ Committees”, in The China Quarterly, No 
57, (Jan/March 1974), pg.135.
42 Ibid, pp. 135-136.
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requirements can be required to attend remedial classes according to the 
demands of the various specialities”.43
Only two days after the release of this report, the “Discussion Meeting on the 
Education Revolution in Composite Universities and Foreign Language 
Colleges” opened in Beijing. The meeting, which was convened by the SEG, 
ran until 20 June. Delegates from 15 colleges and universities, including 
Peking University, Fudan University and the Shanghai Foreign Languages 
Institute attended, as well as representatives from education bureaus in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Liaoning. Delegates appear to have been chosen mainly from 
institutions and locations loyal to the radical Left, however the conference 
appears to have discussed the issue of the academic quality of students at 
some length, suggesting that delegates representing the Left were at least 
willing to recognize the issue. The meeting is reported to have “emphasized 
the need to pay close attention to raising quality”, called for “the development of 
the basic sciences”, and recognized the need to “train talented people for 
scientific research”.44 Significantly, the meeting is also reported to have called 
for the protection of “essential teaching time", perhaps reflecting concerns that 
students were engaged in too many other activities, such as manual labour and 
political study which were affecting their academic study.
Premier Zhou Enlai placed his personal authority behind the drive to raise 
academic standards, meeting with Chinese-American scholar Yang Zhenning 
2 July, 1972. Peking University professor Zhou Peiyuan also attended the 
meeting. Yang made a number of suggestions as to how China could 
strengthen its basic theoretical research and train future researchers, which 
Zhou Enlai personally endorsed. Speaking to Zhou Peiyuan, Zhou Enlai is 
reported to have said “You should go back and manage Peking University’s 
sciences well and raise the level of basic theoretical [knowledge]”.45 Later, on
43 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.443.
44 Ibid, pg.443.
45 Ibid, pg.434.
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20 July, Zhou Peiyuan wrote to Zhou Enlai outlining his views on basic 
theoretical research and teaching in China. Zhou circulated the letter amongst 
members of the SEG and other leading figures in the field of education. Adding 
his own comments to the letter, Zhou Enlai wrote “At the moment we emphasize 
practice, there is not enough said about theory, basic theory classes in school 
are also rare". Challenging one of the cornerstones of the new enrollment 
policy, Zhou went on, “We have prospects for developing social science 
theories and natural science theories. After graduation, middle school students 
shouldn’t solely labour for two years, they should be able to both study and 
work".46
Later in the year, Zhou Peiyuan set out his views in a more detailed article, 
“Some Views on the Education Revolution in the Sciences in Composite 
Universities”, published in the academic newspaper Guangming ribao 6 
October, 1972. Zhou’s views challenged another core element of the new line 
in higher education policy, namely the value of engaging in manual work and 
linking theoretical study with labour. Zhou questioned the view that you could 
“substitute teaching in the laboratory with schools running their own factories”. 
He called for more emphasis to be placed on basic theoretical teaching and for 
more time to be spent in laboratory training.47 Zhou Peiyuan’s arguments were 
strongly criticized in a series of articles published in the Shanghai-based 
Wenhui Bao on the instructions of Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao.
The question of focusing solely on academic standards had of course, been 
one of the focal points for attack by the radical Left. An article in the Renmin 
ribao, 3 August, 1972, addressed this point and sought to distinguish this new 
empahsis on academic ability from the old problems of “professionalism in 
command" (yewu guashuai) and "intellectual development first” (zhiyu diyi) 
which had been subject to so much criticism. The article claimed that the
46 Ibid, pg.444.
47 Ibid, pg.446.
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damage done by Lin Biao in education meant that the quality of teaching did 
not meet the “three great revolutionary movements”, namely class struggle, 
economic production and scientific research. Cadres were told to distinguish 
between raising education standards and the old slogan of “intellectual 
development first”. The article went on to say that schools should make full use 
of the special skills and knowledge of veteran intellectuals and strengthen 
teaching in basic skills and knowledge.48
The question of the quality of new students was directly related to the issue 
of the new enrollment procedures. Students were only expected to have 
received an education to junior-middle school level, but even this requirement 
could be waived for workers and peasants with over ten years work 
experience. A meeting to discuss enrollment work in institutions of higher 
education was held in Beijing 15 July-9 August, 1972, however, while 
delegates to the meeting emphasized the need to ensure students’ academic 
quality, they apparently placed equal emphasis on ensuring the students’ 
political standing too.49 No changes in regulations for enrollment in 1973 
appear to have been made at that time.
Articles in the official media continued to discuss the issue of raising 
academic standards, although as often as not, these articles originated from 
institutions associated with supporters of the radical Left, suggesting that they 
had been forced to confront the issue of quality as a result of the growing 
debate.50 An article describing the experiences of some of the new students at 
Tsinghua University described the difficulties that had faced the students
46 “Qieshi jiaqiang dangwei dui jiaoxue lingyu geming de lingdao”, (Concientiously
strengthen the leadership of the party committee over the revolution in the educational field), in
the Renmin Ribao±3 August, 1972, pg 2.
49 Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.444.
50 See for example “Jianchi zou ‘yi shehui wei gongchang’ de daolu" (Continue to follow the 
path of ‘taking society as [your] factory), describing the experiences of Peking University, in the 
Renmin Ribao, 3 January, 1973 and “Banhao tushuguan renzhen zuzhi xuesheng zixue” (Run 
libraries well and concientiously organize students to study on their own), written by the 
Education Revolution Group at Shanghai Normal University, in the Renmin Ribao, 23 November, 
1972.
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coming from a background of low academic achievements.51 As described in 
the article, the key factor for these students was their willingness to work hard to 
overcome these difficulties. This appears to have been the line taken by the 
radical Left at this time; they recognized the academic weakness of many of the 
students enrolled under the new system, but the good political background of 
these students and their proven ability to work hard, meant that they would 
overcome all difficulties. The emphasis here was still on political qualifications 
taking precedence, however the Left’s argument had shfited slightly to counter 
the new discusion on academic quality by arguing that political qualifications 
were the best way to ensure academic quality.
The conflict over the relative significance of academic and political 
qualifications may have been responsible for the SEG failing to come up with 
any comprehensive guidelines on this issue for enrollment work in 1973. 
However in the course of May and June, 1973, a series of announcements on 
specific subjects did clearly place the emphasis on academic qualifications. 
Although it seems unclear exactly when, or if, a central decision was taken, 
candidates hoping to enroll in a university in 1973 were once again to be 
subject to an examination to test their knowledge in a wide range of subjects.
The main decision taken at this time with regard to testing students academic 
knowledge appears to be the SEG’s "Opinions on Enrollment Work in 1973 for 
Institutions of Higher Education”, approved by the State Council on 3 April,
1973. The document stated that enrollment work should continue along the 
lines of the previous years, except that universities and colleges should:
Pay attention to examining the education level [of candidates] and 
understand the extent of basic theoretical knowledge of those being 
recommended and their analytical and problem-solving ability. 
[Universities] should ensure that students entering their school really 
have completed an education up to or above the level of junior-middle
51 “Qianjin zai you hong, you zhuan de daolu shang Fang Qinghua Daxue xuesheng" (Move 
forward on the path of ‘Red and Expert’ A visit to Tsinghua University students), in the Renmin 
Ribao, 23 February, 1973, pg.2.
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school.
Despite this statement, the SEG appeared unable to set out a comprehensive 
policy which might be followed nationally. Rather the document said simply:
Each province, municipality and autonomous region can conduct 
experiments into the content and method of examination in light of 
specific conditions and the demands of the different specialities.
It appears that it was on the basis of decentralizing control over the exams as 
set out in this document that tests for candidates wanting to attend university 
were re-introduced in 1973.
If this decision was somewhat hedged, later decisions for students of 
physical education and foreign languages were much clearer and confirmed 
the renewed emphasis on academic quality. On 8 May, 1973, the State Sports 
Commission and the SEG jointly announced that that year students wanting to 
study physical education would be required to undergo a unified (national) 
exam. In addition, physical education colleges would be able to take a small 
number of senior-junior school graduates, without first requiring them to take 
part in manual labour for two years. On 2 June, the State Council also 
approved the “Report on Enrollment Work for 1973 at the Beijing Foreign 
Languages Institute". This report stated that as this institute trained students for 
the whole country, it would be allowed to undertake enrollment work on the 
basis of its own regulations. As with students of physical education, the report 
said that Beijing Foreign Languages Institute would be allowed to select a 
small number of junior-middle school graduates. These two examples, where 
moderates used a plea of specialization to justify an end to some of the radical 
Left’s policies acted almost as a “foot in the policy door", gradually undermining 
the coherence of the Left’s arguments, however these were the only significant 
alterations to the new enrollment policy before 1977 and even these reforms 
continued to be hotly debated.
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As the abolition of the old examination system had been a significant 
component of the new, radical, line in higher education, the reintroduction of 
exams for students wanting to attend university was politically very sensitive. 
This fact was recognized in the 48th issue of the column “How should [we] 
manage socialist universities?" The lead article in this issue, “Conscientiously 
carry out university enrollment work” sought to differentiate these new 
examinations from the old national entrance exam.51 In a lengthy defence of the 
new examinations, the article claimed:
In accordance with the needs of the complete development of moral, 
academic and physical [education], during this year’s enrollment work, 
on the basis of recommendation by the masses, we are carrying out 
examinations of education [level]. Some people have said that since 
you are carrying out examinations, you should rely [solely] on these to 
judge who is successful [ding gao-di]. To counter this we have 
mobilized the masses to deepen their criticism of the counter­
revolutionary fallacies of Liu Shaoqi and others and to help the masses 
draw three clear distinctions in accordance with the [Party’s] line: The 
distinction between studying knowldege and technology for the 
revolution and following the path of ‘Red and Expert’, and “putting 
intellectual development first” and “test scores in command”; the 
distinction between carrying out essential academic tests under the 
guidance of the correct political line and using tests to “shut-out, block 
and oppress" [guan-ka-yao] the workers, peasants and soldiers; and 
the distinction between emphasizing academic standards under the 
premise of “politics in command” and placing “test scores in command”. 
In the course of the examination, we pay attention to the correct 
relationship between intellectual knowledge and moral and phsyical 
standards and insist on making a concrete analysis of the worth of all 
three. Therefore, with regards to academic standards, it isn’t a question 
of relying only on scores and making a decision. Rather we integrate 
the results of the examination with an investigtion into the 
recommended candidates analytical and problem-solving ability and 
from this clarify their actual level.
It seems likely that this line probably represented the maximum extent of 
public criticism of the current line in higher education possible at that time. With 
the rehabilitation of many cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution, the
51 Zhunyang District Revolutionary Committee, Jiangsu Province, “Qieshi zuohao daxue 
zhaosheng gongzuo” (Conscientiously carry out university enrollment work), in the Renmin 
Ribao, 20 June, 1973, pg. 3.
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influence of professional academics who had been engaged in education work 
prior to 1966 was growing. It seems likely that the preference of this group 
would have been for the complete abolition of the system of recommending 
people for university places and a return to the national examination system 
that had been in place before, with its emphasis on academic quality. However 
the impact of the Cultural Revolution had changed the ideological environment 
in which these rehabilitated cadres now worked making it difficult to challenge 
the underlying philosophy behind the new exam system. Any changes had to 
be framed within the ideological vocabulary of the time. Faced with this 
problem, any change tended to be ad hoc and incremental, however even 
limited moves drew a sharp response from the radical Left, who, rightly, saw 
any changes as undermining their own policy position.
b. A return to regular activities in China’s universities and colleges
In addition to the discussion on academic standards and the reintroduction 
of a form of testing, there were numerous other signs that academic activity was 
returning to a more ‘regular’ track through 1972 and 1973. On 7 August 1972, 
the SEG published the “Circular on Re-establishing the People’s Education 
Publishing House". The circular stated that one of the responsibilities of the 
newly reopened publishing house would be the compilation and publication of 
material for basic theoretical classes in engineering and the sciences for 
universities.52 Elsewhere China sent its first ever delegation to attend a meeting 
of UNESCO in October 1972 and later the same year the first group of students 
since 1966 were selected to go overseas to study.53 In 1973 China also began 
to accept overseas students once more, with a total of 383 coming to China that 
year, again the first since 1966.
The number of colleges and universities re-opening gradually increased 
through 1972-1974. In October 1972 the Beijing Languages Institute re-
52 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.445.
53 Ibid, pg.447
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opened. A further eight institutions were reopened in March 1973, including 
the Beijing Commerce Institute, Beijing Normal College, the Northwest 
Nationalities Institute and the Chengdu Physical Education College. Another 
27 colleges re-opened in June 1974.54 As these schools reopened the total 
number of students grew significantly from 83,400 in 1971 to 429,981 in 1974.55
A further sign that institutions of higher education were returning to what 
might be termed a more regular track was the gradual reduction in numbers of 
workers and soldiers stationed on campuses as part of the Workers 
Propaganda Teams. This was in part due to the impact of the fall of Lin Biao 
which I will discuss below, but the gradual reduction in numbers also reflected 
the return of academics and administrative staff to their former institutions, 
reducing the need for the propaganda teams. Figures show that in 1973 there 
were a total of 4,892 people involved in the propaganda teams stationed in 
universities across China. This was down from a total of 12,804 in 1971. A 
quarter of China’s universities, 87 insitutions, had no propaganda teams at all.56
c. The death of Lin Biao and the ‘Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and 
Confucius’
Lin Biao’s apparent coup attempt and his subsequent death while fleeing to 
the Soviet Union in September 1971 was followed by a reduction in the 
numbers of military personnel stationed on university campuses across China 
as members of the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. Suzanne 
Pepper views the withdrawal of the military as a consequence of post-Cultural 
Revolution “consolidation”, rather than as a direct result of Lin’s flight,57 
certainly, the signs of normalization discussed above demonstrate a desire to 
place the operation of China’s universities and colleges on a more secure 
footing even before Lin’s death.
57Ibid.
55 Achievements of Education in China, pg.50
56 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.456.
57 Suzzane Pepper, Radicalsim and Education Reform in 20th-century China, pg.469.
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Lin’s fall from grace offered an opportunity for moderate figures like Zhou 
Enlai to criticize Lin and some of the policies of the Cultural Revolution which 
Lin had been associated with. Significantly, criticism of Lin Biao seems to have 
developed into more concrete attacks on the new higher education policies 
introduced during the Cultural Revolution. A report by the SEG for the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council, dated 21 May, 1973, summarized 
some of the criticisms raised in the last 6 months by intellectuals and other 
people involved in education work. The criticisms suggested that there was 
widespread discontent within the academic community. They included:
Thinking that the quality of education today was low, that the 
worker-peasant-soldier students did not resemble university students, 
and that the education revolution was “chaotic, crude, and lowered 
[standards]” ; having conflict with regards to the “two estimates” set out 
in the "Summary of the National Educational Work Conference”, 
believing that the "Summary” was a heavy millstone pressing down 
on the intellectuals, and that it was a product of the extreme “left” line 
of Lin Biao.58
Highlighting the continued Leftist influence within the SEG, the report criticized 
these views, saying they represented “muddled thinking” and “ideological 
confusion” and that “you could even say they were an ‘attack’” . The report 
stated that Lin Biao’s “revisionist line” was actually “rightist”, not left as these 
criticisms implied, it added that the “transformation” (gaizao) of intellectuals 
should continue to be strengthened.59
Obviously the content of the report reflected the thinking of the radical Left. It 
was in their interest to refute any criticism of Lin Biao that labelled his policies 
as extreme “left” as this could then be used to attack their own policy line. It 
seems likely that within the SEG itself, Chi Qun was involved in drafting the 
report. Only a few months later, Chi played an instrumental role in launching 
the ‘Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius’. This campaign, which
50 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.451.
59 Ibid, pg.451.
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continued through 1973 and 1974, provided a background to decision-making 
in general, but a number of meetings were held linking the campaign directly to 
education work. The numbers of Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams in 
universities and colleges briefly rose again during the campaign, suggesting 
they played a leading role in its implementation in institutions of higher 
education.
The launch of the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (pi Lin, pi 
Kong yundong) was marked by the publication of the article “The Confucian 
School and the Reactionary Philosophy of Confucians” in the Beijing Ribao, 4 
September 1973. The article was published under the pen-name "Liang 
Xiao the name used by the writing group of Peking and Tsinghua 
Universities. As noted above, this group was lead by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. 
Jiang Qing was later to proclaim that this was “my group” (wo de b a n )m Only 
four days after the publication of this article, Jiang Qing reportedly instructed 
Chi Qun to use the authority of the SEG to convene the "National Discussion 
Meeting on Criticizing Confucius in the Education System”. Speaking at the 
meeting Chi is reported to have called on all areas to take part in the 
campaign.61 Subsequently, in the field of education, the Campaign to Criticize 
Lin Biao and Confucius was linked to warnings of “restorationism” (fubi) in 
higher education policy. The alleged “restorationist” activities of Lin Biao were 
compared with, and used to attack, the reintroduction of exams or the use of 
the “back door” by cadres to get their children into university. These 
phenomenon were described as a counter-current (huichao) in higher 
education. In the following section I will outline how the radical Left launched a 
number of attacks on the new exams, and how they called on students to “go 
against the counter-current”, (fan huichao). I will also discuss how these 
attacks were linked to the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and
60 Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting (eds.), The Rise of Famous People during the "Great Cultural 
Gre volu tion", pg. 3 41.
31 Ibid, pg.341.
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attacks on the senior leadership seen as responsible for the new policies.
d. “Going against the tide”
As noted above, beginning in 1972, the Left had been forced to address the 
issues of academic quality and enrollment. This had been done in two ways. 
Initially, they issued a series of articles which sought to demonstrate that 
although the academic level of the new worker-peasant-soldier students may 
be lower than former university students, their political conciousness and 
demonstrated ability to work hard mean that they would be able overcome this 
obstacle. A number of articles in the official media addressed this point. 62 
As well as addressing the agenda of their opponents in this way, the Left also 
launched a series of attacks which sought to directly refute the more moderate 
policies that emerged during 1972 and 1973, culminating with the 
reintroduction of the exam for would-be university students in mid-1973. The 
Left manipulated a series of incidents in schools and universities across China, 
encouraging students to “go against the tide”. At the same time, examples of 
what they saw as "restorationism” in higher education were tied to the 
Campaign Against Lin Biao and Confucius.
As early as October 1972, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan had launched 
a series of attacks on Zhou Peiyuan’s article of 6 October, 1972. This had 
outlined his view on the education revolution in science departments in China. 
Zhou had critized the emphasis on taking part in manual labour and called for 
more teaching of basic scientific theory and more laboratory work. Zhang and
02 Articles include, “Tsinghua daxue shoujie gong-nong-bing daxuesheng biye shijian qude 
fengying chengguo”, (The first worker-peasant-soldier university graduates from Tsinghua 
University have achieved rich rewards in practice”, in the Renmin Ribao^27 March, 1974, pg. 1, 
“Fudan daxue like shoujie gong-nong-bing xuesheng shengli jieye", (The first group of worker- 
peasant-soldier science students at Fudan University victoriously complete their courses), in the 
Renmin Ribao^ 16 April, 1974, pg. 1, "Tongji daxue ‘wu qi' gongshe jianchi kaimen banxue yue 
ban yue hao", (Tongji University’s ‘May 7th’ Commune sticks to [the principle] that the more you 
run open-door schools the better it is), in the Renmin Ribao, 9 May, 1974, pg.1, and “Quanguo 
you zhaoshou shiliuwan duo ming gong-nong-bing daxuesheng", (The whole country enrolls 
over 160,000 worker-peasant-soldier university students), in the Renmin Ribao, 15 October, 
1974, pg,1.
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Yao published a series of articles in Wenhui Bao including “Is this way of 
putting forward problems appropriate?”, “Marxism is the most basic theory”, and 
“What kind of basic theory are you laying down?”.63
A more significant move came on 19 July, 1973, when the Liaoning ribao 
published a letter from a sent down youth, Zhang Tiesheng, attacking the new 
exams. This letter was reprinted in the Renmin ribao 10 August, 1973, with an 
editorial comment, and its publication marked the start of the campaign to 
encourage students to “go against the tide” . Reports suggest that Mao 
Zedong’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin played an important role in having the letter 
published and in checking on Zhang Tiesheng’s background to ensure he was 
a suitable subject for Jiang Qing and other members of the radical Left to 
promote. In 1973 Mao Yuanxin was Deputy Directory of the Liaoning 
Revolutionary Committee and Deputy Director and Political Commissar of the 
Shenyang Military Region, which included Liaoning Province in its area of 
resonsibility. Shortly after the SEG published the “Opinions on Enrollment 
Work in 1973 for Institutions of Higher Education”, which emphasized the need 
to ensure university candidates’ academic qualifications, Mao Yuanxin is 
reported to have travelled to Beijing where he held discussions with Jiang Qing 
on a number of education issues.64 Shortly after these talks, Zhang Tiesheng, 
who was sitting the new exam, sent in his letter, complaining that he had not 
had time to prepare as he had been engaged in the summer harvest. Seizing 
this opportunity, Mao Yuanxin used his authority to have the letter published in 
the Liaoning ribao.
Zhang Tiesheng had voluntarily gone to the countryside to work in 1968. At 
the time he took the exam he had risen to become a production team leader in 
the Baita Commune in Xingcheng county, Liaoning. A number of authors have 
mistakenly written that Zhang handed in a blank exam paper. This was not the
63 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.446.
64 Wen Lequn and Hao Ruiting {e6s),The Rise of Famous People During the “Great Cultural 
Revolution", pg.357.
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case. Zhang took the exam, but only achieved an overall score of 38 percent. 
This included a good score of 61 percent in mathematics, but only 6 percent in 
physics.05 These marks were not enough for Zhang to gain a place at 
university, and seemingly knowing he would fail, Zhang wrote his letter on the 
back of the exam paper. In the letter, addressed simply to the “Dear leaders”, 
Zhang pleaded emotionally that he had not had enough time to prepare for the 
exam as he had been taking part in the summer harvest:
During the urgent work of the summer harvest, I didn’t have the 
heart to put production work to one side and ignore it and lock myself 
into a little room [to study] for myself, that would be too selfish. If I had 
acted in that way, I would have suffered the condemnation of my own 
and the poor and lower-middle peasants revolutionary hearts and my 
revolutionary conscience. I have something that I can console myself 
with, namely that for this [the exam] I did not delay the work of the 
collective and within the team I took overall and complete 
responsibility.06
An editorial comment published with Zhang’s letter in the Liaoning ribao^ and 
reprinted in the Renmin ribao added:
When universities enroll students, it is necessary to carry out an 
appropriate academic assessment on the basis of mass evaluation 
and mass recommendation. But is the aim of this academic 
assessment to understand a student’s analytical and problem-solving 
ability, or is it to test how many middle school syllabuses they can 
remember? Is the main criterion for enrollment their conduct during 
participation in the three great revolutionary movements, or is it their 
scores in a test? Is it to encourage young people to willingly accept 
re-education at the hands of the poor and lower-middle peasants and 
workers and to engage in research and complete their own work, or is 
it to encourage them to isolate themselves from the three great 
revolutionary movements and close themselves indoors reading 
books?67
The Renmin ribao ’s own comment suggested that Zhang Tiesheng’s letter
65 Ibid, pg.392.
80 “Yi fen fa ren shensheng de dajuan” (A response paper that sets people thinking), in 
Renmin ribao^ 10 August, 1973, pg. 1.
67 Ibid, pg.1.
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raised important questions for the ‘two line struggle’ in education. It went on:
It has already been five years since Chairman Mao published his 
directive “We must select students from among the workers and 
peasants with practical experience, and after spending a few years at 
school, they should return to take part in production”. The campaign 
to struggle, criticize, and transform in education is currently being 
continued and deepened. We must concientiously study and 
resolutely implement Chairman Mao’s directives, carry out 
investigations and research, sum up our experience and carry out the 
proletarian education revolution well.60
A subsequent article appeared in the Renmin ribao 16 August, 1973, 
praising Zhang Tiesheng’s letter for “overflowing with the revolutionary spirit of 
going against the tide” ( Yangyizhe fanchaoliu de geming Jingsheng)™ The 
Renmin ribao article quoted Marx and Mao Zedong to show that “going against 
the tide” was part of the spirit of being a true Marxist. Indirectly criticizing the 
new exams as reactionary and backward, the article warned that to go against 
the tide you must have good judgement:
You must be good at distinguishing two different kinds of tide. In a 
socialist society, reactionary, backward tides often dress themselves 
up as revolutionary, progressive tides. Because of this, if you haven’t 
got sharp and incisive judgement, you won't succeed.70
The articles comments on “going against the tide” were repeated a week 
later when Zhou Enlai delivered the political work report to the 10th National 
Party Congress, 26 August, 1973, however, as the report was drafted under the 
leadership of Zhang Chunqiao, these comments did not necessarily reflect 
Zhou’s own views. The Congress met in secret to discuss the poltical situation 
in the wake of the death of Lin Biao. Zhou devoted a part of his report to 
discussing the various internal struggles of the CCP and it was in this context 
that he discussed the issue of “going against the tide”:
60 Ibid, pg.1.
69 Yang Pu, “Yangyizhe fanchaoliu de geming jinsheng”, “Uphold the spirit of going against 
the tide”, in the Renmin ribao,. 16 August, 1973, pg.3.
70 Ibid, pg.3.
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... when a mistaken tendency rises like a tide, we should not be afraid of 
being isolated, we must dare to go against the tide, we must dare to hold 
out tenaciously. Mao Zedong said: “Going against the tide is one of the 
principles of Marxism". During the ten internal struggles over the Party's 
line, Chairman Mao dared to oppose the tide, dared to act as a 
representative and guide of the correct line. Everyone of us should 
conscientiously study Chairman Mao and uphold this principle.71
Although speaking in a different context, Zhou Enlai’s words would have 
added some weight to the emerging campaign. Wang Hongwen, who would 
receive a "helicopter” style promotion to the number two spot in the Party at the 
10th Congress, also devoted a section of his report on amendments to the 
Party Constitution to the idea of “going against the tide”. According to Wang, 
the idea that “We must have the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the 
tide” ( Yao you ganyu fanchaoliu de geming jingshen) would be written into the 
new Party Constitution.72
As well as publicizing incidents like Zhang Tiesheng’s letter, members of the 
radical Left attacked policy changes at the highest level, warning of 
“restorationism” and “counter-currents”. A number of articles were published in 
the Renmin ribao and Hong qi defending the higher education policies 
introduced during the Cultural Revolution. In particular a number of articles 
attempted to analyse the signficance of Mao Zedong’s ‘July 21st Directive’. 
Criticism of the new line was also tied to the continuing "Campaign to Criticize 
Lin Biao and Confucius”.
The article “The profound significance of reforms in the university enrollment 
system”, published in Hong qi, Issue 8, 1973 under the name Zhu Yan, used 
the fifth anniversary of the publication of Mao’s ‘July 21st Directive’ to defend 
changes to enrollment procedures during the mobilizational phase of the 
Cultural Revolution. The article warned:
71 Zhou Enlai, “Political report to the 10th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party”, in Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian huibian (An 
anthology of documents from the 10th National Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1973), pp. 18-19.
72 Wang Hongwen, “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution”, in ibid, pg.45.
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The type of person universities enrol! and the type of person they 
train directly reflects the political orientation of education. Enrolling a 
group of people can influence a whole generation and effects which 
road you guide young people to take. Before the Cultural Revolution, 
under the control of the revisionist education line, the old examination 
system was an important element of the bourgoies academic’s control 
over schools. It manifested itself in slogans such as “everybody is 
equal with regards to [test] scores”, but in reality, it was the cultural 
dictatorship of the bourgoeise, and served to keep the broad masses 
of the workers and peasants and their children out of university.
Our giving control over university enrollment to the masses 
symbolizes the leadership of the working class and the supervision of 
the broad masses of workers and peasants over education work.73
In this atmosphere of renewed confrontation, Chi Qun launched one of the 
most significant campaigns against intellectuals since the mobilization phase of 
the Cultural Revolution in his own bailiwick of Tsinghua University. In what 
became known as the “Three month campaign” (san ge yue yundong), some 
403 members of staff at Tsinghua Univesity were criticized by name. Of these 
64 were specially investigated and underwent “key criticism” (zhongdian 
pipan ).74 During the campaign Chi Qun published two articles in Jiaoyu 
geming tongxun (Education Revolution Dispatches) under the name Qin 
Huaiwen. The two articles, “Consolidate and Develop the Fruits of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, and “Another Discussion [on how to] 
Consolidate and Develop the Fruits of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution” criticized teachers and students who had expressed dissatisfaction 
with the education revolution and the two estimates. Chi claimed that “a wind 
to reverse cases had appeared”, and that these teachers were “launching a 
counterattack to settle old scores” (gao fangong daosuan ).75
A further target of the Left’s criticism was the film “The song of the gardener”
(Dingyuan zhi ge), The film, which was based on the plot of a Hunan opera,
73 Zhu Yan, “Gaibian daxue zhaosheng zhidu de shenyuan yiyi”, (The profound significance 
of reforms in the university enrollment system), in Hong qix Issue 8, 1973, pp.9-13.
74 Ibid, pg.456.
75 Ibid, pg.456.
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described the experiences of a teacher Yu Ying in helping one of her pupils. 
The film was criticized at some length in an article published in the Renmin 
ribao 4 August, 1974, (although it had been criticized before this). The article 
“Which education line are you singing in praise of?” criticized the film for 
refuting the new form of student-teacher relations established during the 
Cultural Revolution in which teachers both taught, and learnt from, their 
students:
In our socialist schools, revolutionary teachers and revolutionary 
students are both under the leadeship of the Party, they are comrades 
and battle companions following the same line, they should be 
teaching and studying each other, going forward together. “The song 
of the gardener” refutes this new form of student-teacher relations and 
wants to restore the old relationship of the exploiting classes of the 
last several thousand years with so-called “gardeners” [dingyuan] 
and “pupils” [tao ii, literally “peaches and plums”]. This fundamentally 
denies the proletarian education system and denies the leadership of 
the Party over education.70
One line from the film in particular came in for criticism, namely when Yu 
Ying says “without an education you won’t be able to take on the heavy 
burdens of the revolution”. The Renmin ribao article criticized this line, saying 
it only “emphasized the importance of education” and denied that “proletarian 
politics should be in command”.77
These attacks by the radical Left were linked to the continuing ‘Campaign to 
Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius’. The SEG convened the “Second Discussion 
Meeting on Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius in Education” in Beijing, 5-8 
February, 1974. In a speech to the meeting Chi Qun called for the campaign to 
be “carried through to the end". Chi also called on all areas to “seize the 
representatives of the restorationist forces’’.78 The special column, “How should 
[we] manage socialist universities” carried a series of articles which tied
76 Chu Lan, “Wei nar tiao jiaoyu luxian chang zange?” (Which education line are you singing in 
praise of?), in the Renmin Ribaox4 August, 1974, pg.2.
77 ibid, pg.2.
78 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.462.
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conducting the ‘Campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius’ with the 
continuation of the ‘education revolution’ and other aspects of education 
policy.79 One article attacked Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao for following the line of 
Confucius’ disciple, Zi Xia. The article used classical quotes to criticize the 
education policies of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.e0 It stated that Liu Shaoqi and 
Lin Biao had emphasized that those who did well in their studies would receive 
a good job, “the theory of studying to achieve official office", (Dushu zuoguan 
lu n ). The article linked this to the quote from Zi Xia in chapter 19 of The 
Analects: “when a student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, 
then he takes office”, (xue eryou ze sh i).01 This criticism was used to attack 
Liu Shaoqi’s and Lin Biao’s education policy and highlight the changes in 
education policy made during the Cultural Revolution.
While these attacks continued, it is clear that moves towards normalization in 
China’s universities and colleges continued, albeit at a slow pace. Once again, 
the inability of the radical Left to influence policy implementation appears 
significant. There was no move to rescind the decision to re-introduce the 
entrance exam, despite the intense criticism levelled at this policy by members 
of the radical Left. At the beginning of 1975, the 4th National People’s 
Congress made the decision to reopen the Ministry of Education. At the same 
time, in his speech to the Congress, Premier Zhou Enlai made his famous 
statement that China must achieve the “four modernizations” (in agriculture, 
industry, the military and science and technology) by the end of the century. 
These two decisions were to have important consequences for the direction of
79 See for example, Column No. 56, “Shenru pi Lin, pi Kong, konggu he fazhan jiaoyu 
geming chengguo", (Deepen the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, consolidate and 
develop the fruits of the education revolution), in the Renmin Ribao, 14 February, 1974, and 
Column No. 61, “Zai pi Lin, pi Kong zhong nuli banhao hanzhou jiaoyu", (During the course of 
the campaign to criticize LinBiao and Confucius conscientiously manage correspondance 
education well), in the Renmin ribao, 11 November, 1974, pg.3.
80 Tong Wenxiao, ‘“Xue er you ze shi’ de fandong jiaoyu sixiang bixu pipan” (The reactionary 
education philosophy of “a good scholar will always make an official” must be criticized), in 
Renmin ribaox 16 January, 1974 pg. 1.
01 Confucius The Analects, translated by D.C. Lau, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 
pg.155.
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higher education policy.
4. Intensification of the struggle over higher education policy: January 1975 to 
the death of Mao Zedong
Following the re-opening of China’s universities and colleges in 1970, 
limited reforms to the higher education policy introduced during the Cultural 
Revolution had been carried out against a background of continual criticism 
from the radical Left. This pattern intensified in the period from January 1975 to 
the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 as moderate Party and 
government figures, led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin, 
sought to introduce more comprehensive reforms to China’s higher education 
policy. They were acting partly in response to Zhou Enlai’s call to focus on the 
“four modernizations”, made at the 4th National People's Congress. Zhou’s call 
focused attention on the need for sufficient technical personnel to complete this 
program, and hence the need for universities and colleges to train well- 
qualified graduates. This debate reflected the wider pattern outlined in chapter 
two where I described the policy debate during this period as being 
characterized by how much ideological issues should influence social and 
economic policy making.
In contrast to the moderates, in early 1975, the radical Left launched a 
campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their 
statements on higher education policy quickly shifted to meet the needs of this 
campaign. In December 1975 the radicals issued a strong denunciation of the 
moderates’ programme, claiming that it threatened the achievements of the 
Cultural Revolution. This claim clearly echoed Mao Zedong’s growing feeling 
that the Cultural Revolution was being undermined by the reforms introduced 
by the moderates in a number of different areas. Following the death of 
Premier Zhou Enlai in January 1976, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin were
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both purged, Zhou Rongxin later died whilst undergoing criticism. This 
brought an abrupt halt to further reforms, but in the atmosphere of intensifying 
political struggle, the Left seemed unable to push their own higher education 
programme effectively. The struggle over education policy subsided as the 
political struggle intensified, and it was only with the death of Mao Zedong and 
the purge of the Gang of Four that higher education policy was again discussed 
in any significant way. This section will examine these developments.
a. The 4th National People's Congress
i. The re-opening of the Ministry of Education
The decision to disband the SEG and re-open the Ministry of Education was 
approved by the 4th NPC on 17 January, 1975. The Congress appointed Zhou 
Rongxin as Minister of Education. In addition, Zhou Hongbao, Li Qi, Liu Aifeng 
and Yao Li were listed as ‘responsible persons’ within the Ministry,82 although at 
the time it appears they may have been serving in other departments.83 
Reflecting the on-going struggle between the radical and moderate lines, these 
figures represented a spectrum of political views, however, as the Ministry of 
Education was subordinate to the State Council, Premier Zhou Enlai appears 
to have had a decisive say in making some of the appointments. In particular, 
Zhou Rongxin’s political career had been very close to that of Zhou Enlai. He 
had been appointed deputy Secretary-general of the State Council in March 
1963, however following the fall of the Secretary-general, Xi Zhongxin, Zhou 
was appointed acting Secretary-general in July 1963. He was formally 
appointed Secretary-general at the 3rd NPC in January 1965.84 It is the duty of 
the Secretary-general to deal with much of the day-to-day work of the State
82 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.472.
83 Li Qi is listed as being identified as a member of the Ministry of Culture in March 1975 by 
Wolfgang Bartke, in Who’s Who in the People's Republic of China, (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1981), pg.184.
04 Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921- 
1965, Volume I: Ai Szu-ch'i-Lo l-nung, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), 
pg.223.
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Council, and his work would have brought Zhou Rongxin into close and regular 
contact with Zhou Enlai. His promotion to Minister of Education suggests that 
Zhou Enlai wanted someone he knew and could trust in that position. Zhou 
Enlai’s backing was clearly an influential factor as Zhou Rongxin and Deng 
Xiaoping attempted to introduce further reforms in the field of higher education.
Less is known about the other new appointees. Li Qi had served as Vice- 
Minister of Culture on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Along with other 
senior officials from that ministry, Li dissapeared from pubic view in 1967. His 
first public appearance after his purge was as a member of a Sino-Japanaese 
Friendship delgation which visited Japan in April 1973. In July of that year he 
was appointed as a member of the SEG, where he served until that body was 
disbanded. In March 1975 he was identified as a cadre in the Ministry of 
Culture, however in October 1977 he was appointed as a Vice-Minister of 
Education. His purge in 1967 and subsequent promotion to Vice-Minister after 
the arrest of the Gang of Four suggests he supported the line of Zhou Enlai, 
Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin.
The other figures appear to be more closely allied to the radical Left. Little is 
known about the backgrounds of Liu Aifeng and Yao Li, but both disappeared 
after 1976, suggesting close ties to the Gang of Four. Zhou Hongbao had clear 
ties to the Left. He had formerly served as a lathe operator at Shanghai’s No.1 
Iron and Steel Factory. He was later promoted to Deputy Head of the 
Leadership Small Group of the Headquarters of the Shanghai Militia. The 
militia were closely associated with Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao 
Wenyuan and were mobilized following the death of Mao Zedong to secure 
Shanghai for the radical Left.
While Zhou Rongxin can be definitely shown to have played a leading role in 
pushing attempts to introduce reforms to the higher education policy that 
emerged after the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, the position of 
the ministry as a whole is less clear. While senior cadres from the ministry
continued to be rehabilitated, it seems likely, that initially at least, they remained 
unwilling, or unable, to fully support the line of Deng and Zhou. This reflected 
the organizational difficulties facing the CCP as it attempted to rebuild Party 
and government structures. Some individuals may have been reluctant to 
press for reforms in the light of their recent experiences during the Cultural 
Revolution, but others would have found it equally difficult to assert their 
authority in a climate where organizational norms were still uncertain.
ii. Zhou Enlai’s work report 
Zhou Enlai delivered the government work report to the 4th NPC on 13 
January, 1975. The most significant part of his report concerned his statement 
on the need to achieve the ‘four modernizations’.85 Although Zhou stated in his 
speech that the primary task at that time was still the continuation of the 
Campaign to Criticze Lin Biao and Confucius, pro-reform figures like Deng 
Xiaoping were able to use his comments on the ‘four modernizations’ to justify 
further reforms to China’s economic system.
Zhou’s speech to the 4th NPC strengthened the hand of those pressing for 
reforms in higher education. The practical focus on economic development 
allowed these reformers to call for reforms which would generate the educated 
personnel necessary to fulfill the ‘four modernizations’. This naturally shifted 
the debate towards issues of “expertise”, at the expense of “redness”.
However, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others associated with the 
rectification movement were challenging the policies that had emerged from 
the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong and members 
of the radical Left were still in positions to defend these policies, and Mao’s 
increasingly defensive posture was particularly significant in the failure of this 
initial reform attempt. In addition, while the focus of the Party’s and 
government’s work was expected to be political issues such as the Campaign
06 Zhou Enlai de yi sheng ziliao xuanji, (xia ce) (The Life of Zhou Enlai A collection of 
material (Voi2)), (Hong Kong, 1977), pg.487.
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to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, any reforms to Cultural Revolution policies 
were liable to criticism on political grounds.
b. The rectification movement in higher education: Januarv-October. 1975
The rectification movement proceeded at different speeds and in different 
ways in different policy areas. As early as March, 1975, Minister of Railways, 
Wan Li, was making speeches on the need to improve the funtioning of China’s 
railway network.86 Publically, the earliest criticism and comments in the field of 
higher education appear to have been made by Vice Premier Wang Zhen on 
11 July, although Zhou Rongxin is reported to have made a number of internal 
speeches during May in which he called for reform.87 Wang was speaking at a 
meeting on foreign aid work, however he is reported to have made the 
comment “ I don’t approve very much of agricultural colleges studying Chao 
Yang” (a reference to the Chao Yang Agricultural College). Wang Zhen’s 
comments were in direct contrast to the campaign to promote the experiences 
of that college then underway.
A more direct criticism of the policies of the radical Left came on 13 August in 
the form of an attack on Chi Qun in a letter to Mao Zedong from four members 
of staff at Tsinghua University. The letter, written jointly by three deputy- 
secretaries of the university’s Party committee, Liu Bing, Hui Xiandiao and Liu 
Yi’an and the director of the political department, Lu Fangzhen, criticized Chi 
Qun for a variety of arrogant behaviour, including not letting others have a say 
(gao yiyantang), violating Party policies and appointing people by favouritism 
and offering official posts and making lavish promises (renren weiqin, 
fengguan xuyuan ).88 Liu Bing wrote a second letter to Mao two months later.
On 23 August, a discussion meeting on junior and primary education in the 
four provinces and cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangdong opened
86 Wan U Wenxuan (Selected Works of Wan Li), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 
pp.72-75.
87 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.477.
80 A Chroncile of Major Events in Education, pg.476.
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in Beijing. The meeting, which lasted until 30 August, had been convened by 
the Ministry of Education. Zhou Rongxin gave a number of speeches in which 
he launched several stinging attacks on education policy since the end of the 
mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. He also called for stronger 
resolve on the part of officials within the ministry. Although the meeting was 
ostensibly about junior and primary education, his comments appear to have 
concerned the issue of education as a whole:
Chairman Mao has never said we don’t need education [wenhua ].
In “On New Democracy” Chairman Mao pointed out that we must build 
a scientific and popular education for the nation. Now, as soon as you 
mention education people turn pale as if at the mention of a tiger and 
are afraid to death, hurridly talking about some “reverse current” or 
[saying] its “the wind of 72 again”. 89
A second meeting involving officials from the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, 
Shandong and Jiangsu was held in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province from 15-23 
September, reinforcing the message from the Beijing conference.
Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping played a leading role in co-ordinating the 
various aspects of the rectification movement and pressing for further reforms. 
His selected works for 1975 contain a number of speeches calling for 
rectification in the army, the Party’s work style, industry and science and 
research work. Speaking at a discussion meeting on agricultural work on the 
27 September and again on the 4 October, Deng spoke at some length on the 
need for rectification in all areas. His comments have been compiled into a 
single article “All areas must be rectified” which appears in volume two of his 
selected works.90 In this article, Deng spoke on rectification in education, and 
tied his comments to the 'four modernizations’. He invoked Mao Zedong 
Thought to back up his comments, and repeated Zhou Rongxin’s message of 
not being afraid to carry out reform in the education field:
89 Ibid, pg.477.
90 Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Dierji) (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 2)), 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), pp.35-37.
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At the moment, the majority of school students aren’t studying 
(dushu), this also doesn’t conform with Mao Zedong Thought. What 
Comrade Mao Zedong opposed was education being divorced from 
reality, divorced from the masses, and divorced from labour, it wasn’t 
that he didn’t want [students] to study, rather he wanted them to study 
even better. Comrade Mao Zedong gave young children the 
message [tici] “study well and make progress every day”. In addition, 
Comrade Mao Zedong spoke about the four modernizations, he also 
spoke about class struggle, the struggle in production and scientific 
research being the three basic social practices, but today, we’ve cut 
out scientific research and we’re all afraid to talk about it, as if talking 
about it was a crime. How can this be right?91
In addition to the vertical co-operation in the rectification campaign in 
education between Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and Minister of Education 
Zhou Rongxin, there is one example of what might be called horizontal co­
operation, between Zhou Rongxin and the Minister of Railways, Wan Li. Wan Li 
had been appointed Minister of Railways at the 4th NPC. In 1975 he led a very 
successful campaign to restore order to China’s railway network, disrupted by 
the factional fighting of the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 Wan Li appears to 
have been working very closely with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.
On 20 October 1975 the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Railways 
convened a discussion meeting on education. Its main aim appears to have 
been to discuss the situation in the seven railway colleges run directly by the 
Ministry of Railways. Zhou Rongxin was invited to attend the meeting and he 
used this opportunity to deliver a critical speech in which he attacked a number 
of the policy statements of the radical Left, including the issue of the ‘two 
estimates’ and their attack on the film “The Song of the Gardener”. Zhou also 
linked reforms in education to meeting the needs of the ‘four modernizations’. 
Zhou’s speech “Education must meet the needs of the four modernizations” 
was not published until January 197992, after the death of Mao Zedong and the
91 Ibid, pg.37.
92 Zhou Rongxin, “Jiaoyu yao shiying si ge xiandaihua de yaoqiu" (Education must meet the 
needs of the four modernizations), originally printed in Jiaoyu Yanjiu (Educational Research), 
issue 1, 1979, reprinted in Zhongguo dangdai jiaoyu sichao 1949-1989 {Contemporary trends 
in education in China 1949-1989), (Shanghai: Sanlian shudian, 1991), pp.256-259.
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arrest of the Gang of Four. This suggests that its content was too controversial 
for general publication in 1975. Many of Zhou’s statements presage the debate 
over education that was to emerge following Mao’s death, including the idea 
that the failure to reform education would hinder the completion of the ‘four 
modernizations’. It is worth quoting Zhou’s speech at some length as it is one 
of the clearest statements of the thinking of those conducting the rectification 
movement in education at that time:
If we want to carry out the four modernizations this requires that the 
Ministry of Education train qualified personnel who can consolidate 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and meet the needs of the four 
modernizations. If we don’t modernize then our country won’t be at 
the forefront of the world. The magnificent task of developing the 
national economy raises a great and arduous historical task for the 
Ministry of Education.
If we want to carry forward the four modernizations, science and 
technology must be given priority, and your schools must train 
numerous and quality technical cadres.
I wish to talk about the question of intellectuals. The National 
Educational Work Conference [of 1971] discussed one question with 
regards to intellectuals, namely the question of the last 17 years, 
calling it the ‘two estimates’. With regards to these ‘two estimates’, we 
still haven’t resolved this today. What is the problem that we haven’t 
resolved? Its a question of line, a question of a struggle between two 
lines. Some people simply label all intellectuals as bourgeois 
intellectuals, and say that in 17 years we’ve only trained bourgeois 
intellectuals. Some people say that the students we’ve trained over 
the last 17 years are all undermining the foundations of socialism and 
that’s even more dangerous than the bourgeois intellectuals. When 
Chairman Mao discussed the question of intellectuals in 1957, he said 
that the majority are patriotic and willing to serve socialism. This is our 
country’s real situation.
How we should evaluate “the Song of the Gardener’’ still requires 
detailed research. Speaking from an educational point of view, it [the 
film] lays a foundation for how junior and primary school students 
should be organized to study Mao Zedong Thought, study socialist 
cultural and scientific knowledge and ensure time in class.
The four modernizations require us to train people with a high 
political awareness and high cultural and scientific knowledge, if we 
don’t pay attention to this point in the future it will hold us back (tuo 
houtui). If we don’t change the current situation, then its very likely it
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will hold us back. If we hold back the four modernizations so that we 
can’t progress, isn’t this a return to the past (fujiu )?93
Shortly after Zhou Rongxin made these comments he is reported to have 
started work on drafting a report on developments in the field of education to be 
delivered to the next NPC meeting.94 It is unclear as to what the content of that 
document might have been as it was later suppressed by the radical Left 
following Zhou’s purge at the beginning of 1976. However the very fact that the 
document was suppressed suggests that its content was similar to Zhou’s 
comments above which challenged many of the core ideas of the radical Left’s 
line on higher education.
The suppression of this document shows that the movement to rectify work 
in education should not be seen as taking place in isolation from other 
developments. The emerging reforms in turn fuelled the development of the 
radical Left’s own policy line, leading temporarily to the victory of the radicals 
following the death of Zhou Enlai. In a subsequent section I will show how the 
efforts to rectify education work gradually drew the ire of Mao Zedong, so that 
beginning in late-1975 the radical Left were able to gain his tacit support for the 
campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping . Following the death of Zhou Enlai, 
Deng’s, and Zhou Rongxin’s key backer, the radical Left were able to purge 
these two figures and temporarily put an end to efforts to reform higher 
education policy.
c. The campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
its impact on higher education policy: October. 1974-Januarv 1976
The campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
emerged from a series of comments made by Mao Zedong in late-1974. 
Members of the radical Left issued a number of key articles which attempted to 
develop Mao’s comments and provide a theoretical justification for the new
93 Ibid, pp.256-258.
94 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.478.
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campaign. From the very start, the radical Left tied the new line with their 
higher education policy and a series of statements and articles appeared in the 
national media on this subject. In particular the experience of a new model 
institution, the Chao Yang Agricultural College was promoted by the radical 
Left.
The new Constitution passed at the 4th NPC on 17 January referred 
specifically to the need for proletarian control over education. Article 12 of the 
new Constitution stated:
The proletariat must implement an all-round dictatorship over the 
bourgeoisie in all cultural realms of the superstructure. Culture and 
education, literature and the arts, sport and health, and science and 
research must all serve proletarian politics, serve the workers, 
peasants and soliders, and be unified with productive labour.05
Beginning in January 1975, the national and educational media carried a 
series of articles calling for schools to be turned into “tools of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat” . On 10 January the first edition of the Education Revolution 
Dispatches carried an article “Strive to turn schools into tools of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat". This article contained a strong criticism of 
schools, saying they were places that focused exclusively on transmitting 
knowledge (chuanbo zhishi de changsuo) and that they emphasized “putting 
intellectual development first”.96
An article on the same theme appeared in the Renmin Ribao 18 February,
1975. The article “Run schools so as to make them powerful tools of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat" repeated the experiences of the Shanghai 
Machine Tools Factory’s “July 21st” University and tied these to the new 
campaign. The article stated:
"July 21st” universities have grown strong in the course of the fierce 
struggle between two lines and two kinds of ideology. Over the last 
few years we have upheld the principle of putting proletarian politics
95 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.472.
96 Ibid, pg. 471.
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in command and unceasingly criticized capitalism and criticized the 
revisionist ideas of “professionalism in command”, technology in 
command” and “putting intellectual development first”. We have 
carried out a resolute struggle against old customary forces and 
traditional influences and only then have we ensured that workers’ 
universities, this section of the education sector, are firmly in the 
control of the working class, and ensured that education better serves 
proletarian politics.97
d. Chaovana Agricultural College
Chaoyang Agricultural College emerged as a new model of the radical Left 
at the same time that the new campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat was launched, however initial articles reporting the experiences 
of the college focused on its innovative system of student enrollment and job 
allocation, referred to as “from the commune, to the commune” (she-lai, she- 
qu). It was only in March 1975 that Chaoyang Agricultural College was linked 
to the new campaign.
Chaoyang Agricultural College had been formed in 1970 in response to 
calls for agricultural colleges to work more closely with China’s peasantry. A 
number of departments of the Shenyang Agricultural College had moved to 
Chaoyang in the west of Liaoning Province. There they had combined with the 
smaller Chaoyang District Agricultural Sciences Resarch Insitute, the 
Chaoyang Water Conservancy School and a number of units from a local 
agricultural school to form the new college. There were four departments, 
agriculture, orchards and forestry (guo-iin), animal husbandry, and water 
conservancy. In December 1974 there were reported to be 1,200 students and 
over 300 members of staff.98
Initial articles focused on the college's system of student enrollment and job 
allocation, known as she-lai, she-qu . One of the first articles to discuss the
97 “Ba xuexiao bancheng wuchanjieji zhuanzheng de youli gongju", (Run schools so as to 
make them powerful tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat), in the Renmin Ribao, 18 February, 
1975, pg 1.
98 “Nongda biye dang nongmin hao” (When you graduate from agricultural college its good to 
work as a peasant), in Renmin Ribao^2 December, 1974, pg. 1.
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experiences of the Chaoyang Agricultural College appeared in the Renmin 
Ribao in December, 1974." This article linked the new enrollment system to 
Mao’s “July 21st” Directive of 1968 which had said that "students should be 
selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they 
should return to production after a few years’ study”.100 By locating the college 
closer to the peasants, and more directly catering to their needs by running 
shorter courses, the new school was said to overcome the old isolation of 
agricultural colleges which had led many of their students to refuse to return to 
the countryside after graduation.
At the start of 1975 a number of articles in the Renmin Ribao and the special 
column “How should [we] manage socialist universities” continued to discuss 
the significance of Chaoyang’s system of “she-lai, she-qu“. This concept was 
tied to the on-going campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and was 
even used as part of the campaign attacking the classical quote “when a 
student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, then he takes office”, 
(xue eryou ze shi). One article, printed in the Renmin Ribao 19 January,
1975 claimed that the college’s students had succeeded in breaking the 
mentality of students at the old agricultural colleges:
For the last several thousand years, the doctrine of Confucius and 
Mencius has been continuously preaching the idea of “when a 
student finds that he can more than cope with his studies, then he 
takes office”. Today, the students of Chaoyang Agricultural College 
use their everyday actions to implement a thorough break with this 
kind of old traditional viewpoint. They aren’t “studying only to become 
officials”, [dushu zuoguan], rather they are “studying to work in 
agriculture" [dushu wu nong]. They come to agricultural college 
harbouring the powerful hope that they can win the war to emancipate 
agriculture. Using their own words, they have resolved with an iron 
heart to become new peasants.101
99 Ibid.
100 Theodore Hsi-en Chen, The Maoist Educational Revolution, Appendix G.
101 “Zaixiao zuo gongxian Biye dang nongmin”, (At school make contributions, on graduation 
become a peasant), in the Renmin Ribao, 19 January, 1975, pg.4.
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Beginning on 15 March, 1975, the Ministry of Education ran two special 
classes for education officials at the Chaoyang college. The classes, which ran 
in March and April of that year, are reported to have studied the experiences of 
Chaoyang Agricultural college in "opposing the revisionist line of the last 17 
years in education, strengthening the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the 
field of education and turning schools into a tool of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat” .102 These classes were the first sign that Chaoyang was being 
promoted by the radical left as a model institution in the new campaign to study 
the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Shortly after these classes were held the State Council approved a report by 
the Ministry of Education calling for the experiences of Chaoyang Agricultural 
College to be promoted nationally. The report called on all areas to summarize 
the experiences of Chaoyang and to draw up plans on how to make education 
better meet the needs of a socialist economy and become “tools of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat”. The Ministry of Education report suggested that 
for 1975, schools of higher education adopt Chaoyang’s method of enrolling 
students and allocating work.103
The significance of Chaoyang was formally recognized when in June the 
same year the Ministry of Education issued a notification that all enrollment 
work for 1975 in universities and colleges should be carried out in accordance 
with the principles set out in the April 23 report.104 At the same time, a second 
article appeared in the special column, “How [we] should manage socialist 
universities", written by the Party Secretary of Chaoyang Agricultural College, 
Xu Ming. Speaking about Chaoyang college, Xu used what would become 
one of the radical Left’s more infamous slogans:
Proletarian education must continue the direction of taking 
university students from amongst the workers and peasants and
102 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.472.
103 Ibid, pg.473.
104 Ibid, pg.474.
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returning them to the workers and peasants. We must tear down the 
ladder which the exploiting class used to turn study into a means to 
climb up to the privileged classes and become an intellectual 
aristocrat (jingshen guizu). In order to realize the 
Intellectuallzation of the workers, and the Integration of the 
intellectuals with the working people [laodong renmin 
zhishihua, zhishi fenzi laodonghua ] we must build bridges to 
graudally reduce the three major distinctions [between town and 
country industry and agriculture and mental and physical labour). We 
have resolved to act in accordance with Chairman Mao’s “July 21st" 
Directive and implement the [system] of “from the commune, to the 
commune", and train a new type of peasant with both a socialist 
conciousness and a [high-level] of education.105
e. The culmination of the struggle between the radical Left and the moderate 
reformers over higher education policy. October 1975-October 1976
As I noted above, developments in the policy approaches of the radical Left 
and the moderate reformers should not been seen as occuring in isolation.
The two sides fed off the initiatives of each other, using policy statements, 
speeches and articles issued by the other side to publish their own rebuttals or 
highlight what they felt were significant areas of their own policy approach.
One example is the way in which each side approached the issue of “studying 
only to achieve office’’ (dushu zuoguan). As Deng Xiaoping and Zhou 
Rongxin continued with their rectification campaign in the field of higher 
education, the denunciations of the radical Left grew stronger, fuelled by Mao 
Zedong’s growing concern over the direction the campaign was taking. Indeed 
Mao’s support against the moderates would prove to be vital in bringing about 
an end to their reforms in higher education. The radical Left’s criticism of efforts 
to reform higher education reached a peak in December 1975 with the 
publication of the article “The orientation of the education revolution cannot be
105 Xu Ming, “Zaojiu wei konggu wuchanjieji zhuanzheng er douzheng de xinren”, (Train 
new people who will struggle to consolidate the dicatorship of the proletariat), in the Renmin 
Ribao, 5 June, 1975, pg.3.
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distorted easily".106 This article sparked a wave of criticism of the moderates 
higher education policy in the mass media. Backed by Mao Zedong, the 
radical Left were able to launch a campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping in early-
1976. It was only after the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the Gang of 
Four that the debate over policy resumed.
Beginning in September 1975, Zhou Rongxin started work drafting a report 
on education to be delivered to the next NPC meeting. The intensification of 
the struggle between the reformers and the radical Left can be seen in the fact 
that the Left had this and Hu Yaobang’s report on the work of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences suppressed. Members of the radical Left also took more 
direct action to criticize the actions of the reformers. On 25 October, apparently 
at the instigation of Chi Qun, Lin Junwan, a member of the personnel section of 
Tsinghua University, wrote to Mao Zedong critizing Zhou Rongxin. Echoing the 
letter written to Mao Zedong by Liu Bing and three other senior members of 
staff at Tsinghua in which they criticized Chi Qun’s actions, Lin accused Zhou 
Rongxin of “appointing people by favouratism, and engaging in factionalism".107 
Defending Chi Qun, Lin accused Zhou Rongxin of driving Chi out of the 
leadership group (lingdao banzi) of the Ministry of Education and of attempting 
to discredit the work of the SEG.
In November, Chi Qun organized an enlarged meeting of Tsinghua’s Party 
committee which met to criticize the actions of Liu Bing in sending the two 
letters to Mao Zedong. Mao had already issued instructions on how to handle 
this incident, claiming that Liu Bing’s letters represented a “rightist wind to 
reverse correct verdicts”.108 The Tsinghua meeting marked the start of the
106 Peking Daxue, Tsinghua Daxue dapipan zu (The mass criticism group of Beijing and 
Qinghua Universities), “Jiaoyu geming de fangxiang burong cuangai”, (The orientation of the 
education revolution cannot be distorted easily), in Hong Q i Issue 12, 1975. This article was 
reprinted along with a number of other pieces in a pamphlet of the same title in Hong Kong in
1976. Hereafter I will refer to this pamphlet as The Orientation of the Education Revolution 
Cannot be Distorted Easily.
107 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.479.
106 A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCP, pg.461.
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“campaign to counter-attack the rightist wind to reverse verdicts" and 
highlighted the way the radical Left used attacks on higher education reforms 
for a wider political purpose. At its climax on 18 November, Beijing’s First Party 
Secretary, Wu De attended the Tsinghua meeting and passed on Mao's 
instructions on this issue. The meeting denounced Liu Bing for “denying the 
education revolution and using reactionary statements and conduct to reverse 
the correct verdict of the Cultural Revolution” .109 Following this incident ‘big- 
character’ posters appeared at Peking University publicly criticizing Liu Bing 
and Zhou Rongxin.
While the meeting at Tsinghua University was under way, Zhang Chunqiao, 
who was Vice-Premier in charge of education, met with Zhou Rongxin to 
discuss education issues. Zhang is reported to have heavily criticized Zhou, 
asking if he supported the educational revolution: “In society, there is a trend 
(feng) to refute the Cultural Revolution and to refute the education revolution... 
With regards to the last 17 years, what do you, Zhou Rongxin, think?...’’ 
Returning to Xu Ming’s slogan, Zhang asked “One [school] trains educated 
exploiters and an intellectual aristocracy with a capitalist consciousness, one 
trains uneducated workers with a [socialist] consciousness, which one do you 
prefer? I would rather have an uneducated worker than an educated 
exploiter or intellectual aristocracy”, (my emphasis).110
By the end of November, the positions of Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin 
looked increasingly untenable. Zhou Rongxin in particular continued to be 
subject to criticism, both within the ministry and in public. Meeting with an 
Albanian education delegation on 30 November, Zhang Chunqiao is reported 
to have said “The head of our ministry of education has some problems”.111 As 
Mao Zedong became increasingly unsatisfied with Deng Xiaoping’s actions 
during the rectification movement as a whole, the radical Left were able to
109 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.479.
110 Ibid, pg.480.
111 Ibid, pg.480.
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publish a critical article on the reformers’ line in higher education. The 
publication of this article, “The orientation of the education revolution cannot be 
distorted easily” was followed by a series of articles in the national media and 
effectively marked the end of further reforms in higher education policy until the 
purge of the Gang of Four.
The article, written by the mass criticism group of Peking and Tsinghua 
universities, the two universities most closely associated with the radical Left, 
stated that recently there had been a number of what it called “absurd 
arguments and strange theories” (qitan guailun) spread in the field of 
education. The article warned that there was a stark choice between 
continuing the education revolution or restoring capitalist control over schools:
Whilst the general situation is good, we must be aware that in the 
field of education, class struggle and the struggle over line is still very 
sharp and complicated. Recently, in the field of education, there have 
been a number of absurd arguments and strange theories which say 
that since the Cultural Revolution the education revolution has been 
no good, or that something else has been no good. [They say] that the 
orientation of the education revolution has “never been resolved 
clearly”, and therefore we “must turn around”. Put simply they say that 
the education revolution has been carried out to excess and we’ve 
made a mess of it so we must “turn” around the orientation of the 
education revolution. The problem is very clear, at the moment the 
point at issue is this: should we uphold the orientation of the 
education revolution and continue the proletarian education 
revolution to the end, or overturn a correct verdict on behalf of the 
revisionist education line and restore the old education system where 
bourgeoisie academics controlled our schools?112
The article also set out a clear definition of the radical Left’s view on the 
question of the quality of education, a key point in the struggle between the two 
coalitions, the article stated:
With regards to the quality of education, different classes have 
different opinions. We believe that the students trained by socialist 
universities must serve (fuwu) the consolidation of the dicatorship of 
the proletariat and socialist construction. Because of this, when you 
look at the issue of quality, you must first look at orienation, look at
112 The Orientation of the Education Revolution Cannot be Distorted Easily, pg.1.
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line, and look at the overall development of moral, physical and 
intellectual education. Even if you talk about vocational study, you 
should not treat attending a few classes and reciting a small number 
of textbooks as a standard, rather you must look at [a student’s] ability 
to link theory and practice and their analytical and problem solving 
ability.113
On 14 December, the Party’s Central Committee formally approved the 
“Situation report from Tsinghua University on the great debate in the education 
revolution”. This report greatly increased the political significance of the debate 
over education policy as it represented formal party support for the criticism of 
Zhou Rongxin. The report described the November meeting held at Tsinghua 
University to criticize Liu Bing. According to the report, Liu’s criticism of Chi 
Qun was actually targetted at Mao Zedong and claimed that the two letters Liu 
Bing sent to Mao were politically motivated. 114
By December 1975, Mao Zedong and the radical Left saw Deng 
Xiaopoing’s rectification movement as an attempt to discredit the 
“achievements” of the Cultural Revolution. Mao was later to defend the Cultural 
Revolution, saying it was one of the two greatest achievements of his life. It 
seems that the radical Left were able to play on this very personal fear of Mao’s 
that his life’s work was being undone by bureaucrats within the Party to once 
again discredit and isolate Deng Xiaoping. Without his support, the rectification 
movement could not continue.
The Tsinghua report, published in the name of the Central Committee 
marked the end of Zhou Rongxin’s tenure as Minister of Education. He 
continued to be criticized in the national media, one article published in the first 
edition of Red Flag in 1976 attacked his quote from October 1975 when he had 
warned about a failure to reform education possibly hindering the four 
modernizations.115 The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January, 1976 removed any
11 ^  Ibid, pg 7.
114 4 Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.481.
115 “Jiaoyu geming ‘tuo sige xiandaihua de houtui’ ma?” (Does the education revolution 
‘hinder the four modernizations?’), in Red Flag, Issue 1, 1976, pp.44-48.
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residual protection for both Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin and shortly after 
Zhou Enlai’s death, the radical Left launched the campaign to criticize Deng 
Xiaoping. Deng’s appearance at Zhou’s funeral to deliver the eulogy was his 
last public appearance before he was removed from his official posts. Zhou 
Rongxin was also removed from his position and forced to attend criticism 
meetings, despite being hospitalized. He later died on 12 April, 1976.
Following Zhou Enlai’s death, the radical Left were able to move to 
consolidate their position over the Ministry of Education, but interestingly they 
were either unwilling, or unable, to appoint a new minister who might have 
supported their line. Instead, the radical Left chose to work outside the official 
state channels. On 24 February, 1976, Zhang Chunqiao is reported to have 
approved the establishment of a “temporary leadership small group” (linshi 
lingdao xiaozu) within the Ministry.115 This body was responsible for “political 
campaigns within the leading bodies and day-to-day work” and appears to 
have taken over the running of educational matters.116 The small group was 
staffed by supporters of the radical Left. Zhou Hongbao was appointed head 
while the deputy head was Xue Yushan. Xue had previously served on the 
SEG. He was formerly the Deputy Political Commissar of the 75th Artillery 
Division, a unit based in the Shenyang Military Region under Mao Yuanxin’s 
control. His background was similar to that of Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. Both 
Zhou and Xue were investigated following the arrest of the Gang of Four. In 
addition to these two figures, three other supporters of the radical Left, Yao Li, 
Ren Weimin and Liu Aifeng were appointed members of the small group.
In another sign of the radical’s increasing authority, the magazine 
Education Revolution Dispatches was closed down in January. Zhou Rongxin 
had used this magazine to publish a number of articles in support of the 
reformers position.117
115 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.486.
116 Ibid, pg.485.
117 Ibid, pg.485.
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While the radical Left were able to consolidate their control over the Ministry 
of Education’s day-to-day operations, the debate over the correct line in higher 
education itself appeared to peter out. Following the wave of articles published 
in the national media in December 1975 and January and February 1976, very 
few articles appeared in the following months. The special column "How 
should [we] run socialist universities” was only published intermittently in 1976, 
before stopping altogether: The seventieth issue appeared in the Renmin 
ribao on 14 December, 1975, but it was a full seven months before the 
seventy-first issue was published on 21 July, 1976. The main reason for this 
change appears to be that the debate over policy in higher education was 
subsumed in a wider political struggle in the run-up to Mao Zedong’s death. 
Many of the articles that appeared used a discussion of higher education to 
promote the campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping.
The only major initiative in higher education reported in the period from 
January to Mao’s death was a meeting of education officials from nine 
provinces and municipalities which met in Beijing in May and June to promote 
the experiences of Liaoning Province in implementing the system of "from the 
commune, to the commune”. The meeting met from 6 May to the 23 June and 
discussed what was known as the “three comes and the three returns” (san- 
lai, san~qu). This referred to the original slogan from Chaoyang Agricultural 
College, “from the commune, return to the commune” which had now been 
expanded to include two new versions, “from the factory, return to the factory”
(chang-lai, chang-qu) and “wherever your come from, return there" (nar-lai, 
nar-qu ).118 The experiences of Liaoning Province were formally recognized in 
a report issued by the Ministry of Education on 25 July. The report "A summary 
of enrollment work in institutions of higher education by Liaoning Province’s 
Education Bureau in 1975” stated:
The experiences of Liaoning Province last year in implementing the
116 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.486.
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“three comes and the three returns” in insitutions of higher education 
are very good.
[This system] is one of the most important measures to reform the 
enrollment and work allocation systems at ordinary schools, to restrict 
bourgeois legal rights, to deepen the education revolution and to turn 
schools into tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat and train 
ordinary workers who have shown themselves to be equal to the 
workers and peasants. The general orientation is completely 
correct.119
Underlining the message of this conference, on 22 June the State Council 
ratified a report by the Ministry of Education and the State Planning 
Commission on problems in allocating work for graduates from institutions of 
higher education. The report repeated the line of the Left that it was important 
for graduates to return to the grass-roots level and engage in production. It 
went on to say that except where the state had special requirements, graduates 
should return to their original work units. It added that if students wanted to 
volunteer to go to the countryside, “this should be supported positively”.120
In the following sections I will look at how Hua Guofeng attempted to 
establish himself as the inheritor of Mao Zedong’s legacy in higher education. I 
will then examine how, following his rehabilitation in mtd-1977, Deng Xiaoping 
mobilized support for reform to China’s higher education policy from a broad 
cross-section of political, military and educational figures. By late-1977 it 
seems clear that their was a general consensus about the need to restore the 
national university entrance exams and re-introduce the policy of key-point 
universities. I will then examine to what extent, if any, Hua Guofeng and his 
supporters resisted these reform efforts.
119 Ibid, pg.486.
120 Ibid, pg.486.
150
5. Renewed struggle and the triumph of Deng’s line: October 1976-1978
a. Purging the influence of the 'Gang of Four’ in higher education: October, 
1976-August. 1977
On 13 October, only one week after the arrest of the Gang of Four, the CCP 
Central Committee sent four officials, Zhang Jizhi, Fan Ge, Xiao Han and Jin 
Guixiang, to the Ministry of Education to lead a campaign to “expose and 
criticize the ‘Gang of Four”' (Jiefa pipan “Sirenbang” de yundong)™ This 
campaign appears to have been conducted with some vigour in November
1976.
The line that emerged during the campaign to “expose and criticize" the 
activities of the ‘Gang of Four’ focused on how the Gang had “distorted” Mao 
Zedong’s higher education policy. The new Party Chairman, Hua Guofeng, 
seeking to portray himself as Mao’s rightful successor, used this approach in a 
number of other policy areas as well, but in education it hampered his ability to 
adopt new measures and made it harder to defend this line against the criticism 
that emerged in the following years.
One of the most significant articles published in the initial period after the 
arrest of the Gang of Four was printed in the academic newspaper the 
Guangming ribao, 23 November, 1976. The article, by the Mass Criticism 
Group of the Ministry of Education, was titled “Isn’t it easy to distort Chairman 
Mao’s education policies?” a direct reference to the December 1975 article 
written by the Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities, “The 
direction of the education revolution isn’t easy to distort". The Guangming 
article criticized the Gang of Four’s education policies and launched a strong 
attack on Zhang Chunqiao’s statement of October 1975 that “ I would rather 
have an uneducated worker than an educated exploiter”.
The Renmin ribao published two more interesting articles in late-November
121A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.487.
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1976, both attacking key elements of the radical Left’s critique of higher 
education policy The first article, “Smothering The Song of the Gardener’ was 
also in order to usurp the Party and seize power” was published in the Renmin 
ribao 29 November. Interestingly, the article was written by the Propaganda 
Department of the Hunan Party Committee, Hua Guofeng’s old powerbase. In 
an introduction to the article it was claimed that Hua had played a leading role 
in having “The Song of the Gardener” made into a play, (the script had been 
based on an old Hunan opera and had first been used as a basis for a play by 
actors within the province ).122 Not surprisingly, the article strongly refuted the 
Left’s criticism of the play and praised Hua Guofeng’s role in its production.
The second article, “A reactionary political fraud”, appeared in the Renmin 
ribao the following day, 30 November. This article, written by reporters from the 
Liaoning ribao, attacked the way in which the radical Left had manipulated 
Zhang Tiesheng’s letter. Significantly, the article contained a strong defence of 
the reforms to enrollment procedures introduced by Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping in 1973 that had seen a reintroduction of exams to test university 
candidate’s level of education:
These regulations gave a clear direction for university enrollment 
work after the Great Cultural Revolution, they were of benefit to 
achieving the consolidation and development of the proletarian 
education revolution and possessed a great significance for 
thoroughly implementing Chairman Mao’s education policy and 
training students to be labourers with [both] a socialist consciousness 
and an education.123
On 15 January, 1977, the Central Committee approved the transfer of Liu 
Xiyao to become Minister of Education. At the same time, Yong Wentao was 
appointed Vice-Minister. These moves mark the first senior appointments in the
122 Zhonggong Hunan shengwei xuanchuanbu (The Propaganda Department of the Hunan 
Provincial Party Committee), “Esha ‘y iia n d in g  zhi ge’ ye shi weile cuandang duoquan"
(Throttling “The Song of the Gardener” was also in order to usurp the Party and seize power), in 
the Renmin ribao, 29 November, 1976, pg.2.
123 "Yi ge fangeming de zhengzhi pianju", (A reactionary political fraud), in the Renmin ribao, 
30 November, 1976, pg.2.
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ministry since the death of Mao Zedong. Liu had served as Vice-Chairman of 
the State Science and Technology Commission until 1963, when he 
dissappeared from public view . In 1971 he had been appointed head of the 
SEG, however he dissapeared from public view again in 1973, reappearing in 
January 1975 when he was appointed Minister of the 2nd Machine Building 
Ministry. Yong Wentao had no background in education. Prior to the Cultural 
Revolution he had served with Tao Zhu in the Central-South Bureau and in 
Guangdong. He had been purged together with Tao in January 1967. He 
reappeared in public in November 1972, and prior to his appointment as Vice- 
Minister he had resumed working in Guangdong Province. Both their 
backgrounds suggest that they were a “safe pair of hands” , rather than 
education specialists.
The line that had emerged in this initial period supported the reforms 
introduced in higher education during the Cultural Revolution, for example the 
idea that candidates for university should be recommended by the masses and 
that senior-high school graduates should undertake two years of manual 
labour before they could go on to university. However, in the light of Hua 
Guofeng’s ambitious industrial policy, which sought to achieve a rapid "leap” 
forward, senior officials appear to have recognized the need for an increase in 
the numbers of trained graduates leaving China’s universities and colleges. 
Articles such as that defending the play “The song of the Gardener” recognized 
the importance of education itself and the role it played in socialist construction, 
other articles also recognized the positive role of intellectuals, reversing the 
negative attitude adopted by the radical Left. In this period before Deng 
Xiaoping’s rehabilitation, it appears that there was already an acceptance of 
the reforms introduced by Zhou Enlai, such as the limited exams to test 
university candidates. What emerges from these early articles is a rejection of 
the chaos in China’s institutes of higher education and a practical recognition 
of the importance of education itself. However, the reforms of the Cultural
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Revolution were still seen as correct. Education, and intellectuals, are seen in 
a better light, in line with Mao Zedong’s 1958 statement that the majority of 
intellectuals are willing to serve socialism, however, intellectuals were still 
expected to undergo re-education at the hands of the workers and peasants, 
and education was seen as a means to educate the masses so that they could 
consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Hua Guofeng’s line on higher education emerged more clearly from his 
speech to the 11th National Party Congress, held in August 1977.124 At the 
same time, the national media launched a campaign promoting the 
experiences of the Jiangxi Communist Labourer’s University. It was an 
interesting choice for a model. The university had been founded in 1957, one 
of several hundred institutions that had been founded during the period of rapid 
expansion of institutes of higher education during the Great Leap Forward. It 
had originally established some 30 branches in some of the poorest areas of 
the province, including the old Communist base area of Jingangshan. Aside 
from this revolutionary cachet of being associated with some of Mao Zedong’s 
old revolutionary haunts, the university may have been attractive as a model as 
one of Hua Guofeng’s key supporters, Wang Dongxing, had formerly been 
Party Secretary of the University.
On 30 July, the Central Committee instructed all newspapers to print a copy 
of a letter Mao had sent to the university on 30 July, 1961. The letter, known as 
the “‘July 30th’ Directive,” praised the school for its work-study programs which 
meant that the university “did not need a penny from the state”.125 Mao called 
on all Party, government, and mass organizations to establish similar schools. 
Mao’s simple instructions were developed in a series of articles into an
124 Hua Guofeng, Za/' Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de
zhengzhi baogao, (Political Report at the 11th National Congress of the CCP), (Hong Kong: 
Joint Publishing Col., 1977).
126 "Weida lingxiu he daoshi Mao zhuxi ‘Gei Jiangxi gongchanzhuyi laodong daxue de yi feng 
xin”’, (The great leader and teacher Chairman Mao’s “Letter to the Jiangxi Communist Labourers’ 
University”), in Hong qi, Issue 8, 1977, pp.3-4.
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extensive argument on the values and aims of education, including higher 
education. A typical article, published in the Renmin ribao the same day as 
Mao’s letter claimed:
Practice makes us realize, Chairman Mao’s ‘“July 30th’ Directive” is 
an important Marxist document, it has important practical significance 
and deep historical significance for continuing the revolution under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, developing the proletarian 
education revolution, realizing the integration of the intellectuals with 
the working class and the intellectualization of the working class, 
narrowing the three major distinctions, constructing socialism and 
gradually making the transition to communism.126
This campaign, together with Hua’s speech set out the two key elements of 
Hua Guofeng’s higher education policy: Firstly, upholding what were seen as 
the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Here, the reforms to higher 
education policy introduced during the Cultural Revolution were generally seen 
in a positive light. It was felt that the reforms had been successful in opening 
higher education to the influence of the peasants and working class, and had 
succeeded in transforming the world outlook of intellectuals so that they were 
now willing to work with the proletariat. The importance of part-work, part-study 
schools was defended. Secondly, in response to Hua Guofeng’s radical 
industrial plan, emphasis was placed on higher education, in all its forms, 
training sufficient scientists, technicians and qualified cadres to support 
industrial and agricultural modernization. Renewed emphasis was placed on 
academic learning in slogans such as “study for the revolution” (wei geming 
xuexi) and “master the skills needed for serving the people” (zhangwo wei 
renmin fuwu de benling). This emphasis explains Hua Guofeng’s support for 
the re introduction of tests that had occurred in 1973, and his promotion of the 
campaign to recognize the role of intellectuals as a whole.
126 Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee, “Gaoju Mao zhuxi “qi-san-ling zhishi” de guanghui 
qizhi shengli qianjin” (Hold high the radiant banner of Chairman Mao’s “July 30th directive” and 
march forward victoriously), in Hong qi, 30 July, 1977, pg.2.
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Hua’s simultaneous support for both continuing with the policies introduced 
during the Cultural Revolution and recognition of the need for more trained 
technicians highlights the dilemma he faced in the immediate post-Mao period. 
As the wider debate shifted (under Hua’s leadership), to recognizing that less 
ideological restraints should be placed on economic and social policy, 
supporting higher education policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution 
looked more and more anachronistic. Certainly the ease with which Hua’s line 
was superceded by that of Deng Xiaoping and the moderate coalition suggests 
that Hua too recognized the timitiations of his position.
b. The ‘two-line struggle’ resumes: August-1977 - December 1978
i. Deng Xiaoping’s line on education
Although Deng was not formally rehabilitated until the third plenum held in 
July, it is clear that following his letter of 10 April to Hua Guofeng in which he 
contritely admitted making some mistakes, Deng was free to meet with a 
number of senior Party and military figures. Almost straight away, Deng 
appears to have engaged in discussions on a number of issues, including 
education. On 24 May Deng met with Wang Zhen and Party elder, Deng 
Liqun.127 Some of Deng’s comments made during this meeting have since 
been written up in his selected works under the title "Respect knowledge, 
respect talented people” (Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai). This article 
represents his first comments on education since the rectification movement of 
1975.
Despite not being formally rehabilitated, Deng’s comments, as they have 
been edited, show a determination to reintroduce two of the most controversial 
elements of pre-Cultural Revolution higher education policy, namely key-point 
schools and the national, unified, university entrance exam. Like Hua Guofeng, 
Deng tied his comments to the need to modernize China and train scientists
127 Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai (eds.), Deng Xiaoping zai 1978, pg.102.
156
and technicians to take part in the four modernizations. However, unlike Hua, 
Deng was willing to argue that China had go beyond the Cultural Revolution 
reforms, or rather that China should return to the policies implemented before 
the Cultural Revolution. He felt that key-point schools and exams could be 
justified because they were only way China was going to modernize 
successfully:
If we want to bring about modernization, the key is improving 
science and technology. In developing science and technology, if you 
don’t pay attention to education then you won’t get far. Relying on 
empty talk won’t bring about modernization, you must have 
knowledge and talented people. Without knowledge, without talented 
people, how can we progress? How can we progress when our 
science and technology are this backward? We must recognize our 
backwardness, when we recognize this then we have hope.
When paying attention to science and technology at the same time 
you must pay attention to education. Starting from now, I hope that in 
five years we will see some progress, in ten years there will have 
been more progress, and in fifteen years we will have made great 
progress. In running education we must walk on two legs, that is 
concentrate both on popularizing [education] and raising standards.
We should run key-point primary schools, key-point middle schools 
and key-point universities. Using a rigorous examination, [my 
emphasis] we must concentrate the outstanding people in key-point 
middle schools and universities.128
Deng Xiaoping elaborated on these comments at more length during a 
discussion meeting on science and education work, held in Beijing from 4-8 
August, only shortly after having been rehabilitated. Deng himself was 
reported to have convened the meeting which was attended by thirty scientists 
and educationalists, in his speech to the meeting, Deng announced “I offered 
to undertake the difficult task of managing science and education work and the 
Central Committee has agreed”.129
120 Deng Xiaoping, “Zunzhong zhishi, zunzhong rencai", (Respect knowledge, respect 
talented people), in Deng Xiaoping tongzhi lun jiaoyu, (Comrade Deng Xiaoping on education), 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,1990), pp.24-25.
129 Deng Xiaoping, “Guanyu kexueTie jiaoyu gongzuo de ji dian yijian”, (Some opinions on 
science and education work), in ibid, pg.27.
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Deng’s speech challenged almost all of the Cultural Revolution reforms in 
higher education. It contained a systematic defence of the role of intellectuals 
and education. He refuted the negative assessment of intellectuals that had 
characterized the policies of the radical-Left (although he did not directly 
mention the “two-estimates” and the 1971 National Educational Work 
Conference). Deng argued that the work undertaken by scientists and teachers 
should be seen in the same light as physical labour. Although he recognized 
the usefulness of part-work, part-study colleges, Deng Xiaoping called for the 
government’s emphasis to be placed on regular institutions, and in particular 
the key-point schools. Deng called for the system of mass-recommendation for 
candidates for university to be scrapped and the national entrance exam to be 
restored. He also said that senior-high school graduates should be allowed to 
go directly to university. At the heart of his arguement was the very practical 
defence that this was the fastest way to train new personnel and achieve early 
results (zao chu rencai, zao chu chengguo) for economic construction.130
Deng’s speech challenged a number of the elements of Hua Guofeng’s line 
on higher education as it had emerged since October 1976. His call for the 
centre to focus its resources on a small number of key-point schools appeared 
to go directly against the on-going campaign to popularize the experiences of 
the Jiangxi Communist Labourers’ University, a part-work, part-study school. 
Deng’s empahsis was very much on raising standards, rather than popularizing 
education. Deng’s statements that “mental labour (naoli laodong) should be 
seen in the same light as physical labour also appear to contradict Hua 
Guofeng’s speech to the 11th Party Congress where he had repeated that 
classroom teaching needed to be combined with labour. Most significantly, 
Deng appeared to be redefining the value of intellectuals, and education itself. 
No longer was education, and the intellectuals, to “serve proletarian politics”. 
With the main task now to develop China economically, and achieve the four
130 Ibid, pg.36.
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modernizations, education had a full, and equal role to play. This line presaged 
developments at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee when the 
Party’s focus was shifted from class struggle to economic construction, in this, 
higher education appears to have been ahead of many other sectors.
ii. The triumph of Deng Xiaoping’s line 
During the second half of 1977, Deng appears to have used his own 
personal authority to overcome resistance to further reforms. By the end of 
1977 the unified university entrance exam had been reintroduced and in 
February 1978, the first list of 60 key-point universities and colleges to be re­
established since the Cultural Revolution was announced. During discussions 
in late 1977 Hua Guofeng continued to defend elements of the Cultural 
Revolution reforms, however by the time of the first session of the 5th NPC, held 
in February 1978, Hua appears to have moved to accept many of the policies 
being introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Although their is little evidence to show 
why Hua Guofeng made this shift, it seems likely he was infuenced by the 
strength of the coalition against him and his own calls for education to train new 
personnel to meet the needs of his ambitious modernization programme.
Hua Guofeng seems to have wanted to ensure that the benefits that had 
accrued to the workers and peasants not be lost, particularly the increased 
access under the “open schools” policy and through “mass recommendation”.
It is unclear how much Hua resisted the reintroduction of the national university 
entrance exam, however, once that decision had been taken, Hua’s policy 
seems to have been one of trying to protect the workers and peasants by 
having quotas on the numbers of senior-middle school graduates who could 
directly enroll in university
Throughout the second half of 1977 it is clear that there was an intense 
debate on reforming enrollment procedures in China’s universities. It is 
reported that the Ministry of Education held a meeting on enrollment work for
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universities in Taiyuan from 29 June to 15 July. This meeting reportedly 
decided to continue with the system of mass recommendation, but as a 
compromise they would also allow between 4-10,000 students to enrol! directly 
from senior-middle school. (This would have represented between 2 and 5 
percent of all new enrollments)131 Following the rehabilitation of Deng 
Xiaoping, the Ministry of Education held a second meeting on enrollment work 
from 13 August to 25 September. The length of this meeting suggests that 
there were considerable differences over reform to what was a key element of 
the Cultural Revolution line. This meeting discussed two draft documents 
outlining reforms to enrollment procedures for 1977: “Opinions on enrollment 
work in institutions of higher education for 1977” and “Opinions on enrolling 
research students in institutions of higher education”. These documents were 
approved by the State Council on 12 October.
“Opinions on enrollment work in institutions of higher education for 1977” 
represented a clear break from the Cultural Revolution line, and the line 
adopted by the Taiyuan meeting held only three months before and was a clear 
victory for Deng Xiaoping and the moderates. The "Opinions” called for the 
reintroduction of the unified exam. It also called for the abandonment of “mass 
recommendation”, saying that students should be altowed to put their own 
names forward. The document continued to place the emphasis on workers, 
peasants, sent down youth and demobilizied soldiers, saying that any person 
in these categories could put their name foward. However, reflecting the 
influence of Deng Xiaoping, “Opinions” also stated that the percentage of 
senior-middle school graduates who could directly enroll in university should 
be raised to between twenty and thirty percent.132
A reorganization of the Ministry of Education in October 1977 must have 
improved its professionalism by isolating the management of key sectors of
131 Ibid, pg.499.
132 Ibid, pg.499.
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higher education from the part-work, part-study programme. The 
reorganization appears to have been carried out under the auspices of Deng 
Xiaoping who had assumed responsibility over educational affairs since his 
rehabilitation. The ministry established thirteen bureaus and offices, namely: 
General Office; Political Bureau; Planning Department; Higher Education 
Department No 1 (this covered the liberal arts, sciences, teacher training and 
foreign ianugages); Higher Education Department No 2, (this covered 
industrial, agricultural and medical colleges); Technical Secondary Education 
Department; Ordinary Education Department; Workers and Peasants Education 
Department; Physical Education Department; Student Management 
Department; Science and Technology Bureau; Foreign Affairs Bureau; and the 
Production Supply Management Bureau.
At the same time three new Vice-ministers were appointed on 15 October
1977. The three, Li Qi, Li Qitao and Gao Yi all had backgrounds in education 
or youth affairs, showing an improvement in professionalism amongst senior 
staff in the ministry.
Through October, November and December, attacks on key elements of the 
radical educational line increased. On 6 November, the Central Committee 
published a report by the Ministry of Education which called for the Workers’ 
Propaganda Teams to withrdraw from China’s schools as quickly as possible.133 
Elsewhere, two key model institutions promoted by the Gang of Four were 
criticized. An article in the Liaoning ribao 17 October criticized the way in 
which the Gang of Four had used Chaoyang Agricultual College as a means to 
gain control over the CCP. This article sparked a wave of criticism of that 
institution, and it was later closed down in March 1978.134 Elsewhere, the newly 
re-opened magazineRenmin jiaoyu (People’s Education) published an article 
criticizing Tongji University’s “May 7th Commune”, claiming it had damaged the
133 Ibid, pg.501.
134 Ibid, pg.499.
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education cause. The commune was also disbanded in 1978, and the original 
departments that had formed the commune restored.135
iv. The National Educational Work Conference of 1978
The National Educational Work Conference, held in Beijing from 22 April to 
16 May consolidated the reforms introduced into higher education in late-1977 
and early-1978, however the language of Deng Xiaoping’s speech, and that of 
Liu Xiyao, still reflected the influence of the "educational revolution”, particularly 
the idea that China needed to develop intellectuals from the ranks of the 
workers who were both “red and expert”. At the same time, both these 
speeches stressed the significance of education for economic modernization. 
The two themes should not necessarily be seen as being opposed. In many 
ways they reflected Deng’s broader approach to policy. He was pragmatic in 
the way he recognized that economic modernization was essential for China, 
and the CCP, to overcome the results of the Cultural Revolution. At the same 
time, Deng never advocated a weakening of the Party’s control and he saw 
education as playing the leading role in political indoctrination. So it was 
possible for Deng to simultaneously advocate reforms in education that 
boosted China’s economic construction and at the same time continue to stress 
the political aspects of higher education.
In his report to the conference, Liu Xiyao outlined the contents of the Ministry 
of Education’s 1978-1985 National Education Plan. Liu also called for 
Communist Labourers’ Universities and July 21st Universities to be brought up 
to the standard of other technical universities and colleges. Liu emphasized 
that efforts were to be focused on key-point schools and universities. These 
were to enroll the best students. They were also to encourage specialists from 
science colleges and other departments to come to teach classes. Liu said 
that this would facilitate academic exchange and raise the standard of teachers
135 Ibid, pg.502.
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in these institutions. Liu did devote a section of his report to linking education 
and production, but, aside from being the smallest section of his speech, Liu 
repeated Deng Xiaoping’s warnings that university students should only 
engage in labour that was relevant to their future careers.136 Liu’s report was 
approved by the State Council 8 July.137
Deng Xiaoping’s speech to the conference was less controversial than some 
of his earlier speeches and talks, for instance he did not mention the “2- 
Estimates", nonetheless, it represented a critical attack on Cultural Revolution 
reforms in higher education and a critique of Hua Guofeng’s line. Deng 
Xiaoping defended the reintroduction of entrance exams and called for 
teachers to be shown more respect by the whole of society. When discussing 
education and economic development, Deng called for a rethink of the way 
education was linked with productive labour:
The rapid development of a modern economy and technology 
demands that educational quality and education’s effectiveness also 
rise rapidly. It also demands that we constantly have new 
developments in the ways and methods in which we unite education 
and productive labour.
If we want to do this, each level and each type of school must make 
prudent arrangements as to what kind of labour students take part in, 
how they visit factories or go down to the countryside, how much time 
they spend [taking part in labour] and how to link this closely with their 
studies. Even more important is that education must be suited to the 
needs of national economic development; if studies are irrelevant to 
practice and practice is irrelevant to studies [Xue fei zuo yong, yong 
fei suo xue), isn’t this funadamentally destroying the policy of 
combining education and productive labour? If we do that what 
possibility is there of mobilizing the students’ will to study and labour, 
what possibility is there of fulfilling the arduous demands placed on 
education by the new historical era?138
In many ways, the National Education Work Conference had a greater
130 Liu Xiyao, “Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de baogao”, (Report at the National 
Educational Work Conference), in the Renmin ribao, 12 June, 1978, pg.2.
137 A Chronicle of Major Events in Education, pg.517.
138 Deng Xiaoping, “Zai quanguo jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua”, (Speech to the 
Natioan! Educational Work Conference), in Comrade Deng Xiaoping on Education, pg.63.
163
impact on higher education than the third plenum of the 11th Centra!
Committee held in December the same year, in that the practical policies 
confirmed by the work conference were more significant than the policy 
decisions made at the third plenum. However in one respect, the third plenum 
was important. The decision taken at the plenum meeting to move the focus of 
the Party’s work from class struggle to socialist construction led to a swift 
reassessment of the role of intellectuals and an announcement that they were 
no longer to be subject to reform and re-education. Three months after the third 
plenum, the “2-Estimates” were also formally discredited. The final section of 
this chapter will look at the way gradual reforms continued to be introduced 
following the National Education Work Conference. I will then examine the 
impact of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee in higher education.
d. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and the eclipse of Hua 
Guofeng
i. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and the reassessment of 
education: December 1978-March 1979.
By the time of the third plenum, the structure of China’s education system, its 
enrollment and job allocation policies, and the course content and teaching 
methods had largely returned to their pre-Cultural Revolution position. In this 
sense the plenum had little impact on practical policies in higher education. 
However, the plenum’s decision to shift the focus of the Party’s work from class 
struggle to socialist construction did lead to an important reassessment of the 
value and role of intellectuals and education itself. This was symbolized by the 
formal denunciation of the policy of the “2-Estimates” in March 1979.
The “Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committe of the 
CCP” did not mention education specifically. The meeting focused on 
developing China’s agriculture and industry, and to this end it announced that 
the focus of the Party’s work would be moved from class struggle to socialist
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modernization.139 Although it was claimed that the class struggle would be 
maintained, the Communique added:
However, just as Comrade Mao Zedong said, large scale mass 
class struggle, carried out like a hurricane, is already basically over.
With regards to class struggle in a socialist society, we should resolve 
[problems] strictly in accordance with the policy of distinguishing 
between the two different types of contradictions, and resolve 
[problems] in accordance with the Constitution and laws and 
regulations. We must absolutely not permit the muddling of the two 
different contradictions, and we must absolutely not permit any 
harm to the stability and unity essential for socialist 
modernization. (My emphasis).140
It was this shift, outlined in the plenum communique, that was perhaps most 
significant for higher education as it represented a clean break from the 
negative assessment of intellectuals and the role of education that had 
characterized the Cultural Revolution reforms. Shortly after the third plenum 
closed the Renmin ribao carried an editorial “Completely and correctly 
understand the Party’s policy on intellectuals” which reflected this change. The 
editorial claimed that intellectuals were already an integral part of the working 
class and should no longer be subject to the policies of education and 
transformation:
During the early period after Liberation, our Party proposed the 
policy of unite, educate and transform [tuanjie, jiaoyu, gaozao], with 
the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals as the main 
intended targets. Today, for the majority of intellectuals, this is no 
longer applicable. They are already not the kind of target for uniting, 
educating and transforming as they were in the early period after 
Liberation. They are members of the working class who engage in 
mental labour, they are a dependable force for the Party.141
139 Zhongguo gortgchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quan ti huiyi 
gongbao, (Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP), (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1978), pg.1.
140 Ibid, pg. 5.
141 “Wanzheng de zhunque de lijie dang de zhishifenzi zhengce", (Completely and correctly 
understand the Party's policy on intellectuals), in the Renmin ribao^4 January, 1979, reprinted in 
A Chronicle of Major Events in Educations, pg.539.
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What was important was that intellectuals be freed from the threat of political 
campaigns so that they could be fully mobilized to take part in socialist 
(economic) modernization. Universities and colleges were once again to 
become centres of academic and scientific excellence, places that would train 
the cadres to lead economic development. They were still expected to carry 
out political education, but the emphasis was, for the moment, very much on the 
professional aspects of teaching. This more positive assessment of the role of 
intellectuals and education in China’s development was underlined when the 
Central Committee approved the Ministry of Education’s report calling for the 
"Summary of the National Education Work Conference”, adopted in 1971, to be 
revoked. It was this document that had contained the “2-Estimates’’.
8. Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, higher education policy was subject to intense 
policy debates within the senior leadership of the CCP. During the mobilization 
phase of the Cultural Revolution, higher education had suffered more than any 
other field, with the mobilization of students to take part in the Red Guard 
movement, attacks on teachers and staff and the closure of universities and 
colleges across China. The inherently political nature of education in general, 
and higher education in particular, and its role in training a successor 
generation had led Mao to focus on education and what he saw as the 
bourgeois domination of China’s universities and colleges.
This radicalization in higher education policy and in university and college 
campuses created the conditions for the radical Left to assume positions of 
power in a way that, as subsequent chapters will show, didn’t happen in areas 
tike agriculture or foreign policy. Supporters of the radical Left like Chi Qun 
rose to power in key universities like Tsinghua University and on central 
government and Party organs like the Science and Education Group. This
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gave the radical Left access to the policy debate. In addition, they were able to 
develop institutions under their control into models which were popularized in 
the media and which had a considerable influence over policy.
Despite this influence over policy-making, it is clear that Zhou Enlai’s 
position within the State Council gave him considerable power over the way 
policy was implemented. Zhou’s personal authority was probably enhanced by 
the sending down of all the cadres working at the Ministry of Education, 
effectively closing the Ministry, and placing the onus on Zhou. In addition, it is 
clear that there were immediate doubts as to the suitability of many of the new 
worker-peasant students, enrolled under the new selection procedures. Zhou 
and other reformers appear to have been able to use these doubts to introduce 
limited reforms to the policies brought in during the mobilization phase of the 
Cultural Revolution.
Mao’s prevarication between the two sides is significant. In the last ten 
years of his life, Mao appeared to focus more on ideological issues, however 
this is not to say that he ignored economic factors. His ambivalence on this 
issue created the space in which both reformers and the radical Left could 
promote their policies and served to intensify the policy debate. It was only 
when Mao was convinced that reforms were challenging what he saw as the 
successes of the Cultural Revolution that he came down in favour of one side, 
the radical Left.
In contrast to developments in agriculture which I will discuss below, Hua 
Guofeng made no major policy initiatives in higher education. Hua supported 
many of the reforms introduced during the Cultural Revolution, but significantly, 
he did not move to undo the introduction of testing for university candidates.
Hua was in an ambivalent position, much of his legitimacy was based on him 
being the inheritor of Mao’s line, however Hua also introduced an ambitious 
economic policy which required expanded numbers of technicians and 
scientists. He sought to defend the Cultural Revolution line while accepting the
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reforms introduced in 1973-74. Ultimately the imperatives of economic reform 
exposed this contradiction, and paved the way for the victory of Deng 
Xiaoping’s line. This saw a return to the policies of the pre-Cultural Revolution 
period, with the reintroduction of exams for university candidates, streaming, 
and key-point schools, all in stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution reforms.
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Chapter Four: Agriculture
1. Introduction
In the late-1970s and early-1980s sweeping reforms to agricultural policy in 
the PRC were widely seen, not least by the Chinese themselves, as heralding a 
new phase of development in China following the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. The historic “Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee”, approved on 22 December, 1978, announced reforms to 
agricultural policy which in effect represented a return to the post-Great Leap 
Forward policies of 1.962,.
The early introduction of these measures might suggest that rural areas and 
agricultural production had been severely affected by developments during the 
Cultural Revolution, however a number of authors have argued convincingly 
that the rural sector was mainly untouched by the mobilizational phase of the 
movement which caused so much damage to other areas.1 Indeed it is clear 
from official documents that the centre was anxious to protect the rural sector 
from the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution in order to ensure 
production.
The significance of maintaining agricultural production, not only to feed 
China’s burgeoning population, but also to supply industry with the necessary 
raw materials clearly loomed large in the thinking of nearly all of the central 
leadership, after all, the post-Great Leap Foward famine had occurred only five 
years before.
1 See, for example, Richard Baum, “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of 
a Limited Rebellion", in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971) and David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968-1981, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). Both authors suggest that the rural sector 
was largely untouched by the Red Guard movement during the initial stages of the Cultural 
Revolution, and that it was not until 1968 that radical figures, most notably Lin Biao, attempted to 
introduce new agricultural policies.
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a. The significance of a study of agriculture during the Cultural Revolution
What makes agricultural policy during this period particularly interesting is 
the difficulty radical leaders faced in both generating and then implementing a 
set of policies which reflected the ideological imperiatives of their broader 
campaign, but which did not disrupt overall production. Leaders of the radical 
Left might have dominated the tenor of the debate in higher education, but they 
could not afford to halt agricultural production in the same way that they had 
closed China’s universities. Agriculture was essential for feeding China’s 
population and generating the raw materials for industry. The economic 
imperatives proved a considerable restriction on the implementation of a 
radical agenda for agriculture, and moderates appeared able to make use of 
problems in production to justify what might otherwise be seen as inappropriate 
measures in the climate of the Cultural Revolution. A noticeable seasonal 
cycle in the policy-making process in agriculture emerges, with periods of 
radicalization being restricted at key points in the agricultural calender.
From the very start the central leadership, seemingly with Mao’s approval, 
sought to restrict the impact of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas. An 
editorial in the Renmin ribao 7 September, 1967, entitled “Grasp Revolution, 
Promote Production” banned Red Guards from “interfering in rural politics”.2 
Shortly after this, the Central Committee issued the “Regulations of the CCP 
Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the 
Countryside Below the County Level”. The “Directive” specifically prohibited 
Red Guards from travelling to communes and brigades below the county level 
and in article two warned that efforts should be focused on agricultural tasks 
during the forthcoming harvest season.3
Although this ban on Red Guard’s travelling to rural areas was later lifted, the
2 Richard Baum, “The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside”, pg.384.
3 "Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in 
the Countryside Below the County Level”, in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution 1966-1967, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pg.79.
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conflict over the relative merits of production and ideological factors remained 
at the heart of the debate over agricultural policy throughout the Cultural 
Revolution and a study of agriculture should offer insights into economic 
restrictions on radical policy during this period.
In addition, agricultural policy during this period is significant as agriculture 
is one of the few areas where two leading Party figures, Lin Biao and Hua 
Guofeng, are thought to have made significant contributions to the policy 
debate. New information, including a number of speeches previously 
unpublished offer clearer insights into their thinking on agriculture, and their 
respective roles.
Following the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution, it was Lin Biao, 
together with Chen Boda, who is reported to have put forward the most radical 
policies for agriculture.4 Lin was also reported to be a strong advocate of 
Dazhai’s distribution system which placed greater emphasis on political 
attitude.
Hua Guofeng made a number of significant contributions to the debate on 
agricultural policy, both before and after the death of Mao Zedong. Hua 
delivered both the key-note speeches at the two Dazhai conferences, held in 
1975 and 1976. From 1971, Hua had also been responsible for agricultural 
mechnization policy, and he developed a comprehensive industrial and 
agricultural policy which sought to accelerate the pace of mechanization in 
agriculture. A study of agricultural policy during this period offers further 
insights into Hua’s thinking on this subject which represents his most clearly 
enunciated policies.
b. Policy issues in the debate over agricultural during the Cultural Revolution
Although there were a wide variety of issues that were debated in 
agricultural policy during this period, four issues stand out: The level of
4 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.56.
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ownership and accounting within the commune; the extent to which political or 
material incentives, such as the use of private plots, should be allowed or 
encouraged; how to interpret the significance of the campaign to study the 
model brigade at Dazhai; and the best way to achieve the mechanization of 
agriculture.
Following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, there was widespread 
criticism of egalitarian tendencies in agricultural distribution and it was 
proposed that the level of owernship and accounting be lowered to the 
production team level and that distribution be based once more on work 
undertaken. The “Regulations on the Work in the Rural People’s Communes” , 
adopted in 1962, clearly stated that the production team was to be “the basic 
accounting unit of a people’s commune”.5 On the whole, the principles 
contained in the “Regulations" remained in place throughout the period to 
1978, however it seems clear that radical figures, in particular Lin Biao and 
Chen Boda, did place pressure on rural areas to raise the level of accounting 
once more in the two years before Lin’s downfall. Hua Guofeng, popularizing 
the experiences of Dazhai, also called for the expansion of brigade 
accounting.0
The extent to which political, rather than material incentives should be used 
to boost peasant enthusiasm and agricultural production was a much more 
significant point of contention. Associated with this issue was the question of 
the use of private plots, which were seen by the radicals as a residual 
attachment to private property on the part of the peasant,7 and the use of rural 
markets to boost peasant income. For the radicals, influenced by Mao’s 
voluntaristic thinking, the use of political incentives to change an individual’s
5 “Regulations on the Work in the Rural People’s Communes (Revised Draft)”, in Issues and 
Studies, Vol. XV, No. 10, (October 1979), pg.94.
6 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.72.
7 David Zweig, “Agrarian Radicalism as a Rural Development Strategy, 1968-1978”, in 
Joseph, Wong and Zweig (eds.), New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution, (Camrbidge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pg.70.
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orientation would ensure advances in agricultural production, but moderate 
figures argued that some form of material incentive was required to boost, and 
reward, the peasant’s output.
The third issue that is of interest in the debate over agricultural policy is the 
significance of the campaign to study the experiences of Dazhai. This 
campaign is interesting as it continued, with renewed vigour, after Mao’s death 
and the purge of the Gang of Four when other models in this and other fields 
were often roundly condemned or dropped. Although there were a number of 
other model communes, in particular two promoted by the Gang of Four, none 
was as influential as Dazhai.
The final issue that I will focus on in this study is the issue of agricultural 
mechanization. Because all sides favoured mechanization, there was less 
policy debate on this issue than in the other three areas highlighted. However, 
how to achieve agricultural mechanization continued to be debated, 
particularly in light of the radicals’ views on self-sufficiency for local areas. Hua 
Guofeng in particular placed considerable emphasis on the role of agricultural 
mechanization for boosting support for collective agriculture.
c. Agricultural policy during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. 
1962-1969
As I noted in my introduction to this chapter, a number of authors argue that 
rural areas of China were not significantly affected by the radical turn of events 
that occured in China’s urban areas during the mobilizational phase of the 
Cultural Revolution. David Zweig argues that the first effort to introduce 
“radical agricultural policies” began in spring 1968.8 Richard Baum, in his 
study of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on rural China writes:
From its advent in the spring of 1966 until mid-autumn of 1968,
China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban 
phenonmenon. A substantial majority of China’s rural villages not
8 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China^pgs. 56 and 63.
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only failed to experience significant Red Guard agitation, “power 
seizures,” or internecine factional struggles, but also remained, 
throughout much of this two and one-half year period, effectively 
insulated from aiVbut'the mosfcursory ihrormation concerning thb 
occurrence of such events elsewhere.9
Although Baum contradicts his statement on no power seizures occuring 
later, on the whole these views appear to reflect the reality of most of China’s 
rural areas. The vast distances and difficult communications certainly served to 
isolate much of the countryside from travelling groups of Red Guards. While 
villages may have been isolated from urban Red Guards, Baum does however 
recognize the threat to stability in these areas posed by the organization of 
indigenous Red Guard groups and this phenomenon is described in some 
detail in Chen Village.
In Chen Village, a small Red Guard group formed in October 1966, 
although it appears to have had little effect on the day-to-day affairs of the 
village. It is clear, however, that other areas were affected more severely. With 
the advent of the autumn harvest season, it appears that the central leadership 
was concerned about the damage that might be caused by the spread of the 
Red Guard movement to the countryside. Reflecting these fears, the Renmin 
ribao published an editorial 7 September entitled “Grasp Revolution, Promote 
Production” which banned urban Red Guards from travelling to rural areas.10 
Shortly after this the Central Committee issued new regulations which repeated 
this message, and called for “concentrated efforts” during the autumn harvest.11
The message preventing Red Guards from travelling to rural areas was 
repeated in a further Renmin ribao editorial on 10 November, although for the 
first time it was stated that "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should be
9 Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside”, pg.367.
10 Ibid, pg.384.
11 “Regulations of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in 
the Countryside Below the County Level”, in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution 1966-1967, pg.79.
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carried out in both urban and rural areas actively and step by step”.12 Richard 
Baum argues that there were two apparent reasons for this shift: Firstly the 
“overall leftward swing” which occurred in Chinese politics at this time; and 
secondly, the continued obstructionism of some local cadres who used the 
phrase “Grasp Revolution to Promote Production” to emphasize production. 
While the centre may have resented this emphasis on production, it seems that 
they were anxious that the autumn harvest be a success. With the autumn 
harvest over, new regulations published on 15 December, 1966, clearly called 
for the launch of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas.13 The "Directive” called 
for the formation of Red Guard units in the countryside, made up primarily of the 
sons and daughters of poor and lower-middle peasants. In response to these 
new instructions, Chen Village describes how a new Red Guard organization 
was formed which ousted the earlier group whose class credentials no longer 
met requirements.14
Following the publication of the new “Directive” there were a wave of attacks 
on rural cadres in January and February 1967. Many cadres simply refused to 
work, and faced with the impending spring planting season, the centre was 
once again forced to take measures to ensure that production was not harmed. 
A new circular was published on 7 March, 1967 which expressly forbade 
further seizures of power in rural areas and sought to promote farm work:
The present is the very busy season for spring farming. Under this 
excellent situation, rural areas all over the country should earnestly 
implement Chairman Mao’s directive, "grasp revolution and promote 
production,” and immediately whip up an earth-shaking upsurge of 
spring farm work.
During the very busy season for spring farm work, struggle for 
seizing power should not be carried out in production brigades and
12 Ibid, pg.398.
13 “Directive of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution in the Countryside (Draft)”, in /Jb/'aCpp. 139-142.
14 Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village The Recent History of a 
Peasant Community in Mao's China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pg.117.
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production teams.15
As part of the movement to carry out spring farm work, large numbers of PLA 
officers and men were dispatched to communes across China. One effect of 
sending such large numbers of PLA personnel to the rural areas was to restore 
social order, disrupted by the January and February “power seizures” in 
communes, brigades and production teams across China. Aside from an 
upsurge of Red Guard violence in the first half of 1968, the countryside 
remained calm for the rest of this period. The military’s role in ensuring stability 
was identical to the role it played in other fields. For the remainder of the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution the focus was on consolidating 
control in the rural areas. This was to be achieved through the establishment of 
three-in-one committees, and again, as in other areas, the PLA played a 
leading role in organizing and staffing these bodies.
Thus towards the end of the mobilizational phase, there was a considerable 
military presence at the grass-roots level in rural China. Some authors have 
linked this presence to a radical upsurge in agricultural policy beginning in 
1968 and associated with Lin Biao. In the following section I will examine the 
content of this radical upsurge, and try and identify to what extent it can be 
linked with Lin Biao.
2. Lin Biao in Command? The Conflict over Agricultural Policy 1968-1971
Lin Biao’s influence over China’s political system was at its highest in the 
year immediately before and following the Ninth Party Congress. The collapse 
of much of the Party and government structure in the wake of the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution and the threat of a Soviet attack had served to 
raise the prestige of the military and give it a very real role in government, Party,
15 “Circular of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Undesirability of Seizure of Power 
in Rural Production Brigades and Production Teams During the Spring Farming Period", in CCP 
Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967, pg.349.
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economic and educational organizations across the country.
In rural areas, military personnel had entered many villages in an effort to 
restore order and to help to establish new leading bodies. This development is 
confirmed in Chen Village, where the authors describe the PLA entering the 
village in 1967 to help the villagers elect a “Cultural Revolution Leadership 
Small Group”.16 Although they left Chen Village as soon as the elections had 
taken place, the authors do state that a “corps of several junior officers took 
control of the administration of the commune....”17
it is this domination by the military of both central and lower-levels of 
administration that has lead many authors to conclude that Lin Biao, (with the 
support of members of the radical Left such as Chen Boda), was able to launch 
a radical agriculturarpolicy,.18 Certainly, beginning in 1968, there was an 
increasingly radicalized environment in China’s countryside. This was 
reflected in the central and provincial press, with articles in the Renmin ribao 
criticizing the use of materia! incentives and calls for peasants’ commercial 
activities to be restricted. There was an emphasis on studying and applying 
Mao Zedong Thought to the everyday activities of the peasants, and calls for 
the collective rural economy to be developed.
In early 1969 there were calls for a “New Flying Leap” in agriculture. David 
Zweig ties this new “Leap” to Lin Biao, but claims that Lin launched the 
campaign in November 1969, some nine months after the Renmin ribao had 
actually carried articles on this issue. Lin Biao certainly made use of Mao’s call 
to “prepare for war” (beizhan), and following the issuing of this new directive 
there were a number of articles in the media on the need to “store grain” (chu 
Hang) in preparation against the threat of a Soviet invasion. There was also 
renewed emphasis on self-sufficiency, one of the old themes of the “Study 
Dazhai” campaign.
16 Chan, Madsen, and Unger, Chen Village, pg.130.
17 Ibid, pg. 130.
18 This is the view of both David Zweig and JOrgen Domes.
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The major difficulty in establishing the extent of Lin Biao’s involvement in this 
radical upsurge in the countryside is the lack of material on Lin’s own views. 
Apart from Lin’s political report delivered at the Ninth Party Congress, there are 
few comments by him on agriculture, and even this report is limited to a few 
sentences. The work report is now known to have been drafted by Zhang 
Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.19 Interestingly, Zhang and Yao’s draft replaced 
an earlier version drafted by Chen Boda. Zhang and Yao apparently criticized 
Chen’s report for “advocating ‘the theory of [only concentrating on] production 
forces’” (guchui ‘wei shengchanli luri ).2Q This suggests that the policies of 
Chen Boda, an ally of Lin Biao, were not as radical as those of other members 
of the radical Left.
The extent of Lin’s influence over agriculture can also be questioned as by 
early-1970, when Lin Biao is still assumed to have retained his influence within 
the Chinese political system, the radical upsurge in agricultural policy was 
being challenged in the media. By the end of 1970, a more moderate line had 
been adopted, which emphasized the production team as the level of 
ownership and gave permission to peasants to engage in sideline production.
I will analyze these developments below.
a. The radical upsurge in China's countryside: 1968-1969
Although the PLA had succeeded in stabilizing the situation in China’s rural 
areas, the general political atmosphere continued to become increasingly 
radicalized in 1967-68. In particular, as Zweig notes, two political campaigns, 
the Cleansing the Class Ranks Campaign and the Three Loyalties Campaign 
increased radical pressures in the countryside, and set the tone for the radical 
upsurge in rural areas in 1968.21 The Three Loyalties Campaign (loyalty to 
Mao, to Mao’s thought and to his revolutionary line) was significant as it lead to
19 Ye Yonglie, Chen Boda Zhuan, (Biography of Chen Boda ), (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 
1994), pg .495.
20 Ibid, pg.495.
21 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China,,pg.57.
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an intensification of the “Cult of Mao". The way in which this effected the day- 
to-day lives of China’s peasants is described in Chen Village :
To show their loyalty, the Chen Villagers now marched with big 
wooden placards bearing Mao’s portrait to their evening political 
meetings. There, before the session opened, they joined hands in a 
circle and clumsily danced Loyalty Dances... to the tune of “Sailing on 
the Seas Depends on the Helmsman, Making Revolution Depends on 
Mao Zedong Thought.22
Before every meal, in imitation of the army... Chen Village families 
began performing services to Mao. Led by the family head, they 
bowed to a portrait of Mao; intoned in unison a selection of Mao 
quotations; sang “The East is Red”; and as they sat to eat, they recited 
a Maoist grace.23
In the media, a number of articles extolled the value of studying the “three 
constantly read works” (lao san pian ), Mao’s three articles “Serve the People”, 
“In Memory of Norman Bethune”, and “The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the 
Mountain”. The emphasis was placed on political and ideological correctness, 
as a means to encourage people to work harder at achieving a better harvest. 
An article in the Renmin ribao, 3 May, 1968 called on peasants to “arm their 
brains with Mao Zedong Thought” and to “use the revolution to command 
production" (yong geming tongshuai shengchan ).24 The same article also 
called on peasants to “Study Dazhai”. In a new development of the Dazhai 
movement the May article praised Dazhai’s peasants for their loyalty to Mao, 
and the way in which they used Mao Zedong Thought. The article 
recommended that villages across China follow Dazhai’s lead in setting up 
classes to study Mao’s works, however, interestingly, it did not discuss 
Dazhai’s system of distributing work points on the basis of an individual’s 
attitude to work even though the political attitude of a peasant had become a 
significant factor in Dazhai’s distribution system.
22 Chan, Madsen and Unger,Chen Village, pg.169.
23 Ibid, pg.170.
24 “Quanguo xianqi honghong lielie chunji shengchan huodong” (The Whole Country 
Launches Mighty Spring Production Activities), in the Renmin ribao, 3 May, 1968, pg.2.
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In this increasingly radicalized atmopshere, a number of articles appeared 
attacking the use of material incentives (wuzi ciji) in agriculture. In particular 
the policy of “sanzi yibao" (more private plots for private use, more free markets, 
more enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss, and fixing 
output quotas on a household basis) was heavily criticized for fostering the 
selfish interests of rich and upper-middle peasants. Peasants were 
encouraged to study Mao’s Thought in order to overcome these tendencies 
and work harder for the collective economy. Reflecting the radical upsurge, 
Chen Boda and Lin Biao are reported to have established their own test points 
in Beijing and Hangzhou respectively. At these sites private plots were said to 
be restricted and the Dazhai system of distributing work points was instituted.25 
If these test points were successful, the official media appears not to have 
devoted much space to their achievements or to the Dazhai distribution system.
Moving into 1969, there were clearer signs of Lin Biao’s involvement in 
agricultural policy as China made preparations to counter the perceived threat 
of a Soviet invasion. China’s peasants were instructed to “store grain” (chu 
liang) and Dazhai’s spirit of self-sufficiency was promoted as resources were 
diverted to the military. At the same time, China’s media called for a "new leap” 
in agriculture.
One of the first references to the “new leap” (xin feiyue) appeared in the 
Renmin ribao, 7 February, 1969. The article praised the efforts of peasants in 
Hubei for their labours during winter production work and claimed that they had 
“fired the first shots in bringing about a new leap in agricultural production”.26 
The article claimed that 2,500,000 peasants in the province were engaged in 
constructing fields or building and repairing irrigation works during the slack 
winter months. Interestingly, as well as referring to the campaign to “Study
25 David Zweig,Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.56.
26 "Daxiang nongye shengchan xin feiyue di yi pao" (Firing the first shots in the new leap in 
agricultural production), in the Renmin ribao, 7 Feburary, 1969, pg.4.
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Dazhai”, the article also claimed that peasants in Hubei were “responding to 
the great leader Chairman Mao’s instruction for ‘the whole country to study the 
PLA1”, a reference to the campaign first launched in 1964 which had brought 
Lin Biao to international attention.
In a speech which otherwise said very little about agriculture, Lin Biao 
emphasized the need to “take agriculture as the foundation” in his work report 
at the Ninth People’s Congress. Lin Biao also used the work report to the 
Congress to repeat one of Mao’s earlier instructions: “Be prepared against war, 
be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people” (bei 
zhan, bei huang, wei renmin ).Z7 During preparations for the Congress, serious 
clashes had occurred between the Chinese and the Soviets along their mutual 
border in the northeast. These clashes continued after the Congress closed, 
and the threat of a Soviet attack appeared considerable.
The campaign to prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union, which 
was closely associated with Lin Biao, had a major impact on agricultural policy. 
Beginning in the first half of July, the Renmin ribao and Hong qi carried a 
series of articles calling on peasants to “Store grain and prepare granaries, 
prepare for war and prepare for famine” (chu lianq^chu cao, bei zhan bei 
huang). Peasants were instructed to make planned use of grain and be 
economical in how much they used. In this way they could ensure that more 
grain was sold to the state, and more stored for future emergenices. The 
emphasis was on self-reliance, both as a means of reducing state-funding, and 
to ensure food supplies in the event of an attack.
Articles in the Renmin ribao 11 July, 1969 introduced the new policies to 
readers, highlighting the message of self-reliance:
In the past, the Taiping Production Brigade of Tongda Commune 
was well-known as a brigade which brought [state] grain for its rations 
and used loans to spend money, it relied on aid to plant its land. In 
the course of implementing Chairman Mao’s great strategic directive,
27 China Problems Research Center Selected Works of Lin Piao, (Hong Kong: Chih Luen 
Press, 1970), pg.46.
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“prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, everything for the 
people”, this brigade used the revolutionary spirit of self-sufficiency 
and hard work and firmly grasped revolution, boosting production. In 
only three short years they had transformed the situation of backward 
production. Today, not only does this brigade sell its surplus grain to 
the state, the collective is also able to store grain.28
The article encouraged peasants to rely on their own resources to build 
granaries, but interestingly, this was still to be done within production teams, 
not production brigades or at higher levels. In the past, the need to mobilize 
labour for large-scale capital construction projects had been used by radicals 
to call for the merger of production teams and raising the level of ownership to 
the brigade level as a means of freeing more production forces, however the 
Renmin ribao article underlined that self-sufficiency at the lowest possible level 
was the main order of the day.
Despite this call for construction work to be undertaken at the production 
team level, statistics show that the overall number of production teams fell in 
the year 1969-1970, reaching its lowest point since the Great Leap Forward. 
This demonstrates that local leaders were pressurizing peasants to merge 
teams to free labour for granary and other construction projects although there 
was no apparent central policy on this issue. Figures quoted by David Zweig 
show that the number of production teams fell from 5,100,000 in 1966 to only 
4,600,000 in 1969-70.29 One place where this occurred was Chen Village, 
where land ownership and accounting were transferred to the brigade level at 
the end of the Three Loyalties Campaign.30
Zweig notes that during 1969 peasants came under pressure to increase 
sales of grain to the state and that in an effort to achieve self '■Sufficiency in grain 
many areas dug up cash crops and private plots in order to grow wheat and
28 "Yikao qunzhong dagao chu liang jian cang gongzuo” (Rely on the masses to carry out 
work to store grain and build graneries), in the Renmin ribao, 11 July, 1S69, pg.1.
29 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China^pg. 58.
30 Chan, Madsen, Unger, Chen Village, pg.172.
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rice.31 Dazhai’s renowned emphasis on self-reliance was the subject of 
numerous articles, which also stressed the importance of expanding farmed 
land to boost production further.32
The issue of the mechanization of agriculture was also tied to moves to 
develop self-sufficiency at the local level. An article written by the director of 
the revolutionary committee of a commune in Hubei appeared in the tenth 
issue of Hong q l The article underlined the importance of Mao’s directive that 
“the fundamental way out for agriculture lies in mechanization” and then 
defended Mao’s policy that collectivization must preceed mechanization. 
Significantly the article criticized individuals who felt a commune required 
investment from the state to achieve mechanization:
With regards to the question of achieving agricultural 
mechanization, should we rely solely on state investment, or rely on 
the strength of the collective and self-sufficiency. Some people 
advocate holding our hands out to higher [levels] and relying solely 
on state investment. They say: “the investment required for 
mechanization is considerable, if we want to do it, then we can only 
rely on the state.” To counter this kind of idea, we have launched a 
great debate and after studying Chairman Mao’s instructions on "self- 
reliance” and “hard struggle”, everybody’s thinking was unified and 
our socialist awareness was raised and a great mass fervour to 
achieve mechanization ourselves unfolded in a flourishing manner.33
Overall, it is clear that preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union 
had a major impact on agricultural policy in China. There appears to have 
been a transfer of resources away from agriculture to war preparations, and 
increasingly localities were encouraged to rely on their own efforts to boost 
production and achieve long-term policy goals such as the mechanization of
31 David Zweig, op cit, pg.58.
32 See for example, “Dazhai ren zai jixu geming dadao shang qianjin” (Dazhai’s people 
advance along the broad road of continuing the revolution), in the Renmin ribao, 17 September, 
1969, pg.2, and “Qianyang xian chu liang jian cang qude xianzhu chengji" (Qianyang county has 
achieved outstanding results in storing grain and building graneries), in the Renmin ribao±29 
August, 1969, pg.4.
33 “Zai hezuohua de jichu shang shixian jixiehua” (Achieve mechanization on the basis of 
cooperativization), in Hong qi, Issue 10, 1969, pp.64-65.
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agriculture. In the drive to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and increase the 
amount supplied to the state, many regions appear to have further restricted the 
cultivation of private plots, ploughing these up to grow grain. However, it 
appears that in the radicalized environment many of these developments at the 
lower-level were spontaneous, for instance the reduction in the number of 
production teams, occurinq^even though no central policy had been 
announced on this issue.
Lin Biao was closely involved in the preparations for a possible war with the 
Soviet Union, even Sun and Teiwes who are otherwise quite sceptical as to 
Lin’s participation in the policy process, accept that he played a leading role on 
this issue.34 However the extent to which he was responsible for the radical 
upsurge in agricultural policy that characterized this period is unclear as there 
are no major central policy documents from this period available, and few 
comments by Lin himself. Nor can any of the model communes described in 
the central media be easily linked with Lin Biao or his supporters.
What is clear from media reports and anecdotal accounts is that 1968 and 
1969 were a time of considerable upheaval in the Chinese countryside. Chen 
Village describes how three separate work teams were dispatched to the 
village within the space of three months in early 1969.35 There is a degree of 
confusion between media accounts and developments that appeared to be 
occurring at the local level, suggesting a high degree of spontaneity at the 
grass-roots level.
Following the closure of the Ministry of Agriculture during the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution there was little central guidance over China’s 
countryside during this period. What presence there was tended to be in the 
form of work teams participating in the Three Loyalties Campaign or the 
Campaign to Cleanse Class Ranks. These groups were concerned mainly
34 Warren Sun and Frederick Teiwes, Riding the Tiger, Lin Biao During the Cultural 
Revolution, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996).
35 Chan, Madsen and Unger, Chen Village, pp. 181-182.
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with the leadership structure in the villages, not agricultural policies per se, 
however the political climate at the grass-roots level during these campaigns 
became increasingly radicalized. This trend was reinforced by the calls to 
prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union. In this environment it 
appears that many of the developments at the local level were spontaneous 
responses to the radical environment, rather than centrally led policies.
b. Conflict over agricultural policy: Autumn 1969-Winter 1970
By the latter half of 1969, it appears that moves were underway to stabilize 
the situation in rural areas. Chen Village reports that the radical upsurge that 
characterized the two political campaigns “had left peasants confused and 
emotionally exhausted”.36 Without discarding class struggle altogether, the 
workteam stationed in the village now stressed that increasing agricultural 
production was to be the main task.37 Significantly, in November 1969, the 
Central Committee issued a directive which “stipulated that the implementation 
of the Tachai [Dazhai] distribution system could be postponed if the ideological 
level of the peasants in a people’s commune or production brigade was not 
high enough’’.38There is no evidence of a similar directive introducing the 
system, however the fact that the Central Committee felt compelled to issue this 
directive suggests that the pressure to introduce this system had been fairly 
widespread.
The issue of the Dazhai distribution system was tied to the question of how 
to boost the peasants incentives to work. It is clear that where the system was 
implemented, there was general dissatisfaction at the tendency towards an 
egalitarian distribution of work points which characterized the way the system 
developed. Rather than truly reflecting an individual’s efforts, the Dazhai 
system soon developed into a fairly standardized form of distribution, with little
3e Ibid, pg.178.
37 Ibid, pg.181.
38 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.58.
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variations in the work points awarded. Encouraging peasants to work hard 
became a key issue, and this once again revolved around the question of 
whether to use ideological or material stimuli to boost the peasants efforts.
At the start of 1970, the Renmin ribao carried an editorial which called on 
rural cadres to pay more attention to the peasants to raise their enthusiasm. As 
the spring planting season once again approached there were warnings that 
the main focus of work should be agricultural tasks. “Proletarian politics” were 
still “in command”, but their was a new emphasis on moderating rural policy to 
increase output. This seasonal cycle in policy had been apparent during the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution and appears to have reflected 
the concerns of the leadership as a whole that agriculture provide enough food 
and raw materials. However it is noticeable that the State Council, under Zhou 
Enlai, began to play a leading role in calling for further reforms in agricultural 
policy.
On 7 March, 1970, the Renmin ribao carried the editorial “Discuss with the 
masses, reap another plentiful harvest in agriculture”. The editorial warned that 
“human elements were the most important” (ren be yinsu di yi). While the 
editorial repeated the message that peasants needed the “revolutionary spirit 
of ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘hard struggle’”, cadres were instructed to discuss 
issues with the peasants and raise their enthusiasm for agricultural work.39 A 
further article, written under the pen name Zhao Bountiful Year (Zhao 
Fengnian) appeared in the third edition of Hong qi, warning that many rural 
cadres were afraid to focus on production, especially those that had undergone 
some form of criticism in the past.40
A number of articles appeared criticizing elements of the radical upsurge in 
the countryside, in particular, moves to raise the level of accounting and
39 “Tong qunzhong shanglian, duoqu nongye xin fengshou” (Discuss with the masses, reap 
another plentiful harvest in agriculture), in the Renmin ribao, 7 March, 1970, pg.1.
40 Zhao Fengnian, “Tuchu wuchanjieji zhengzhi, zhuajin chungeng shengchan” (Emphasize 
proletarian politics, firmly grasp spring ploughing and production), in Hong qi, Issue 3, 1970,
pp.44-45.
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ownership, and the focus on grain production at the expense of other crops. An 
article in the second issue of Hong qi warned that peasants should not be 
forced into higher levels of collectivization and defended ownership by the 
production team:
Just as we could only lead the peasants step by step to move away 
from individual ownership to collective ownership in the past, so we 
can only lead the peasants step by step in their transition from a 
smaller system of collective ownership to a greater system of 
collective ownership, but we cannot and more over should not attempt 
to complete this course at one stroke.41
We should see that the People’s Commune system we are currently 
implemeting, with three levels of ownership with the team as the base, 
is basically in accordance with the level of development of production 
forces. In the current stage we must uphold and perfect this system so 
as to give full play to the superiority of the People’s Commune 
system.42
Elsewhere, in a sign that the State Council was resuming some control over 
agricultural policy, it convened a national conference on cotton production in 
Beijing in early February. This conference was a platform for calls for more all­
round development in agriculture, countering the focus on grain production that 
had characterized the radical upsurge. An article in the Renmin ribao 7 March, 
called for rural areas to implement Mao’s directive to “take grain as the key and 
develop in an all round way” {yi Hang wei gang, quanmian fazhan ).43
The trend in the national media was clearly towards moderating the radical 
upsurge of the last two years, however Jurgen Domes notes a number of signs 
that suggested significant opposition towards any movement away from the 
radical line. The February edition of Hong qi, which had carried the warning 
about not enforcing higher levels of ownership on the peasants also stated:
41 Quoted in David Zweig, Agrairan Radicalism in Chinaxpg.58.
42 Writing group of the Henan Revolutionary Committee, "Wo guo shehuizhuyi nongye de 
fazhan daolu” (The road of development for our countries socialist agriculture), in Hong qi, Issue 
2, 1970, pg. 8.
43 “Zi li gengsheng, jianku fendou, ba wo guo mianhua shengchan tuixiang genggao 
shuiping”, (Self-reliance, hard effort, push our country’s cotton output to an even higher level), in 
Renmin ribaoJ  March, 1970, pg.1.
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The system of collective property in the People’s Communes must 
progress from the lower to the advanced level, and we need even 
more urgently a transfer of collective property into the property of all 
the people.44
Elsewhere, in a speech to activist representitives on 1 February, 1970, the 
Commander of the Xinjiang Military Region, General Long Shujin, is reported 
to have called on them to study the Dazhai distribution system, despite the 
Central Committee’s directive of November.45
The two main authors who have written about agricultural policy during this 
period (David Zweig and Jurgen Domes), disagree on the significance of 
developments during this period. For Domes, General Long’s speech marked 
the start of a new “Study Dazhai” campaign, launched by Lin Biao and his 
supporters. Domes suggests this new campaign continued through 1970 and 
into 1971, but came under increasing criticism, not least by regional military 
commanders, for the impact it had on peasant initiative.40
In contrast, Zweig sees the June-October 1970 Northern Districts Agricultural 
Conference (which I discuss in more detail below), as marking the beginning of 
a more moderate phase in agricultural policy. Zweig describes the new “Study 
Dazhai" campaign launched in September as having been "deradicalized”.47 
The radicals were further undermined by criticism from regional military figures 
and criticism of Chen Boda, a leading member of the radical Left, following the 
second plenum of the 9th Central Committee. More moderate policies were 
then introduced throughout 1971, culminating with the issue of the Central 
Committee’s directive “Distribution in the People’s Communes”, which criticized 
“blindly learning from Dazhai” .40
44 In Hong qi, Issue 2, 1970, quoted in Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese 
Countryside Rural Societal Policies in the People’s Republic of China 1949-1979, (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1981), pg. 68.
45 Ibid, pg.67
46 ibid, pg.72.
47 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China  ^pg.61.
40 Ibid, pg. 62.
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In reality, the actual situation appears to have lain somewhere between 
these two accounts. The final communique from the Northern Districts 
Agricultural Conference certainly reflected a more moderate approach to 
agricultural policy and called for the “Sixty Articles" to continue to be 
implemented. However, as Zweig notes, this call appears to have gone 
unregarded in the immediate aftermath of the conference.49 Significantly, the 
new campaign to “Study Dazhai”, launched while the conference was meeting, 
continued to warn against former landlords and “bad elements” who had 
entered the leadership and were blocking the campaign and called on 
peasants to guard against “rightist conservatism”. The tone was still one which 
was heavily influenced by the voluntaristic elements in Mao Zedong’s thinking.
The contrast between the communique of the conference, and the early 
articles in the new "Study Dazhai” campaign suggest at best confusion in the 
central leadership, and at worst conflict over issues such as the use of material 
or politicial stimuli. However, the extent of any opposition to the moderate line 
is unclear, and may only reflect the uncertain situation nationally as China 
moved to a period of consolidation and construction after the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution. By early 1971, a number of articles had 
appeared criticizing developments in the new campaign and underlining the 
importance of key policies such as the three levels of ownership and peasants 
engaging in sideline industries.
On 1 May 1970, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was established. 
According to Zweig this represented the start of a “conservative trend”,50 
however, the appointment of Sha Feng, formerly the director of the PLA Armour 
School,51 suggests a more mixed picture and reflects the confused message 
over agricultural policy that characterizes this period, (although his
^Ibid, pg. 61.
50 Ibid, pg. 59.
51 Michael Lamb, Directory of Officials and Organizations in China, 1968-1983, (Armonk, New
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1983).
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appointment may have reflected the fact that the majority of tractor operators 
were former tank drivers).
On 25 June, shortly after the establishment of the new Ministry, the State 
Council convened a preparatory meeting for the Northern Districts Agricultural 
Conference (Beifang diqu nongye huiyi). Following this, the conference 
opened on 25 August in Xiyang county (the location of the Dazhai brigade). In 
all the conference ran for over one month and clearly saw an extensive debate 
over agricultural policy, including a lengthy discussion on the experiences of 
various regions in conducting the campaign to “Study Dazhai”. While the 
conference was still meeting, a major new campaign to study Dazhai was 
launched in the national media. A final report on the meeting was issued by 
the State Council on 5 October, 1970,52 however there is little further information 
on who spoke at the meeting.
In the final report on the Conference, the State Council called on rural 
authorities to continue to implement the "60 Articles”, the moderate document 
that had been introduced in the wake of the Great Leap Forward to restore 
agricultural production. On issues such as the level of ownership and 
accounting and private plots the final report adopted a much more moderate 
line which is worth quoting at some length:
In December 1967 the Central Committee clearly set down:
“Currently, rural People’s Communes have a system of three levels of 
ownership, with the production team as the basis” . In February 1969 
an editorial in the Renmin ribao emphasized once more: “with 
regards to new problems in policy that have emerged in the course of 
the movement, especially problems related to ownership, we should 
handle them cautiously, and seek advice from higher levels.
We must eliminate the residual influence of “the three freedoms 
and one guarantee”, and the “four big freedoms”, however where it 
does not effect the development and superior position of the collective 
economy, commune members can engage in [working] private plots 
and family sideline industries. We must resolutely eliminate the 
residual influence of "material incentive” and “work points in
53 For a copy of this report see Huang Daoxia, Jian guo yilai nongye hezuohua shiliao 
huibian, (An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural Collectivization since the Founding 
of the PRC), (Beijing, 1992), pp. 832-833.
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command", however we must also uphold the principle of “to each 
according to their work” and oppose egalitarianism. We must both 
criticize the mistaken tendency of “allocating everything and eating up 
all the food” [fenguang chijin] and avoid excessive accumulation 
which might effect commune members income. Under the premise of 
submitting to the national unified plan, we must allow the flexibility of 
production teams planting according to their local conditions.53
While the conference was under way, the national media launched a new 
phase of the long-running campaign “ In Agriculture Study Dazhai” . The final 
report issued on 5 October dealt with two issues which it claimed were 
important if the new campaign was to be successful: Firstly, Dazhai’s emphasis 
on “placing proletarian politics in command” and using Mao Zedong Thought to 
raise peasants’ socialist consciousness; and secondly, ensuring correct 
leadership of the movement in the commune and brigade. Despite this latter 
point, the report emphasized that the majority of cadres were good. The report 
also emphasized that localities should pay heed to their own conditions in 
implementing the campaign (Jue bu neng bugu ziji de tiaojian).5*
The Renmin Ribao published a key editorial and leading article on 23 
September, based on an investigation of Dazhai.55 This was followed by a 
series of further articles which marked the launch of the new stage in the 
campaign. The main focus of these early articles was to criticize the influence 
of the “right” and to warn of the residual influence of landlords, rich peasants 
and other “bad elements”.
The Renmin Ribao article stated that the main issue in carrying out this 
stage of the campaign to "Study Dazhai” was to resolve any remaining 
problems with leading organs in the communes and brigades. While the 
article emphasized that only a very small minority of communes had a problem 
it stated:
63 Ibid, pg.832.
54 Ibid, pg.832.
55 “Cong Dazhai dadui dao Xiyang xian” (From Dazhai production brigade to Xiyang county), 
in Renmin ribao, 23 September, 1970, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, (Xinhua Monthly), 
September 1970, pp. 128-132.
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In a very small number of cases, the leading organs in communes 
and brigades have allowed bad people to enter. These people allow 
landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and bad people to 
come out and cause damage. They don’t practice socialism, rather 
they practice capitalism, they don’t practice the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, rather they practice the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.56
During ideological rectification, Xiyang county severely criticized 
the various forms of rightist conservative thinking which existed 
amongst the cadres and which were blocking the [campaign] to study 
Dazhai. People with this kind of thinking felt, "Studying Dazhai 
involves suffering”, “Studying Dazhai is too hard”, “Studying Dazhai is 
too difficult”. They only thought of protecting their patch [shou tan], 
they didn’t want to do anything new, they only wanted to work slowly, 
in a small way, not think big or work fast.57
The emphasis of this article was clearly influenced by the voluntaristic elements 
of Mao Zedong’s thinking. The article called for peasants to be educated in the 
revolutionary spirit of “one, not being afraid of hardship and two, not being 
afraid of death”.
As the campaign developed, there are indications that there was a further 
radical upsurge in the countryside. Jurgen Domes suggests that the Dazhai 
system of distributing work points became “increasingly predominant”, and that 
distribution was often based solely on political behaviour. In addition he notes 
other phenomenon reported in the regional media such as confiscation of 
private plots and restrictions on sideline businesses, attempts to raise the level 
of accounting to the brigade level and renewed pressure to sell larger 
quantities of grain to the state.58
Peasant opposition to these developments was said to be widespread and a 
number of key regional military commanders began to voice their opposition. 
Significantly it was often the military, who drew the majority of their recruits from 
rural areas, who had the clearest picture of developments in the countryside. 
Complaints to serving soldiers by family members were reportedly the origin of
56 Ibid, pg.129.
57 Ibid, pg.130.
50 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pp. 67-69.
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Peng Dehuai’s concerns with the policies of the Great Leap Forward. In a 
speech broadcast twice by the Jiangsu Radio, General Xu Shiyou, commander 
of the key Nanjing Military Region openly criticized elements of the new 
campaign:
We must combine revolutionary enthusiasm with a practical and 
scientific attitude. Blind passion must be avoided. Under all 
circumstances, we must be considerate of the people’s suffering.50
Later, in a resolution on launching the movement to study Dazhai, the 
Guangxi Revolutionary Committee, led by a former comrade of Xu’s, General 
Wei Guoqing, guaranteed peasants the right to cultivate private plots and 
engage in sideline businesses and warned that agriculture must guard against 
“interventions from the Right and Left” (my emphasis).00 Xu and Wei’s 
interventions highlight an important element of the implementation of the new 
campaign, that is regional variations. Both Xu and Wei were later seen as 
strong supporters of the moderate coalition under Deng Xiaoping and their 
interventions must be seen in this light. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is clear that provincial leaders played an important role in determining 
the impact of a given campaign within their own bailiwick. Mao Yuanxin’s use 
of developments in Liaoning to support the Gang of Four is a contrasting 
example.
That the campaign was developing in an unexpected direction was 
confirmed with the publication of a key editorial in the Renmin ribao in early 
1971. At the same time another article criticized formalism and commandism in 
the campaign. Following this, the tone of the column "In Agriculture Study 
Dazhai” changed, with calls for rural cadres to implement the Party’s 
agricultural policies more thoroughly and in a prudent and cautious manner.
As in previous years, seasonal factors appear significant in the attempt to de-
59 Jiangsu People’s Broadcasting Station, 28 October and 5 November, 1970, quoted in 
ibid, pg.71.
60 Ibid, pg.71.
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radicalize the movement. The editorial implied that the onset of spring planting 
lay behind the more moderate interpretation of Dazhai; its first line warned “The 
busy spring ploughing season will soon be here” .61 Although the editorial 
repeated the importance of applying Mao Zedong Thought in all rural activities, 
it also defended the principle of “distributing according to labour” and 
underlined that in the current stage of development China should continue to 
implement the system of three levels of ownership in the communes. These 
points were clearly intended as criticism of developments in rural China since 
the launch of the new Dazhai campaign.
A second article had been published four days before this editorial which 
went much further in its criticism of developments in China’s countryside over 
the last four months.62 This article criticized formalism and commandism in the 
conduct of the campaign, and criticized the excessive focus on grain 
production. It also defended ownership by the production team and private 
plots, and warned against excessive accumulation at the expense of the 
peasants’ income. On formalism and commandism, the article warned:
Because we’ve been victorious, some comrades have become 
arrogant and conceited and think they are terrific, they just think 
something’s OK without carrying out an investigation; they use their 
impressions to replace policies, engage in formalism, commandism, 
and what I say goes, or one person alone has a say, they speak lies, 
they don’t follow the true path, they follow evil ways. This is a big 
obstacle to implementing Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. 63
The article also warned against only focusing on grain production (dandayi) 
and called on rural areas to fully implement the policy of “taking grain as the
01 "Yanzhe Mao zhuxi geming luxian duoqu nongye xin fengshou”, (Follow Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary line to achieve a new bountiful harvest in agriculture), in Renmin ribao, 18 February, 
1970, pg.1.
62 “Dangqian nongye xue Dazhai yundong zhong de yixie wenti” (Some current problems in 
the campaign "in Agriculture Study Dazhai”), in Huang Daoxia, A n Anthology of Historial Material 
on Agricultural Collectivization, pp. 833-835, This document is reported to have emerged as a 
result of discussions at the 1971 National Planning Meeting held in Beijing from 15 February to 
21 March, however, it was first published on the eve of that meeting, and was perhaps rather the 
result of preliminary discussions on the economy which preceeded the planning meeting.
63 Ibid, pg. 833.
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key, develop all-round” (y/ Hang wei gang, quanmian fazhan).
Central documents reflected the renewed emphasis on a moderate line, 
with the State Council again taking a leading role. A State Council report on a 
conference on cotton, oil and sugar production, approved by the Central 
Committee on 30 March, underlined the continued importance of the "60 
Articles” which had guaranteed private plots and the three-levels of ownership.
Following the publication of the February editorial further articles appeared 
which emphasized that the Party’s agricultural policies should be implemented 
more thoroughly, underlining the view that recent developments did not match 
the Party’s original intentions. Articles criticized both Left and Right 
interference. The special column “In Agriculture Study Dazhai” reflected these 
developments, and also warned of the need for more prudence in studying 
Dazhai.64 An article in the Renmin ribao 21 March criticized brigade cadres in 
a commune in Anhui and seemed to suggest that many of the recent 
developments in the campaign to study Dazhai had been spontaneous:
...in the last few years, because brigade leaders have not 
conscientiously implemented the Party’s economic policies for 
agriculture, they have gone against the principle of “to each according 
to their labour” and damaged the masses enthusiasm for the socialist 
revolution and effected the movement to study Dazhai.65
In August, in a further sign that a more moderate line was in place, a Central 
Committee notice on state purchases of grain warned against excessive buying 
of grain and, in a return to using material stimuli, the notice suggested that in 
plentiful years, the state could purchase above quota grain at 30 percent more
04 See for example, “Qianxu qinzhen zuo xue Dazhai de daitou ren” (Be modest and 
prudent, in becoming a leader in the movement to study Dazhai), in Renmin ribao, 8 April, 1971,
pg. 3, “Renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce zhazha shishi de xue Dazhai” (Conscientiously 
implement the Party's policies, study Dazhai in a down-to-earth manner), in Renmin ribao, 27 
April, 1971, pg. 4, and “Diaocha jiushi jiejue wenti” (Investigate in order to resolve problems), in 
Renmin ribaoL 14 June, 1971, pg.3.
66 “Renzhen luoshi zhengce, qieshi xuehao Dazhai”, (Resolutely implement policies, 
thoroughly study Dazhai), in Renmin ribao, 21 March, 1971, pg.3.
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than the usual price.66
It seems clear that by August 1971 a moderate line was in place in 
agricultural policy and this was to remain the dominant line until late-1973.
The period from 1968-1971 was characterized by two radical upsurges in the 
Chinese countryside, firstly from late-1968 to spring-1970, and then from late- 
1970 to spring-1971. In both instances, the immediate pressures of agricultural 
work and securing a harvest appear to have led the centre to attempt to 
moderate the renewed radicalization in agricultural policy. Identifying 
individuals, or indeed groups, with specific policy stances during this period is 
problematic as there are few speeches or quotes available. This makes it very 
difficult to verify the extent to which Lin Biao was directly responsible for the 
radical agricultural policies of this period whch a number of authors have 
attributed to him.
Rural China emerged from the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution 
relatively unscathed, however, PLA and militia units had played a significant 
role in rural areas in helping to establish new, revolutionary, leading organs. It 
appears that in some areas military personnel also took over the leadership at 
the commune and brigade level. This presence by the military at the grass­
roots level has been seen as enhancing Lin Biao’s ability to launch a 
radicalization of agricultural policy, but this must be questioned as many 
military units were more interested in securing stability after two years of 
disruption, rather than continuing with even more radical policies. What 
appears to have been more significant for the radicalization of rural areas 
during 1968-1969, as shown in works such as Chen Villagex\Nexe the two Party 
campaigns, The Three Loyalties Campaign and the Cleansing the Class Ranks 
Campaign.
In this radicalized environment, many of the developments at the grass-roots
60,lZhonggong zhongyang guanyu jixu shixing liangzhi zhenggou renwu yiding wunian de 
tongzhi” (Central Committee notice on continuing to implement [the system] of fixing grain 
requistions for five years), in A Collection of Documents on Rural Policy, pg.325.
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level appear to have been spontaneous, rather than the result of central policy. 
One central policy which did have an impact on rural areas was the movement 
to “prepare for war” (bei zhan). It seems clear that this was directly responsible 
for moves to increase extraction of grain and calls for rural areas to become 
more self-sufficient, however there is no evidence that there were calls for 
production teams to be merged or that private plots be abandoned, rather these 
seem to have been spontaneous developments in response to the 
radicalization of the Chinese countryside. When it became clear that these 
moves were effecting peasant morale, and with spring planting looming, the 
centre were quick to issue calls for moderation in agricultural policy.
From the spring of 1970 to September the same year, moderates at the 
centre were trying to implement a more moderate line in agriculture, certainly 
the final communique of the Northern Districts Agricultural Conference adopted 
a very moderate tone, issuing a strong defence of ownership by the production 
team and the right to work private plots. However, at the same time, indications 
such as the appointment of Sha Feng as the new Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry and the launch of a new campaign to “Study Dazhai” suggest a more 
mixed picture.
The campaign “ In Agriculture Study Dazhai” , launched in the Renmin ribao 
on 23 September 1970 returned to the voluntaristic elements in Mao’s thinking, 
calling on individuals to not “fear death”. As Domes and Zweig note, the winter 
of 1970-71 saw a second radical upsurge in rural areas, with reports of private 
plots being confiscated and ownership being transferred to the brigade. Once 
again there is no sign that these developments were the result of central policy, 
rather they again appear to have been the result of the re-radicalization of rural 
areas through the “Study Dazhai” campaign. Once again, when spring 
planting loomed in 1971, the centre took steps to moderate the tone of the 
campaign, and by late-spring, early-summer 1971 the centre was once again 
emphasizing a moderate line in agricultural policy which would dominate until
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late-1973.
3. The moderates predominate in agricultural policy: Summer-1971-August 
1973
A number of external factors were significant in assisting moderate figures at 
the centre in implementing a more moderate line in agricultural policy at the 
end of 1971 and beginning of 1972. Firstly, the death of Lin Biao during his 
apparent flight to the Soviet Union led to a general de-radicalization of Chinese 
politics during this period. There was mild criticism of radical policies in a 
number of policy areas (see for example my comments in the previous chapter 
on higher education). Secondly, as David Zweig points out, personnel 
changes at the provincial level saw Lin Biao’s supporters on provincial 
revolutionary committees replaced by regional military figures who backed 
Zhou Enlai’s line. In addition, supporters of the Gang of Four were not 
represented in large numbers on these committees.67
In light of these developments, moderates were able to call for a return to 
the agricultural policies of the post-Great Leap Forward period, with renewed 
emphasis on ownership and accounting at the production team level and 
stressing the importance of private plots. 1971 also saw a major attempt to set 
out China’s agricultural mechanization policy for the next ten years with a 
national conference being held in Beijing. This conference repeated Mao’s 
basic line on mechanization being achieved through the self-sufficient efforts of 
communes and brigades, however a report on this conference did warn against 
accumulating captial resources at the expense of peasant incomes. Hua 
Guofeng is reported to have chaired this meeting, and he clearly had 
considerable input into policy on agricultural mechanization, however 
assessing his impact on agricultural policy in general is much harder.
67 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China^pg. 62.
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a. Establishing the moderate line: Auqust-December 1971
Although It is clear that the moderate line was in the ascendency by August 
1971, there are indications that this line was not thoroughly clarified until 
November and December.
Through the second half of 1971, a series of articles in the Renmin ribao 
called for cadres at lower-levels to undergo education in the Party’s agricultural 
policies, and for those policies to be thoroughly implemented. However these 
articles also reveal that the main target of official criticism, that is “rightist” or 
“leftist” errors underwent a shift during these months. In particular, two articles 
by Zhao Fengnian, published less than a month apart, show a significant 
change in line.68 An article printed in the Renmin ribao on 14 October focused 
on what could be termed “errors of the right”, warning against "sticking to 
conservatism” and “only chasing production figures”. However, in a second 
article printed in the Renmin ribao on 7 November, the same writer warned 
against interference from both the “Left” and the Right, and warned that “some 
comrades... believe that ‘Left’ is better than Right” (yi wei “zou" b iyou hao). A 
second article printed in the Renmin ribao on the same day was much clearer 
in its condemnation of “leftist errors”, warning against leftist practices such as 
collectivizing trees around peasants’ homes and not rewarding peasants for 
handing manure over to the collective.
Criticism of leftist excesses in agricultural policy culminated in 1971 with the 
publication of the Central Committee’s “Directive Concerning the Question of 
Distribution in the Rural People’s Communes” on 26 December 1971.69 In its 
preamble the directive stated that a “rectification movement for criticizing 
revisionism” had been launched in rural areas, “smashing the
08 Zhao Fengnian, “Guanjian zaiyu xian de lingdao” (The key lies with the county leadership), 
in Renmin ribao, 14 October, 1971, pg.3 and “Yansu renzhen luoshi dang de zhengce”
(Seriously and concientiously implement the Party’s policies), in Renmin ribao, 7 November,
1971, pg.2.
09 A copy of this directive appears in A Collection of Rural Policy Documents, pp.353-357 and 
is translated in Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside^, pp. 159-164.
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counterrevolutionary conspiracy of careerist, conspirator, renegade and traitor 
Lin Biao” . This campaign was tied to successes in promoting the “overall 
development in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and 
fisheries.70
The directive focused on six problems in distribution work in communes and 
brigades which it claimed needed to be resolved. It warned against excessive 
accumulation by a commune and stated:
We should make every possible effort to enable the peasants to 
receive better personal incomes in normal situations from the 
increased production year after year.71
The directive continued to call for the smooth completion of state grain 
purchases, but also warned against over-purchase of grain, a problem that had 
been apparent during the leftist upsurge in the countryside. Significantly the 
directive also called for the principle of “from each according to his ability and 
to each according to his work” to be upheld and warned against egalitarian 
distribution. On Dazhai, the directive warned communes against copying the 
brigade’s experiences without considering local conditions. Underlining the 
importance of material incentives, the directive called for rural “commercial 
departments" to "actively” organize sideline occupations and to not "reduce... 
price[s] so as to promote the development of multiple business in rural areas”.
A draft document “Certain Questions Concerning the Strengthening of Rural 
Commerce (Draft)” was published in February the following year which 
expanded on these points, although it is unclear if this document was 
subsequently formally adopted.72
This December 26 directive formed the basis for the moderate line in 
agricultural policy that characterized the period until the Tenth Party Congress
70 Jurgen Domes, ibid, pg.159.
71 Ibid, pg.160.
72 “Guanyu jiaqiang nongcun shangye de ruogan wenti (caogao)”, (Certain Questions on 
Strengthening Rural Commerce (Draft)”, in A Collection of Rural Policy Documents, pp.358-367.
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in August 1973.
b. Agricultural mechanization
1971 saw a major effort to boost the mechanization of agriculture by China’s 
central leadership, with the convening of a national conference to discuss this 
issue, and the publication of two major policy documents setting out five and 
ten year plans for mechanization and reporting the conference’s conclusions. 
There was also considerable coverage of this issue in the central media.
The national conference was chaired by Hua Guofeng. Although Hua 
Guofeng was still officially working in Hunan at this time, Ting Wang does 
suggest that he took over responsibility for agricultural mechanization in 1971. 
Hua’s role demonstrates that, at least in agriculture, he played a more leading 
role than many writers have argued.
The National Conference on Agricultural Mechanization opened in Beijing 
on 6 August, 1971,73 This was the first serious attempt to discuss this issue 
since the start of the Cultural Revolution and it is clear that the meeting 
discussed future plans for mechanizing agriculture in China as on the 16 
September the centre issued the discussion document, “The National 
Programme for the Development of Agricultural Mechanization 1970-1980’’.
This document adopted a cautious approach to the issue of mechanization, 
repeating Mao’s line that mechanization could only be achieved on the basis of 
collectivization. In addition, mechanization was tied to, and seen as secondary 
to, preparations for a possible war with the Soviet Union:
Agricultural mechanization must be linked with [the policy] “prepare 
for war, prepare for natural disasters, everything for the people”. First 
is prepare for war. Soldiers and armies must always be the first to 
have food to eat and clothes to wear, only then can they fight, 
otherwise, even if they have rifles and cannons, they won’t be any 
use. Second is preparing for natural disasters. When they have a 
natural disaster, if the locality hasn’t prepared any grain, cotton or oil 
for natural disasters, then they will have to rely on the outside to give
73 Zhongguo nongye dashiji, 1949-1960, (Major Events in Chinese Agriculture, 1949-1980), 
(Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1982), pg. 140.
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financial help, this can’t be said to be long-term planning, if there is a 
war, it will be even worse. Third, state accumulation mustn’t be too 
great, we must think of those people who don’t have enought to eat, 
and only a few clothes to wear.74
The “Programme” emphasized that mechanization should be undertaken on 
the basis of local initiative.75 The majority of implements and machinery were 
to be made at the local level, and to be small or medium sized. To help with 
this development, local “five small” (wu xiao) industries were to be expanded. 
(The “five small” industries were local, small-scale, iron and steel factories, coal 
mines, cement plants, fertilizer factories and hydroelectric power plants, an 
idea Hua would return to later).76 The Programme set the target of 70 percent of 
"main processes” (zhuyao zuoye) in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fisheries, to be mechanized by 1980.77
Three months after the “Programme” was published, the State Council 
issued the “Report on Problems in Accelerating the Realization of Agricultural 
Mechanization”. Although this report repeated the basic line of the first 
document, the tone was less political, and it set out much clearer targets for the 
next five and ten years. In particular, the need to tie agricultural mechanization 
to preperations for war was relegated to the last few paragraphs and there was 
a slightly more urgent note in the calls for Party organs at all levels to focus on 
this issue.78 Interestingly, a 1976 State Council report suggests that this latter 
point was contested by members of the Gang of Four. Zhang Chunqiao is 
reported to have complained that “agricultural mechanization is something for 
the industrial ministries, Party committees shouldn’t pay attention to it”.
74 "Quanguo nongye jixiehua fazhan gangyao 1970-1980”, (The National Programme for 
the Development of Agricultural Mechanization, 1970-1980), in A Collection of Rural Policy 
Documents, pg.328.
75 Ibid, pg.328.
76 Ibid, pg.330.
77 Ibid, pg.329.
76 “Guowuyuan guanyu jiasu shixian nongye jixiehua wenti de baogao”, (The State Council 
Report on Problems in Accelerating the Realization of Agricultural Mechanization), in ibid, 
pp.338-352.
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Elsewhere, Yao Wenyuan is reported to have blocked publication of the 
editorial “Mechanization is the basic way forward for agriculture”, drafted under 
the supervision of Hua.79 Both Zhang and Yao appear sceptical that the target 
of achieving mechanization by 1980 could be met, although Zhang’s 
comments, if true, suggest this was not an issue which they saw as a priority.
c. The moderate line in agriculture prevails: January 1972-Auqust 1973
Both David Zweig and Jurgen Domes agree that this was a period where 
moderates, led by Zhou Enlai, had the most influence over the formation of 
agricultural policy at the centre. The publication of the December directive on 
distribution in communes appears to have precipitated a wave of criticism of 
radical agricultural policies in the provincial media, and in particular criticism of 
local-level cadres who adopted these policies.
One document that is available outside of China and which is indicative of 
the overall trend during this period is the somewhat awkwardly titled “Simao 
District Party Committee’s Opinion About the Implementation of the ‘CCP 
Central Committee Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the 
Rural People’s Commune’” .80 Whilst it did criticize the “rightist” line in 
agriculture, this document strongly advocated key elements of the moderate 
line, including distribution according to labour, criticism of blind copying of 
Dazhai and praising peasants’ who “overfulfilled tasks assigned”.
The Simao document warned that cadres should “pay attention to 
overcoming egalitarianism and reasonably give rewards to commune members 
according to the quality and quantity of work”.81 The document also advocated a 
simple form of production responsibility, the “four-fix” for production teams, 
namely, “fixed time, fixed quality, fixed quantity and fixed work points’’.82
79 In A Collection of Rural Policy Documents, pg.378.
00 A translation of this document appeared in Issues and Studies^ Vol. IX, No.6, (March 1973), 
pp. 91-97.
61 Ibid, pg.92.
82 Ibid, pg.93.
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However, the extent to which peasants would receive material rewards for 
overfulling any quota was unclear as the Simao document simply said 
peasants should be “praised” if they “overfulfilled tasks assigned". On Dazhai, 
the document not only warned against blind copying of Dazhai, it also warned 
that the Dazhai system of distribution should only be introduced with the 
consent of the masses.83
Chen Village is reported to have dropped Dazhai’s distribution system in 
favour of “piece-rate” working, although they appear to have been considerably 
more cautious than the Simao district, only finally abandoning the Dazhai 
system in the summer of 1973.84
Two elements of the Directive on Distribution which attracted considerable 
media attention during this period were the slogans “Take grain as the key, 
develop all-round” (yi liang wei gang, quanmian fazhan) and “Take agriculture 
as the base and industry as the leading factor” (yi nongye wei jichu, gongye 
wei zhudao). Both slogans had emerged in the post-Great Leap Forward 
period, and the fact that the media concentrated on them at this point reflects 
the way in which the central leadership were returning to the readjustment 
policies Liu Shaoqi and Deng Zihui introduced in the early 1960s in an effort to 
boost agricultural production again.
The 26 December directive had given considerable prominence to the 
notion of all-round development in agriculture, that is not focusing exclusively 
on grain production, a policy closely associated with Lin Biao’s call to “prepare 
for war” under which grain extraction by the state rose significantly The call for 
all-round development was repeated in an editorial in the Renmin Ribao, 16 
April, 1972. Whilst calling for continued efforts in grain production, the editorial 
warned:
At the same time, we must also take care, grain production and the 
diversified economy are not two unrelated things, rather they help
83 Ibid, pg.92.
04 Chan, Madsen and Unger, Chen Village, pg. 249.
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each other develop. If we want to both increase grain production and 
have a diversified economy and develop all-round, then there will 
definateiy be certain contradictions in labour power, land, and capital 
resources. However these contradictions can all be solved.
Moreover, as long as we arrange grain production and the diversified 
economy well, then the able-bodied, the semi-able, the part-time 
workers and those commune members with a speciality will all be 
able to work to the best of their abilities and will always have 
something to do whatever the season.85
In response to these calls local cadres in Chen Village reportedly encouraged 
peasants to expand their fishponds and engage in other “profitable” sidelines.86
A series of articles in the Renmin Ribao and the provincial press also 
addressed the issue of achieving a better balance between agricultural and 
industrial development, summarized in the slogan, “Take agriculture as the 
base and industry as the leading factor”. In general, these articles emphasized 
the need for the simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, in 
particular local-level, light industry which could supply machinery and raw 
materials for agriculture. This idea reflected Hua's point on developing the “five 
small” industries and suggests his influence, although this cannot be 
confirmed.87 Further articles told cadres to “proceed from actual conditions”,88 
be hardworking and thrifty,89 “seek truth from facts”,90 and to rid themselves of
85 “Yi liang wei gang quanmian fazhan", (Take grain as the key, develop all-round), in Renmin 
ribao, 16 April, 1972, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, April, 1972, pg, 1.
06 Chan, Madsen and Unger, Chen Village, pg. 240.
87 See for example, Zhong Licheng, “Zongjie zhengque chuli nong, qing, zhong guanxi de 
jingyan” (Summarize the experiences in correctly handling the relationship between agriculture, 
light and heavy [industry]), in the Renmin ribao1_22 June, 1972, reprinted in the Xinhua yuebao, 
June, 1972, pp.50-53, “Sichuan sheng Leshan diqu, Guangdong sheng Jiangmen shi, Yunnan
sheng Gejiu shi renzhen zhixing ‘yi nongye wei jichu, gongye wei zhudao' de fangzhen”,
(Leshan district in Sichaun, Jiangmen city in Guangdong and Gejiu city in Yunnan are all 
conscientiously carrying out the general policy of “take agriculture as the base and industry as the 
general guide"). This was originally a series of articles printed in the Renmin ribao on the 2, 7 and 
23 of August. Reprinted as a single article in the Xinhua yuebao, August, 1972, pp. 107-109.
00 “Cong shiji chufa, zuo juti zhidao”, (Proceed from actual conditions, give specific 
directions), in the Renmin ribao, 13 January, 1973, pg.4.
89 “Jianchi qinjian de yuance”, (Maintain the principle of [being] hardworking and thrifty), in 
the Renmin ribao, 23 January, 1973, pg.2.
90 "Zuo shishi qiushi de mofan" (Act as a model of seeking truth from facts), in the Renmin 
ribao, 8 February, 1973, pg.3.
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idealistic tendencies.91 Behind these instructions there appears to have been 
implicit criticism of the way in which local cadres had implemented radical 
policies with little thought as to the consequences in their villages. Certainly, 
Chen Village highlights how many of the radical policies had been 
implemented with little thought for local conditions.92
A key element of the moderate’s line appears to have been to reduce blind 
copying of central policy and the experiences of other areas. As part of this 
trend, I have already commented on warnings against repeating Dazhai’s 
experiences in areas where it was unsuitable. This trend towards re-evaluating 
Dazhai’s experiences continued into 1973, as the moderates carried out a 
reassessment of the significance of Dazhai as a model.
The extent of this reassessment was demonstrated in a speech given by 
Dazhai’s Party Secretary, Chen Yonggui at a meeting of agricultural cadres 
held in Chengdu in April 1973. In his speech, Chen Yonggui declared that five 
conclusions could be drawn from a "study of the experiences” of Dazhai:
(1) The production of grain and the delivery of quotas to the public 
registration organisation, as welt as the peasants’ rations, must be 
raised.
(2) Forestry, animal breeding, fishing and sideline occupations are 
to be developed ‘in a big way’.
(3) It is important to make a “great leap’ in the building of irrigation 
and drainage works.
(4) The mechanisation of agriculture must be strongly encouraged.
(5) ‘Great changes’ have to be enforced in all villages.93
Although certain elements of the earlier campaigns to “Study Dazhai”
91 “Xishua weixin jingshen, jiasu qianjin bufa", (Clear oneself of idealism, quicken the pace 
forward), in the Renmin ribao, 20 March, 1973, pg.2.
92 In Chen Village, the authors relate how, in order to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency, the 
peasants were made to grow cotton and to plant wheat and sorghum as winter crops. These 
were all unsuited to Chen Village’s tropical climate and yields were low. In addition, the extra 
crops reduced nutriments in the soil, and adversely effected output of rice, the villages main 
crop. Elsewhere, in imitation of Dazhai, the villagers were made to create terraces in the 
mountainous areas surrounding the village, even though there was insufficient topsoil to make 
them viable for crops.
93 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Counfys/daLpg.78-79.
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remained, particularly the emphasis placed on irrigation works, much of the rest 
marked a moderation of the campaign. Gone was the emphasis on politics in 
command” that had dominated the Renmin Ribao editorial of 23 September, 
1971. Emphasis was now placed on all-round development, encouraging 
peasants with increased rations and developing sideline industries.
Elsewhere, policy documents and articles in the media endorsed two other 
key features of the moderate line, ownership and accounting at the production 
team level, and the use of material incentives to boost production (or at worst a 
de-emphasis on the use of political incentives, as seen in the reassessment of 
Dazhai’s experiences).
The one area under study in this chapter that remained relatively 
unchanged during this period was the policy towards agricultural 
mechanization. The two key central documents adopted in late 1971 continued 
to advocate the Maoist line of self-sufficiency and local initiative. The main 
reason for this decision appears to have been the continuing difficulty in 
finding sufficient capital resources to fund a more significant central- or 
provincial-led effort. Constrained economically, moderates appear to have 
been unable to radically alter the line on agricultural mechanization, although 
they did attempt to moderate its implementation with warnings against 
excessive accumulation by brigades and communes at the expense of peasant 
incomes.
Moderates in the central leadership benefitted during this period from a 
general de-radicalization following the flight and death of Lin Biao. The 
consolidation of provincial organs had also benefitted the moderates as Lin 
Biao’s supporters were replaced by regional military commanders who were 
generally more interested in stability following the disruption caused by the 
implementation of radical policies in the countryside. Supporters of other 
radical figures like Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and representatives of 
mass organizations were only poorly represented on these provincial bodies.
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However, beginning in early-1973, radical supporters of Jiang Qing and 
Zhang Chunqiao launched a counter-attack. Following the promotion of Jiang 
Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and other radical figures at the Tenth 
National Party Congress held in August 1973, these attacks intensified. While 
the main focus of their criticism were reforms in education policy, in April 1974, 
members of the Gang of Four linked the on-going “Campaign to Criticize Lin 
Biao and Confucius” to agricultural policy. Renewed political campaigns in the 
countryside also served to re-radicalize the atmosphere in rural areas.
From iate-1973 until the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, members 
of the Cultural Revolutionary Left competed with two coalitions of leaders over 
agricultural policy: moderates, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, and other 
Cultural Revolutionary beneficiaries such as Chen Yonggui and Hua Guofeng. 
Hua in particular played a leading role in agricultural policy during this period, 
delivering the key note speech at the First National Conference of "In 
Agriculture Study Dazhai”. This period is particularly interesting as it highlights 
the policy issue on which Hua appeared best able to put forward a coherent 
policy platform and generate a coalition of supporters for his line. I will 
examine these developments in the following section.
4. Renewed conflict over agricultural policy: August 1973-September 1976
a. The re-radicalization of the debate on agriculture
Even before the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, there were indications 
in the media of a re-radicalization of the debate on agricuture. The Renmin 
ribaot (when reporting Chen Yonggui’s speech at Chengdu in which he 
outlined new criteria for studying the experiences of Dazhai), chose instead to 
report his comments on “smashing conservative thinking” and “going all-out”,
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slogans of the radical Left.94 From April, a series of articles written under the 
pen-name Guo Dajiang appeared in the Nongye xue Dazhai column in the 
Renmin ribao. These articles returned to themes of reforming cadres way of 
thinking and their working style and relying more on the “pioneering spirit” 
(chuanye xing) of the masses. “Guo’s” articles tied these developments to the 
on-going pixiu zhengfeng movement that had been underway in China since 
1971.
It is possible that "Guo’s” articles represent an early exposition of the views 
of Hua Guofeng and Chen Yonggui. The name Guo Dajiang is a clear play on 
an early slogan from the campaign to study Dazhai, “crossing the big river”, 
which referred to fields which produced over 800 jin of grain per mu. Certainly 
the first articles did focus on Chen Yonggui and the experiences of Dazhai, 
however without further evidence their background remains speculative.
In an article printed in the Renmin ribao 19 May, 1973, Guo Dajiang warned 
that cadres needed to understand and trust the masses more. Because rural 
cadres did not understand that the peasants wanted a total transformation of 
production conditions, they became timid and conservative, and it was only as 
a result of the pixiu zhengfeng that this way of thinking had been overcome.05 
In a second article two days later Guo called on rural areas to develop their 
pioneering spirit in undertaking winter field construction projects and bring 
about the radical transformation in the countryside which Chen Yonggui had 
talked about. The emphasis on mobilizing the collective economy was 
reminiscent of the earliest stages of the Dazhai campaign with its emphasis on 
organizing production teams into larger units to undertake capital construction 
projects:
94 Guo Dajiang, “Zhi neng dagan, bu neng xiaogan", (We can only go all out, we can’t act 
timidly) and Party Committee of Su County, Anhui, “Po baoshou sixiang, shu xiongxin 
zhuangzhi” (Smash conservative thinking, foster lofty ambitions and great ideals), in the Renmin 
ribao, 24 April, 1973, pg 3. Both articles report a speech given by Chen Yonggui, although no 
date or location is given for the speech.
95 Guo Dajiang, “Yao liaojie qunzhong zai xiang xie shenme”, (We must understand what it is 
the masses are thinking), in the Renmin ribao, 19 May, 1973, pg.2.
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To transform agricultural production conditions and undertake 
large-scale basic field construction is a great socialist cause. Only by 
continuing with the socialist direction and relying on the great strength 
of the collective economy of the People’s Communes will we be able 
to radically transform agricultural production conditions. And it is only 
by radically transforming agricultural production conditions that we 
can fully demonstrate the superiority of the collective economy of the 
People’s Communes and accelerate the development of socialist 
agriculture.90
The emphasis in articles published in the Renmin ribao in the run-up to the 
10th Congress was very much on fostering the right attitude in both cadres and 
peasants, and only then would agriculture be able to advance. This may well 
be a reflection of Mao’s growing displeasure at wider developments, or a sign 
that the radical Left were seeking to use this displeasure to press their own 
agenda. Policy slogans such as “take grain as the key, develop all-round” 
continued to appear in the press, but the main themes were educating cadres, 
fostering the correct attitude and adhering to Mao’s line.
At the 10th Party Congress Zhou Enlai delivered the political work report. He 
called for the Party to continue to implement the policy of “taking grain as the 
base and industry as the main guide”, but he also warned that China’s 
economy was weak and it was still necessary to implement the policies of self- 
sufficiency and self-reliance, struggling hard and “walking on two legs".
On Dazhai, Zhou returned to the idea of politics being in command, 
contained in the 23 September editorial. He also repeated many of the themes 
of the articles discussed above:
[In the campaigns] in industry study Daqing, in agriculture study 
Dazhai, we must continue to place proletarian politics in command, 
carry out major mass movements, and fully bring into play the masses’ 
enthusiasm, wisdom and pioneering spirit.97
96 Guo Dajiang, “Fayang chuangye jingsheng”, (Make full use of the pioneering spirit), in 
Renmin ribao, 21 May, 1973, pg.3.
97 Zhou Enlai, "Zai Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de 
baogao” (Report to the 10th National Congress of the CCP), in Zhongguo gongchandang di shi 
ci quanguo daibiao dahui wenjian huibian (A Collection of Documents from the 10th National 
Congress of the CCP), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973), pg.32.
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David Zweig suggests that a campaign to educate rural Party cadres in the 
CCP’s basic line began “immediately after the Tenth Party Congress”.98 While 
the campaign certainly appears to have intensified after the Congress closed, 
articles in the Renmin ribao suggest that this campaign was well underway on 
the eve of the conference. The new “Line Education Campaign”, together with 
the on-going pixiu zhengfeng, and later the Camapign to Criticize Lin Biao and 
Confucius clearly re-radical!zed the environment in rural China and led to a 
resurgence of radical practices.
Articles in the press returned to the themes of political correctness and 
criticized “rightist tendencies”. One article in the Renmin ribao 21 August 
criticized the tendency of peasants to avoid work that did not receive a high 
number of work points and called for peasants and cadres to undergo 
education in the Party’s line to overcome this tendency."
As the Line Education Campaign unfolded similar articles appeared in the 
press throughout 1973 relating its impact in rural areas across China.100 As 
China moved into 1974 it was clear that members of the radical Left had been 
successful in re-radicalizing the debate over agriculture by using these new 
campaigns to launch their criticism of moderate agricultural policies. A new 
radical upsurge swept China’s countryside through the spring and summer of 
1974.
b. A new radical upsurge in agricultural policy: 1974
On 3 April, 1974, the Renmin ribao published a front page editorial “Criticize 
Lin Biao and Confucius, Carry Out Spring Ploughing Well” (Pi Lin pi Kong, 
gaohao chun geng). Immediately following this editorial a short series of
98 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China  ^pg. 64.
99 Lin Zhenshan, “Genju dang de luxian, luoshi juti zhengce” (In accordance with the Party’s 
line, implement concrete policies), in Renmin ribao, 21 August, 1973, pg.2.
100 See for example, “Dang de jiben luxian shi laodong renmin de shengmingxian’1, (The 
Party’s basic line is the lifeblood of the people), in Renmin ribao, 21 November, 1973, pg.3 and 
“Jinjin zhuazhu nongcun zhong liang tiao daolu douzheng de dashi”, (Firmly grasp the major task 
of the two-line struggle in the countryside), in Renmin ribao, 3 December, 1973, pg.3.
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articles were published in three issues of a special column of the same title, 
published on the 4, 10 and 23 of April. Opinion as to the impact of the 
campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius on agriculture is mixed. Jurgen 
Domes suggests that attempts by the radical Left to promote the experiences of 
Xiaoqinzhuang brigade in conducting the campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and 
Confucius were unsuccessful.101 The short duration of the special column also 
suggests that the new Campaign had a limited impact.102 What seems clear is 
that although the new campaign per se may have had only a minor impact on 
rural areas, it was a part of a wider radicalization of Chinese politics that 
occurred in 1973-74 and that again encouraged a return to many of the radical 
agricultural policies of 1970-71. In particular, the renewed emphasis on 
political criteria led to criticism of private plots and sideline industries.
Returning to the theme of ideological correctness, the editorial of 3 April 
stated:
The Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius is a political and 
ideological struggle to uphold Marxism-Leninism and oppose 
revisionism. As this campaign deepens and develops, our country’s 
millions of peasants’ understanding of class struggle and line struggle 
will be raised, and their revolutionary spirit will be developed even 
further.
Line is the key link, once it is grasped, everything else falls into 
place. We must firmly grasp the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and 
Confucius, this task is of primary importance and we must once and 
for all raise the broad masses of cadres and peoples’ awareness of 
class struggle and line struggle, raise their awareness of continuing 
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and turn the Campaign to 
Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius into a powerful motive force to 
promote spring ploughing, production and all other work.103
Other articles in the column linked the successful implementation of the
101 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside^ pg.85.
102 David Zweig suggests that interviews and press reports from the provinces show the 
campaign did have a significant impact on rural areas. See Agrarian Radicalism in China^pg.63.
103 "Pi Lin pi Kong, gao hao chun geng”, (Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, carry out spring 
ploughing well), in Renmin ribao, 3 April, 1974, pg.1.
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Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius with boosting the peasants’ 
enthusiasm for such revolutionary tasks as collecting fertilizer and taking part 
the construction of irrigation projects.
A significant part of efforts to promote the campaign in rural areas appeared 
to be the dispatch of work teams made up of regional, county and commune 
leaders. An article printed in what appears to be the final issue of the special 
column on 23 April claimed that in the Shantou District of Guangdong, some
10,000 cadres from the district, county and commune leading bodies had gone 
to over 400 production teams where they had engaged in productive labour 
and worked with the masses in carrying out the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao 
and Confucius.104
The impact of such large numbers of work teams on rural areas would have 
been considerable if repeated across China, however in Chen Village the 
actual content of the new campaign appears to have been beyond the grasp of 
most peasants:
The new campaign seemed inscrutable. Even the urban youths 
who remained in the village were totally perplexed about the 
conceivable relevance of denouncing Confucius.
When the cryptic, indigestible essays maligning “Confucianism” 
were read out at the mass meetings and it was time for audience 
participation, the cadres and activists obediently stood up to 
denounce Confucius and to recount how Confucian feudalistic 
thinking manifested itself in their daily activities. “But," admits one of 
them, “we couldn’t think of anything to say that had much to do with 
Confucius or much to do with anything.”105
Accounts in the Renmin ribao and Chen Viilage suggest that numerous 
work teams were dispatched across China, both as part of the Campaign to 
Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and the Line Education Campaign, and that
104 “Shantou diqu nongcun yipian chungeng fanmang jingxiang", (The countryside in 
Shantou district is a vast scene of spring ploughing activities), in Renmin ribaox23 April, 1974, 
pg.4.
105 Chan, Madsen and Unger, Chen Village, pp.250-251.
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peasants were mobilized to attend political meetings. David Zweig quotes 
reports suggesting that there was an upsurge in criticism of private plots and 
sideline industries during 1974 and that “specialized construction groups” were 
formed, facilitating the “expropriation” of labour from the production teams.100 In 
September 1974 two articles appeared in the Renmin ribao promoting the 
experiences of the Xiaoqinzhuang production brigade on the outskirts of 
Tianjin. This brigade had been developed as a model on the initiative of Jiang 
Qing. As well as outlining the experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang during the 
Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, these articles described how the 
brigade focused on strengthening the collective economy of the commune, 
downplaying the function of individual production teams.107
Clearly, developments in three of the four issue areas I focus on in this 
chapter indicate that the radical Left were the dominant influence over 
agricultural policy during 1974, seemingly as a result of the re-radicalization of 
politics in general. The prominence given to political study and political 
incentives overturned the tendency towards increasing material rewards seen 
in 1973. In the “Study Dazhai” campaign, numerous articles repeated the 
radical line of the 1971 editorial that Dazhai’s main experience was “putting 
proletarian politics in command”. Elsewhere there are indications that some 
brigades restricted the independence of individual production teams, once 
again focusing on developing ownership at the brigade and commune levels, 
and expropriating labour for large-scale capital construction projects.
The impact of these developments in rural areas across China was mixed. 
David Zweig suggests that the implementation of radical policies “varied from 
place to place and year to year", again suggesting that local leadership was 
important in their implementation. In one example, one county in Jiangsu
106 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pp.63-64.
107 See particularly, “Xiaoqinzhuang de zhengzhi yexiao”, (Xiaoqinzhuang’s political night 
school), in the Renmin ribao, 8 September, 1974, pg.1. This article describes the impact of the 
brigade's night school in raising the political consciousness of brigade members. The article 
particularly emphasises the role played by poor and lower-middle peasants.
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Province launched attacks on capitalistic tendencies, including private plots 
and running collective enterprises, however this campaign did not take off in 
the rest of the province.108 There were other examples of the radicalization of 
China’s countryside across China, with private plots and sideline industries 
subject to renewed restrictions in Guangdong and rural fairs closing in Fujian.109
c. From the 4th National People’s Congress to the 1st Dazhai Conference: 
Januarv-October 1975
Political developments at the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975 generally 
favoured members of the moderate coalition with the on-going rehabilitation of 
victims of the Cultural Revolution strengthening their position. The moderates 
were able to use their new strength to criticize radical policies. Deng Xiaoping 
and Zhou Enlai also used the Fourth National People’s Congress to re-launch 
Zhou’s slogan of achieving the “Four Modernizations” by the end of the century.
The 4th NPC opened 13 January, 1975. In his work report to the Congress, 
Zhou Enlai stated that the Party’s main task should be completing the Four 
Modernizations by the end of the century. Zhou’s statement redirected 
attention onto economic issues, and was used as a clarion call by moderates to 
launch a wholesale rectification of Party and government work, including 
agriculture. Elsewhere, in a speech that was otherwise dominated by political 
and foreign policy issues, Zhou did praise the PRC’s achievements in 
agriculture. He claimed that although China’s population had risen by 60 
percent since 1949, grain output had risen 1.4 times and cotton output 4.7 
times, thus “guaranteeing the basic food and clothing needs of the people”.110
The new Constitution, adopted by the Congress, affirmed the “three-level 
system of ownership” (thereby underling the position of the production team)
108 Daivd Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.64.
109 Ibid, pg.64.
110 Zhou Enlai, "Zhengfu gongzuo baogao”, (Government political report), in the Renmin 
ribao, 21 January, 1975, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, January, 1975, pg.12.
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and guaranteed private plots and sideline occupations.111 In his speech to the 
Congress on amendments to the Constitution Zhang Chunqiao set out the 
Party’s guarantees, and distinguished the new policy from both “rightist” and 
"leftist” excesses:
The draft revisions have set out regulations [zuo guiding ] regarding 
non-agricultural self-employed labourers and regarding commune 
members being able to run a small number of private plots and family 
side-line industries. These regulations combine the principle of 
maintaining socialism with the necessary flexibility, and draw a clear 
distinction from the absurd proposals of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao for 
fixing output quotas for each household [baochan daohu] or 
abolishing private plots completely.112
The outcome of the Congress clearly marked the launch of a new moderate 
line in agriculture, but Zhang’s subsequent change of line suggests that he did 
not support many of the ideas he had discussed in his speech. Key radical 
policies, such as criticism of private plots and sideline activities were 
themselves criticized and the role of the production team reaffirmed, however 
only a month after the Congress closed members of the Gang of Four, 
seemingly with Mao’s support, launched a new campaign to “Study the Theory 
of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”.
Mao Zedong did not attend the NPC and it is apparent that he was 
displeased with the outcomes of these meetings. Criticism by Mao of China’s 
eight-grade wage system and the practice of distribution according to labour 
were published in the Renmin ribao in February. Mao criticized these 
tendencies, saying they were a legacy of the “old society”. Mao labelled them 
“bourgeois rights” and called for these phenomenon to be restricted, through 
the dictatorship of the proletariat.113
The new campaign was not directed against agriculture per se, however in
111 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pg. 83.
112 Zhang Chunqiao, “Guanyu xiugai xianfa de baogao", (Report on amendments to the 
Constitution), in the Renmin ribao, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, January, 1975, pg. 11.
113 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pg. 83.
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two key articles published in March and April, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang 
Chunqiao did discuss the situation in China’s rural areas and set out their own 
policies. Zhang contradicted much of what he had said in his report to the NPC 
only three months earlier. Further articles appeared discussing the 
experiences of Xiaoqinzhuang and articles were published on He’ertao, a 
brigade in Liaoning which had been developed as a model under the auspices 
of Mao’s nephew, Mao Yuanxin.
Yao Wenyuan’s article, “On the social basis of Lin Biao’s reactionary clique’’ 
appeared in the third issue of Hong qi and was reprinted in the Renmin ribao 
1 March.114 The bulk of the article was devoted to a criticism of the current 
ownership structure and the graduated wage system, in line with Mao’s 
comments printed in the Renmin ribao the month before. Lin Biao was also 
criticized for advocating the use of material incentives. In a criticism which was 
directed more at the policies of the moderate figures in 1975 than Lin Biao in 
1970, Yao Wenyuan attacked an unspecified member of Lin Biao’s “clique” for 
writing: “The principles of distribution according to labour and material benefit’ 
are the ‘decisive factor’ in developing production forces”.115
A month after the Renmin ribao published Yao’s article, the same paper 
printed an article by Zhang Chunqiao “On the Comprehensive Dictatorship 
Over the Bourgeoisie”.116 In this article Zhang wrote at some length on 
problems in the ownership system in China’s countryside. Zhang called for the 
expansion of ownership by the commune, in direct contradiction to his January 
speech where he had affirmed the importance of the three-level ownership 
system. He also criticized the policy of continuing to allow private plots and 
sideline industries:
In agricultural resources, approximately 90 percent of arable land 
and irrigation machinery and 80 percent of tractors and livestock are
114 For a copy of this article see Xinhua yuebao^ March 1975, pp. 1-6.
115 Ibid, pg.2.
115 For a copy of this article see Xinhua yuebao, April 1975, pp.5-9.
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owned by the collective. Ownership by the whole people [i.e. through 
the commune] is relatively small. Because of this over 90 percent of 
grain and all economic crops are produced through the collective 
economy. The proportion [produced] by state farms is very small.
Apart from this, we stil! continue to have a small amount of commune 
members’ private plots and sideline industries.117
Zhang used figures from his own bailiwick, Shanghai, to call for a growth in 
the amount of ownership at the commune level:
Taking the suburbs of Shanghai as an example, in 1974, the 
proportion of overall income earned by the commune level rose from
28.1 percent in the previous year to 30.5 percent, at the brigade 
[level] it rose from 15.2 percent to 17.2 percent and at the production 
team [level] it fell from 56.7 percent to 52.3 percent. The superiority of 
the communes being both larger in size and having a higher degree 
of public ownership [yi da er gong] was more and more apparent.118
Zhang warned that the transition to accounting by the commune would take a 
"relatively long time”, however he called for renewed efforts to be made, and 
warned against “slackening our guard” just because China had carried out one 
Cultural Revolution.119
In addition to these long articles, a number of articles appeared in the 
Renmin ribao in the first half of 1975 promoting the experiences of two model 
communes, Xiaoqinzhuang in Hebei and He’ertao in Liaoning. These articles 
set out other elements of the Gang’s agricultural policies, however they were 
not as successful in having the experiences of these models incorporated into 
agricultural policy in the same way that they had with a number of model higher 
education institutions they promoted, most probably because Dazhai remained 
the dominant model in agriculture and the Gang of Four appeared to have little 
influence over its leadership.
Together, these reports and the two longer articles by Yao Wenyuan and 
Zhang Chunqiao are the clearest exposition of the radical Left’s agricultural
117 Ibid, pg.6.
118 Ibid, pg.6.
119 Ibid, pg.7.
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policy. Perhaps most important, as seen in the example of Xiaoqinzhuang, is 
the use of political education and mass mobiliziation through political 
campaigns as a means of bringing about advances in agriculture. The reverse 
of the same coin was the criticism of “capitalist” tendencies, such as the 
advocacy of private plots and sideline industries, although it was at least 
recognized that these were phenomenon that must be eradicated gradually. 
Finally, Zhang Chunqiao had set out a clear call for the level of ownership to be 
raised progressively to that of the commune. Interestingly, in light of 
developments at the First Dazhai Conference, members of the Gang of Four 
appear to have said nothing significant about agricultural mechanization. This 
would be one of the key planks in Hua Guofeng’s policy platform, as set out at 
the Conference.
On 2 July, 1975, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to delegates attending the Central 
Committe’s All-China Conference on Professional Work in Agriculture in which 
she repeated the radical Left’s call for the focus of work to be on political 
education. Wang Hongwen apparently attended the meeting, held in 
Shijiazhuang, Hebei, as the senior Party representative. In her letter Jiang 
warned the delegates against curtailing ideological education in times of 
difficulties:
... I hope that the Comrades will understand that the most basic 
condition for developing an excellent situation is to constantly arm our 
leadership with the theories of Marxism, to thoroughly investigate and 
study, to use the arrow of Chairman Mao’s Thought to shoot at the 
ultimate source of the problem, and to oppose the concept that “the 
people regard food as the first requisite”, so when revolution and 
production are in conflict the grasp of revolution should be somewhat 
slackened, and in calamities where agricultural production cannot 
catch up, revolutionary movement should be postponed. Only under 
the guidance of the correct ideology, can we have correct and 
effective revolutionary actions and find the ways and means to 
overcome difficulties.120
120 “Chiang Ch’ing’s Letter to the Delegates Attending the CCP CC All-China Conference on 
Professional Work in Agriculture”, in Issues and Studies, October 1975, pg.87.
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Criticism of moderate policies and their impact in the countryside was not 
only confined to members of the radical Left. Immediately following the 4th 
NPC, Chen Yonggui, who was promoted to the position of Vice-Premier at the 
Congress, began a series of tours of rural areas, to promote the experiences of 
Dazhai. However it is clear that many of the developments he saw during his 
tours made him feel uneasy. Chen subsequently launched a strong attack on 
“the restoration of capitalism" in the countryside.
Writing in his biography of Chen Yonggui, Yang Quan states that Chen 
began a series of tours to Guangxi, Fujian, Tibet, Zhejiang and other areas 
immediately after the 4th NPC had closed.121 During a visit to a township in 
Fujian, Yang suggests that Chen was shocked at the continued strength of 
private enterprise in the area. As Chen’s car would arrive at a new spot, small 
stall holders and private traders would pack up and quickly make their exit. In 
an internal report of his visit to Changle district in Fujian, made in February 
1975, Chen made a stinging criticism of capitalist tendencies in the area:
The restoration of capitalism in the district... of Ch’ang-le has 
assumed extremely alarming proportions, in reality, the situation there 
is about the same as during the period of the rule of the Kuomintang.
The only thing which is missing is the Kuomintang flag... There are 
thirty-five groups of people who produce exclusively for their own 
benefit... They have distributed the arable land to the individual 
households and have made the individual household into a 
distribution organ... In an entire hsien [xian ], everybody, cadres as 
well as the population, are busy with specuation... Some people live 
in one room with three generations... while the cadres live a life of 
luxury.122
The failure of the radical Left’s efforts to promote their own model brigades 
and communes led them to try and cultivate Chen Yonggui however Yang 
Quan suggests that Chen did not get on well with either Jiang Qing or Zhang 
Chunqiao. Following his appointment to the Politburo Chen moved into the
121 Yang Quan, Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg.239.
122 Excerpts of Chen’s report are printed in Zhongyao diqing huibao {Important Reports on 
the Situation of the Enemy), No. 176, (Taibei, 15 October, 1976). Quoted in Jurgen Domes, 
Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pg. 90.
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Diaoyutai state guesthouse, home of the Gang of Four. Chen also reportedly 
studied with Wang Hongwen to try and overcome his poor literacy.123 However, 
in May 1975, Chen Yonggui moved out of Diaoyutai into a house very close to 
that of Wu Jianxian, the model textile worker from Shanghai, who Chen 
reportedly felt much closer to as the other token model worker on the Politburo. 
Among Chen’s other visitors at his new residence, Yang Quan notes that Hua 
Guofeng, Chen Xilian and Wu De were frequent callers.124 This is one of the 
few indications of Chen’s growing association with Hua Guofeng which would 
become more apparent at the First Dazhai Conference and subsequently after 
Mao’s death in September 1976.
d. The First Dazhai Conference to Mao’s death: September 1975-September 
1976
It is clear that in the course of 1975 three policy positions emerged with 
regards to agriculture: Firstly, that of the moderate figures, under the nominal 
leadership of Zhou Enlai and including Deng Xiaoping and Wan Li. They 
continued to support the use of private plots and sideline industries, and sought 
to protect the role of the production team as the main unit of ownership and 
accounting. They also downplayed the importance of political education, 
although this was often done indirectly, by using slogans such as the “Four 
Modernizations” which placed the emphasis back onto economic issues. Their 
policies had been set out in the 1971 “Directive Concerning the Question of 
Distribution in the Rural People’s Communes" and the documents passed at 
the 4th National People’s Congress; Secondly, members of the radical Left. 
They had set out their policies in the two key articles written by Yao Wenyuan 
and Zhang Chunqiao and in a series of articles promoting the experiences of 
Xiaoqinzhuang brigade and He’ertao commune. They stressed the importance 
of political education and mass mobilization, criticized the use of private plots,
123 Yang Quan, Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg.257.
124 Ibid, pg.262.
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sideline industries and other “material incenties”, and called for the gradual 
transfer of ownership to the commune level.
At the same time a third line was emerging, centred around two of the 
leading Cultural Revolution beneficiaries, Hua Guofeng and Chen Yonggui.
Hua had had responsibility for agricultural mechanization since 1971. Chen, of 
course, had been promoted to the Politburo on the strengths of his success in 
developing the model brigade at Dazhai and together these two had 
considerable experience in agriculture. It is probable that the articles by Guo 
Dajiang reflected the views of this group, these articles reappeared on the eve 
of the conference, however it is only with the publication of Hua’s speech at the 
First Dazhai Conference that the policies of this group are clearly set out. 
Representatives of the three groups, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Qing and Hua 
Guofeng, each delivered a speech to the Conference. Apparently siding with 
his new protegee, Hua Guofeng, Mao blocked publication of Deng’s and 
Jiang’s speeches. Hua’s speech was published together with those of a 
number of leading figures from the Dazhai commune who were closely 
associated with Chen Yonggui.
Uniquely, for there is little evidence of Hua Guofeng dominating the debate 
in any other policy area in a similar way prior to Mao’s death, Hua’s line, 
adopted by the conference formed the basis of agricultural policy in China for 
the next three years. It came in for strong criticism from the Gang of Four who 
roundly criticized Hua for not going far enough. In the months leading up to 
Mao’s death, the main conflict over agricultural policy was between these two 
groups. It was only following Mao’s death and the subsequent arrest of the 
Gang of Four that Hua could consolidate his control over agricultural policy at 
the Second Dazhai Conference.
The First Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai opened on 15 
September in the Shanxi brigade before moving to Beijing for the second half 
of the conference on 15 October. Over 3,700 delegates attended the first stage
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of the meeting, which was held in a makeshift arena converted from a 
workshop in the brigade’s tractor plant. Both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing 
delivered their speeches at the opening ceremony on 15 September, but 
interestingly, Hua Guofeng did not deliver his speech until the conference had 
moved to Beijing, one month later. This was despite the fact that he attended 
the 15 September ceremonies.
Chen Yonggui, the former Brigade leader of Dazhai, chaired the opening 
ceremony, and delivered the opening address. Chen used the address to set 
out the agenda for the meeting, which was to consist of two main subjects: 
summing up the experiences of the campaign to study Dazhai, and discussing 
how to achieve the target of basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980.125 This 
latter point clearly reflected the influence of Hua Guofeng, who had chaired the 
1971 meeting on agricultural mechanization which had set out this policy. This 
suggests that Hua had had considerable influence over preparations for the 
First Dazhai Conference and defining its agenda.
In his biography of Chen Yonggui, Yang Quan makes it clear that Deng 
Xiaoping was already in political difficulties when he attended the First Dazhai 
Conference. Although the official report on the opening ceremony states that 
Deng Xiaoping delivered his speech on behalf of the Central Committee126 this 
may have been little more than a token public recognition of his position as 
First Vice-Premier. Yang Quan suggests that Deng had been ordered to attend 
the Conference and had been instructed to only talk about Dazhai. Deng was 
also reportedly interrupted on a number of occassions by Jiang Qing.127 This 
would have been a significant public slight for Deng as he was a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo and First Vice-Premier, while Jiang Qing 
was only a member of the Politburo.
126 “Quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zai Xiyang longzhong kaimu”, (The National 
Conference on In Agriculture Study Dazhai solemnly opened in Xiyang), in the Renmin ribao, 15 
September, 1975, reprinted in Xinhua Yuebao, September 1975, pg.4.
126 Ibid, pg. 4.
127 Yang Quan, A Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg. 277.
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Unfortunately, Deng’s speech has never been made public. Yang Quan 
quotes one sentence by Deng, “When studying Dazhai, I ask everbody to be 
careful, you mustn’t focus only on how much grain is produced, you must study 
the specific policies of Dazhai and Xiyang....”128 Although it is impossible to 
confirm, this sentence does seem to have been typical of Deng’s stance.
Jurgen Domes suggests that subsequent attacks on Deng in the spring and 
summer of 1976 indicate that he called “for a further relaxation of the rural 
collective economy... and at least the maintenance of the status quo which was 
created by the revision in 1961/2”.129
In contrast, a full copy of Jiang Qing’s speech has been published in Taiwan, 
even though Mao blocked publication of this speech as well as Deng’s. In 
contrast to what is known about Deng’s comments, Jiang’s speech focused on 
ideological issues, warning of the threat of capitalist restoration in the 
countryside. Jiang listed six problems which continued to hamper agricultural 
production, all overtly political in their content:
First, capitalism is very much alive in the countryside. Second, 
basic-level Party committees in certain areas persist in paying little 
attention to the movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture, do not 
strive to mobilize the masses, and even exercise passive resistence.
Third, leadership in certain places still remains in the hands of bad 
persons. Fourth, a number of our comrades still lack the fervor to 
continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Fifth, 
class enemies are stirring up trouble from their hideouts. Sixth, the 
peasants still harbor to a serious degree the notion of a small peasant 
economy. The above-mentioned phenomena must be criticized and 
corrected from now on in the agricultural rectification campaign.130
In her speech Jiang called for a mass rectification movement in the countryside. 
Her comments were clearly influenced by Mao’s voluntaristic thinking, and 
were reminiscent of the lanugage of the Great Leap Forward. On specific
128 Ibid, pg.277.
129 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pg.95.
130 “Chiang Ch’ing’s speech at the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in 
Agriculture (Summary)”, in Chinese Law and Government Spring 1977 (Vol.X, No.1), pg.14.
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policies Jiang warned that agricultural workers who had migrated to urban 
areas should be forced to return to take part in the new mass mobilization. She 
also claimed, in the name of Mao, that some of the policies laid down in the 
moderate “Sixty Points” would be amended, although she added that the 
amendments had not yet been agreed by the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo.
There were two more key-note speeches, the first by the new Dazhai 
Brigade Secretary Guo Fenglian on 24 September and the second by Deputy 
Secretary of Xiyang County, Wang Jinzi on 27 September. This second speech 
is particularly significant as it foreshadows much of Hua Guofeng’s own 
speech, and suggests a degree of uniformity between Hua and a close 
associate of Chen Yonggui.
In his speech Wang Jinzi listed the two main achievements of Xiyang county 
as capital construction of new farm land (zao tian) and efforts to achieve 
mechanization. Hua Guofeng would repeat this message in his speech three 
weeks later. The line which emerged from Wang's speech was one which 
recognized the importance of boosting peasant’s livelihoods and rewarding 
hard work, but which also called for the strengthening of the collective economy 
and raising the level of ownership to the commune level. Significantly, as 
outlined by Wang, the peasants’ enthusiasm for the collective would be 
boosted when they saw the benefits of particiaption in large-scale capital 
construction projects rather than direct political education as emphasized by 
the radical Left.
Wang stated that the movement to study Dazhai had strengthened the 
collective economy and led to major developments in ownership by the 
commune. At the same time however, Wang warned that "major improvements 
in the collective economy must bring about major changes in people’s
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livelihoods” .131 Recognizing at least a partial need for material rewards, Wang 
quoted figures which claimed that the average amount of income distributed 
collectively across the whole county had risen from 47.5 Yuan per person in 
1966 to 94 Yuan in 1974. Wang also called for the principle of “to each 
according to his labour” to be implemented correctly.132
On mechanization, one of the key elements of Hua Guofeng’s speech, Wang 
called for the pace to be stepped up. He claimed that Xiyang had combined 
the movement to study Dazhai with efforts to bring about mechanization and 
used the Dazhai spirt to promote work in this field. Wang underlined that in 
Xiyang, mechanization had been achieved on the basis of the county’s own 
efforts, 83 percent of investment in tractors, irrigation equipment and other 
machinery had come from the county itself, and only 13 percent of investment 
had come from the State. The money for this investment came from increased 
accummulation following increases in production and the profits of communal 
enterprises.133
Wang's speech makes it clear that he expected a transition to higher levels 
of ownership in the near future. Apart from generating the increases in 
production which would fund higher levels of accumulation for mechanization, 
Wang argued that participation in large-scale, communal projects fostered a 
greater degree of unity and cooperation. Hua would return to this theme in 
more detail in his speech.
The conference reopened in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 15 
October. Over 7,000 delegates attended this stage of the meeting, which was 
once again chaired by Chen Yonggui. The only speech at this stage was given 
by Hua Guofeng and given the month gap between Deng and Jiang’s 
speeches and that of Hua, it seems likely that this speech was intended as a
131 Wang Jinzi, “Xue Dazhai buduan geming, zhua genben jianchi douzheng", (Study 
Dazhai’s continuous revolution, seize the basics, continue to struggle), in the Renmin ribao^2Q 
September, 1975, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, September 1975, pg.148.
132 Ibid, pg.150.
133 ibid, pg. 151.
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summing up of the conference’s proceedings.
in his analysis of the First Dazhai Conference, David Zweig suggests that 
Hua Guofeng was constrained by the presence of Deng which “prevented him 
from pushing a more radical program’’.134 A closer analysis of Hua’s speech 
shows that he supported key elements of the Left’s agricultural program, 
including the transfer of ownership to the commune level, the reorganization of 
“people going it alone” (dan gan) and the reclamation of excess private plots. 
Hua appears to have been in a strong position throughout the conference and 
rather than Hua being constrained, Yang Quan suggests that it was Deng 
Xiaoping who was in difficulties. The previous chapter on higher education 
shows that by October 1975, when the second half of the conference opened, 
Deng had lost the support of Mao and was increasingly sidelined.
Yang Quan appears closer to the truth when he suggests that this 
conference marked “a turn to the left" (zhe ge hui deque shi ge xiang zuo 
zhuan de hui).m Hua shared the radical Left’s objective of strengthening the 
commune-level economy, at the expense of the production team and brigade. 
However, while Hua made a passing reference to the radical Left’s idea of 
political mobilization and re-education, it is clear that he saw participation in 
basic-field construction (zao tian) and the mechanization of agriculture as the 
best means of “educating” the peasantry on the superiority of the commune 
system. These were the two issues that Wang Jinzi had highlighted as the 
main achievements of Xiyang county during the conference.
In his speech, Hua Guofeng undertook a partial re-writing of Zhou Enlai’s 
“four modernizations” , placing the emphasis on modernizing agriculture as the 
means to achieving modernization in the other three areas and so underlining 
the impotance of his agricultural reforms. When discussing Dazhai Hua set 
out six criteria by which to judge if a county had reached the standard of the
134 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg. 67.
135 Yang Quan, A Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg.275.
227
model commune and become a “Dazhai-type county” (Dazhai xian), These 
criteria reflected the influence of both the radical Left and the moderates, but 
also contained his own influences, particularly with regards to mechanization 
and basic field construction:
1) It has a core county leadership which continues to implement 
the Party’s line and policies and the unified struggle.
2) It has established the superiority of the poor and lower-middle 
peasant classes, is able to actively carry out the resolute struggle 
against the bourgoiesie and carries out effective supervision and 
reform of the class enemies.
3) The county, commune and brigade leadership are able to 
continue to take part in productive labour in the manner of Xiyang 
county.
4) With regards to basic field construction, agricultural 
mechanization and scientific cultivation, progress must be fast and the 
results significant.
5) As the collective economy grows, the production and income of 
poor communes and brigades should reach or exceed the current 
levels of middle-level teams in that locality
6) Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline industries and 
fisheries should all be developed to make major increases in 
production, make larger contributions to the state and gradually 
improve the livelihood of commune members.136
On distribution, Hua warned against insufficient accumulation by the 
collective and criticized the phenomenon of distributing everything and eating 
everything (fen guang chi y'/ng).137 Perhaps the most significant part of Hua's 
speech came in a section entitled “Speed up the construction of large-scale 
agriculture” (Jiakuai jianshe shehui zhuyi danongye). In this section Hua 
discussed the impact of participation in capital construction project and the 
mechanization of agriculture as a means of boosting the peasants enthusiasm 
and belief in higher levels of ownership. Field construction and mechanization 
were not only means of achieving better rates of production, they would also
136 Hua Guofeng, “Quan dang dongyuan, daban nongye, wei puji Dazhai xian er fendou”, 
(Mobilize the whole Party, go in for agriculture in a big way, fight to popularize Dazhai-type 
counties), in the Renmin ribao, 21 October, 1975, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, October 1975, 
pg. 15.
137 Ibid, pg.16.
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educate the masses to accept higher levels of cooperativization. Hua appears 
to have substituted this idea in place of the radical Left’s emphasis on 
mobilization through political education and campaigns, and this policy would 
later be criticized for “focusing only on production forces" (wei shengchanii 
l u r i ) na
As this is a key element of Hua's agricultural line, it is worth quoting him at 
some length:
The experience of Dazhai-type counties everywhere shows, 
wherever great achievements have been made in basic field 
construction, the superiority of the commune in being both larger and 
having a higher degree of public ownership has been shown, the old 
legacy of the small-producer [mentality] has undergone a major 
transformation, and there are even better conditions for agricultural 
mechanization. During the course of basic field construction the 
peasants awareness of the collective and organizational discipline 
have both increased greatly, people believe in the collective even 
more and they have built up their socialist vigour and the [spirit of] “the 
more I work the more I want to work, the more I work the more I dare to 
work, the more I work the more I can work”. Because of all of this, we 
have gone a step further in consolidating and advancing the victory in 
criticizing capitalism and carrying out socialism.139
Developing agricultural mechanization doesn’t only enable us to 
significantly raise agricultural labour’s production ratio, give more 
spare time to the broad masses to develop the mixed economy and 
build a flourishing and wealthy new socialist countryside, it also gives 
full play to the commune’s role as a mixed organization for peasants, 
workers, merchants, students and soliders. It gives full play to the 
superiority of the commune, being both larger and having more public 
ownership and it helps to reduce the three major disparities between 
town and countryside, workers and peasants and physical and mental 
labour, all of which is of major significance.140
Hua phrased his words very carefully, but it is clear that his objective was to 
encourage people to transfer ownership to higher levels:
 The People’s Communes possess enormous vitality and truly spurs
138 Yang Quan, Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg.275.
139 Hua Guofeng, “Mobilize the whole Party, go in for agriculture in a big way fight to 
popularize Dazhai-type counties”, in Xinhua Yuebao, October 1975, pg. 17.
140 Ibid, pg.17.
229
on progress in all our nation’s agricultural tasks. In the current stage, 
the People’s Commune system of "three levels of ownership, with the 
production team as the base” is basically in accordance with the 
[conditions] in the majority of areas and with the development of 
production forces. At the same time, we should see that following the 
development of the campaign to build Dazhai-type counties, following 
the development of large-scale socialist agriculture, particularly the 
strengthening of the commune and brigade economies, this kind of 
system which has the production team as the basic accounting unit, 
will, when the time is right, gradually transform into a system with the 
brigade, or even the commune, as the basic accounting unit. Looking 
even further, the People’s Communes must change from collective 
ownership to ownership by the whole people, and then from the 
socialist type of ownership by the whole people to communist 
ownership by the whole people.141
Hua Guofeng’s comments on raising the level of ownership to that of the 
commune echoed Jiang Qing’s speech and other articles by members of the 
Gang of Four. However, Hua’s apparent de-emphasis of political education 
and mass rectification, in favour of participation in labour as a means of 
educating the masses, drew criticism from Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and 
Yao Wenyuan. Hua's recognition of the need to boost peasant livelihoods also 
appears to have attracted the criticism of the radical Left.
Jiang Qing criticized Hua’s report for being “revisionist”, however the report 
was approved by Mao and distributed as Central Committee document No.
21.142 It was published in the Renmin ribao on the 21 October, however Yao 
Wenyuan was apparently successful in blocking its publication in Hong qi. In 
addition, Zhang Chunqiao barred the distribution of Hua’s report in Shanghai 
and organized a number of close colleagues in Shanghai to criticize Hua’s 
report “clause by clause”.143 In some areas, supporters of the Gang of Four 
were able to block work teams sent out to implement the report from entering 
rural areas.
The death of Zhou Enlai and the subsequent ouster of Deng Xiaoping
141 Ibid, pg.18.
142 Yang Quan, A Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg.277.
143 Ting Wang, Chairman Hua Leader of the Chinese Communists, (London: C. Hurst, 1980), 
pp.97-98.
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temporarily put an end to the moderate line in agriculture. In higher education, 
the death of Zhou and the removal of Deng largely put an end to the policy 
debate in this issue area because two key opponents to the Gang of Four were 
no longer present. Policy conflict over higher education largely faded until the 
death of Mao Zedong. The case of agriculture was different: Hua Guofeng had 
set out a new policy position at the First Dazhai Conference, which adopted a 
middle-line between the moderates and the radical Left. His appointment as 
acting-Premier nominally gave him the power to implement this line. Although 
the policy debate over agriculture was gradually subsumed in the wider 
intensifying political conflict in the run-up to Mao’s death, Hua’s strength on this 
issue appears to have ensured that he remained a target for criticism from the 
Gang of Four and agriculture remained an important issue through the first half 
of 1976.
The impact of Hua Guofeng's speech was mainly felt in the mobilization of 
peasants and workers to participate in capital-construction projects, 
traditionally organized during the slack winter season. David Zweig reports 
that during the winter of 1975-76 some 130 million people worked on 
construction projects, “with more turning out than ever before for winter field 
work in Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Xinjiang”.144 
In addition as many as 1.6 million cadres were sent to the grassroots to work, 
although many of these were transferred as part of the on-going Line Education 
Campaign.
Attacks on Hua Guofeng’s agricultural policies by the radical Left were 
stepped up following the April Tian’anmen Incident and the second purge of 
Deng Xiaoping. In his speech to the Second Dazhai Conference, held in 
December 1976, Chen Yonggui stated that in April of that year the Gang of Four 
had blocked an attempt to reaffirm Hua’s speech at the first conference,
144 David Zweig,Agrarian Radicalism in China, fn. 102, pg. 67.
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stopping the speech from being republished.145 The Campaign to Counter­
attack the Rightist Wind to Reverse Verdicts offered the radical Left new 
opportunities to attack Hua’s line by linking it to criticism of Deng Xiaoping.
An article published in Hong qi in April was an implicit criticism of Hua’s 
policies, claiming that the most basic experience of Dazhai was the need for 
continued class struggle:
Dazhai has a wealth of experience, but if we concentrate them into 
one lesson, then that is that we must always firmly grasp the key link of 
class struggle, carry out mass criticism of revisionism and capitalism 
and work energetically for socialism.146
Another article in the same issue reportedly accused Deng Xiaoping of 
ignoring Dazhai’s emphasis on class struggle.147
Yang Quan suggests that Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the First Dazhai 
Conference came in for criticism as part of the Campaign to Counter-attack the 
Rightist Tendency to Reverse Verdicts. While this might be expected, Yang also 
suggests that the whole conference was criticized as an attempt to “overturn 
correct verdicts” (fan a n ). Yang reports that a number of big character posters 
appeared criticizing Chen Yonggui’s speech for only concentrating on 
productive forces (wei shengchanli lun), and so ignoring the importance of 
political and ideological issues.148
Elsewhere in the media, an article appeared in the Renmin ribao in late 
June linking the Campaign to Criticize Deng Xiaoping with the on-going 
movement to study Dazhai. This article also criticized what it said was the 
tendency to focus only on productive forces:
At the start of the Campaign to Counter-attack the Rightist tendency 
to reverse verdicts, the county committee mobilized the masses to
445 Ibid, pg.68.
148 Lu Yang, “Xue Dazhai yao yi jieji douzheng wei gang”, (In studying Dazhai we must take 
class struggle as the key link), in Hong qi, Issue 4, 1975, pg. 63.
147 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg. 68.
148 Yang Quan, A Biography of Chen Yonggui, pg. 277.
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relate these ideological tendencies and criticism of the tendency to 
concentrate on productive forces. This led the broad masses of 
cadres and people to realise, only concentrating on productive forces 
and developing socialist production are two separate things, and 
criticising only focusing on productive forces is not the same as 
criticising developing socialist production. Criticising concentrating 
on productive forces is criticising the revisionist line of not taking class 
struggle as the key link in all work. Only by thoroughly criticising 
concentrating on productive forces can we successfully carry out 
socialist production.149
Although the main target of criticism in the article is Deng, the way in which the 
same criticism was directed at Chen Yonggui suggests that the radical Left 
were using this campaign to indirectly attack Hua Guofeng, in much the same 
way they used the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius to attack Zhou 
Enlai. As a consequence of the radical’s attacks, David Zweig reports that 
there was a further radical upsurge in the countryside, with many areas 
reporting they had adopted the He’ertao commune’s system of controlling trade 
fairs, renewed restrictions on private plots and sideline industries and the 
introduction of brigade accounting.150 It should be noted however that the latter 
two policies had been advocated by Hua Guofeng in his speech to the First 
Dazhai Conference and so it is unclear how much they were a result of radical 
pressure and how much it was a result of Hua’s own advocacy of these 
policies.
Whether or not the radical Left were responsible for this new upsurge in the 
countryside, by the second half of 1976 the debate over agricultural policy had 
been subsumed in the intensifying struggle at the centre and the media were 
focusing on other issues.
149 “Pi Deng douzheng youli tuidong Xiyang xue Dazhai yundong”, (The struggle to criticize 
Deng Xiaoping is a powerful motive force in Xiyang’s movement to study Dazhai), in the Renmin 
ribao, 28 June, 1976, reprinted in Xinhua Monthly, June, 1976, pg.143.
160 Daivd Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg. 69.
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5. Hua Guofeng, Wan Li and production responsibility systems: October 1976-
December 1978
a. Hua consolidates his position: October-December. 1976
Following the arrest of the Gang of Four in October Hua Guofeng sought to 
consolidate his position as the new leader of the CCP. Agriculture, and the 
conflict with the Gang of Four over agricultural policy, formed a major part of 
Hua and his supporters’ consolidation effort and Hua’s first major act following 
the Gang’s arrest was to convene a second Dazhai conference, allowing him to 
return to themes with which he was confident and could expect strong support 
from people like Chen Yonggui. Elsewhere, an editorial on agricultural 
mechanization from 1971, drafted under the guidance of Hua, but suppressed 
by the Gang of Four, was finally published with a strong critique of the Gang. 
During this period Hua appeared to place more emphasis on the theme of 
class struggle than before, adopting one of the Gang’s key policies. However 
both he and Chen continued to emphasize the twin tasks of basic field 
construction and achieving mechanization in agriculture by 1980 as the main 
issues in agricultural policy. These would become the dominant themes as 
Hua developed his agricultural policies through 1976-1977.
One month after the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Renmin ribao published 
the article “The mighty revolutionary current of ‘In Agriculture Study Dazhai’ 
cannot be stopped”.151 The article was written by the Mass Criticism Group of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and appears to have been the first 
significant article on agriculture following the Gang’s demise. It strongly 
criticized the Gang of Four for blocking the implementation of Hua Guofeng’s 
speech at the First Dazhai Conference and for causing confusion in rural areas 
in China. The article took a middle line, both defending the need to improve
151 “Nongye xue Dazhai de geming hongliu bu ke zudang", (The mighty revolutionary current 
of ‘In Agriculture Study Dazhai’ cannot be stopped), in the Renmin ribao, 21 November, 1976, 
reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, November 1976, pp.172-175.
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production forces, a policy associated with the moderates, and stressing that 
the main experience learnt in the movement to study Dazhai was “taking class 
struggle as the key", a key element of the radical Left’s line.152
The publication of this article formed the backdrop to the opening of the 
Second Dazhai Conference in Beijing on 10 December, 1976. One of the 
main aims of the conference was to further discredit the Gang of Four, but the 
conference also discussed agricultural policy and the importance of agricultural 
mechanization. Although the conference opened on 10 December, the two 
major speeches were only given on 20 and 25 December, by Chen Yonggui 
and Hua Guofeng respectively. According to Chen’s speech, delegates had 
filled their time by studying Mao’s “On the Ten Major Relationships", discussing 
Hua Guofeng’s speech at the First Dazhai Conference, and studying a number 
of Central Committee documents and material on the Gang of Four’s crimes.153 
In addition, a State Council report “On the basic realization of agricultural 
mechanization by 1980” appears to have been delivered to the meeting on 25 
December.
The fact that delegates discussed Mao’s “On the Ten Major Relationships” 
appears significant. In this essay, Mao had discussed the importance of 
achieving a better balance between agriculture, light and heavy industry, and of 
industry supporting agriculture more. This was particularly important for Hua 
Guofeng as he placed a lot of emphasis on mechanizing agriculture, something 
that could only be achieved with help from industry. In addition, he wanted to 
develop local, commune and brigade level enterprises to fund increasing 
levels of accumulation by the commune in support of mechanization.
Hua only spoke in general terms on agriculture. Summing up the
152 Ibid, pg.173.
153 Chen Yonggui, “Chedi pipan ‘sirenbang’ xianqi puji Dazhai xian yundong de xin gaochao”, 
(Thoroughly criticize the “Gang of Four", set off a new upsurge in the movement to popularize 
Dazhai-type counties), in Nongye xue Dazhai - Di er ci quanguo nongye xue Dazhai huiyi zhuanji, 
(In AgriculturalStudy Dazhai - A special issue on the Second National Conference on In 
Agriculture Study Dazhai), (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe,1977), pg. 27.
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conference’s discussion, he said that the meeting had set out the twin tasks of 
popularizing Dazhai-type counties and achieving agricultural mechanization. 
He reaffirmed the Party’s commitment to achieving the “four modernizations” by 
the end of the century, but added that the next ten years (1976-1985) would be 
the key to completing this goal. Hua also defended the importance of 
productive forces, quoting Mao, saying that only by developing productive 
forces sufficiently would the socialist economic and political systems have a 
sufficient material base.154
It was left to Chen Yonggui and the State Council report on agricultural 
mechanization, to provide more details of future agricultural policy. Both of 
these documents returned to themes set out at the First Dazhai Conference, but 
the State Council report was also heavily influenced by the 1971 conference 
on agricultural mechanization. This was underlined by the publication of Hua 
Guofeng’s 1971 editorial “The basic way forward for agriculture lies in 
mechanization” only two days before the State Council report was presented at 
the conference.155
Chen’s speech was one of the clearest expositions of his and Hua’s line on 
agriculture. After paying tribute to Hua Guofeng for arresting the Gang of Four, 
and criticizing the Gang for their actions in damaging agricultural policy, Chen 
set out three key tasks for work in agriculture: Firstly, turning one-third of 
counties in China into Dazhai-type counties by 1980 (Chen did not give any 
criteria on how to judge a “Dazhai-type county” but it seems likely that Hua 
Guofeng’s six criteria, laid out at the First Dazhai Conference were still the ideal 
model); Secondly, achieving the basic mechanization of agriculture; and 
thirdly, achieving all-round development, with production in grain, cotton, oil 
crops, meat and other economic crops all to exceed planned targets.
Chen returned to one of the major themes of the "study Dazhai” campaign,
454 Ibid, pg.22.
155 “Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua”, (The basic way forward for agriclture lies in 
mechanization), in the Renmin ribao, 23 December, 1976, pg.1.
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stressing the importance of continuing work in basic field construction and 
warning against any slackening of efforts:
We have already had considerable achievements in this field, 
however development has been very uneven, in a few places the 
mountains and rivers are as before, their appearance hasn’t changed. 
These places still rely on heaven to eat [kao tian chi fan]. We cannot 
let this situation continue to exist. We must combine a mass 
movement with specialist units and launch a People’s War in basic 
field construction.156
Chen called for the pace of agricultural mechanization to be speeded up.
He repeated the message of the 1971 conference, calling for the “five small’’ 
industries to be developed to boost mechanization. Although Chen repeated 
the message of self-sufficiency, in a sign that the central leadership now placed 
more emphasis on this issue he went on:
... the State should energetically support [dali bangzhu] each 
province and autonomous region to develop local, small-scale iron 
and steel enterprises and industries that support agriculture as quickly 
as possible, so as to ensure the completion of the major task of 
basically achieving mechanization by 1980, put forward by Chairman 
Mao.157
Chen also called for higher rates of accumulation, stating that this would be 
beneficial to consolidating the commune and boosting the commune members 
enthusiasm for socialism. However he also warned that local leaders should 
ensure peasant livelihoods continued to rise, saying that except for years of 
natural disasters, at least 90 percent of peasants should see a rise in living 
standards every year.150
The Second Dazhai Conference provided a significant boost to efforts to 
increase the mechanization of agriculture in China, with the publication of 
Hua’s 1971 editorial and the State Council report “On the basic realization of
156 Chen Yonggui, “Thoroughly Criticize the ‘Gang of Four’”, pg. 42.
157 Ibid, pg. 43.
150 Ibid, pg. 44.
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agricultural mechanization by 1980".159 Hua’s role in this issue was underlined, 
firstly with the publication of the editorial itself, and secondly in a lengthy 
discussion of the 1971 conference which Hua had chaired and his 1975 
speech in the State Council report. With his experience of leading work in this 
field since 1971, and prior to that in Hunan Province, Hua clearly felt confident 
in pressing this policy.
Publishing the 1971 editorial seems to have mainly served the purpose of 
giving Hua Guofeng another vehicle in which to promote himself and criticize 
the Gang of Four as the State Council report provided more concrete policy 
details. An editorial comment published with the original article, lambasted Yao 
Wenyuan’s actions in suppressing the editorial in 1971:
Yao Wenyuan’s arbritary witholding of this editorial amply 
demonstrates his opposition to the basic line of our Party on 
agricultural issues put forward by Chairman Mao and his opposition to 
Chariman Mao’s great slogan of basically achieving the 
mechanization of agriculture by 1980. At the same time it brought him 
into conflict with Chairman Hua and other leading comrades at the 
centre who were resolutely continuing to implement Chairman Mao’s 
revolutionary line.160
The editorial comment went on to praise Hua’s role at the First Dazhai 
Conference and call for further efforts to achieve the target of basic 
mechanization by 1980.
The State Council report set out clear policy guidelines for achieving 
agricultural mechanization. It called for a clear division of labour, with the main 
focus to be on locally-produced, small- and medium-scale machinery. At the
169 “Guanyu yi jiu ba ling nian jiben shang shixian nongye jixiehua de baogao”, (Report on the 
basic realization of agricultural mechanization by 1980), in A Collection of Rural Policy
Documents, pp.376-385. Although this document does not make it clear if this report was 
presented at the Second Dazhai Conference, it is dated the 25 December, and is in the form of a 
speech. It also begins "Chairman Hua, delegates...” suggesting that Hua Guofeng was present. 
As it is unlikely he would have attended a second meeting after delivering his report on the 25 
December, the State Council report must have been presented at the Dazhai Coference. This 
copy of the report does not make it clear who gave the report at the conference.
180 “Nongye de genben chulu zaiyu jixiehua", (The basic way forward for agriculture lies in 
mechanization), in the Renmin ribao, 23 December, 1976, pg.1.
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same time the State would manage larger pieces of machinery. Local areas 
should concentrate on building up the "five small" industries to support efforts to 
mechanize agriculture.
The report also gave specific targets for the number of new tractors and 
amount of irrigation capacity to be achieved by 1980. The new targets were 
drastic revisions of those set out in the 1971 report: The new target for the 
number of tractors to be in use by 1980 was between 650,000 and 800,000, 
compared to only 400,000 in the 1971 report; and the target for irrigation 
capacity in 1980 was over 70,000,000 horsepower, compared to only 
35,000,000 horsepower in 1971.
In addition to setting out concrete policies and targets, the report also 
outlined the impact on an individual’s world view that increasing levels of 
mechanization would achieve. As I noted above this was a key element of Hua 
Guofeng’s line on this issue:
In some counties, communes and brigades that uphold Chairman 
Mao’s revolutionary line, continue to struggle against the revisionist 
line and that have basically achieved agricultural mechanization, a 
magnificent picture of large-scale socialist agriculture is unfolding. In 
these areas there have been major increases in labour productivity, 
their ability to withstand natural disasters has improved dramatically, 
they have developed all aspects, agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, sideline industries and fisheries, and they have amply 
demonstrated the superiority of the People’s Communes, being both 
larger and having higher levels of public ownership. The broad 
masses of the poor and lower-middle peasants have realized more 
profoundly that socialist modernized agriculture [shehui zhuyi 
xiandaihua nongye] is absolutely superior to the small-scale 
agricultural economy and capitalism, they have become more 
conscious of changing the habits of the small producer, and have split 
with the private ownership mentality and old traditional views, and 
they now follow the socialist path more resolutely.161
The report was approved for distribution by the Central Commitee on 19
161 “Guanyu yi jiu ba ling nian jiben shang shixian nongye jixiehua de baogao”, (Report on 
achieving the basic mechanization of agriculture by 1980), in A Collection of Rural Policy 
Documents, pg.379.
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January, 1977.
b. Hua in command: 1977
Through 1977 there was little sign of any coherent opposition to Hua 
Guofeng’s agricultural policies. The Renmin ribao and Hong qi carried a 
series of articles by close supporters of Hua promoting his line and indications 
such as the numbers participating in basic-field construction suggest that these 
policies were being implemented throughout China. Although Deng Xiaoping 
was formally rehabilitated in March of this year most of his efforts were directed 
at criticizing Hua Guofeng’s general ideological position, not specific policies. 
Other key figures at the centre, including Ye Jianying, apparently spoke in 
support of Hua’s line.
However, late in 1977, Wan Li, Party Secretary of Anhui, spoke in defence of 
the rights of production teams, in stark contrast to Hua’s line which foresaw the 
imminent raising of the level of ownership to the brigade and commune level. It 
appears that a number of test-sites were launched in Anhui in late-1977 which 
experimented with forms of production responsibility systems, again in stark 
contrast to Hua’s line. Although these experiments were limited in number, 
they presaged developments in 1978 when similar projects in Sichuan and 
those in Anhui would lead to radical reforms in agricultural policy at the third 
plenum of the 11th Central Committee.
There were a number of key articles in the central media written by 
supporters of Hua Guofeng including Chen Yonggui, Wang Qian, Party 
Secretary of Shanxi, and Guo Fenglian, the new Brigade Secretary of Dazhai. 
There were three main themes in these articles: Achieving the target of one 
third of counties meeting Hua Guofeng’s six criteria for being a "Dazhai-type 
county" by 1980; continuing work to complete agricultural mechanization; and 
work on basic field construction. Other central leadership figures, including Ye 
Jianying spoke in support of these policies.
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In the second half of the year a number of articles appeared discussing the 
issue of basic field construction and rural capital construction. Hua convened a 
meeting on rural capital construction in Xiyang county in the summer of this 
year. The October issue of Hong qi also carried a long article by Chen 
Yonggui on this subject. Figures in David Zweig’s book Agrarian radicalism in 
China show that participation in basic field construction reached a peak in the 
period 1977-78. This issue was one of Hua’s six critieria, and the successful 
completion of construction work was tied to efforts to build Dazhai-type 
counties.
The October issue of Hong qi carried Chen Yonggui’s article "Manage basic 
field construction as if it were a great socialist cause”. Relating Dazhai’s own 
experiences, Chen warned that basic field construction was an arduous task 
but one which brought rewards in improving production and safeguarding 
against natural disasters. Chen added that large-scale capital construction 
projects demonstrated the superiority of the socialist economy, as they would 
be impossible to organize if everybody was “going it alone”.162
Figures quoted by David Zweig show that in the Nanjing region rural capital 
construction reached a peak during 1977 and 1978, with some 99,260,000 
cubic metres of earth being moved in 1977, up from 89,230,000 in 1976 and 
only 59,880,000 in 1975. David Zweig reports that by October some 390,000 
projects were underway across China and by mid-November, “over 80 million 
rural laborers were involved”.163
In another important article, Guo Fenglian, the Brigade Secretary of Dazhai, 
touched on the ideological significance of mechanizing agriculture:
In Dazhai we have developed from the small implements, old 
technology and drought prone areas of before to the new agriculture 
of having a certain level of mechanization, irrigation and science. Not
102Chen Yonggui, "Ba nongtian jiben jianshe dangzuo weida de shehuizhuyi shiye lai ban”, 
(Manage basic field construction as if it were a great socialist cause), in Hong qi, Issue 10,1977, 
reprinted in Nongye xue Dazhai (di ershisan ji {In Agriculture Study Dazhai (Volume 23)), pg.9.
163 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pp.70-71.
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only has this rapidly developed productive forces, raised grain 
production... and made greater contributions to the state, in addition, 
in the course of developing agriculture, peasants have seen the 
superiority of socialism and have warmer feelings for the socialist 
system. What is more their thinking has made a great leap, their spirt 
has been liberated, they are standing higher, seeing further, and their 
vision is wider, leading them to constantly transform their traditional 
small producer outlook and the traditional forces.164
It is clear from these and other articles that there was a definate radical 
upsurge in rural China through 1977. Although political education was 
downplayed, in contrast to the radical Left’s line, peasants were mobilized to 
participate large-scale construction projects and leaders emphasized the 
importance of developing the brigade- and commune-level economy. In 
particular, the development of agricultural mechanization was seen as 
necessitating higher levels of ownership.
This radical upsurge culminated with a meeting of the Politburo in December 
1977. Although details of this meeting are sketchy, it is reported to have called 
for “a mini-Great Leap in agricultural output” and set new targets for grain and 
cotton production.165 Delegates also called for 10 percent of brigades to 
establish brigade level accounting through the winter of 1977-78.
On the eve of the meeting, the Renmin ribao printed the editorial 
“Accelerating the pace of agricultural development is a fighting task [zhandou 
renwu] for the whole Party”.166 The editorial presaged developments at the 
Politburo meeting by calling for a significant increase in grain production and 
production of other economic crops. To achieve these aims, the editorial stated 
that the key question on which accelerating the pace of development 
depended was the correct understanding of Dazhai’s experiences. Local 
leaders should rigidly adhere to the six criteria, continue with the campaign to
164 Guo Fenglian, "Rang Dazhai hongqi geng xianyan”, (Let the red flag of Dazhai be even 
brighter), in Hongqi, Issue9, 1977, pg.103.
165 David Zweig, Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.71.
166 “Jiakuai nongye fazhan sudu shi quandang de zhandou renwu”, (Accelerating the pace of 
agricultural development is a fighting task for the whole Party), in the Renmin r/jbaoJ1 December, 
1977, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, September 1977, pg.168.
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criticize the actions of the Gang of Four in agriculture, ensure cadres 
participated in labour and make strenuous efforts to complete basic capital 
projects.167 In a clarion call to rural leaders the editorial concluded:
Historical experience proves that every new leap in the national 
economy is always preceded by a new leap in agriculture. At the 
moment we are facing a new high tide in economic and cultural 
construction and accelerating the pace of agricultural development is 
a task which brooks no delay. The general situation is good, but 
pressing. The whole Party must respond to the call of Chairman 
Hua... mobilize, go in for agriculture in a big way, popularize Dazhai- 
type counties and struggle to accelerate the pace of agricultural 
development.168
c. Hua's agricultural line is overturned: 1978
At the beginning of 1978, Hua Guofeng’s agricultural policies appeared very 
much in the ascendency: further articles appeared at the start of the year in 
support of the transition to brigade accounting.169 However developments at 
the provincial level as early as November 1977 posed a challenge to Hua’s 
line. In particular, Wan Li led a determined campaign to guarantee the 
autonomy of the production team, in stark contrast to the line being promoted at 
the centre. Through 1978, production team autonomy became a key issue 
around which opposition to Hua Guofeng consolidated. Wan Li was at the 
forefront of this campaign and published a series of articles on this subject in 
the provincial and national media.
Unlike higher education, Hua Guofeng appears to have retained 
considerable influence over agricultural policy right up to the pivotal third 
plenum, with key elements of Hua’s programme being incorporated into the
167 Ibid, pg.169.
188 Ibid, pg.170.
169 “Guanyu guodu dao dadui hesuan wenti de jiankuang", (A brief comparison on the 
question of the transition to brigade accounting), in Nonglinbu (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry), Fuji Dazhai xian dongtai (Developments in popularizing Dazhai-type counties), Issue 
2, reprinted in Huang Daoxia(ed.), An Anthology of Historical Material on Collectivization, 
pp.873-874. This report outlined the intention of some counties in Jilin, Beijing, Shanxi and 
other provinces to have as many as 67 percent of brigades as the basic accounting unit by the 
end of the first half of the year.
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documents approved at the plenum. In March, Hua repeated his call for a new 
leap in agriculture at the first session of the 5th NPC. The new constitution 
adopted by the Congress also repeated the call for the transition to brigade 
accounting, although “only when conditions were ripe”. Later in the year a 
number of articles appeared promoting the experiences of Wuxi and Suzhou 
in successfully managing work in running commune- and brigade-level 
enterprises and carrying out rural capital construction work, two core elements 
of Hua Guofeng’s agricultural line. Interestingly, both of these policies were 
coopted by the moderates into the new line that emerged in the wake of the 
third plenum and the development of local enterprises would later become a 
core element of Deng Xiaoping’s rural developmental policy.
i. Wan Li and developments in Anhui Province
As I noted above, Wan Li had been an active participant in Deng Xiaoping’s 
1975 rectification movement. He was transferred to Anhui as First Party 
Secretary in June 1977 and he quickly focused on improving the province’s 
rural economy. Together with two other leading figures in the province, Gu 
Zhuoxin and Zhao Shouyi, Wan Li undertook a number of radical reforms 
which directly challenged key elements of the line in agriculture being 
promoted at the centre at that time. It is unclear how much support he received 
from Deng Xiaoping and other moderates at the centre, but the extent to which 
his ideas were publicized by the central media suggests that he had extensive 
backing in Beijing.
As early as November 1977, Anhui’s Provincial Party Committee approved 
the document “Regulations concerning a number of problems in current rural 
economic policies (trial draft)”, otherwise known as the “Six Articles”. This 
document was reportedly based on inspections carried out personally by the 
three leaders and returned to themes contained in the moderate “Sixty Articles” 
of the post Great Leap Forward period. At a time when Hua Guofeng and other
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central leaders were calling for renewed efforts and a new “leap” in agriculture, 
this document put forward a strong defence of individual peasants1 rights and 
the autonomy of the production team. The call for the development of sideline 
industries and rural markets was also a radical departure from central policy at 
that time. The main themes contained in the “regulations” were:
(1) Carry out rural economic management well and permit 
production teams to set up different production responsibility systems 
in accordance with farm work... (2) Respect the autonomy of 
production teams; (3) reduce the burdens on teams and commune 
members; (4) carry out the policy of to each according to their work;
(5) the distribution of grain should take account of the interests of the 
state, the collective and the individual; (6) permit and encourage 
commune members to run private plots and household sideline 
occupations and lift the ban on [kaifang] rural markets and 
commerce.170
Wan Li repeated the message to respect the rights of production teams at a 
provincial meeting on rural work, held in November 1977. Attacking another of 
the core elements of Hua Guofeng’s line, Wan Li warned:
How do we get agricultural policies right, how do we carry out 
management well? The most important thing is to maintain [the policy 
of] matching policies to local conditions and matching policies to the 
season [yin di zhiyi, yin shi zhi yi], seeking truth from facts and 
following the mass line. Paying attention to mechanization is 
completely right. However the most important productive 
force is man and the socialist enthusiam of the broad 
masses. Without the enthusiasm of the people, we’re not in 
a position to talk about anything, even if we achieve 
mechanization, it will be hard to fully utilize its effect (my 
emphasis).171
Crucially, Wan Li was developing the argument that more pragmatic steps 
needed to be taken to develop rural productive forces, and that this should 
include a far higher degree of material reward to raise the “socialist
170 Wan Li wenxuan, (Wan Li’s Selected Works), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.1995), fn.18, 
pg.645.
171Ibid, pp.101-102.
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enthusiasm” of the masses.
A further article by Wan Li appeared in the March issue of Hong Qi, on the 
eve of the first session of the 5th National People’s Congress. Perhaps 
because he was writing in the Party’s leading theoretical journal, Wan Li does 
pay lip service to the notion of moving to accounting at the brigade-level. 
However he warns that this should only be undertaken when the ‘‘conditions 
are ripe" (tiaojian chengshu), a phrase that was to be repeated in the new 
State Constitution. Wan Li also repeats Hua Guofeng’s line that to accelerate 
the pace of agriculture local leaders should study Dazhai and undertake rural 
capital construction projects. Once again, however, he qualifies this support by 
repeating his argument of February that "the most basic factor [in accelerating 
the development of agriculture] is relying on people’s enthusiasm”.172
Wan Li discussed Anhui’s experiences in implementing the "Six Articles”, 
and in particular work to boost peasant incomes and reduce the burdens on 
individual peasants and the production teams. For Wan Li this was the best 
way to boost agricultural production, and these would become two of the main 
themes used to discredit Hua Guofeng’s agricultural line. Signficantly Wan Li 
also discusses Anhui’s experiences in contracting out certain agricultural work 
to work teams (zuoyezu) as reportedly outlined in the “Six Articles”. These 
contracts were a development of the “three fixes” (san ding) which had fixed 
quotas for production, purchase and marketing of grain. The Hong qi article 
discusses what might be called the “four fixes”, fixed quotas for tasks, quality, 
time and work points (ding renwu, ding zhiliang, ding shijian, ding gongfen ).173 
Wan Li specifically prohibits the idea of household contracting (bao chan dao 
hu), opposition on this issue remained strong enough that this policy was not 
adopted by the third plenum. However, the ideas on contracting he outlined 
very much presaged developments at the December meeting and would be
172 Wan Li, “Renzhen luoshi dang de nongcun jingji zhengce", (Conscientiously implement 
the Party’s rural economic policies), in Hong qi, Issue 3, 1978, pg. 92.
173 ibid, pg. 95.
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incorporated into documents on agriculture adopted by the plenum.
Clearly Wan Li’s views and the experiences of Anhui played a key role in 
mobilizing oppostion to Hua Guofeng’s agricultural policies. It seems certain 
that they were more significant in discrediting Hua’s line in the run up to the 
third plenum than developments in Sichuan, which have been portrayed as 
playing the decisive role by a number of authors. As Jurgen Domes notes, “For 
most of 1978, the new debate centred on the question of the ‘sovereignty of the 
production team’, which soon became the shibboleth for those who opposed 
the rural policies of Hua”.174 Although Domes does not identify this policy with 
any one leader, Wan Li’s speeches had developed this idea extensively in the 
first half of 1978. Although Hua Guofeng continued to defend his policy line, 
developments in Anhui acted as a touchstone for moderates which would lead 
to the introduction of radical reforms at the third plenum.
d. Intensifying conflict over agricultural policy
At the first session of the 5th National People’s Congress, which opened in 
Beijing on February 24, a compromise position on agriculture between Hua 
Guofeng’s line and that of Wan Li, Deng Xiaoping and other moderates was 
adopted. In his political work report to the Congress Hua called for 4-5 percent 
annual growth in overall agricultural production in the years 1978-1985, a 
much higher target, and for 85 percent of major agricultural work to be 
mechanized by the end of the plan period. He repeated his call for one-third of 
counties in China to be Dazhai-type counties by 1980 and called for rural areas 
to continue to study the example of the Shanxi brigade.175 At the same time Hua 
recognized the rights of individual peasants to run private plots, although he 
added that these should be “few in number” (shao Hang), he supported
174 Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pg. 101.
176 Hua Guofeng, “Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qiangguo er fendou”, 
(Unite and struggle to build a modern, strong, socialist country), in Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian, (Documents of the first 
session of the 5th National People’s Congress of China), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), 
pp.24-25.
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“appropriate” rural markets and opposed egalitarianism and the arbitrary 
transfer of resources (yi ping er diao) from production teams.176
The new Constitution, adopted by the Congress on 5 March also reflected 
both Hua’s line and the views of the moderates. Article 7 recognized 
ownership by the production team, a key element of the moderates’ line, but 
also called for the transfer to brigade accounting “when its conidtions are ripe” 
(repeating Wan Li’s phrase). On private plots Article 7 stated:
Provided the absolute predominance of the collective economy of 
the people’s commune is ensured, commune members may farm 
small plots of land for personal needs, engage in limited household 
side-line production, and in pastoral areas they may also keep a 
limited number of livestock for personal needs.
Articles in the media in the months following the NPC meeting suggest an 
on-going conflict over agricultural policy, with articles supporting key elements 
of both the moderates and Hua Guofeng’s agricultural lines. Not all of Hua 
Guofeng’s line came in for uniform criticism from the moderates. Key elements 
of his agricultural policy appear to have been supported by moderate figures, 
including the importance of developing rural enterprises to support agriculture 
and rural capital construction. Both of these policies received strong support 
from Zhao Ziyang in a November speech.
On 21 April, the Renmin ribao published a strong defence of sideline 
industires and individual peasants’ rights to engage in “ legitimate" sideline 
production, based on Article 7 of the new Constitution.177 Interestingly, the 
article also used the “60 Articles” as a justification for this line regarding 
household sideline industries, quoting the 1962 document that “[We] should 
permit and encourage commune members to utilize their spare time and
176 Ibid, pg. 31.
177 “Zenme kandai zhengdang de jiating fuye?", (How should we view appropriate household 
sideline industries?), in Renmin r ib a o ^  April, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, April, 1978, 
pg.124.
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holidays to develop household sideline industries”.170 A number of other 
articles promoting the moderate line would return to the “60 Articles” for 
inspiration and as a justification for their policy line.
In June the Central Committee approved a report from Xiangxiang county in 
Hunan Province on reducing the burdens on peasants. Although Hunan was 
widely seen as being Hua Guofeng’s old bailiwick, this report was an implicit 
criticism of radical mobilizational tactics, which Hua had adopted, which placed 
inappropriate burdens on peasants across China. Articles in the Renmin ribao 
popularized the report’s message, and tied this to boosting peasant’s 
enthusiasm for agriculture, and reducing the burdens on peasants became an 
important element for mobilizing support for the moderate line in agriculture.
The Central Committee formally approved the Xiangxiang report on 23 
June.170 Shortly after this a key editorial and an article appeared in the Renmin 
ribao, introducing the Xiangxiang report and calling for the burdens on 
peasants to be reduced. The editorial “ Implement the Party’s policies, reduce 
the burdens on peasants” stated:
If we want to implement the various policies of the Party in the 
countryside, then reducing the irrational burdens on the peasants, 
truly carrying out [the policies of] increasing income when we increase 
the harvest and more pay for more work and being able to honour 
allocations are part of the decisive elements [shi you jueding yiyi de 
yi huan].m
In an effort to reduce the burdens on peasants the editorial repeated calls for 
farm labourers who left rural areas for the city to return to their homes, it also 
called for cadres to continue to take part in agricultural labour and for the
178 Ibid, pg.123.
179 See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhuangfa Hunansheng Xiangxiang wei baogao de 
pishi', (Central Committee instructions on transmitting the report of the Xiangxiang County 
Committee, Hunan Province), in An Anthology of Historical Material on Agricultural 
Collectivization, pp.874-875.
180 "Luoshi dang de zhengce jianqing nongmin fudan", (Implement the Party’s policies, 
reduce peasant burdens), in Renmin ribao , 5 July, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua Yuebao, July 1978, 
pp.96-97.
249
numbers of non-production labourers to be reduced.181
An article discussing the Xiangxiang report appeared alongside the editorial. 
This listed eight different “irrational burdens” that had been placed on 
peasants. These included: (1) Inappropriate transfer of the labour, 
capital and material resources of the production team; (2) 
extravagance, the flouting of rules and corruption; (3) too many people not 
engaged in production; (4) the costs of construction projects such as roads and 
educational facilities being transferred to the peasants; (5) too many 
peasants being transferred from production teams to work in 
commune enterprises without appropriate reward; and (6) excessive 
rural capital construction pro]ects which went on too long102 (my 
emphasis).
Clearly a number of these points challenged key elements of Hua Guofeng's 
agricultural policies, including large-scale rural capital construction and the 
mobilization of labour from the production team. Speaking in October, Hu 
Qiaomu, a close supporter of Deng Xiaoping called for the “sovereignty of the 
production team" to not only be protected, but “even broadened”.183 Another 
close supporter of Deng, the economist Xue Muqiao, tied this issue to the 
failure to increase agricultural production significantly, despite "a great deal of 
basic farm construction”.184
The Renmin ribao also carried a number of other reports which promoted 
key elements of Hua Guofeng’s agricultral line. In particular, the experiences of 
Wuxi in running commune and brigade enterprises and Suzhou in conducting 
rural capital construction were promoted. Both of these ideas were
101 Ibid, pg.97.
182 “Zhonggong Xiangxiang xianwei caiqu youxiao cuoshi luoshi zhengce, jiejue nongmin 
fudan guozhong wenti", (The Xiangxian County Committee has adopted effective measures to 
implement the Party's policies and solve the problem of excessive demands on the peasants), in 
Renmin ribao, 5 July, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, July, 1978; pp.99-100.
103 Quoted in Renmin ribao, 6 October, 1978, reprinted in Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the 
Chinese Countryside, pg. 101.
184 Quoted in Renmin ribao, 18 October, 1978, translated in ibid, pg.101.
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incorporated into the third plenum’s documents on agriculture, and although 
large-scale construction projects had been criticized for placing excess 
demands on peasants, both these ideas appeared to have had the support of 
moderate figures. Parts of Hua’s line were clearly incorporated, albeit in a 
modified form, into the moderates’ programme, and the way in which these 
programmes were altered to suit the moderates’ own line is apparent in these 
articles.
On the 4 April, the Renmin ribao carried a report on the successful running 
of commune- and brigade-level industrial enterprises in Wuxi county, Jiangsu.
In line with Hua Guofeng’s agricultural policies, these enterprises were praised 
for providing investment for agriculture, promoting mechanization and 
encouraging rural capital construction. In all these enterprises were said to 
have invested over 96 million yuan in agriculture over the last 10 years and 
increased the number of tractors in the county from 130 in 1970 to over 4,300 in 
1977.105 Furthermore, in contrast to statements on protecting the sovereignty of 
production teams, the article praised the way the development of these 
enterprises had led to changes in the three-level ownership structure of 
communes in the county, with the proportion of the overall commune economy 
generated at the commune- and brigade-level rising from only 22 percent in 
1970 to 64 percent in 1977.186
Elsewhere, on 23 July, the Renmin ribao carried an editorial and an article 
discussing Suzhou’s experiences in conducting rural capital construction. 
These two articles clearly show the impact of the moderates’ criticism of this 
policy in that they contain warnings against making excessive demands on the 
peasants and avoiding the irrational transfer of resources away from the 
production team.
As the figures for nearby Nanjing quoted above show, rural capital
105 “Nongye gaosudu fazhan de tujing”, (The path of high-speed development in 
agriculture), in Renmin ribao, 4 April, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua Yuebao, April 1978, pg. 121.
186 ibid, pg.122.
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construction reached a peak in 1977-78. State investment in basic-field 
construction and other projects was raised significantly in 1978.187 The editorial 
continued to underline the importance of work in this field, repeating the line 
that it was beneficial to maintaining a high pace of development in agriculture 
and was an important factor in guarding against natural disasters.188 However 
the editorial warned against placing excessive demands on individual 
peasants and production teams, and called for State aid where necessary:
If we practice “excessive egalitarianism and inappropriate transfer 
of resources” and increase inappropriate burdens on the peasants, 
then the peasants will not be able to sustain their enthusiasm. We 
must remember the lessons of history and protect the enthusiasm of 
the masses one hundredfold. We cannot commit the mistake of 
“excessive egalitarianism and inappropriate transfer of resources” .
Those production teams that won’t receive any benefits, but send 
labour to participate in basic field construction cannot be alllowed to 
subsidise costs and grain [tie qian pu liang]. They must be given 
appropriate compensation. With regards to important basic field 
construction projects, the state and locality must give aid.189
The moderate line developed through 1978 to incorporate a number of 
elements. Firstly, it emphasized the “sovereignty” of production teams, the 
lowest of the three levels of commune ownership, and warned against 
excessive and inappropriate transfer of resources away from the production 
team to facilitate capital construction projects or the development of commune 
and brigade enterprises. Moderate leaders warned against premature 
transition to higher levels of ownership, a key element of Hua Guofeng’s 
agricultural line, unless “conditions were ripe". With no clear definition of what 
conditions were necessary, this allowed for a degree of prevarication. 
Ownership and accounting at the production team level were defended as 
being in accordance with the current stage of development of rural productive
187 David Zweig suggests investment in the Nanjing region trebled in 1978 when compared 
to the figure for 1977. Agrarian Radicalism in China, pg.70.
106 "Cong Suzhou kan nanfang", (Seethe south from Suzhou), in Renmin ribao, 23 July, 
1978, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, July, 1978, pp.94-96.
189 Ibid, pp.95-96.
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forces and ideological awareness of commune members.
Secondly, moderates emphasized the use of material rewards to boost 
peasant enthusiasm and increase productivity. Both Hua Guofeng and the 
moderates had downplayed the importance of political and ideological 
stimulus. Instead Hua Guofeng suggested that mobilizing the rural population 
to take part in rural capital construction projects, and the achievement of basic 
mechanization would raise the enthusiasm of individual peasants and boost 
productive forces. This theory was discredited in a series of articles by Wan Li 
and other moderates who saw the enthusiasm of individual peasants as the 
most important factor, and took a pragmatic line that a wide variety of material 
stimuli should be employed to reward increased productivity on the part of 
China’s rural workforce.
Thirdly, the moderates placed far greater importance on respecting local 
conditions. This was used to downplay the significance of Dazhai as a national 
model. In November an article criticized some areas actions during the 
campaign to “study Dazhai” for being too rigid in their application of Dazhai’s 
experiences. The idea of acting in accordance with local conditions” (yin di 
zhi y i) was also extended to rural capital construction work and developing 
local industrial enterprises. With this proviso, these latter two points were 
adopted by the moderates as part of their agricultural line.
Finally on mechanization, the moderates continued to advocate the basic 
mechanization of agriculture by 1980. However, targets were lowered at the 
third plenum. Mechanization was still seen as an important way to increase 
productivity in agriculture, however the role assigned to it by Hua Guofeng in 
raising peasants’ enthusiasm for higher levels of collective ownership was 
downplayed
e. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee
In the run up to the historic third plenum criticism of some elements of Hua
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Guofeng’s agricultural line intensified. As mentioned above, an article 
appeared in the Renmin ribao in November criticizing the way the “study 
Dazhai” campaign had been implemented. Articles called for more account to 
be taken of local conditions. Other articles, reflecting the moderates’ emphasis 
on material rewards called for the “taboo” on making money to be lifted. At the 
same time leading moderate figure Zhao Ziyang spoke in support of Suzhou’s 
experiences in carrying out basic field construction and running commune and 
brigade enterprises. All of these themes would be incorporated into the 
documents of the third plenum.
On 26 November, while the Central Work Conference which preceded the 
third plenum was still meeting, the Renmin ribao published an article based on 
an interview with Shanxi Province’s First Deputy Party Secretary, Li Hanxiao, in 
which he outlined a number of problems in the campaign to popularize the 
experiences of Dazhai brigade. Li discussed five problems: Firstly, there had 
been too much blind copying of Dazhai’s policies, without any thought of local 
conditions, particularly the blind copying of Dazhai’s system of allocating work 
points; secondly, criticism of "capitaist tendencies” had gone too far and 
legitimate sideline industries had been criticized; thirdly, political and 
ideological issues had been overemphasized, at the expense of material 
stimuli; fourthly, in implementing the policy “from each to the best of their ability, 
to each according to their work", local areas had demanded more from 
peasants without truly rewarding extra work; and finally, the balance between 
the collective economy and “small freedoms” had been upset, and private plots, 
sideline industries and rural markets had been unduely criticized.190
This was a strong critique of a key element of Hua Guofeng’s agricultural 
policy, and a direct attack on a number of his supporters, including Chen 
Yonggui who were closely associated with Dazhai. Other articles printed in the
190 "Dacian jiefang sixiang, jiasu fazhan nongye”, (Boldly liberate thinking, accelerate the 
development of agriculture), in Renmin ribao, 26 November, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, 
November 1978, pp.117-118.
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Renmin Ribao at the same time also called for more attention to be paid to 
local conditions, quoting Li Xiannian’s speech at the July 1977 National 
Conference on Basic Field Construction: “Our policies are: Take grain as the 
key, develop all-round, suit measures to local conditions, with an 
appropriate [degree of] centralization".191
It is clear that by the eve of the third plenum, the ground had been prepared 
for the increased use of material rewards. An article in the Renmin ribao 6 
December related the experiences of Yibing County in Sichuan in raising 
production. Their success was attributed to lifting the “taboo” on the word 
money, (bu yao jiwei yi ge “qian” z/').192 Presaging developments at the 
plenum, the article warned that ideological work must not be conducted without 
consideration of material issues:
... People’s thinking is closely linked with material conditions. We 
must constantly imbue the peasants with socialist ideas and educate 
the peasants “to love the commune as if it were your family”, and plant 
the fields for the revolution. However, education in political ideology 
must be conducted alongside economic work and concern for the 
material benefits of the commune members, only then will it achieve 
obvious results.193
Although, under the leadership of Zhao Ziyang, Sichuan had been at the 
forefront of developing the moderate programme in agriculture, not all the 
elements of Hua Guofeng’s agricultural line were rejected out of hand by the 
provincial leadership. In particular the experiences of Suzhou and Wuxi in 
carrying out rural capital construction and managing commune and brigade 
enterprises were recognized as significant.
191 Gao Shangquan, “Anzhao keguan guilu fazhan nongye”, (Develop agriculture in 
accordance with objective laws), in Renmin ribao, 16 November, 1978, reprinted in Xinhua 
yuebao, November, 1978, pg.117.
192 Huang Yanjun and Yu Quanling, "Sichuansheng Yibingxian xiashitang dadui jianshe 
shehui zhuyi xin nongcun de diaocha", (An investigation into the construction of a socialist new 
countryside in Xiashitang brigade, Yibing County, Sichuan Province), in Renmin Ribao, 6 
December, 1978, reprinted in Huang Daoxia , An Anthology of historical Material on Agricultural
Collectivization, pg.882.
103 Ibid, pg 883.
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Speaking on 1 October at a meeting of Sichuan’s county party secretaries, 
Zhao Ziyang spoke at some length, and in glowing terms, of emulating Suzhou 
and Wuxi’s experiences. In a section of his speech that could have been taken 
straight from Hua’s work report at the Fifth NPC, Zhao stated:
Two experiences of Suzhou Prefecture in Jiangsu Province stand 
out and merit our earnest emulation. One is the all-out effort in 
farmland capital construction to build fields that yield a ton of grain per 
mu. Another is the extensive operation of commune- and brigade-run 
enterprises to follow the path of comprehensive development of 
agricultural, sideline, and industrial production. These two are 
interrelated and each can help the other move forward. Only by going 
in for commune- and brigade-run industrial operations in a big way 
can we accumulate enough funds and material for the construction of 
fields that yield a ton of grain per mu\ and with the construction of this 
kind of field grain yield and output of diversified economy can be 
raised by a big margin; then more work force, raw materials, and feed 
will be released for the development of commune- and brigade-run 
industrial operations. This is what we describe as “running industries 
around agriculture and promoting agriculture by means of industrial 
growth”.184
In modified form, Flua’s policy of using industry to stimulate agricultural growth 
would be incorporated into the third plenum’s conclusions.
The third plenum opened on 18 December, however the decisions on 
reforms to agricultural policy had all been taken at the preceding Central Work 
Conference which met for over a month from 10 November to the 15 December. 
It is clear that although Hua Guofeng’s political position had been severely 
weakened by developments in the run up to the plenum, he still intended to 
play a leading role in the work conference’s proceedings. On agriculture, Shi 
Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai suggest that it was Hua who as early as 13 
November, demanded that the work conference focus on agriculture, and that it 
was one of Hua’s leading supporters, Vice-Premier Ji Dengkui, who introduced
194 Zhao Ziyang, “Speed up the development of agriculture in an effort to wrest a still greater 
harvest next year [Excerpts]”, in Chinese Law and Government, Spring 1982, (Vol.XV, No.1), 
pg.85.
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the two key documents on agriculture that the plenum would later adopt.195 
Whatever Hua’s intention, there was apparently widespread criticism of the 
draft documents which intensified as the work meeting progressed. The 
political momentum at the work conference was clearly with Deng Xiaoping 
and the moderates and the final documents on agriculture adopted by the third 
plenum largely reflect their viewpoints.
The final communique of the third plenum, issued on 22 December 
announced the historic shift in the Party’s work from focusing on class struggle 
to carrying out socialist modernization. On agriculture the communique stated 
that the “People’s Communes should continue to implement the system of three 
levels of ownership, with the team as the base", and in a break from the line 
adopted at the Fifth NPC, that this would be a “stable, unchanging” policy 
(wending bubian). The communique also guranteed commune members the 
right to run private plots and sideline industries and added that these and rural 
markets were “an essential supplement to the socialist economy”.196 In order to 
raise the peasants enthusiasm for agriculture, the communique called for their 
material interests to be taken care of and for their democratic rights to be 
protected.197
More concrete policies were set out in the two documents adopted by the 
plenum: “Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development 
(Draft)” and the “Regulations on the Work in the Rural People’s Communes 
(Draft for Trial Use)”.198 These documents were issued jointly by the Central
195 Shi Zhongquan and Chen Dengcai (eds), Deng Xiaoping zai 1978, (Deng Xiaoping in 
1978), (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), pg.240.
196“Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi 
gongbao”, (Communique of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP), in 
Shiyi jie san zhong quanhuiyilai zhongyao wenxian xuandu Shang ce, {A Selection of Important 
Documents since the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, Volume One), (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1987), pg.8.
197 Ibid, pg.7.
190 Translations of these two documents appeared in the July, August and September, 1979 
issues of Issues and Studies.
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Committee on 14 January as Centra! Document (1979) No.4.
There were a number of key policies set out in these documents which 
formed the backbone of agricultural policy over the following years. On 
ownership, the system of three levels of ownership, with the production team as 
the base was reaffirmed. The “Decision” also warned against transferring 
accounting to higher levels “without fulfilling all requirements”. Any unit 
wishing to establish brigade accounting had to submit a proposal to the 
provincial leadership.190 The rights of the production team were guaranteed 
and the arbitrary transfer of resources forbidden.
More specific measures to boost agricultural production included the 
introduction of contracting out of agricultural tasks to “work groups”. Over­
fulfilment was to be rewarded, however contracting with individuals or 
households was specifically prohibited.200 Furthermore, sideline industries 
were to be “encouraged” so as to increase peasant’s “personal income and 
invigorate the rural economy”.
To stimulate production, the “Decision” announced that the requisition price 
for grain would be raised by 20 percent, and the price for above-quota 
requisitions was to be raised by 50 percent. At the same time the prices of key 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, machinery, and other manufactured goods 
was reduced by 10 to 15 percent. In addition to paying more for its purchases 
of grain, the “Decision” said that State investment in agriculture would rise over 
the next three to five years to “18 percent of total investment in capital 
construction” and that “expenditure on agricultural projects and aids to the 
communes, brigades, and teams, will also be raised to 8 percent out of the 
state’s total expenditure.201
in addition to the emphasis on using material incentives, the "Decision” also
199 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Questions 
Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)", in Issues and Studies, July 
1979, pp. 111-112.
200 Ibid, pg.111.
201 Ibid, pg.112.
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reaffirmed the importance of continuing rural capital construction and 
agricultural mechanization, although the target of 85 percent mechanization by 
1985, set at the 5th NPC, was reduced to 80 percent. Finally, the role of 
commune and brigade enterprises was underlined. The “Decision” called for 
the value of the enterprises’ output with regards to the total revenue of the 
commune to rise from the current 28 percent to more than 50 per cent by 
1985.202
The impact of these reforms on agricultural production has been well 
documented. From a figure of 609.5 billion jin (one jin  is equal to half a 
kilogram) of grain crops produced in 1978, production rose sharply to 641.1 
billion jin  in 1980, 709.0 billion jin  in 1982 and 814.6 billion jin  in 1984.
Cotton production saw similar growth, from 4.3 billion jin in 1978 to 12.5 billion 
jin  in 1984. Average per capita consumption of grain (in j in )  rose from 319 in 
1978 to 531.3 in 1984 and pork consumption rose from 15 to 21.1 jin over the 
same period. The social impact on rural areas was also significant, although 
the major change, the abolition of the communes, is outside the scope of this 
thesis, occuring in 1981.
7. Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, the economic and social importance of 
agriculture meant that senior figures within the Party initially attempted to shield 
rural areas from the full impact of the Cultural Revolution. These non-political 
factors acted as a significant block to the full implementation of a radical 
agricultural line, as production imperatives over-rode political idealism. The 
material examined in this chapter has shown how radical agricultural policies 
were often set aside in the spring and autumn when agricultural work reached 
a peak and has highlighted how the radical Left’s agricultural policy followed a 
noticeably different pattern to that outlined in the chapter on higher education.
202 Ibid, pg.116.
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Perhaps the most important part of this chapter has been to examine the 
extent of the influence of Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng over agricultural policy. 
Although the material does not reveal the degree to which Lin Biao participated 
in the debate over agricultural policy, it is clear that preparations for a possible 
war with the Soviet Union, with which Lin was closely involved, did lead to a 
radical upsurge in the countryside. The material presented here suggests that 
Lin was not directly involved with agriculture, but rather that the radical upsurge 
was an indirect result of the military and industrial policies being pursued at 
that time.
It seems that Lin Biao did not have strong ties with either the government 
bureaucracy or leading Party figures closely involved with agricultural policy. 
The one exception was Chen Boda, who had been closely involved with 
agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, however his influence over 
agricultural policy had declined by the late 1960s and early 1970s. A number 
of authors have argued that the military’s presence in rural areas following the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution allowed Lin Biao to implement 
a radical line. However I believe that not all of these soldiers should be seen 
as being under the control of Lin Biao, and that many of these local forces and 
their leaders were more interested in stability than the continued 
implementation of radical policies, (the example of Xu Shiyou’s intervention is 
instructive). Together, this suggests that Lin Biao had little direct influence over 
agricultural policy and that instead, his influence came as an indirect result of 
the military policies that he was implementing at this time.
In contrast this chapter has shown that Hua Guofeng had a much greater 
influence over agricultural policy than has previously been thought, and that his 
involvement with this issue at the centre began as early as 1971. This chapter 
has shown how Hua Guofeng used his influence over agricultural 
mechanization and agricultural policy in general to build a coalition of support 
based primarily on ties with the model Dazhai brigade and the support of Mao
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Zedong. From late-1975, before Zhou Enlai’s death, it was Hua Guofeng’s 
coalition who had the most influence over agricultural policy and Hua used this 
issue after Mao’s death to mobilize wider support for his leadership.
In contrast to Lin Biao and Hua Guofeng, members of the Gang of Four 
appear to have had little influence over agricultural policy, indeed it appears 
that in Zhang Chunqiao’s case he had little interest in agricultural policy per se, 
only showing real interest in issues of political leadership in China’s rural 
areas. The Gang of Four had few ties to leaders in rural areas, or to those 
involved with agricultural policy at the centre. Attempts to win over Chen 
Yonggui failed, and model communes developed at their initiative received 
only sporadic coverage in the media. This weakness appears to be the main 
reason for their lack of influence over agricultural policy, although they 
continued to launch strident attacks on the policies of both the moderates and 
Hua Guofeng.
As I have shown in this chapter, agricultural policy fluctuated significantly 
during the period under study. Political factors such as the ideological climate, 
political campaigns and power struggles at the centre were clearly influential in 
leading developments in agricultural policy and lending weight to a given 
coalition’s position, so the purge of Lin Biao temporarily strengthened the 
position of the moderate coalition. However, as noted above, this chapter has 
also shown how economic factors, as seen from both the centre and at local 
levels were significant. One interesting development was the spontaneous 
introduction of reforms at the local level, before the introduction of central policy 
directives, the best example being the introduction of production responsibility 
systems in Anhui before the third plenum of December 1978 which formally 
approved this policy. These developments were generally in response to local 
difficulties and were seen as a means of boosting production in difficult times. 
Moderates at the centre both used, and encouraged, the development of these 
experiments in order to strengthen their own policy position which placed more
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emphasis on economic elements in policy-making. Their success was an 
important factor in the moderates’ ability to overcome the opposition of Hua 
Guofeng in a field where he demonstrated greater influence than has generally 
been recognized.
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Chapter Five: Foreign Policy
1. Introduction
The period of 1969-1978 saw two major shifts in China’s foreign policy, 
namely the move to establishing better relations with the United States of 
America and the general opening to the outside world {dui wai kai fang), 
symbolized by mainland China’s entry into the United Nations, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with a broad range of countries and the 
beginning of large-scale trading, firstly under Hua Guofeng, and then more 
significantly under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. And yet both of these 
developments came against a domestic backdrop characterized by increased 
ideological rhetoric, which targetted both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, US military involvement in southeast and northeast Asia and an 
economic policy that emphasized notions of self-sufficency and local initiative.
As many authors have noted, China’s international relations suffered 
considerable damage during the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution.1 The actions of junior diplomats and students studying overseas, 
who sought to proselytise in the name of Mao, together with the withdrawal of 
most of China’s ambassadors, meant that by 1969 the PRC was only on 
friendly terms with a handful of nations. At home Red guard units even 
succeeded in taking over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for a short period 
and issuing instructions to embassies overseas. Red Guard actions in Macao 
and the burning of part of the British Embasy in Beijing only reinforced the 
image of a radical upsurge in China’s foreign policy.
Despite the seriousness of these events, it is clear that actions such as the 
burning of the British Embassy marked the peak of radical activ ity jn  foreiqn 
affairs. China’s international position and wider security concerns relating to
1 See, for example, Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution", in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971), pp.313-366.
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deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations led China’s senior leadership to intervene 
to control disorder in the foreign affairs system. Under the personal guidance 
of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, senior military and MFA officials met to 
discuss China’s strategic position, discussions which led directly to the re-start 
of talks with the US. Although the on-going war in Vietnam, and US incursions 
into both Cambodia and Laos complicated negotiations, the general trend 
throughout this period was one of ameleorating Sino-US relations, culminating 
in the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979.
Elsewhere, China’s accession to the UN in 1971 symbolized the end of the 
period of isolation engendered by the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. China established diplomatic relations with a series of countries 
around the world during this period, including Japan, Italy, West Germany, and 
a number of African and Latin American countries. Although China’s isolation 
during the early part of the Cultural Revolution is sometimes over-stated, under 
Hua Guofeng’s leadership the PRC began trading internationally on a much 
larger scale than had been seen previously.
a. The significance of a study of China’s foreign policy
A study of China’s foreign policy during the period 1969-1978 is significant 
for a number of reasons: Firstly, developments in this field followed a different 
pattern to those in either higher education or agriculture discussed in the 
preceding chapters; secondly, decision-making in the foreign policy arena was 
dominated by a small number of senior leaders, most notably Mao Zedong and 
Zhou Enlai and although there were clearly a number of important differences 
of opinion within the Chinese leadership over foreign policy decisions, it was 
not riven by the factionalism that characterized the two issue areas discussed 
in the previous chapters; thirdly, a study of China’s foreign policy highlights the 
role of military figures in foreign policy decision-making in China.
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Developments in foreign policy followed a different pattern to those in both 
agriculture and higher education. In contrast to agriculture, the most radical 
phase for China’s foreign policy was during the mobilizational phase of the 
Cultural Revolution, from 1967-1968. From 1969 onwards, the trend was 
towards moderating the position of this earlier period. Although higher 
education suffered in a similar manner during the mobilizational phase, there 
was little success in moderating policies for a number of years. Higher 
education was also marked by dramatic policy reversal, for instance the re- 
radicalization in 1974-1975, which was not the case with foreign policy.
The main reason for the differences in the way in which foreign policy 
developed during this period is the domination of the policy debate by a small 
group of senior leades. While they were alive, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai 
were the main authorities on foreign policy. Later Deng Xiaoping was also able 
to lead foreign policy, although never to the extent of Mao. Surrounding Mao, 
Zhou and Deng were a small group of leading Party, military and government 
officials who were involved in the decision-making process. These included 
Lin Biao, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, China’s Foreign Minister during the 
early part of the Cultural Revolution, and a number of other MFA officials, 
including Qiao Guanhua, Huang Hua and Ji Pengfei.
This core group of officials appears to have held the authority to take all 
major foreign policy decisions and was isolated from much of the factionalism 
that characterized developments in other areas, and that had been present in 
foreign affairs during the mobilization period. As I will show below, the 
personal authority of Mao and Zhou and the overriding importance of security 
concerns appear to have acted to prevent major factionalization in this field.
This is not to say that there weren’t divisions within the leadership over key 
issues: There is evidence to suggest that Lin Biao opposed Sino-US
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rapprochement2 and Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four attacked Deng Xiaoping 
for undermining China’s policy of self-sufficiency. However, the debate over 
these issues was, on the whole, restricted to the senior ledaership; little of the 
on-going negotiations with the US prior to Kissinger’s 1971 visit is reflected in 
the national media for instance. This served to isolate most developments in 
foreign policy from the domestic situation.
Finally, a study of foreign policy during this period highlights the role of a 
number of military figures in this field, both as a radical force and a force for 
moderation. While Lin Biao reportedly opposed Sino-US rapprochement, it 
was on the initiative of four other PLA marshals that Mao and Zhou Enlai 
moved to improve relations between the two countries. The PLA certainly had 
a bureaucratic interest in China’s foreign policy as the main guarantor of the 
PRC’s security, however this interest was advocated by individual PLA 
members who held senior positions within the Party and government strucutre. 
Since they held a variety of views there was no single “PLA postion’’ on any 
issue. But senior PLA commanders played a leading role in the making of 
foreign policy, in contrast to the situation in either agriculture or higher 
education where PLA influence tended to be indirect, filtered through 
implementation.
b. Policy issues in the debate over foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution
This chapter will focus on four interlocking issues: Firstly, China’s 
relationship to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This period saw the transition from China’s position of opposition to both of the 
superpowers to the evolution of the strategic triangle between China, the US 
and the Soviet Union with China “leaning” towards the US as a counter­
balance to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Secondly, I will examine
2 This is the line adopted by John Garver in China's Decision for Rapprochement with the 
United States, 1968-71, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) and Japp van Ginneken’s The Rise 
and Fall of Lin Piao, (New York: Penguin Books, 1972).
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China's foreign economic and trade policy. Even while Mao Zedong was 
alive, foreign trade grew considerably. In 1975 Deng Xiaoping attempted to 
open further to the outside world, but his efforts were criticized by the radical 
Left. Hua Guofeng adopted many of Deng’s policies and initiated a policy of 
large-scale foreign trade, in particular to purchase technology unavailable in 
China.
Thirdly I will look at China’s position on the Vietnam War and the wider 
conflict in southeast Asia. This issue, together with the question of Taiwan, lay 
at the heart of the Sino-US relationship and later influenced Sino-Soviet 
relations. Finally, I will look at the evolution of what might be called China’s 
world view, as reflected in the statements of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. 
This encompasses Mao’s “Three Worlds” theory and notions of “opening to the 
outside world". These statements set the broad parameters within which 
China’s foreign policy evolved and was applied, and framed China’s relations 
with other nations.
c. Foreign policy in the PRC. 1966-1968
The mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution had a damaging impact 
on China’s foreign policy in two main regards: Firstly, the activities of radical 
junior diplomats and students studying overseas severely damaged China’s 
foreign relations. Attempts to popularize Mao Zedong Thought overseas, 
demonstrations, and the crass behaviour of inexperienced diplomats meant 
that by 1968 China was on friendly terms with only a handful of countries, most 
prominently Pakistan and Albania. All of China’s ambassadors, except Huang 
Hua in Cairo, had been withdrawn, handicapping any efforts to improve the 
situation, whilst some eighteen Chinese diplomats had been declared 
persona non grata between 1966 and 1969, highlighting the sensitivities felt 
by many host countries.3
3 George P. Jan, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China Since the Cultural Revolution”, in 
Asian Survey, Vol XVII, Nos.6 (June 1977), pg.519.
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Secondly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing had been hampered by 
Red Guard attacks and purges of senior staff, limiting its capacity to function 
effectively. (The Ministry did however remain open, in contrast to both the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry). The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during this period, Chen Yi, came under attack from 
Red Guard units for his role in supporting the use of work teams in the Ministry 
to limit the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cutlural Revolution. 
Significantly, Chen received the personal support of Zhou Enlai and the Central 
Committee and remained in place, however he was forced to make several 
self-criticisms and was hampered in carrying out day-to-day work.4 There is no 
evidence that at this stage Chen was attacked on foreign policy issues, rather 
he was criticized for his handling of the impact of the Cultural Revolution within 
the MFA.5
Elsewhere, Jan writes that a total of five, out of eleven, Vice-Ministers were 
purged. The two assistants to the MFA disappeared from public view and six 
Directors and twenty Deputy Directors of the fifteen geographical and functional 
departments within the MFA were purged. The massive loss of experienced 
staff could only undermine the efficiency of the MFA during this period.6
Domestic developments, including the attack on the British Embassy, 
together with the deterioration in China’s foreign relations with key allies such 
as Cambodia and Burma, appear essential in convincing Mao Zedong and 
Zhou Enlai that the radical influence needed to be brought under control within 
the foreign affairs system and led to a definite change of heart on the part of 
Mao to end radical activities overseas and in the MFA. This downturn in radical 
activity coincided with increased controls over the wider Red Guard movement, 
but wider security concerns relating to China’s deteriorating international
4 Melvin Gurtov, “The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution”, in Thomas Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China, pp.323-334.
5 Ibid, pg.320.
0 George P. Jan, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China”, pp.518-519.
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position must also have been significant.
New regulations were introduced on the day of the attack on the British 
Embassy, restricting Red Guard activities in the diplomatic quarters in Beijing, 
and specifically forbidding them from “beating, smashing, burning, invading 
and obstructing”.7 Key members of the radical Left, including Jiang Qing and 
Kang Sheng, also spoke out against Red Guard activities in the field of foreign 
affairs. On 1 September 1967, Kang Sheng distinguished between criticism of 
Chen Yi and the government’s foreign policy line, stating that it was the Central 
Committee, not the MFA, that dictated foreign policy. Kang also forbade any 
further power seizures in foreign affairs and the Foreign Ministry.8 Elsewhere, a 
speech by Jiang Qing was published on 5 September in which she called for 
an end to attacks on foreign embassies.
Through the latter half of 1967 and 1968, Chinese officials worked hard to 
repair much of the damage caused by radical activities during the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. This included statements of 
support for Cambodia, a donation of 10,000 yuan to the Burmese Red Cross to 
help victims of a hurricane and the issuing of exit visas for British diplomatic 
personnel previously refused permission to leave.9
The restoration of order domestically, did mean senior Chinese leaders were 
once again able to resume control over the day-to-day running of foreign 
affairs. Indications such as the appointment of many MFA careerists as new 
ambassadors, and the initiative towards improving Sino-US relations suggest 
that the foreign affairs system was able to recover quickly from the impact of 
developments during the mobilizational phase and was able to continue 
functioning despite many of the most influential figures in this area being 
supposedly side-lined from day-to-day work. I wilflook at these and other
7 Melvin Gurtov, “The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural
Revolution” , pg.352.
0 Ibid, pg.353.
9 Ibid, pg.355-356.
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developments below.
2. A Differentiated Approach to the Two Superpowers Emerges: 1969-1971
While Red Guard attacks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stopped by 
1969, the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution led to a 
concerted effort in the first half of 1969 to restore effective functioning within the 
Ministry. More urgently escalating border clashes with the Soviet Union in 
March and April 1969 forced China’s senior leadership to review its 
international position. These clashes were provoked by the Chinese, but the 
Soviet response in the ensuing period appears to have led to a major change 
in the strategic thinking of China’s leadership. Four of the most senior PLA 
Marshals, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi, held a series of 
meetings to discuss the international situation which led directly to China’s 
renewed overtures to the US.
Throughout this three year period, China’s assessment was that the US was 
a waning power, beset by economic and social crises at home, and embroiled 
ever more deeply in Vietnam and southeast Asia. Mao’s assessment was that 
the more involved America became in Vietnam, the stronger the resistance, 
both in southeast Asia and elsewhere to US aggression. China’s assessment 
of the US as an imperialist power did not change during this period, however 
the perception of America as a weakening superpower, and so a country less 
likely to pose a serious military threat to the PRC, allowed the majority of 
Chinese leaders to make an approach to America to ease Sino-US relations as 
a counter to the growing threat of the Soviet Union. Apparent opposition form 
some leaders, including Lin Biao, and the on-going and escalating conflict in 
Vietnam made negotiations difficult, and it was a full two years after the first 
meeting of the four PLA marshals before Kissinger made his first secret visit to 
China. I will examine these issues below.
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a. Consolidation in the MFA: 1969
Although Chen Yi had survived the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution as nominal head of the MFA, ill-health meant that the day-to-day 
leadership of the Ministry was undertaken first by Vice-Minister Qiao Guanhua 
and then, from April 1970, Vice-Minister Ji Pengfei, who was made acting- 
Minister on 1 April that year.10 Both Qiao and Ji had long careers in foreign 
affairs11 and both should be seen as close allies of Zhou Enlai. The presence of 
Qiao and Ji would certainly have made it easier for Zhou to maintain tight 
personal control over the activities of the Ministry.
In addition to Qiao and Ji, two other Vice-Ministers had come through the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution unscathed. They were Li 
Yuewen, who according to George Jan “represented the People’s Liberation 
Army... in the Foreign Ministry” and Han Nianlong, who had served as the 
Deputy Political Commissar of the Shanghai garrison region.12 Han’s 
background suggests possible ties with the radical Left in Shanghai, but 
without further details it is difficult to assess either of their possible allegiences.
It is perhaps significant that neither Li or Han appear in media reporting to the 
extent of Qiao Guanhua and Ji Pengfei, although Han would remain in his post 
until 1982.
One of the most visible signs of re-organization and consolidation within the 
MFA was the appointment of new ambassadors to serve in China’s embassies. 
This process began in May 1969 and gathered pace with the appointement of 
17 ambassadors in June and July of that year. By the end of 1970 34 new 
ambassadors had been appointed, filling half of the vacant posts. Significantly, 
the majority of the appointees were career diplomats, with 29 of the 34 coming 
from the foreign service or MFA. Six of these simply returned to their former
10 George P. Jan, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China”, pg.519.
11 See, for example, their biographies in Wolfgang Bartke, Biographical Dictionary and 
Analysis of China's Party Leadership 1922-1988, (Munich: K,G. Saur, 1990), pgs. 75 & 170.
12 George P. Jan, op cit, pg.520.
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posts.13 When contrasted to the radical leadership that was then entering 
China’s universities and colleges as part of the MacTZedong Thought 
Propaganda Work Teams, the difference is considerable and suggests that the 
impact of the mobilizational phase in foreign affairs was much more short lived 
than in higher education.
b. Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations: March-October. 1969 
Sino-Soviet relations had continued to worsen throughout the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution. Disputes over the transit of Soviet supplies of 
weaponry to Vietnam, clashes over policy in the Middle East, and the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 all served to heighten the tension 
between the two countries. In particular the Chinese leadership were 
vehement in their condemnation of Brezhnev’s doctrine of “Limited 
Sovereignty”, seeing a threat to China’s own position. The Peking Review 
later labelled Brezhnev’s policy "an outright doctrine of hegemony”.14
Brezhnev’s doctrine and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia are 
correctly seen as having played an important part in the Chinese leadership’s 
reassessment of its position vis-a-vis the two superpowers. Certainly the idea 
that the Soviet Union felt it had the right to intervene militarily in any socialist 
country was taken seriously by the Chinese. However the perceived threat to 
China’s security that the Soviet Union might pose was only translated into 
decisive action following border clashes along the Ussuri river in the northeast 
of China. The Chinese media carried powerful condemnation of the clashes, 
which continued throughout March and April, and had a direct impact on 
China’s assessment of its international position.
Untangling the details of the various incidents from contemporary reports is
13 Melvin Gurtov, “The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution”, pp.365-366.
14 Peking Review, 24 April, 1970, pg.10, reprinted in Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet 
Confrontation since Mao Zedong Dispute, Detente, or Conflict?, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), pg.34.
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difficult owing to the propaganda value that both sides sought to extract from 
the clashes, however, a number of writers have suggested that the first clashes 
were provoked by the Chinese.15 The first incident occured on 2 March, 1969, 
on the disputed Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River. A number of Chinese 
border guards were reported killed and wounded during the clash. Although 
there had been a number of incidents along the length of the border prior to 
this, this particular attack proved to be flashpoint which increased tension 
significantly as the island had been the focus of competing territorial claims 
between the two sides.
Two days after this incident the Renmin ribao and the Jiefangjun ribao 
published a joint editorial, “Overthrow the New Tzars” (Dadao xin shahuang) 
which carries a stinging attack on the “Soviet revisionist renegade clique" 
(Suxiu pantu jituan):
The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has persistently viewed the 
Chinese people as its enemy. Particularly since our country launched the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, achieving a great and decisive 
victory, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has both hated and been 
afraid [of us] and further intensified its anti-Chinese activities. Not only do 
they wantonly slander and criticize China and carry out activities to 
destabilize and damage [us], along the Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese- 
Soviet borders they have massed troops, constantly violating our territory 
and air space, creating border incidents and carrying out military 
intimidation of our country. They put all their effort into colluding with 
American imperlialism and reactionary forces in all countries and try to 
organize an anti-China encirclement.16
How different is this kind of bandit action by the Soviet revisionist 
renegade clique to the wanton occupation of other countries’ territory, 
violation of other countries’ soveriegnty and riding-roughshod 
everywhere [carried out by] American imperialism?
15 See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International 
Implications, 1945-1990, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), pg. 190 and Richard 
Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics A Study of Political Change and Communication, (Cambridge, 
Mass. Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989), pg.98.
16 “Dadao xin shahuang”, (Overthrow the New Tzar), in the Renmin ribao, 4 March, 1969, 
pg.1.
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The People’s Daily carried a series of artciles reporting demonstrations 
across China protesting Soviet actions.17 Subsequently there were a series of 
further incidents in the area. An official Chinese note of protest, printed in the 
Renmin ribao on 14 March listed Soviet incursions on the 4, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 
12 March.18 Two more serious incidents occurred on the 15 March, when some 
50 Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles crossed into Chinese teeritory and on 
the 17 March when 3 tanks and over a hundred Soviet soldiers were involved 
in further clashes.19
c. Reassessing China’s strategic position: March-October, 1969
These events had a decisive impact on China’s strategic thinking. While 
they were continuing, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai organized four of China’s 
most senior military figures, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu 
Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, to meet on a weekly basis to discuss China’s 
strategic position. It was as a result of these talks, which continued into 
October, that China moved to re-open negotiations with the US.
The first of the meetings of the four Marshals actually took place on 1 March 
the day before the first serious border incident at Zhenbao Island. It seems 
likely that the growing tension along the border and a number of smalier-scale 
incidents had led Mao and Zhou to take the initiative in organising these 
meetings. Whatever the reason for convening the meetings, the initial 
discussions of the four Marshals were clearly dominated by the escalating 
conflict with the Soviet Union. For Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai's major foreign 
policy aim at this time was avoidance of a major war with the Soviet Union.20 In 
this light, Chinese provocation on the border may seem ill-advised, but rather
17 See, for example, the front pages of the Renmin ribao on the 6, 7, 8, and 9 March.
16 "Wo guo zhengfu xiang Sulian zhengfu tichu qianglie kangyi", (This country’s government 
has raised a strong protest with the Soviet government), in the Renmin ribao, 14 March, 1969, 
pg.1.
19 Zhongguo gongchandang da shidian, (A Dictionary of Major Events of the CCF), (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pg.439.
20 Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy, (London: 
MacMillan, 1996), pg. 172.
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than suggesting on-going radicalization in Chinese foreign policy or policy 
differences within the leadership, Dittmer seems nqht when he suggests that 
“Chinese leaders calculated that a sharp, short warning blow would deter 
future Soviet encroachments...”.21 In fact, the tough Soviet response only 
served to underline the threat to China’s security, a threat that was reinforced 
by the on-going build up of the Soviet military along the border and explicit 
threats to China’s nasceant nuclear weapons program.
The selection of the four PLA Marshals was strange in that at that time they 
had been side-lined from day-to-day work as a result of their clash with 
members of the radical Left in 1967 in what had become known as the 
"February adverse current”. The four Marshals had all played a prominent role 
in the arguments with Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. At the time 
that Mao instructed the four to meet to discuss the international situation, it is 
clear that they were still in some disgrace; the biography of Ye Jianying notes 
that Ye and and the other Marshals were “squatting” in Beijing’s “six factories 
and two schools”.22 (This phrase refers to six model factories in Beijing and 
Peking and Tsinghua Universities. These were held up as model institutions in 
the movements to cleanse class ranks and rectify the Party. Party figures 
stayed, i.e. "squatted”, at these institutions in order to undergo reform). That 
Mao felt it was necessary to employ these four despite their apparent disgrace 
suggests a high degree of pragmatism in his attitude in that ideological purity 
was less significant than securing China’s international position. This decision 
also suggests a reluctance to use figures from the radical Left on major foreign 
policy initiatives.
In all the four marshals met a total of 23 times. The first series of meetings 
were held in March and appear to have discussed the on-going border 
incidents with the Soviet Union. Following the Ninth Party Congress the four
21 Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization, pg.190
22 Compilation group for the “Biography of Ye Jianying”, Ye Jianying zhuan, (Biography of Ye 
Jianying), (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1995), pg.598.
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held a second and more important series of meetings which addressed wider 
strategic issues. It is clear that the four military leaders were the only senior 
figures to attend these meetings and that there were no representatives of 
either the radical Left or supporters of Lin Biao, despite his leading position at 
the time. Together with the knowledge that Lin Biao did not write his political 
report to the Congress, which dwelt at some length on the issue of China’s 
relations with the two superpowers, Lin’s exclusion from the meetings suggests 
that he did not play a leading role in formulating China’s foreign policy. It is 
significant that Mao himself had suggested the four meet, but had chosen not to 
include his “close comrade-in-arms and successor”. While it is clear that he 
was excluded from these meetings, the degree to which he opposed the 
outcome of the deliberations of Ye and the others is less clear owing to a lack of 
attributable material.
After the first series of meetings in March, Ye Jianying undertook the drafting 
of a report summarizing the discussions. The report was titled “In the forest of 
the world we can see the tree of Zhenbao Island”. (In Chinese Zhenbao means 
precious, so Ye’s title conveys a sense of Zhenbao Island being precious to the 
Chinese). The report linked Soviet aggression to attempts by the two 
superpowers to control the whole world and highlighted the growing 
contradictions between countries across the globe. It also reportedly made 
concrete proposals on military training, building up of the militia and military- 
industrial production.23
At the Ninth Party Congress, which opened on 1 April, 1969, the Soviet 
Union came in for further criticism. The section of Lin Biao’s political report on 
China’s foreign relations, which was actually drafted by Yao Wenyuan and 
Zhang Chunqiao, was dominated by a stinging attack on the Soviet Union:
Since Brezhnev came to power, with its baton becoming less and 
less effective and its difficulties at home and abroad growing more and 
more serious, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been
23 Ibid, pg. 598.
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practising social-imperialism and social-fascism more frantically than 
ever... Its dispatch of hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy 
Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations against China on our 
territory Chenpao Island are two foul performances staged recently by 
Soviet revisionism.24
Lin’s political report balanced this attack on the Soviet Union with criticism of 
US actions in Vietnam and Taiwan. Many commentators have taken these 
statements as a sign that Lin Biao was resistant to the move to improve 
relations with the US, prefering a position of opposing both superpowers at 
once. In as much that Lin Biao did not write the political report it is impossible to 
ascribe a particular position to him. Even if we take this report as a 
representation of the posiiton of Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, two 
members of the radical Left, it is difficult to see in it any opposition to the line 
subsequently taken by the central leadership to improve relations with the US.
Lin Biao’s poi'rtfcai1 report was scathing imtSxnffcrsm~oTth'e\JS?Dtn: It oiis'o - 
highlighted what the Chinese saw as the declining position of America:
The paper-tiger nature of US imperialism has long since been laid 
bare by the people throughout the world. US imperialism, the most 
ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world, is going downhill 
more and more. Since he took office, Nixon has been confronted with 
a hopeless mess and insoluble economic crisis, with the strong 
resistance of the masses of the people at home and throughout the 
world and with the predicament in which the imperialist countries are 
disintegrating and the baton of US imperialism is getting ever less 
effective.25
These comments were in accord with a number of articles on America that 
appeared in the media at the time of the Congress.26
In the following months this sort of assessment of US strength played an 
important part in the deliberations of the four marshals and in the decision to
24 China Problems Research Center (ed.), Selected Works of Lin Piao, (Hong Kong: Chih 
Luen Press, 1970), pp.57-59.
25 Ibid, pg.56.
26 “ Meiguo heiren zhengqu ziyou jiefang douzheng xiang zongshen fazhan”, (The struggle 
for freedom and liberation by America’s blacks is developing in depth), in the Renmin Ribao, 16 
April, 1969, pg.5.
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renew discussions with American officials. Opposition to US actions, most 
notably in Vietnam and southeast Asia, did not decline as a result of this 
decision and negotiations between the two sides suffered continual set-backs 
as a result of the on-going conflict. However China’s assessment that the US 
was a declining power which no longer posed a direct military threat apears to 
have convinced Chinese leaders that it was right to ease Si no-US relations as 
a counter-balance to the greater danger of increased Sino-Soviet tension.
In the wake of the Ninth Congress, the four marshals, who all retained their 
positions on the Central Committee, resumed their meetings. As I noted above, 
this second set of meetings appears to have focused on the wider strategic 
situation. Underlining the perilous situation China faced, in June Soviet 
nuclear bombers were brought from western USSR to practice attacks of mock 
ups of Chinese nuclear facilities in northwestern China.27 Elsewhere, also in 
June, Soviet leaders proposed establishing an Asian collective security 
system, explicitly aimed at containing China.20
Early on in the second series of meetings, Chen Yi is reported to have called 
for efforts to improve Sino-US relations, stating: “We must make the resumption 
of Sino-US talks and an improvement in relations an important part of our 
report to the Central Committee.”29 In an indication of the sensitivity of such a 
move, and the fact that Chen Yi remained in a weak position, others attending 
the discussion are reported to have been concerned that Chen might face 
renewed criticism. Chen is reported to have stood by his comments: “I still 
maintain my opinion, we must resume the Sino-US ambassadorial-level talks 
[a reference to the talks in Poland] as soon as possible, so as to develop Sino- 
US relations.30
During the fours’ discussions Ye Jianying is reported to have expressed
27 Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization, pg. 190.
28 Ibid, pg. 173.
29 Biography of Chen Yi, Pg. 614.
30 Ibid, pg. 599.
278
similar sentiments. Ye said China should take advantage of the contradictions 
between the US, the Soviet Union and some European countries to develop 
Sino-US relations. Ye felt that the US was bound to withdraw its troops from 
Vietnam and that it was afraid that the Soviet Union would fill the vacuum left 
behind.31
On the 11 July, the four marshals signed a report “A preliminary estimate of 
the situation in the war” (Dui zhanzheng de chubu gu ji) which was presented 
to Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. The report had been drafted by Xiong 
Xianghui, a career diplomat who had attended the second series of meetings.
It assessed that the contradiction between China and the Soviet Union was 
greater than that between China and America, and that the contradiction 
between the US and the Soviet Union was greater than that between China 
and the Soviet Union. Having conducted a detailed analysis of the 
international situaion it recommended that China re-open negotiations with the 
US.32
This report was part of the wider reassessment of China’s strategic position 
which occurred at this time in the face of the Soviet threat. By July-August 
1969, the majority of the Chinese leadership appears to have given its support 
to the position of Zhou Enlai, Mao and the four marshals of differentiating 
between the two superpowers and seeking to improve relations with the US, a 
position that remained unchanged for the rest of the period covered by this 
study.
China’s new determination coincided with a new direction in US policy which 
was seemingly based on a similar analysis of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the relationships within the strategic triangle of China, America, 
and the Soviet Union. During a tour of Pakistan, Nixon told Pakistan’s 
leadership that the US would not support the Soviet Union in isolating China.
31 Biography of Ye Jianying, pg.599.
32 Ibid, pg.600.
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Following the autumn border clashes between China and the Soviet Union, 
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson stated that America would not side 
with either the Soviet Union or China against the other country.33 In October
1969, Kissinger instructed the US ambassador in Poland, Walter Stoessel, to 
offer a resumption of the ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw, an offer which 
the Chinese accepted and the first of these renewed meetings was held on 20 
Januay, 1970.
d. "Getting past first base”: Difficulties in dealing with an “imperialist” power: 
1970-Julv 1971
The difficulties China faced in negotiating with what it saw as an imperialist 
power, involved in a war with its southeast Asian allies, were fully exposed in
1970. Throughout this year, relations between the two sides were constantly 
subject to developments in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. At times 
negotiations had to be suspended. However, it is important to note that 
criticism of US actions in southeast Asia, while leading to temporary breaks in 
negotiations, did not derail the general trend towards improving Sino-US 
relations.
Throughout 1970 the Chinese analysis remained that the US was a 
declining power. Further escalation of the war in southast Asia would serve 
only to deepen America’s economic and political crisis. As I argued above, this 
perception of the US as a declining threat to China allowed the PRC leadership 
to continue its approach to what in public was still seen as China’s leading 
enemy. The fact that the formation of foreign policy lay in the hands of one or 
two senior leaders seems to have enabled the decision-making process to be 
isolated from much of the factional infighting that might otherwise have derailed 
negotiations at these sensitive stages. In early June, only a few weeks after the 
publication of a key Mao editorial calling for a united front to oppose American
33 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993), pg.79.
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imperialism, Zhou Enlai was telling diplomats from eastern Europe that he was 
looking forward to resuming contacts with the United States in Warsaw.
Sino-US talks resumed on 20 January, 1970. As Kissinger relates, it seemed 
apparent that the thinking in Washington and Beijing on the eve of this meeting 
had followed similar lines. When the US Ambassador Walter Stoessel read out 
a preapared statement which included a proposal that America would be 
willing to send a representative to Beijing, or accept a Chinese representative 
in Washington, his Chinese counterpart, also reading from a prepared 
statement, replied:
We are willing to consider and discuss whatever ideas and 
suggestions the U.S. Government might put forward in accordance 
with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, therefore really 
helping to reduce tensions between China and the U.S. and 
fundamentally improve relations between China and the U.S. These 
talks may either continue to be conducted at the ambassadorial level or 
may be conducted at a higher level or through other channels 
acceptable to Oatfr states.34
Subsequently, Nixon made a conciliatory statement in the President’s 
Foreign Policy Report which was aimed at assuring China that the US would 
not take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict:
Our desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of 
exploiting the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no 
benefit to us in the intensification of that conflict, and we have not 
intention of taking sides. Nor is the United States interested in joining 
any condominium or hostile coaltion of great powers against either of 
the Communist countries.35
Following this announcement, the Chinese, at the next Warsaw meeting, held 
in February, accepted the US proposal to send a representative to Beijing.
Despite this apparent progress in negotiations, events on the ground in 
Vietnam put a temporary halt to any further improvement in relations.
34 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pg. 687.
35 Ibid, pg.689.
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Beginning in Aprii, South Vietnamese forces, backed by US troops, entered 
parts of Cambodia in an attempt to eradicate Vietnamese base areas.
Sihanouk fied to Beijing, where he established a Cambodian government in 
exile. He was greeted personally by Mao, Zhou, Lin Biao and other senior 
leaders.36
In his memoires Whits House Years, Henry Kissinger suggests that the 
Chinese waited a full three weeks before issuing a statement criticizing 
America’s “brazen" invasion of Cambodia.37 Such a delay would have been 
significant, however the Chinese side issued a short ten line statement on the 5 
May, some two weeks before the editorial Kissinger notes. This earlier 
statement was accompanied by an editorial which directly criticized Nixon’s 
actions. As well as attacking this new escalation, the editorial repeated the 
earlier analysis that such actions would only hasten America’s decline and 
were indicative of the deepening domestic crisis in the US.38
This editorial was followed two weeks later by a full front-page article, 
published in Mao’s name: "People of the world unite, defeat the American 
aggressors and all their running dogs”. It was this article that Kissinger labelled 
“remarkably bland”, however his assertion that it “is not personally abusive 
toward you [Nixon]” seems at odds with the article’s characterization of Nixon’s 
actions in America as “fascist”.39 The article claimed that the main trend in the 
world today was revolutionary, and that there was a new high-tide in the 
struggle against American imperialism around the world, with people in Asia,
30 "Weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi he ta de qinmi zhanyou Lin fu zhuxi jiejian Jianpuzhai guojia 
yuanshou xihanuke qinwang he furen”, (The great leader Chairman Mao and his close comrade in 
arms Lin Biao met with Cambodia's State Leader Prince Shihanouk and his wife), in the Renmin 
ribao, 2 May, 1970, pg. 1.
37 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg. 692.
30 "Nikesong zhengfu de xin de zhanzheng maoxian", (The Nixon government’s new military 
adventure), in the Renmin ribao, 5 May, 1970, pg.1.
39 “Quan shijie renmin tuanji qilai, dabai meiguo qinluezhe ji qi yiqie zougou!”, (People of the 
world unite, defeat the American aggressors and all their running dogs), in Mao Zedong waijiao 
wenxuan, (Selected foreign policy works of Mao Zedong), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan 
chubanshe, 1994), pg.585.
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Africa and Latin America rising in “revolutionary struggle”.40
Although the US incursion brought about a temporary halt in the on-going 
Sino-US meetings in Warsaw, it is clear that in early June, moderates in China 
were already looking to reopen these talks.41 Throughout June Chinese signals 
appeared mixed, suggesting the possibility of conflict within the senior 
leadership over correct policy. Aside from Zhou’s comments on reopening the 
Warsaw talks, on the 2 July, the Chinese attempted to intercept a US spy plane 
flying 100 miles off its coast. This was reportedly the first time that China had 
attempted to do this since 1965.42 The leadership of the PLA Air Force were key 
supporters of Lin Biao, however it may be stretching a point to suggest that this 
action indicates an attempt on the part of Lin’s supporters to sabotage Sino-US 
relations. Key anniversaries for the Chinese, such as the twentieth 
“anniversary” of President Truman’s decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the 
Taiwan Strait, and the twentieth anniversary of America’s entry into the Korean 
War were all marked by editorials which further soured the atmosphere.43
Whatever the internal situation, the Chinese decision to release the 
American Bishop James Walsh, who had been imprisoned for spying for twenty 
years in 1960, marked a concilliatory gesture. This was matched by the US 
government who eased some of the trade sanctions imposed on American 
companies wanting to trade with China.
At the time of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC, China made 
perhaps the most famous, and most famously misunderstood, gesture of 
reconcilliation towards the US, when Mao invited Edgar Snow and his wife 
onto Tian’anmen Gate to take part in the anniversary celebrations. Mao and
40 Ibid, pg.585.
41 Henry Kissinger states that Zhou Enlai is reported to have told a number of eastern 
European diplomats that he was “looking forward” to the resumption of these talks as soon as 
possible. See White House Years, pg. 696.
42 Ibid, pg.697.
43 See, for example, “Yazhou renmin tuanjie qilai, ba meiguo qinluezhe cong yazhou 
ganchuqul", (People of Asia unite, drive the American aggressors out of Asia!), in the Renmin 
ribaio, 25 June, 1970, pgs. 1&2.
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Zhou personally welcomed Edgar Snow onto Tian’anmen Gate, and pointedly 
posed with him in numerous photographs. However, Kissinger noted that this 
action had “overestimated our subtlety, for what they conveyed was so oblique 
that our crude Occidental minds completely missed the point”.44
Elsewhere, Lin Biao’s speech at a meeting marking the 21st anniversary of 
the PRC carried renewed criticism of the US and messages of support for anti­
imperialist struggles around the world. This speech was printed in the Renmin 
ribao on 2 October.45 Once again it is almost impossible to ascertain if this 
speech is truly representative of Lin’s own views, however it was in line with 
other articles printed both before and after Lin gave his speech. Meanwhile, 
the Chinese leadership did not allow improving Sino-US relations to interfere 
with negative reporting of US actions in southeast Asia. Nor did it lead China 
to abandon any of its fundamental positions, such as its stance on Taiwan. In 
light of the on-going criticism of America, any similar criticism by Lin should not 
necessarily be taken as indicating his opposition to Sino-US rapprochement, 
however without a correctly identifiable body of work by Liri“Biao, is almost 
impossible to assess how out of line with the central leadership his position 
was.
Lin Biao’s speech was interesting in that it contained a negative reference to 
“social imperialism”, indicating the Soviet Union, suggesting that “American 
imperialism and social imperialism are extremely isolated and finding the going 
tougher”.46 John Garver’s analysis of articles in the Peking Review in 1970 
suggests that this year saw a pro-Soviet tilt on the part of the Chinese.47 
Certainly the central media carried few articles criticizing the Soviet Union,
44 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg.698.
45“Lin Biao fu zhuxi zai qingzhu zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli ershiyi zhou nian 
dahuishang de jianghua”, (Vice-Chairman Lin Biao's speech at the mass meeting to celebrate the 
21st anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China), in Renmin ribao, 2 October, 
1970, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, October 1970, pp.8-9.
48 Ibid, pg.8.
47 John Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970: The Tilt Towards the Soviet Union”, in The 
China Quarterly, No.82 (June 1980), pp.41-54.
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however this may simply reflect the end of the large-scale border incidents of 
1969, or may be the result of an effort to reduce tension to support the struggles 
of the three southeast Asian nations. Lin’s comments were not out of step with 
those of other senior leaders. In a conversation with Pakistan’s President 
Yahya Khan, Zhou Enlai was equally dismissive of both superpowers:
Therefore we can see, if a nationally independent country relies 
primarily on its own strength and dosen’t listen to orders from the 
superpowers, it dosen’t matter if its American or Soviet interference, it 
will all be defeated.48
Yahya Khan’s visit to China marked a new stage in Sino-US relations. Khan 
had earlier visited the US and met with Nixon on 25 October. Knowing of 
Khan’s impending visit to the PRC Nixon briefed him on some of the Warsaw 
talks and asked him to convey the sentiment that America “regarded a Sino-US 
rapprochement as essential”.49 Khan was in China from 10-15 November 
where he clearly passed on his message. Some three weeks after his return, 
the Pakistani ambassador to America met with Kissinger to verbally pass on a 
personal message from Zhou Enlai to Nixon. Zhou emphasized that he spoke 
not only for himself, but also Mao and Lin Biao. Zhou’s message stated that 
China:
has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful 
means.... In order to discuss the subject of the vacation of Chinese 
territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon’s will be 
most welcome in Peking.50
The mutual covert signalling of intentions continued into 1971, with the 
Chinese sending a further message via the Romanian ambassador to the US, 
indicating their willingness to accept an envoy as long as the US were
40 “Minzu duli yundong zai buduan gaozhang”, (The movement for national independence is 
continually rising), in Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, (The foreign policy works of Zhou Enlai), 
(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxuan chubanshe, 1990), pg. 467.
49 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg.699.
60 Quoted in ibid, pg.701.
285
prepared to resolve the issue of Taiwan, which was said to be "the one 
outstanding issue between the United States and China”.51 Kissinger replied 
through the same channel, but showing some oriental subtlety of his own he 
only sent an oral message, not a written reply, demonstrating his preference for 
the “Pakistani channel”.
Developments in southeast Asia once again threatened to cause difficulties 
for the cautious negotiations. Through February and early-March, South 
Vietnamese forces, backed by America, entered Laos in an effort to cut the Ho 
Chi Minh trail. An editorial in the Renmin ribao 14 February, 1971, described 
“American imperialism” as “currently the most reactionary, most corrupt force, it 
is always trying to go against the tide and is always trying to overturn history”.52 
Ten days earlier the Renmin ribao had carried another article denouncing US 
actions in Laos, but as Kissinger points out, on the same day the Chinese Vice- 
Minister, Qiao Guanhua, a close ally of Zhou Enlai, approached the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Beijing. Qiao said that although the war in southeast Asia 
made it impossible for the Warsaw talks to resume, Qiao felt that the Chinese 
would soon want to meet with the Americans. Qiao also asked that this 
message be brought to the American’s attention.53 Certainly it seems that 
moderates like Qiao and Zhou were anxious to limit the impact of new 
developments in southeast Asia on the on-going negotiations and it seems 
likely that given Mao’s close involvement in the opening out to the US, their 
actions had his blessing.
One of the most significant moments in the torturous negotiations was the 
invitation by the Chinese for an American table tennis team to visit China. The 
visit was the clearest sign yet of the thaw in Sino-US relations and came less 
than a month after the lifting of the ban by the US State Department on US
51 Henry Kissinger, ibid, pg.703.
52 "Quanli zhihuan yinduzhina san guo renmin de kangmei jiuguo zhanzheng”, 
(Wholeheartedly support the people of the three Indochina nations in their war to resist America 
and save their countries), in the Renmin ribao, 14 February, 1971, pg. 1.
53 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg.706.
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citizens travelling to China. On the Chinese side the symbolic significance of 
such a visit was clear and once it became apparent that the US team wanted to 
visit China, Zhou Enlai approached Mao for his personal approval, which he 
duly gave on 7 April.54 Placing his own seal of approval on the visit Zhou Enlai 
met with members of the US team. The visit of the American table tennis team 
appeared to finally pave the way for Henry Kissinger’s first visit to China, 
although the convoluted means of communciation, and bureaucratic 
obstructionism in Amercia, delayed this visit until July.
The significance of the meeting for the Chinese was highlighted by their 
sending four foreign office officials to Pakistan to “escort” Kissinger on his 
journey. They included Zhang Wenjin, the head of the West European, 
American, and Oceania Department of the MFA, Tang Wensheng, (Nancy 
Tang), an American born Chinese who acted as interpreter, and Wang Hairong, 
Mao's niece, who later rose to become a Vice-Minister in the MFA.55 The 
presence of the latter highlghts the importance Mao himself attached to the 
visit. At the airport in Beijing, Kissinger was greeted by Ye Jianying, one of the 
four Marshals who had first proposed easing Sino-US relations and Huang 
Hua, China’s ambassador to Canada.56 It is noticeable that representatives of 
the radical Left and supporters of Lin Biao did not attend this, or subsequent 
meetings.
Kissinger’s visit appears to have achieved two main aims: Firstly, it allowed 
both sides to set out their positions on a variety of issues. After the difficulty of 
communicating through Pakistani intermediaries, it was clearly a relief to both 
sides to meet face-to-face; and secondly to prepare for a visit by President 
Nixon with the announcement to be contained in a joint-statement. The first of 
these aims was conducted in marathon talks with Zhou Enlai, which lasted
54 Gong Li, “Zhongguo ‘pingpang waijiao’ de gaoceng juece’1, (The high-level decision on 
China’s “ping-pong diplomacy"), in Dangshi yanjiu, (Research on Party History, February 1991, 
pg.9.
55 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg.741.
56 Ibid, pg.743.
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seventeen hours. The second task was undertaken in negotiations between 
the American delegation and Huang Hua, with an agreement on wording only 
being reached as the deadline for Kissinger’s departure loomed.57 The joint 
statement was published simultaneously in China and the US on 19 July, 
announcing that the PRC had issued an invitation to Nixon to visit China before 
May 1972.
e. Sino-Soviet relations: 1971
Sino-Soviet relations had eased slightly in 1970, with a noticeable 
reduction in Chinese polemic directed at the Soviet Union. However, in 1971, 
tensions increased again, particularly around the issues of nuclear 
disarmament and the Soviet proposal for a five-power summit, and the conflict 
between India and Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh. Chinese 
and Soviet diplomats would clash over these issues following the PRC’s entry 
into the UN.
A joint editorial in the Renmin ribao, Hong qi and the Jiefangjun ribao, 
published to mark the 100th anniversary of the Paris Commune, denounced 
Brezhnev as a “renegade” and launched a stinging attack on “Soviet 
revisionism”:
In today’s Soviet Union the title Soviet [suweiai] hasn’t changed, 
the title of the country hasn’t changed, however the class content has 
completely changed. The Soviet state, whose leadership authority has 
been usurped by the Soviet revisionist clique isalready no longer a tool 
of the proletariat to suppress the boutgeosie, but has become a tool to 
restore capitalism and suppress the proletariat. The Soviet revisionist 
clique has turned the Soviet Union into a playground for a handful of 
new style, bureaucratic monopoly capitalists and a jail for hundreds of 
thousands of workers; this is the whole meaning of a “Soviet socialist 
state of the whole people" and “Soviet democracy”.58
57 Ibid, pg.752.
B8“Wuchan jieji zhuanzheng shengli wansui”, (Long live the victory of the dictatorship of the 
propletariat), Hong qi, Issue 4, 1971, pg.14.
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In contrast, the editorial contained only mild criticism of the US. Kissinger and 
the Americans reportedly saw this editorial as marking a shift, which meant that 
the Chinese now percieved the Soviet Union as the main enemy.59
Brezhnev’s proposal for a five-power summit on nuclear disarmament (to 
include China, the Soviet Union, the US, France and Great Britain), was 
handed to the Chinese on 15 June. Perhaps occupied by Henry Kissinger’s 
visit, the Chinese did not appear to reply until 30 July. This statement was 
subsequently printed in the Renmin ribao on 8 August. In their statement, the 
Chinese side claimed that all countries, not only the five big powers, should be 
involved in any disarmament talks.60 It also repeated the assertion that China 
would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
f. The PRC’s entry into the United Nations 
Mainland China could not play any direct role in the on-going debate within 
the UN over whether to admit the PRC, however the Chinese leadership was 
able to apply considerable pressure on UN members, and particularly the US, 
over the issue of Taiwan. The position of both the PRC and the leadership on 
Taiwan was that there should only be one Chinese representative in the UN, 
however Kissinger notes that the US State Department sought a way to admit 
the PRC whilst allowing the Taiwanese to retain a seat.61 When, on 2 August, 
the US proposed that the UN recognize both the PRC and Taiwan the Chinese 
MFA issued a strongly worded statement criticizing efforts to create “two 
Chinas":
The Chinese government solemnly declares: The government of the 
People’s Republic of China resolutely opposes “two Chinas’’, “one 
China, one Taiwan” or other similar absurd propositions, it resolutely 
opposes the fallacy that “Taiwan’s status hasn’t been resolved yet" and 
it resolutely opposes the conspiracy of “Taiwan independence”. If ever
59 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pg 
707.
50 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo de shengming", (A Statement by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China), in the Renmin ribao, 8 August, 1971, pg.1.
81 Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pg.719.
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“two China’s”, “one China, one Taiwan”, “Taiwan’s status hasn’t been 
resolved yet” or other similar circumstances arise at the United Nations, 
then the government of the People’s Republic of China will resolutely 
not develop any relations with the United Nations. This solemn and just 
stand of the government of China will never waver.62
One month after this statement, the Renmin ribao published an article by one 
of its commentators which continued the attack on the actions of the US.63
It seems clear that China would have resisted any offer of admission to the 
UN which entailed continued representation for Taiwan, however, US resolve 
on this issue was at best limited and this ambivalence must have added to the 
momentum in favour of admitting mainland China. The PRC was finally 
admitted to the UN following a vote at the 26th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on 25 October. An editorial in the Renmin ribao on 30th 
October declared the vote a “victory for Chairman Mao’s revolutionary foreign 
policy line”, and claimed that it showed the “bankruptcy" of America’s plan to 
create two China’s.64
Qiao Guanhua, Zhou Enlai’s close colleague, was appointed to head 
China’s first delegation to the United Nations. Huang Hua, who had played a 
leading role in negotiations with Kissinger and who was another career 
diplomat was made the deputy-head of the delegation and was subsequently 
appointed China’s permanent representative at the UN. Other members of the 
delegation included Wang Hairong, Mao’s niece, and Xiong Xianghui, who had 
worked with the four marshals in drafting the report that had first suggested 
opening to the United Sttaes.
The delegation was given a send off normally reserved for only the top 
leaders. Over seventy Party, government and military leaders were at the
62 "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu shengming”, (A Statement by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), in the Renmin ribao, 21 August, 1971, pg.1.
63 “Jianjue fandui meiguo zhizao ‘liangge zhongguo’ de yinmou”, (Resolutely oppose 
America’s plot to create "two China’s"), in the Renmin ribao, 25 September, 1971, pg.1.
64 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming”, (A Statement by the government of 
the People’s Republic of China), in the Renmin ribao, 30 October, 1971, pg.1.
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airport, including Ye Jianying, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Li Xiannian, Ji 
Pengfei, Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng (interestingly first in a list of over 
twenty government officials who are reported to have attended the ceremony).05
Qiao Guanhua gave his opening speech to the United Nations on 15 
November. It was a wide ranging speech which set out China’s position on 
Taiwan, Korea, southeast Asia, the Middle East and other issues. On 
disarmament he repeated the earlier government statement that China would 
not resort to first use of nuclear weapons and called on the Soviet Union and 
America to match this pledge.66 Qiao was critical of the two superpowers for 
ignoring the desire of the people of the world for arms cuts, particularly in 
nuclear weapons, and of speaking about disarmament, but in practice only 
increasing their military power. Qiao made a further speech at the United 
Nations during a debate on the Middle East and once again he was critical of 
the actions of both the Soviet Union and the US, accusing them of 
manipulating the United Nations over this issue.67
A subsequent editorial in the Renmin ribao continued with the theme of 
superpower domination of the United Nations, claiming however that this 
session of the general assembly had seen significant defeats for both the US 
and the Soviet Union at the hands of smaller countries. Summarizing events at 
the meeting, the editorial of 27 December claimed that this was one of the most 
significant meetings since the founding of the UN. In particular the votes to 
approve mainland China’s entry into the UN and the call for a ceasefire in the 
on-going Indian-Pakistan conflict were seen as defeats, respectively, for the US
65 “Woguo chuxi lianda diershiliu jie huiyi de daibiaotuan likai Beijing, daoda niuyue. Qiao 
Guanhua tuanzhang zai niuyue jichang fabiao jianghua” (Our delegation attending the 26th 
United Nations General Assembly left Beijing and arrived in New York. Head of the delegation 
Qiao Guanhua gave a speech at New York airport), in the Renmin ribao, 10 November, 1971, 
reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, November 1971, pg.144.
66 “Zhonghua remin gongheguo diabiaotuan tuanzhang Qiao Guanhua zai lianda diershiliu jie 
quanti huiyi shang de fayan”, (The leader of the People’s Republic of China’s delegation Qiao 
Guanhua's speech to the 26th United Nations General Assembly), in the Renmin ribao, 17 
November, 1971, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, November 1971, pg.148.
67 Warren kuo, (ed.), Foreign-Poicy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975, 
(Taibei: Institute of International Relations, 1976), pg.61.
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and the Soviet Union at the hands of the smaller countries.68
Qiao’s comments in his various speeches presaged theoretical 
developments in China’s foreign policy and the emergence of a new line 
which, in an echo of the non-aligned policies of the 1950s, sought to place 
China together with Third World countries as the main “bulwark” against the 
two superpowers’ activities. I will examine these development below.
q. China changes its world view
China’s characterization of the Soviet Union as a superpower was part of an 
on-going shift in China’s perception of the world situation. It is clear from the 
material available that it was Mao who was the leading authority on 
reinterpreting China’s world view and who led this reassessment. Those 
statements we have on this subject from other leaders are largely only 
comments on Mao’s pronouncements. While Zhou Enlai certainly played a 
leading role in this shift, Mao’s authority on theoretical issues appears to have 
been most significant, leaving Zhou the task of elaborating some of the details, 
and devising policies to implement this shift (in themselves significant and 
influential tasks).
In the early- and mid-1960s, Chinese leaders had characterized the world as 
being divided into what might be called four “camps”, namely, the US, the 
socialist camp, (including both China and the Soviet Union), and two 
"intermediary belts” (zhongjian didai). The first of these “belts” was defined as 
encompassing all of Africa, Asia and Latin America, whilst the second included 
Europe and other “advanced capitalist countries”, such as Japan and Canada 
and the countries of “Oceania”.69 The two belts were explicitly defined in terms 
of their opposition to, or reliance on, the US.
68 “Ping lianheguo dahui di ershiliu jie huiyi", (Evaluate the 26th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly), in the Renmin ribao, 27 December, 1971, pg.1.
69 "Zhongjian didai you liangge", (There are two intermediary belts), in Selected Foreign 
Policy Works of Mao Zedong, pp.506-509. This section contains three separate talks given by 
Mao Zedong in March 1963, January 1964 and July 1964, however the general content of the 
three talks is similar, defining the two belts in the way outlined above.
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By 1971 it is clear that although Mao still characterized the Soviet Union as a 
member of the socialist camp, he saw it as somewhat different to other socialist 
countries because it possessed nuclear weapons. Mao also felt that China 
could work with the countries in the second belt, those reliant on the US, 
through exploiting the tensions between these countries and America:
We have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and moreover 
we are two of the countries in the Socialist camp. However, Sino- 
Soviet relations are not as good as China’s relations with the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, let alone as good as China’s 
relations with Ikeda’s party. This is worth thinking about for a moment, 
what are the reasons [for this]? It is beause America and the Soviet 
Union both have nuclear weaposn, they want to control the whole 
world, but the Liberal Democratic Party is controlled by the US.
Speaking from an international position, comparing Japan to America 
and the Soviet Union, it is in second place. Other countries in second 
place like this include England, France, West Germany, Italy etc. We 
still have some work we can do [with them]. Japanese monoply 
capitalists are not that united with US. England and American 
[relations] are fairly good, but they aren’t that united either. France 
angers America. West Germany’s position is becoming more 
important, in this way, the situation will definately develop into 
opposition to America.70
It is clear that escalating tensions between China and the Soviet Union 
added weight to the Chinese analysis that saw the Soviet Union as being 
outside the socialist camp. In a conversation with Pakistan’s President Yahya 
Khan in November 1970, Zhou Enlai characterized the Soviet Union as a 
superpower on the basis of its superior nuclear weapons. However he was 
also critical of joint US-Soviet action in the UN to restrict the extent of territorial 
waters a country could claim.71 This was the latest of a series of actions such as 
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border incidents of 
1969, which clearly led the Chinese leadership to see the Soviet Union in 
terms of being a superpower and aggressor.
70 Ibid, pp. 507-508.
71 Zhou Enlai, “Minzu duli yundong zai buduan gaozhang”, (The movement for national 
independence is ceaselessly rising), in Selected foreign policy works of Zhou Enlai, pp.465-468.
293
Subsequent to this re-analysis of the Soviet position, the Chinese leadeship 
also re-evaluated the role of countries in what Mao had called the "first belt”. 
Chinese leaders began referring more frequently to these countries as the 
Third World. From the start Mao had defined these countries in terms of their 
opposition to US imperialism and in a talk from July 1970, "Imperialism is afraid 
of the Third World", America remained the target of his comments.72 However, 
as Zhou Enlai’s comments from a few months later, quoted above show, by the 
end of 1970 Chinese leaders were also praising the opposition of third world 
countries to Soviet actions.
It is clear that through 1971 and 1972, developments throughout the Third 
World led the Chinese leadership to place increasing emphasis on these 
countries as the main bulwark against the two superpowers, replacing the role 
of the socialist camp that had formed the foundation of Mao’s earlier analysis. 
China’s position in this analysis at this point was unclear. Without the Soviet 
Union, did China now lead the socialist camp? Or was China allied with the 
Third World? The comments on the role of the Third World in opposing both 
the US and the Soviet Union suggest the latter, but for a number of years 
Chinese leaders did not make this direct claim.
A key editorial celebrating the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the PRC 
commented that “Third World countries are playing a growing importance in 
international affairs’’.73 This article continued to analyse the world in terms of 
two belts and highlighted ongoing differences between countries in the second 
belt and the two superpowers. However the main successes had been 
achieved in the Third World. The article cited the examples of Egypt's 
expulsion of Soviet military advisers and on-going resistance to America in 
Vietnam and southeast Asia. China’s position in this analysis is not made 
clear, however in the next two years, China would increasingly identify herself
72 “Diguozhuyi pa di san shijie”, (Imperialism is afraid of the Third World), in Selected foreign 
policy works of Mao Zedong, pp. 587-588.
73 “Duoqu xin de shengli”, (Seize new victories), in Hong qi, Issue 10, 1972, pg.5.
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with the Third World countreis. This would lead Mao to espouse his “Three 
Worlds Theory”, which formed the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s major speech to 
the United Nations in 1974. I will took at these developments below.
3. Presient Nixon’s visit and on-going differences over southeast Asia: 1972- 
1974.
a. President Nixon’s visit to China 
In the run up to President Nixon’s visit to the PRC in February, the Chinese 
media continued to criticize American actions in southeast Asia and to criticize 
Nixon personally. In an analysis of Nixon’s “State of the Union Address” an 
article by a Renmin ribao commentator on 30 January claimed that Nixon’s 
comments reflected the fact that the situation was less and less beneficial to 
America. The article was also highly critical of Nixon’s policy of 
"Vietnamization”, claiming this was simply “using Asians to fight Asians”.
A second article printed in the Renmin ribao on 29 January was also highly 
criticial of Nixon’s “8-point Proposal” to resolve the conflict in southeast Asia, 
announced in a speech given on 25 January. The article criticized the 
proposal for continuing to support the idea of the “Vietnamization” of the conflict 
and went on to claim that faced with problems at home and abroad, Nixon’s 
proposal was really an attempt to deceive the American people and continue 
the war in Vietnam.74
On the 4 February the Chinese government issued a statement condemning 
the 8-point Proposal and criticizing American aggression in Vietnam. At the 
same time the Renmin ribao published a key editorial which continued the 
criticism of the proposal and put forward two conditions for resolving the 
“Vietnam problem”, that is that America unconditionally withdraw all of its troops
74 "Meidi qinlue Yuenan de xin pianju", (A new fraud in American imperialism’s invasion of 
Vietnam), in the Renmin ribao, 29 January, 1972, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, January 1972, 
pg.12.
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from Vietnam and that it stop “all interference in South Vietnam’s internal 
affairs.75 Even on the day before Nixon’s arrival, the Renmin ribao published 
an article criticizing US bombing raids on North Vietnam:
This kind of military provocation and intimidation by American 
imperialism towards the Democratic Republic of Vietnam nakedly 
exposes [the fact] that the American government isn’t really “resolving" 
the Vietnam war and peacefully solving the Vietnam problem, but 
rather that it is continuing to expand and intensify this criminal war of 
aggression.76
Reconciling these statements with the warm welcome afforded to President 
Nixon is difficult, however as I have noted a number of times previously, the 
Chinese appear to have pursued Sino-American rapprochement without any 
easing of their position on issues such as Taiwan or the Vietnam War.
Kissinger felt he detected an easing in the polemic directed at both America 
and Nixon personally prior to his ground-breaking visit. Certainly, in 
comparison to the early, mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution, this 
was the case, but similar statements could be made about China’s reporting of 
its relations with other countries too, this was simply a reflection of the changing 
conditions within China itself.
What is important to note is that the Chinese world view, as I have outlined it 
above, now saw the US as a weakening, although nonetheless still powerful, 
nation. Chinese leaders assessed that the possibility of a war between the two 
sides had greatly reduced. China sought better relations with America as a 
means of resolving issues like Taiwan, and as a bulwark to what was now 
perceived as the main threat to China’s security, the Soviet Union. So Nixon 
could be warmly welcomed, while he and his government continued to be 
criticized in the media.
75 “Meidi bixu liji tingzhi qin yue zhanzheng”, (American imperialism must immediately stop its 
war of aggression towards Vietnam), in the Renmin ribao, 4 February, 1972, pg.1.
76 “Meiguo zhengfu bixu tingzhi qinglue yuenan de yiqie zhansheng xingdong”, (The 
American government must stop all of its military actions of invading Vietnam), in the Renmin 
ribao, 20 February, 1972, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, February 1972, pg. 193.
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Assessing the extent of any divisions within the Chinese leadership over 
Nixon’s visit is difficult. It may be significant that members of the radical Left 
were absent from the cermonies in Beijing, however Zhang Chunqiao and 
Wang Hongwen, in their capacity as leaders of the Shanghai Revolutionary 
Committee, did host a banquet in Nixon’s honour during his stay in Shanghai. 
Perhaps the most notable absentee from proceedings was Jiang Qing, who 
appears not to have attended any of the banquets laid on for the American 
delegation, only appearing at a performance of a revolutionary opera attended 
by President Nixon. Less than a month later she did attend a banquet in 
honour of Prince Shihanouk and was listed first in a list of government 
representatives, ahead even of Ye Jianying. Simply appearing with 
representatives of “American imperialism” may have been too galling for the 
most prominent representative of the radical Left, while Zhang and Wang, as 
the official hosts in Shanghai would have had little option to stay away.
What is most apparent is that those who had the closest contact with Nixon, 
aside from Mao, were members of the foreign policy system closely associated 
with Zhou Enlai, or senior moderate figures. Zhou personally accompanied 
Nixon during his visit in Shanghai. Mao’s insistence on the earliest possible 
meeting with Nixon gave it his personal seal of approval and would certainly 
have served to stifle any internal criticism of the visit, however given Mao and 
Zhou’s close personal control over the preparation for the historic meeting, it 
seems likely that the radical Left, or indeed any other group, had little scope for 
direct opposition,
Nixon arrived in China on 21 February and was greeted personally by Zhou 
Enlai and a delegation including Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Guo Moruo and the 
new Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei. (Ji was another career diplomat who had 
been purged during the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in 1971, 
when he was appointed acting-Foreign Minister during Chen Yi’s illness).
Zhou and Nixon shared a car on the way into Beijing and Nixon wrote that
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during the journey Zhou commentated, "Your handshake came over the vastest 
ocean in the world - twenty-five years of no communication”.77 Within hours of 
his arrival he had been informed that Mao would like to meet him and Nixon 
and Kissinger spent an hour with Mao in a wide-ranging and apparently warm 
discussion. This meeting was also attended on the Chinese side by Zhou, 
Mao’s niece Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang.
The warm atmosphere continued into the banquet hosted by Zhou in Nixon’s 
honour. However, in his toast to welcome Nixon, Zhou displayed a pragmatic 
awareness of the difficulties China and America faced in easing relations 
between the two sides:
At present, pushing forward the normalization of relations of [our] 
two countries and striving for a relaxation of the tense situation has 
become the ardent hope of the people of China and America. People, 
as long as we have the people then we have the force to create world 
history [chuanzao shijie lishi de dongh]. I believe that one day, this 
joint hope of our two peoples will be realized.
The social systems in China and America are fundamentally 
different, and there are enormous differences between the 
government of China and America. However, these kinds of 
differences should not prevent China and America from establishing 
normal state relations on the basis of mutual respect for sovereighnty 
and teeritorial uintegrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non­
interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and 
peaceful coexistence, what is more they shouldn’t lead to war.78
Zhou Enlai and Nixon held a number of meetings where both sides engaged 
in a afrank exchange of views. While there is no public record of these 
discussions from the Chinese side, Nixon’s memoirs contain a detailed account 
of the conversations. On Vietnam and the wider conflict in southeast Asia Zhou 
admitted frankly that as long as the US continued with its policy of the 
"Vietnamization” of the war, and as long as the Vietnamese continued to fight,
77 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pg.560.
78 "Zhou zongli zai huanying nikesong zongtong anhuishang de zhujiuci”(Premier Zhou’s 
toast at the banquet to welcome President Nixon), in the Renmin ribao, 22 February, 1972, 
reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, February, 1972, pg. 24.
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China had no choice but to continue to support them.79 Zhou’s language 
matched that of the Renmin ribao editorials discussed above, highlighting that 
this was the majority view within the Chinese leadership, but that it was not 
seen as an obstacle to further negotiations.
The biggest sticking point during the visit was over the wording of a joint- 
statetment. The Chinese side proposed that the statement reflected each side’s 
views, without papering over the obvious differences in opinion that existed at 
that time. Nixon’s somewhat strange comment that the usual procedure was “to 
have meetings for several days... and then put out a weasel-worded 
communique covering up the problems” was met with a sharp response from 
Zhou Enlai who is reported to have replied “if we were to act like that we would 
not only be deceiving the people, but we would be deceiving ourselves”.80 
Finally both sides agreed to adopt the Chinese approach and the final 
communique, now known as the “Shanghai Communique” after the location 
where it was signed, contained separate sections setting out the position of 
each side on key issues.
The most contentious issue covered by the communique was Taiwan. The 
Chinese reaffirmed their position that the "government of the PRC is the only 
legal government of China”, and that “Taiwan is a province of China”. In 
addition they condemned all activities which aimed at creating “two Chinas” or 
“one China, one Taiwan”.81 In contrast, the American side produced the now 
famous wording that while recognizing that Taiwan was an integral part of 
China, did not give precedence to the government of either the PRC or the 
regime on Taiwan: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a 
part of China. The United States government does not challenge that
79 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pg. 569.
80 Ibid, pg.564.
81 “Lianhe gongbao”, {Joint communique), in the Renmin ribao, 28 February, 1972, 
reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, February 1972, pg.20.
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position”.82
The publication of the Shanghai Communique was a landmark event in 
Sino-US relations, however its wording highlighted the gulf btween the 
positions of the two sides. While the visits of Kissinger and Nixon served to 
break the deadlock between China and the US and facilitate further 
negotiations, it was a full six years before diplomatic relations were 
established. The issue of Taiwan, and the presence of US troops on the island 
remained the key to improving relations between the two sides, however, the 
on-going war in Vietnam also plagued efforts at rapprochement in 1972 and
1973. One important consequence of Nixon’s visit was that it freed many of 
America’s allies to seek better relations with China. In particular, Japan’s Prime 
Minister Tanaka made the first visit of a Japanese leader to China in 
September of 1972, marking a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations.
b. On-going differences on resolving the Vietnam War 
Negotiations on resolving the conflict in Vietnam had been underway in 
Paris for a number of years, when, on 23 March, 1972, the US side announced 
that it was temporarily suspending participation in the talks. An article in the 
Renmin ribao claimed that this exposed America’s plot to “hamper the 
resolution of the Vietnam problem and continue the war of aggresion”.83
When President Nixon subsequently announced the bombing of North 
Vietnam and the mining of harbours there, the Chinese government issued a 
sharply worded statement criticizing US actions:
The American aggressor army in Vietnam and Indochina has used 
all sorts of barbarous methods and slaughtered thousands of people.
The American government doesn’t talk about this, rather it shouts 
about “defending” the lives of American soldiers. In reality American 
youth losing their lives on the Vietnamese battlefields is a result of the 
aggressive policies of the American government. The problem is very 
simple, all it needs is for the American government to immediately stop
82 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, pg.576.
83 “Meiguo zhengfu de manheng xingjing", (The American government’s arbitrary action), in 
the Renmin ribao, 31 March, 1972, pg.1.
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its aggression, withdraw all of its troops unconditionally, and stop 
supporting the puppet cliques, then American prisoners of war could 
return home at an early date and the lives of American soldiers will 
naturally be insured. If the American government continues to 
wantonly escalate the war, this will only cause even more young 
Americans to lose their lives, can we call this “defending” their lives?84
As the difficult negotiations in Paris continued, the Chinese continued to 
criticize what it saw as US prevarication. When a deadline for signing a joint 
Vietnamese-US agreement passed, the Chinese lambasted America for 
“raising obstacles and going back on their word".85 An editorial of 1 November 
claimed the US was facing a major trial and warned, “The facts show, no force 
in the world can break the iron will of 40 million Vietnamese people to realise 
their sacred national rights1'.88
c. Sino-Soviet relations in 1972 
Relations between China and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate in 
1972. The two sides clashed over what the Chinese saw as Soviet support for 
India and Bangladesh against Pakistan, with China using its veto power to 
block a Soviet motion during a discussion on the entry of Bangladesh at an 
August session of the United Nations Security Council. The Chinese also 
continued to be highly critical of Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament.
Speaking at the 27th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 1972, 
China’s representative Qiao Guanhua launched a strong attack on Soviet 
proposals for a nuclear test ban treaty, claiming this was an attempt by the 
Soviet Union to prevent smaller nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and 
maintain its own ability to carry out nuclear blackmail:
In order truly to do away with the nuclear treat, it is necessary to
04 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming”, (Statement by the government of 
the People’s Republic of China), in the Renmin ribao, 12 May, 1972, pg.1.
85 "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming”, (Statement by the government of
the People’s Republic of China), in the Renmin ribao, 31 October, 1972, pg.1.
06 “Meiguo zhengfu mianlin kaoyan”, (The American government is facing a trial), in the
Renmin ribao, 1 November, 1972, pg.1.
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completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy nuclear weapons. Yet the 
Soviet Government dares neither to undertake not to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons nor to touch on the question of complete prohibition 
and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons but advocates the 
cessation of all nuclear tests. Why? As everyone knows, the Soviet 
Union has made hundreds of nuclear tests. When it had made 
enough tests in the atmosphere, it proposed the partial ban on nuclear 
tests. Now when it has made enough underground tests, it calls for a 
ban on all nuclear tests. Actually this means that the Soviet Union 
could make any kind of tests when it had the need, and that when it no 
longer has the need others are not permitted to make any tests. This is 
another trap blatantly designed to maintain its nuclear monopoly, 
following the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the treaty on non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons.87
A joint-editorial published in the Renmin ribao, Hong qi, and the Jiefangjun 
ribao also published in October 1972 accused the Soviet Union of military 
expansionism and continued the criticism of Soviet proposals for nuclear 
disarmament.88
d. The end of the Vietnam War 
The signing of the Agreement on Ending the War in Vietnam and Restoring 
Peace by the various parties on 27 January, 1973 was marked by the Chinese 
with a triumphal editorial in the Renmin ribao. The editorial claimed that the 
victory of the Vietnamese showed that all oppressed nations could defeat their 
aggressors if they were willing to take up arms.89
Although the Chinese saw the ending of the Vietnam War as a victory over 
American imperialism, the promise of the eventual withdrawal of US troops 
from Vietnam also served to ease Sino-US relations by ending one possible 
source of direct conflict between the two sides. These developments appear to 
have boosted Beijing’s confidence in its own assessment of the international 
situation and in the immediate aftermath of the agreement the Chinese also
07 Kuo, (ed.) Foreign-Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975, (Taibei: 
Institute of International Relations, 1976), pp.75-76.
80 “Duoqu xin de shengli”, (Seize new victories), in Hong qi, Issue 10, 1972, pg.7.
89 "Huanying yuenan xieding de qianding", (Welcome the signing of the Vietnam 
agreement), in the Renmin ribao, 28 January, 1973, pg.1.
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appeared optimistic that the Paris accord would lead to a quick solution to the 
situation in Cambodia.90
On their way back from the conference in Paris, the Vietnamese delegation 
stopped in Beijing, where the Chinese held a celebratory meeting and banquet 
to commemorate their success. The banquet is perhaps most noteworthy for 
the prominence of members of the radical Left in official reporting of this event. 
Jiang Qing appeared second in a list of Party and government leaders 
attending the meeting, after Zhou Enlai. Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan 
were listed fourth and fifth respectively, after Ye Jianying, but ahead of Li 
Xiannian. Zhang Chunqiao also gave the keynote speech.91
The period in the run-up to the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 
certainly saw a resurgence in the activities of the radical Left in other areas 
however it is difficult to explain the presence of the three radical figures in these 
terms. The reporting on their presence at this meeting is similar to that of a 
banquet in honour of Prince Shihanouk, held in March 1972. Jiang, Zhang and 
Yao had attended this banquet, and were listed in identical positions in official 
reporting, in stark contrast to reports of their activities during Nixon’s visit only a 
month earner. Simiiariy, official reports of the banquet held in September 1972 
in honour of the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka show that none of the 
three radical figures attended.92
All this suggests that the political orientation of the three was sufficiently 
strong to lead them to avoid, where possible, being associated with figures 
from “imperialist" countries. Little can be deduced from Zhang’s speech at the 
banquet in honour of the Vietnamese delegation as it followed the official line
90 “Zhichi Jianpuzhai Wangguo minzu tuanjie zhengfu de yanzheng lichang”, (Support the 
grave position of the Government of National Unity of the Kingdom of Cambodia), in the Renmin 
ribao, 1 February, 1973, pg.1.
91 "Shoudu longzhong jihui relie qingzhu Yuenan tingzhan heping xieding jianding”, (A 
grand assembly in the capital warmly celebrates the signing of the peace agreement on ending 
hostilities in Vietnam), in the Renmin ribao, 3 February, 1973, pg.1.
92 "Tianzhong Jiaorong zongli dachen dadao Beijing Zhou zongli juxing anhui huanying 
Tianzhong shouxiang”, (Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei arrives in Beijing Premier Zhou held a 
banquet to welcome Prime Minister Tanaka), in the Renmin ribao, 26 September, 1972, pg. 1.
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of criticizing all "big powers”,93 however, the subsequent elevation of Wang 
Hongwen to second in the Party hierarchy may have given the radical Left an 
increased influence over foreign policy. Certainly, in late-1973, Wang began to 
attend a number of meetings between Mao and visiting foreign dignitories, 
although he continued to be listed after Zhou Enlai.
Despite the Paris agreement, ongoing US support for the regimes in Saigon 
and Phenom Phen continued to draw Chinese criticism. A number of articles 
appeared in the Chinese media throughout the rest of 1973 and into 1974 
attacking US actions, although much of the language of these articles appears 
routine.94 Certainly, any concerns the Chinese had were not allowed to 
interfere with a visit by Henry Kissinger in February 1973, who held meetings 
with Mao, Zhou and Ji Pengfei.
e. China is a part of the Third World
Beginning in 1973 Chinese leaders made a number of statements clearly 
identifying the PRC as a member of the Third World. This marked a 
fundamental shift from China’s position at the start of the Cultural Revolution 
which had described China as being a member of the socialist camp and 
identified China with what was seen as the main characteristic of the present 
world situation, the fight of Third World nations against US and Soviet 
aggression.
Mao first identified China as a member of the Third World during during a talk 
with the leader of Mali in June 1973.95 An editorial published on 13 September 
marking the fourth meeting of heads of the non-aligned movement, repeated
93 “Zhang Chunqiao tongzhi de jianghua", (Comrade Zhang Chunqiao’s speech), in the 
Renmin ribao, 3 February, 1973.
94 See, for example, “Jianpuzhai renmin bi sheng”, (The Cambodian people will certainly 
win), in the Renmin ribao, 23 March, 1973, pg.1, “Tuanjie, zhandou, shengli de sannian”, (Three 
years of unity, struggle and victory), in the Renmin ribao, 25 April, 1973, pg.1, and “Relie 
huanying laizi Yuenan nanfang de qinmi zhanyou”, (Warmly welcome our close comrade in arms 
from Southern Vietnam), in the Renmin ribao, 18 November, 1973, pg.1.
95 Chen Donglin, Miao Yang, Li Danhui, (eds.), Chugoku bunku daikakumei jiten, (A 
dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution), (Fukuoka: Chugoku shoten, 1997), pg. 938.
304
this line, and linked China with the struggles of third world countries for 
independence:
China is a developing socialist country, and is part of the Third 
World. During the long mutual struggle, China and the people of the 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have formed a deep 
friendship. We resolutely support the desire for independence of the 
people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, uphold the struggles of the 
rightous nations and people against imperialism, new and old 
colonialism, apartheid, Zionism and big power hegemonism, and 
resolutely support the non-aligned countries in carrying out policies of 
peace and neutrality. We believe, if the nations and people of the Third 
World rely on their own strength, resolutely struggle, strengthen their 
unity, maintain their vigilence and increase their defences then they 
will definately achieve even bigger victories in their struggle against 
imperialism, against colonialism and against hegemonism.96
China’s championing of the Third World was used to criticize the actions of the 
Soviet Union and should partly be seen in the light of Sino-Soviet competition 
for influence in Africa and Asia.
As China moved into 1974, this identification with the Third World would form 
an integral plank of Mao’s new “Three Worlds Theory”, which formed the basis 
for Deng Xiaoping’s major speech to the United Nations.
4. Further differentiation between the superpowers and Mao’s “Three Worlds 
Theory” : 1974-1976
a. Mao’s “Three Worlds Theory”
At the beginning of 1974, China marked the first anniversary of the signing of 
the agreement on ending the Vietnam War with a low-key editorial in the 
Renmin ribao. The editorial celebrated successes such as the withdrawal of 
US troops from South Vietnam, however it also continued the earlier criticism of 
the Saigon regime, and US support for that regime, for not fully implementing
96 “Zhuhe disici bujiemeng guojia shounao huiyi shengli bimu”, (Congratulate the victorious 
conclusion of the fourth meeting of heads from the non-aligned countries), in the Renmin ribao, 
13 September, 1973, pg.1.
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the accord.97 China’s earlier optimism on a quick resolution to the problems in 
southeast Asia had faded, and a number of further articles and editorials critical 
of US support for the regimes in Saigon and Phnom Phen continued to appear 
in the media throughout 1974.
During the first four months of that year, Mao met with a number of foreign 
visitors and newspaper reports show that Wanq Honqwen also attended these 
meetings in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Party. As I noted above,
Wang had risen to second in the Party hierarchy at the Tenth Party Congress 
and it seems that attending these meetings was a reflection of this new status. 
There is no record of Wang having spoken at any of these meetings, and he 
continued to be listed after Zhou Enlai, however his presence at the meetings 
would have been a significant boost to the radical Left, giving them access to 
these high-level meetings.98
Despite his elevation, Wang was not chosen for what proved to be one of the 
most symbolic events in Chinese foreign policy during the Mao-era, the 
delivery of a speech to the United Nations outlining Mao’s “Three Worlds 
Theory", instead, the radical Left’s arch-rival, Deng Xiaoping, was chosen. The 
selection of Deng may be an indication of Mao’s tendency to balance 
appointments between contending coalitions, but it seems more likely that this 
was an indication of Wang’s lack of experience on the international stage, 
suggesting that Mao was reluctant to entrust such an important speech to the 
inexperienced Wang.
Mao had earlier outlined the idea of the countries of the world being divided 
into three areas during a talk with the Zambian President Kenneth Kawanda. 
Mao stated that he saw the US and the Soviet Union as the first world, Europe,
97 “Bali xieding yingdang chedi zhixing", (The Paris agreement should be fully implemented), 
in the Renmin ribao, 27 January, 1974, pg.1.
98 Wang is variously reported to have attended meetings between Mao and the Zambian 
President (Renmin ribao, 23 February, 1974, pg.1), Mao and the Tanzanian President, (Renmin 
ribao, 26 March, 1974, pg.1), and Mao and a Cambodian delegation, (Renmin ribao, 3 April, 
1974, pg.1).
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Japan, Australasia, and Canada as the second world, and the remaining 
countries as the third world, this included China." Mao distinguished between 
the countries in terms of money and possession of nuclear bombs:
America and the Soviet Union have nuclear weapons, and they are 
comparatively wealthy; The second world, Europe, Japan, Australia 
and Canada, don’t have many atomic weapons, and they aren’t as 
wealthy [as the US and the Soviet Union]; however, compared to the 
third world, they are wealthy.100
This simple definition was to form the foundation of the Chinese world view for 
the remaining period under study in this thesis, even though Mao appears to 
have made no further comment on the subject. The publication of a leading 
editorial in 1977 saw these simple comments elevated to the proportions of a 
“theory”.
The Chinese leadership used a special meeting of the UN, held to discuss 
questions of resources and development, to publicise China’s new position. 
That the leadership took this seriously is shown by the fact that they dispatched 
Deng to New York, rather than rely on Huang Hua, China’s permanent 
representative to the UN.
The selection of Deng above Wang Hongwen suggests the influence of Zhou 
Enlai, but Mao personally chose Deng Xiaoping, and criticized Jiang Qing 
when she objected to Deng going to New York.101 Since his rehabilitation in 
April 1973, Deng and Zhou had worked together in a number of areas, 
however Deng had not played a prominent role in the foreign policy arena, for 
instance he had not appeared at any of the meetings between Mao and senior 
foreign dignitaries attended by Zhou and Wang. Wang reportedly had incurred 
the Chairman’s displeasure for his naiviete with Mao telling Wang “Politically,
99 "Guanyu san ge shijie huafen wenti”, (On the problem of differentiating the three worlds), 
in Selected foreign policy works of Mao Zedong, pg.600.
100 Ibid, pg.600.
101 Benjamin Yang, Deng A Political Biography (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 
pg.179.
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you are no good, and Deng Xiaoping is far better”.102 This seems the likeliest 
reason for the selection of Deng.
Whatever the politics of Deng’s selection, he was given a send off at Beijing 
airport that involved nearly all of China’s senior leadership, again underlining 
the importance of his speech. Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan 
attended the farewell as well as other leading Party, government and military 
figures including Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen and 
Xu Xiangqian were also prominent in the list of those present, as was Hua 
Guofeng, who was listed ninth. Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and all five of the 
current Vice-Ministers also attended.103
Deng delivered his speech to the United Nations on 10 April. He began by 
outlining the Chinese view that the trend in the world was one of “chaos”
( tianxia daluan), and that as a result of numerous lengthy conflicts there had 
been major political changes and re-organizations. Deng argued that the 
independence movement in the Third World had strengthened, and that at the 
same time the “western imperialist clique” had split as a result of uneven 
development. Because of these changes, countries could be divided into three 
“worlds” that were at once mutually linked and mutally opposed to each other. 
Deng repeated Mao’s formulation that the US and the Soviet Union made up 
the first world. Asia, Africa, Latin America and other developing countries like 
China made up the Third World, and Europe, Canada, Australaisa and Japan 
made up the second world. In a sign of the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, 
Deng singled out the Soviet Union as the worst of the two superpowers.104
Deng developed the theme that had been apparent in Chinese statements of
1 0 2 ^  p g . 179.
103 “Deng Xiaoping fu zongli shuai daibiaotuan li jing pu niuyue chuxi liandatebie huiyi”, (The 
delegation led by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping has left Beijing and arrived in New York to attend 
the special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), in the Renmin ribao, 7 April, 1974, 
pg.1.
104 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo daibiaotuan tuanzhang Deng Xiaoping zai lianda di liu jie 
tebie huiyi shang de fayan”, (Leader of the delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng 
Xiaoping’s speech at the 6th special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly), in the 
Renmin ribao, 11 April, 1974, reprinted in the Xinhua yuebao, April 1974, pg.8 ,
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the last tew years that characterized the Third World as the most revolutionary 
because they had endured the most exploitation. This appears to be a 
development of the notion that the Chinese people were a “blank canvas". The 
countries of the second world were said to be both exploiters and exploited and 
so, much as in the united front, some countries could serve as allies to the Third 
World. Their opposition to the “big power politics” of the two superpowers was 
said to have had a “significant influence on the development of the 
international situation”.105
On China’s position of self-reliance, Deng underlined that China advocated 
“relying on the strength and wisdom of your own people”. However he went on:
Maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in one’s own 
hands and self-regeneration isn’t "closing the country to international 
intercourse” [biguan zihsou ] and refusing outside aid.106
This is the clearest indication of China’s desire to open to the outside world 
following the end of the mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. In the 
following year ana'a haififwouid Y6rm a major point or Contention obtWeen 
Deng and the moderates and members of the radical Left.
Deng’s visit to the UN was something of a personal triumph and his 
performance clearly won Mao’s support, following Deng’s return, he was 
included in Mao’s meetings with foreign visitors, eclipsing Wang Hongwen, 
who was apparently left out of many of these meetings.107
As is clear from Deng’s comments at the UN and the editorial of 9 April, the 
Soviet Union continued to come in for increasing criticism from the PRC in
1974. Early in the year, a series of incidents served to increase the tension 
between the two sides. In January, relations deteriorated over an alleged 
spying incident. This was followed by a series of tit-for-tat expulsions of Soviet
105 Ibid, pg.9.
106 Ibid, pg.10.
107 Yang, DENG A Political Biography, pg.181.
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and Chinese diplomats. The Renmin ribao published an alleged confession of 
the spy, Wang Hongshu, on 22 January.108
b. Disputes between the radical Left and Deng Xiaoping 
Following his successful visit to the United Nations in May, Deng Xiaoping 
eclipsed Wang Hongwen'in the field of foreign affairs, appearing in Wang's 
stead with Mao during his meetings with foreign dignitories. This was probably 
a result of Wang’s failure to learn how “to conduct himself appropriately” and 
that he “remained an embarrassment in the presence of foreign dignitaries”.109 
As I have related in early chapters, through 1974 and 1975, Deng Xiaoping 
and Zhou Enlai’s reforms came in for increasing criticism from members of the 
radical left. There are indications that the two coalitions clashed over elements 
of foreign policy during this period, in particular over the issue of further 
opening to the outside world. However, the overall foreign policy line had been 
laid down by Mao as outlined above, and the radical Left did not, or could not, 
criticize the main elements of this line.
Deng’s Selected Works do not contain any speeches from 1973 or 1974, 
however it is clear from his comments in later speeches that Deng supported 
greater economic contact with the rest of the world, in particular he advocated 
increasing exports to pay for imports of equipment and technology to 
modernize the Chinese economy. In a speech from August 1975, Deng stated:
Traditional export products such as industrial and handicrafts must 
use every means to increase exports. We must consider exporting 
chemical products. We should also consider exporting coal and 
should think of signing long-term contracts with foreign countries to 
import technology and equipment to develop new coal mines and use 
coal to pay [them] back. There are many benefits in doing this: (1) We 
increase exports, (2) we can bring about the technological 
transformation of the coal industry, and (3) we can increase productive 
forces. This is a major policy, and as soon as the Central Committee
108 “Suxiu paiqian tewu Li Hongshu de yi fen gongci", (The confession of the Soviet spy Li 
Hongshu), in the Renmin ribao, 22 January, 1974, reprinted in the Xinhua yuebao, January 
1974, pg.11.
109 Yang, DENG A Political Biography, pg.181.
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has approved it we will carry it out. In short, we must strive to export 
more goods, swapping them for more high-grade, precision and 
advanced technology and equipment, so as to speed up the 
technological transformation of industry and raise productivity.110
Although Deng’s actual position in 1974 is unclear, he did come in for intense 
criticism from the radical Left on the issue of increasing economic contact with 
the world, most notably over what became known as the Fengqingiun 
Incident.
The Fengqing was the first domestically built cargo ship over 100,000 tons to 
successfully complete a voyage to Europe. The ship arrived back in Shanghai 
on 30 September, the eve of China’s National Day, and its voyage was given 
prominent media publicity by the radical Left’s supporters. An article wriitten by 
two reporters from the Shanghai newspaper Jiefang ribao, (Liberation Daily) 
linked the successful voyage to Mao’s policy of independence and 
“regeneration through one’s own efforts’’ (duli zizhu, zili gengsheng ):
The workers who built the steamer “Fengqing“ are pioneers in 
thoroughly implementing Chairman Mao’s policies of independence 
and maintaining the initiative in one’s own hands and 
regeneration through one’s own efforts, [original in bold] the 
crew of the steamer “Fengqing “ are heroes who dare to sail against 
the wind. In order to defend Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, they 
together with the boat builders, have launched a fierce attack against 
the thinking of worshipping and having blind faith in foreign goods, 
smashing the slavish comprador philosophy that says [only] “foreign 
built ships can navigate long-distances”, and built the first long­
distance vessel made completely of Chinese equipment.111
At a Politburo meeting on 17 October, Jiang Qing used the success of the 
Fengqing to launch a strong attack on those who advocated importing foreign 
vessels, claiming this was “worshipping foreign things and fawning on foreign
110 Deng Xiaoping, “Guanyu fazhan gongye de jidian yijian", (A few ideas on developing 
industry), in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, (di erjuan), (Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works (Volume 2)), 
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pg. 29.
111 "Duli zizhu, zili gengsheng de yiqu kaige", (A song of triumph for maintaining 
independence and keeping the initiative in one’s own hands and regeneration through one’s 
own efforts), in the Renmin ribao, 12 October, 1974, reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, October 1974, 
pg.174.
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powers", (chongyang me/wa/).112 In an attack on Deng Xiaoping and Zhou 
Enlai, who in 1970 had advocated importing foreign ships, Jiang Qing 
demanded that Deng make his position clear.
The issue of foreign economic policy formed only a part of the wider conflict 
between moderates like Deng and the radical Left, however it is significant in 
that it was the major bone of contention between the two sides with regards to 
China’s overall foreign relations. As I noted above, Mao’s authority in the field 
of China’s foreign policy limited the radical Left’s scope for criticism, thus the 
Fengqing Incident gave the radical Left an opportunity to criticize Deng 
Xiaoping and the moderates for apparently going against Mao’s stated policies 
of self-reliance and self-regeneration. However on theoretical issues and on 
issues of China’s relations with the two superpowers, statements by both sides 
essentially follow the overall line113 and the radical Left’s use of the 
Fengqingiun Incident was a relatively weak attempt to influence foreign policy.
With Wang Hongwen’s eclipse, and Mao’s ambivalence towards the 
factional activities of the Gang of Four in foreign affairs, the radical Left had little 
direct input into foreign-policy decision-making. Mao continued to dominate 
this field, despite growing ill-health, and moderates in the State Council, in the 
form of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and MFA officials controlled the 
implementation of China’s foreign policy. The moderates’ influence can only 
have increased with the appointment of Vice-miniser Qiao Guanhua, as the 
new Minister of Foreign Affairs in November 1974. Qiao was a career diplomat 
and a long-time colleague of Zhou Enlai.
One area where the radical Left did try to increase their influence over 
foreign affairs was in extending the implementation of on-going political 
campaigns to the MFA and in particular to officials serving in China’s
112 Wang, A dictionary of major events of the CCP, pg.456.
113 See, for example, Jiang Qing’s comments in an address to diplomatic cadres in which she 
repeats the standard line with regards to the US and the Soviet Union, in Kuo, Foreign Policy 
Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975, pg. 37.
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embassies overseas. However, even here, they appear to have accepted 
some of the arguments of the moderates that officials overseas had important 
work that could not be distrupted to the same extent as officials serving at 
home. In an address to diplomatic cadres, Jiang Qing is reported as saying:
The task on the diplomatic frontline is different from that on other 
frontlines. Because diplomatic workers have to spend a considerably 
longer time working abroad, we cannot make demands of them as we 
do people at home. Nor can we use the methods we are using at 
home.114
The dispute between the radical Left and moderates would continue 
throughout 1975, however there is no evidence that the moderates’ influence 
weakened before the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, with Deng 
continuing to attend Mao’s meetings with foreign dignitories and leading the 
meetings during US President Ford’s visit in December 1975. This was in 
contrast to Deng’s apparently weakened position at the First Dazhai 
Conference in September and the criticism of moderate reforms to hgiher 
education.
c. Breakthroughs in southeast Asia and China's relations with the two 
superpowers
The capture in April of Phenom Phen by forces loyal to Prince Shihanouk, 
and the subsequent liberation of Saigon in May were greeted with triumphant 
editorials in China. These victories confirmed for the Chinese the view set out 
by Deng Xiaoping in his speech to the United Nations that the “main trend in 
the world today was for countries to want independence” and that the “two 
superpowers were beset with difficulties at home and abroad”.
The differentiation in the PRC’s treatment of the two superpowers sharpened 
in 1975. Although the Chinese leadership’s analysis saw the world situation as 
being harmful to both the US and the Soviet Union, it also characterized
114 "Chiang Ch’ing’s Address to Diplomatic Cadres”, in ibid, pp.40-41.
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on this weakness to expand its influence. Shortly after the Communist victory 
in Vietnam, the new Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua delivered a major foreign 
policy speech to senior Party members. In his speech, Qiao set out China’s 
view in somewhat colourful language:
One special characteristic of the recent world situation is the decline 
and impairment of American imperialism and the consequent elation of 
social-imperialism [the Soviet Union]. The Soviet union expects 
American imperialism to retract its dirty hands and wash them in the 
Mississippi so that the Soviet Union can replace the United States in 
world hegemony.115
Deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations clearly had an impact on China’s 
relations with Vietnam. John Garver traces the origins of Vietnamese 
discontent to China’s 1972 rapprochement with the US and to Chinese 
pressure on the Vietnamese to accept a peace deal which included Nguyen 
Van Thieu’s regime in Saigon.116 The Chinese were anxious that any power 
vacuum left by the sudden withdrawal of American troops could be filled by the 
Soviet Union and so pressured the North Vietnamese to temporarily accept a 
partial US presence in the south. While Vietnam was still engaged in fighting 
the Saigon regime, these tensions remained hidden under the surface, 
however the liberation of Saigon clearly removed this obstacle, and Sino- 
Vietnamese relations deteriorated rapidly in the following years.
In contrast to the strong Chinese polemic directed against the Soviet Union, 
Sino-US relations improved throughout 1975, culminating with the visit of US 
President Gerald Ford in December. Certainly the victories in Cambodia and 
Vietnam over US-backed forces removed two of the main stumbling blocks to 
improved relations with America. Deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations, and 
the Vietnamese ties with the Soviet Union may also have raised Chinese fears
115 “Ch’iao Kuan-hua’s Speech on Foreign Policy”, in Kuo, Foreign-Policy Speeches by 
Chinese Communist Leaders 1963-1975, pg.11.
116 John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of Chian, pp. 168- 169.
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of Soviet encirclement, leading them to seek better relations with the US.
China continued to criticize American actions, particularly with regards to the 
Middle East and Latin America, however these atacks were moderate in 
contrast to criticism of the Soviet Union.
Gera! Ford visited the PRC from 1-5 December in only the second ever visit 
by a US President. Zhou Enlai, whose health was failing, delegated Deng 
Xiaoping to lead the Chinese side during Ford’s visit. Deng hosted the main 
banquet in Ford’s honour, attended the meeting between Ford and Mao and 
met with Ford on his own. This all suggests that Deng still held Mao’s 
confidence, however these were Deng’s last major appearances with foreign 
dignitories before his second purge following Zhou’s death in January 1976. 
This apparent confidence in Deng in foreign affairs in in contrast to Yang 
Quan’s comments that Deng was already in poitical difficulties at the time of the 
First National Conference to Study Dazhai, held in September of that year.117
5. The death of Mao and the Hua Guofenq intereqium: 1976-1978
Whatever Mao’s confidence in his Vice-Premier in December, by January 
this had clearly evaporated in the face of prolonged agitation by members of 
the radical Left and Mao’s own concerns regarding educational reforms 
introduced by Deng. The death of Zhou Enlai on 8 January left Deng Xiaoping 
without his main political backer and crucially, at this point, Mao chose to back 
the radical Left against Deng. After delivering the eulogy at Zhou’s funeral on 
15 January, Deng disappeared from public view for over a year. The radical 
Left certainly campaigned to have Zhang Chunqiao appointed as the new 
Premier, however, Mao, disenchanted with some of their overt political 
activities, chose Hua Guofeng as a compromise candidate. He was appointed 
acting-Premier in early February.
117 Yatiy Quan, Chen Yonggui zhuan, (Biography of Chen Yonggui), (Wuhan: Changjiang 
wsnyi chubanshs 1996) py 277
Hua Guofeng very quickly took on the role of meeting with foreign dignitories, 
but only in a role supporting Mao. Mao continued to show an interest in 
meeting foreign visitors despite his ill-health, and Hua appeared at Mao’s side 
in a position variously filled at one time or another by Zhou Enlai, Wang 
Hongwen and Deng Xiaoping. He attended Mao's meetings with former US 
President Nixon on 23 February, with a Laotian delegation on 18 March, and at 
one of Mao's last public appearances at a meeting with Pakistan’s Prime 
Minister Bhutto on 27 May. Hua also held independent talks with the Laotian 
delegation, also attended by Yao Wenyuan.118
The death of Zhou Enlai and the purge of Deng Xiaoping does not appear to 
have effected the position of moderate figures within the MFA. Qiao Guanhua 
continued to serve as Foreign Minister, although he would be replaced in 
November, following Hua Guofeng’s elevation to Party leader. All of the current 
Vice-Ministers also continued in post. But the activities of these figures 
reduced considerably in the run-up to Mao’s death in September. Qiao 
Guanhua evidently attended the February meeting between Mao and Nixon, 
but he did not attend either of the other meetings mentioned above. It seems 
likely that in the intensifying political conflict that characterized this period MFA 
officials found it increasingly difficult to carry out routine work. Mao’s personal 
interest, as far as he was able to express this, also appears to have reduced 
factional competition within the foreign affairs system and would have 
hampered the radical Left’s ability to criticize the activities of individual officials.
There were no major policy initiatives in the period leading up to Mao’s 
death, although in the first two months of 1976 there were signs that the policy 
of further differentiating between the two superpowers was continuing. Only
110 See, “Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian meiguo qian zongtong nikesong he furen", (Chairman 
Mao Zedong met with former US President Nixon and his wife), in the Renmin ribao, 24 February, 
1976, pg.1, "Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Kai Shan tongzhi shuailing de laoguo dangzheng 
daibiaotuan”, (Chairman Mao Zedong met with a Party and government delegation from Laos led 
by Comrade Kai Shan), in the Renmin ribao, 18 March, 1976, pg.1, and “Mao Zedong zhuxi 
huijian butuo zongli he furen deng guibing”, (Chairman Mao Zedong met with Prime Minister 
Bhuto and his wife and other honoured guests), in the Renmin ribao, 28 May, 1976, pg.1.
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two weeks before giving former US President Nixon a warm welcome, the 
Renmin ribao had published a front page editorial highly critical of Soviet 
actions in Angola.119 Subsequently, Prime Minister Bhutto’s visit was used to 
criticize Soviet actions in South Asia.120
The period after Mao’s death in September was characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty, as was bound to happen after the death of China’s 
paramount leader. However the arrest of the Gang of Four in October eased 
tensions internally, and established Hua Guofeng as the leader of the CCP as 
well as Premier. Their followed a period of consolidation, both for China and 
for Hua Guofeng, and its is clear that Hua used the opportunity afforded him as 
China’s Party and government leader to meet with foreign guests to further 
bolster his position. During December 1976 the Renmin ribao gave 
prominent coverage to his meetings with delegations from Vietnam and 
Tanzania. A telegram marking the election of a new General Secretary of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party was sent in Hua’s name alone, where before 
other senior political and military figures might also have signed it.121
As I discussed in earlier chapters, there were no major personnel changes at 
this point in the fields of higher education or agriculture, but Qiao Guanhua was 
replaced as Foreign Minister by Huang Hua in December 1976. It is hard to 
interpret this move. Qiao was 64 and may simply have felt the need to retire.
His replacement, Huang, can in no way be seen as being closer to Hua 
Guofeng. Huang was another career diplomat who had served as China’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations since 1971 and had thus 
largely been away from Beijing for the time Hua had been working at the 
centre. By promoting Huang, Hua Guofeng may have been trying to gain his
119 “Suxiu zhimin kuangzhang de dabaolu", (A major expose of Soviet revisionism's colonial 
expansionism), in the Renmin ribao, 4 February, 1976, pg.1.
120 “Relie huanying bajisitan guibing”, (Warmly welcome the honoured guest from Pakistan), 
in the Renmin ribao, 26 May, 1976, pg.1.
121 "Hua Guofeng zhuxi de hedian”, (Chairman Hua Guofeng’s telegram of congratulation), in 
the Renmin ribao, 22 December, 1976, pg.1.
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support within the MFA.
In contrast to agriculture, the period immediately after Mao’s death saw no 
major new policy initiatives, indeed, unlike either agriculture or higher 
education, foreign policy saw little policy conflict in the period 1977-1978. Hua 
and Deng would later clash over Hua’s policy of increasing foreign trade, 
however this argument was about the extent of contact with foreign countries, 
not the contact itself. Hua’s most significant initiative, launched in November 
1977, was to elevate Mao’s concept of the “Three Worlds" into the status of a 
theory, however this move appears to have had the support of a broad range of 
leaders, including Deng. The “Three Worlds Theory’’ continued to form the 
basis for China’s strategic view for the remainder of the period under study in 
this thesis. The policy of differentiating between the two superpowers also 
continued through 1977-1978, with Sino-Soviet relations worsening following 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, in stark contrast to the formal 
establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations at the start of 1979.
a. Hua’s Guofeng and the “Three Worlds Theory”
The period of consolidation in China's foreign policy continued through the 
first months of 1977, with a noticeable reduction in foreign visitors to China. 
However, beginning in April, the Renmin Ribao once again began to show Hua 
Guofeng meeting foreign delegations. Although Hua was invariably pictured 
greeting the guests, Li Xiannian and Ye Jianying are also reported to have 
attended many of these meetings, reflecting their position in the post-Mao 
period.122
Hua’s first major foreign policy statement was contained in his political report
122 “Hua zhuxi huijian riben jing-tuan-lian fanghua daibiaotuan”, (Chairman Hua met a 
delegation from the Federation of Japanese Economic Organizations visiting China), in the 
Renmin Ribao, 3 April, 1977, pg.1, “Hua zhuxi huijian saqieer furen", (Chairman Hua met Mrs. 
Thatcher), in the Renmin Ribao, 10 April, 1977, pg.1. and “Hua zhuxi, Ye fuzhuxi huijian yuenan 
junshi daibiaotuan”, (Chairman Hua and Vice-Chairman Ye met a military delegation from Vietnam), 
in the Renmin Ribao, 3 June, 1977, pg.1.
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to the 11th National Party Conference, held in August 1977. Hua’s comments 
did not deviate from the earlier line set out by Mao, indeed, this speech can be 
seen as the first step forward elevating Mao’s idea of dividing the world into 
three camps into a theory. On the two superpowers, Hua repeated the view that 
America and the Soviet Union were competing to be the hegemonic power, but 
that it was the Soviet Union that was the major threat to world peace. On Mao’s 
“Three Worlds Theory”, Hua went on:
Mao’s theory of distinguishing between three worlds clearly shows 
the main trend in the current international struggle, and makes clear 
who are the main revolutionary forces, who are the main enemies, 
and who are the intermediate forces we must struggle against or unite 
with; this lets the world international proletarian struggle unite with ail 
possible forces, forming the broadest possible united front to oppose 
the main enemy.... The experience of the past few years has shown 
that this theory of Chairman Mao’s is completely correct. Following 
the passage of time it will display even greater power.123
Hua’s comments regarding Mao’s “Three Worlds Theory” were the first in a 
series of major statements eulogizing its importance. In elevating Mao’s few 
comments from 1974 to the status of a theory, Hua was clearly trying to draw on 
Mao’s legacy to bloster his own position. As I noted above, Mao had 
dominated the formulation of foreign-policy during his lifetime and the idea of 
distinguishing between three worlds had already been outlined by Deng 
Xiaoping in an address to the United Nations. Hua had little experience of 
foreign policy work and did not have close contacts with senior MFA officials. 
Therefore it seems Hua chose to develop Mao’s idea, which had broad support 
amongst the senior leadership, rather than attempt to create new policies of his 
own.
On 1 November, the Renmin ribao devoted almost all of that issue to 
publishing the theoretical article “Chairman Mao’s theory of distinguishing
123 Hua Guofeng, “Zai zhongguo gongchandang dishiyi ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de 
zhengzhi baogao”, (Political report at the 11th National Conference of the CCP), (Hong Kong: 
Joint Publishing Co., 1977), pg.33.
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between three worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism”. Apparently 
based on only three lines of comment by Mao in 1974, this six-page article set 
out to place Mao’s new theory as a development of the thinking of Marx, Lenin 
and Stalin. The article traced Mao’s evolving thinking, and highlighted Hua’s 
own comments at the 11th Party Conference.124
As I’ve noted above, there is little evidence of any disagreement within the 
senior leadership over Mao’s Three Worlds Theory, although there may have 
been some unease over eulogizing Mao so strongly. However even Deng 
Xiaoping, speaking at the end of 1977, praised the Three Worlds Theory, 
claiming that it formed the basis of China’s international struggle against 
hegemony.125
b. Opening to the world. China's foreign economic relations in 1978
Although there was a broad consensus amongst the Chinese leadership 
over China’s foreign policy, the launch of a new economic policy by Hua 
Guofeng led to disputes between China’s top leaders. Hua’s radical plans, 
which saw investment rates higher than those of the Great Leap Forward, led to 
economic chaos which played a great part in his ultimate downfall, however at 
the time of their launch at the 5th National People’s Congress in February 
1978, they enjoyed widespread support from a number of senior leaders.
Hua’s new policies are significant as they went directly against the Maoist 
notions of self-sufficiency and autarky in the national economy and called for 
substantial increases of imports of western technology. Hua’s ambitious plans 
borrowed some elements from Deng Xiaoping and paved the way for China's 
wider opening to the West and the subsequent introduction of Special
124 “Mao zhuxi guanyu sange shijie huafen de lilun shi dui makesi-iieningzhuyi de zhongda 
gongxian”, (Chairman Mao’s theory of distinguishing between three worlds is a major contribution 
to Marxism-Leninism), (Hong Kong: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanfian shudian fendian, 1977), 
pp. 26-29.
125 "Zai zhongyang junwei quanti huiyi shang de jianghua”, (Speech at a full meeting of the 
Central Committee's Military Commision), in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, 
pg.77.
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Economic Zones in the south of China.
In his work report to the 5th National Congress, held in Beijing from 26 
February-5 March, Hua Guofeng called for major advances in agricultural and 
industrial output and set out targets for the next ten years. In industry he 
announced the new construction of 120 large-scale projects, including 10 new 
iron and steel works, 8 major coal mines, 10 large oil fields and 30 large-scale 
power stations.126 As Richard Baum points out, many of these new projects 
were to rely on large-scale imports of western and Japanese technology.127
Although enjoying wide support, Hua’s new ten-year plan had disastrous 
results. Imports of new technology and sometimes entire “turnkey” factories led 
to a growth in imports of 85 percent in 1977 and 1978.128 Many of the items 
imported were unsuitable for Chinese conditions, and little thought had been 
given to the training required for their use. It was expected that increases in 
coal and oil output would pay for imports, however delays in bringing new 
projects on line led to a massive budget deficit of RMB 17.1 billion in 1979.120
Discontent grew throughout 1978, however the main focus of moderate 
attacks on Hua Guofeng was political, focusing in particular on his policy of the 
“two whatevers”. Certainly Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works remains quiet on 
economic issues in 1978, although Richard Baum suggests that this is a result 
of the fact that Hua had “borrowed” so many of Deng’s own ideas.130 Certainly 
the resemblence between Hua’s plans and Deng’s comments from 1975 
quoted above are noticeable. The key third plenum did see a shift in Party 
policy in agriculture, but wholesale reform of Hua’s ten-year plan did not occur
126 Hua Guofeng, “Tuanjie qilai, wei jianshe shehuizhuyi de xiandaihua qiangguo er fendou”, 
(Unite and strive to build a modern and strong socialist country), in Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo di wu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian, (Documents from the 
first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1978), 
pg-32.
127 Richard Baum, Burying Mao Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pg.54.
128 Ibid, pg.55.
129 Ibid, pg.56.
130 Ibid, fn.30, pg.395.
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until a central economic work conference in 1979.
6. China’s foreign relations in 1978
a. A collapse in Sino-Vietnamese relations
China’s relations with Vietnam deteriorated rapidly in 1978, firstly over 
Vietnam’s expulsion of overseas Chinese resident in Vietnam, and then, more 
significantly, following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in the autumn of 1978. 
Improving Soviet-Vietnamese relations also played an important part in 
Chinese calculations and a key editorial from 1978 blamed Soviet “smears" for 
the Vietnamese expulsions of overseas Chinese.131 As I noted above, the 
Chinese had welcomed a senior Vietnamese delgation as late as December 
1977, however the culmination of the expulsions and growing Soviet- 
Vietnamese cooperation effectively ended contact at the senior level between 
the two sides.
Following Vietnamese attacks on Cambodia in the autumn, the Renmin 
ribao published a leading editorial which criticized Vietnam for wanting to 
become the hegemonic power in Southeast Asia. In an effort to garner support 
against Vietnam, the editorial warned that Vietnam would go on to threaten 
Thailand, Malaysia and Burma.132
b. The third plenum of the 11th Central Committee and Sino-US normalization: 
December 1978
The Communique of the third plenum said very little about China’s foreign 
policy or foreign economic policy. Discussions had been dominated by the 
issue of agriculture, the Party’s focus of work, and Hua Guofeng’s own position, 
perhaps leaving little room for discussion of other topics. Hua’s foreign 
economic policy would come in for severe criticism in the new year, however on
131 “Guangming leiluo shizhong ruyi", (Open and above board, it has always been like that), in 
the Renmin ribao.
132 «gu yue baqUan2hUyjZhe yuanxing bilu”, (The Soviet and Vietnamese hegemons must 
be revealed for what they are), in the Renmin ribao, 16 December, 1978, pg.1.
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foreign policy and China’s foreign relations there still appears to have been a 
broad consensus within the Chinese leadership. Certainly this meeting saw no 
major policy initiatives in the way that it did for agriculture.
While the plenum was meeting, China and the US formally announced they 
would establish diplomatic relations from 1 January, 1979, some seven years 
after President Nixon’s ground-breaking visit.133 Negotiations between the two 
sides had continued quietly and although the question of Taiwan remained a 
problem, the establishment of diplomatic relations was a major success for the 
PRC and appeared to have broad support within the senior leadership. Deng 
Xiaoping would seal this achievement with a triumphant visit to the US in 
January.
The Chinese side clearly saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
the US as an opportunity to resolve the issue of Taiwan and on the same day 
that relations were formally established the PRC took the conciliatory step of 
formally ending the bombardment of the offshore islands still occupied by 
Taiwanese troops.134 On the same day the Renmin ribao also published a letter 
of petition from the NPC Standing Committee to Taiwan, which used the 
mainland’s diplomatic triumph to issue a new call for reunification.
The establishment of diplomatic relations with the US was clearly a major 
victory for the PRC. Despite serious concerns regarding Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union, Deng, 
speaking at a meeting to discuss the petition to Taiwan, talked in glowing terms 
about China’s international position:
Last year, in international affairs, the basic policies we followed 
were those that had formerly been laid down by Chairman Mao and 
Premier Zhou, however they had been unable to realize them before
133 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he meili jianhe zhongguo guanyu jianli waijiao guanxi de 
lianhe gongbao”, (Joint Communique by the People’s Republic of China and the United States 
of America on establishing diplomatic relations), in the Renmin ribao, 17 December, 1978, 
reprinted in Xinhua yuebao, December 1978, pg. 240.
134 “Guofang buzhang Xu Xiangqian shengming tingzhi paoji da, xiao Jinmen deng daoyu”, 
(Minister of Defence Xu Xiangqian announces the end of the bombardment of large and small 
Jinmen and other islands), in the Renmin ribao, 1 January, 1979, pg.1.
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their death. We have realized a part of their legacy. The signing of the 
Sino-Japanese friendship treaty and the normalization of Sino-US 
relations are beneficial to world peace and stability and are beneficial 
to the development of the international anti-hegemonistic cause. At 
the present, we face numerous problems and we must continue to 
strive hard. In international affairs we must continue to consolidate 
and expand the excellent position we have already achieved. 1 
believe, those committee members present must be happy and 
optimistic at our current position, and that they happily made their own 
contributions.135
7. Conclusion
In contrast to the two previous chapters on higher education and agriculture, 
this chapter has shown that from late-1969, foreign policy decision-making was 
not characterized by conflict over policy to the extent seen in the other two 
issue areas. The main reason for the lack of factionalization highlighted by this 
chapter was the perception on the part of China’s senior leaders of the cost of 
failure in foreign policy (the threat of a war with the Soviet Union) which served 
to create a stronger consensus on major policy issues than might otherwise be 
expected during the Cultural Revolution period. The domination of foreign 
policy decision-making by a handful of senior leaders was also significant, 
further dampening any factional tendencies, and the authority of Mao and his 
strong stance served to reduce policy conflict in this field in a way that was not 
evident in either agriculture or higher education.
This chapter has shown that although the foreign policy system underwent a 
period of radicalization similar to higher education during the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution, the debilitating effects of the radical upsurge 
on China’s foreign relations led China’s senior leaders to restore order in the 
foreign policy system and this was followed by a de-radicalization of policy that 
continued throughout the period under study in this thesis. Intensifying border 
clashes with the Soviet Union in the first half of 1969 led directly to a strategic
135 “Jiejue Taiwan wenti, wancheng zuguo tongyi daye tishang juti richeng", (A concrete 
agenda for resolving the Taiwan problem and completing the great cause of the unification of the 
Motherland), in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, pg.155.
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change in China’s foreign policy stance and renewed overtures to the US in an 
attempt to balance the perceived Soviet threat. This change in policy was on 
the personal initiative of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and came on the advice 
of four senior military figures who had undertaken a review of China’s strategic 
position. The selection of these four and the exclusion of Lin Biao and 
members of the radical Left from their deliberations suggests a high degree of 
pragmatism in foreign policy decision-making.
There is some evidence of the radical Left’s displeasure at this change in 
policy (notably the way they stayed away from meetings with visitors from 
America and Japan), however policy statements by radicals and Lin Biao have 
been shown to have largely followed the overall line of the Party. This line of 
differentiating between the two superpowers remained in place throughout the 
Cultural Revolution period and continued under Hua Guofeng. The major 
policy initiative during this period, Mao’s “Three Worlds Theory,” received 
support from all sides. Even though Hua Guofeng was under attack politically, 
there is little indication of serious disagreements over China’s foreign policy 
within the senior leadeship during this period, Deng Xiaoping even went out of 
his way to show his support for the Three Worlds Theory in a number of 
speeches both at home and abroad.
Hua Guofeng’s major contribution to China’s foreign policy had been to 
attempt to maintain the status quo by promoting Mao’s concept of Three Worlds 
into a theory. This move is reminiscent of his support for Mao’s educational 
line, and, as in the case of education, suggests Hua had little experience of his 
own to lay out a major new policy line. Hua might also have been trying to tap 
into the broad support for Mao’s "Three Worlds Theory” to bolster his own 
position.
In contrast Hua’s foreign economic policy was a radical departure from 
China’s former posture of self-reliance, although the continued promotion of 
slogans like zili-gengsheng in the media had hidden the fact that contact with
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the outside world had been expanding since the end of the mobilizational 
phase of the Cultural Revolution. Hua’s ambitious economic plans came under 
attack when they led to a major budget deficit, however Hua’s main opponent, 
Deng Xiaoping, remained largely quiet during this criticism. It is clear that 
many of Hua’s ideas had come from documents drafted under Deng’s auspices 
during 1974-1975 and Deng shared many of Hua’s views that China should 
open more widely to the outside world. The major point of contention bewteen 
Hua and Deng was not whether China should open to the West, but to what 
extent. Following Hua’s ouster Deng would lead the drive to further contacts 
and launch the Special Economic Zones policy.
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Conclusion: The Compartmentalization of Policy-Making in 
the PRC
In undertaking this study of agriculture, higher-education and foreign policy, I 
have attempted to highlight variations in the policy-making process across 
different issue areas and provide an explanation of the reasons for this 
variation. A review of earlier literature on the policy-making process shows that 
it used two models to describe decision-making in the PRC during the period 
1969-1978: The first model characterizes the Cultural Revolution by periods of 
across-the-board radicalization or moderation of policy, such that a 
radicalization in agricultural policy is matched by a similar radicalization in 
higher education, or a period of moderation in foreign policy is matched by a 
similar line in both of the other two areas; The second model focuses on the 
balancing between different factions, with Mao playing a leading role in 
ensuring that no one faction dominates the policy-making process.
This research rejected these two views and put forward a third alternative, 
that there is a high degree of “compartmentalization” of the Chinese decision­
making process. This suggests that there is variation in policy-making across 
different policy areas and that each issue area had its own coherent logic and 
followed a pattern that was far more independent of other issue areas than 
earlier research suggests. The previous chapters on higher education, 
agriculture and foreign policy have shown that this possibility best reflects the 
reality of decision-making in the PRC during this period.
The perception of the risk of failure by senior leaders has been identified as 
the leading variable which explains this variation. In addition I have suggested 
that membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies and 
previous experience acted as intervening variables which could enhance or 
detract from an actor’s influence and effect policy outcomes. I will outline the
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findings of each of the three studies of individual issue areas below before 
highlighting the apparent variations in policy-making across the three areas. I 
will then outline the reasons for these variations before going on to suggest an 
improved model of the policy-making process in the PRC.
Higher Education
More than any other sector, higher education suffered as a result of the 
mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution. Universities and colleges 
across China closed as many students were mobilized to take part in the Red 
Guard movement and teachers and other staff were often subject to brutal 
attack. The issue of higher education became the focus of intense debate in 
the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and universities and colleges were 
the focus of competition between the different coalitions, particularly during the 
controversy over the role of the work teams sent by Liu Shaoqi and his 
supporters to restrict the burgeoning movement. Although it had originally only 
been intended that universities would close for six months, it was not until 1970 
that they began to re-open nationally.
The “Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, adopted by the eleventh plenum of the 8th 
Central Committee in August 1966 was intended to provide a blueprint for the 
prosecution of the Cultural Revolution. It called for the transformation of the old 
educational system, including the shortening of courses, the simplification of 
teaching material, and increased participation in manual labour. As the 
universities and colleges re-opened a key element of the new line was the 
abolition of the national entrance examination and the introduction of a system 
of recommendation of potential students, which emphasized the importance of 
political factors. This policy was an attempt to improve the low numbers of 
students being enrolled from groups such as the workers, peasants and 
military, the “red classes”.
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The radical Left were able to use model institutions such as the Shanghai 
Machine Tools Factory school to develop a comprehensive policy programme 
which covered both science and engineering colleges and arts institutions.
The radical Left’s influence over the formation of higher-education policy was 
enhanced by their role on leading bodies such as the Science and Education 
Group (SEG), which oversaw policy-making in this area until 1975, and their 
control of key educational instutions such as Peking, Tsinghua and Fudan 
universities. These institutions acted as test-points for the radical Left’s line. 
Their control over higher education policy was underlined at the National 
Educational Work Conference which convened in Beijing in April 1971. This 
conference adopted the infamous "two-assessments” which stated that in the 
seventeen years before the Cultural Revolution schools had been under the 
leadership of “traitors, special agents, and those who follow the capitalist road” 
and that schools had been “places to train bourgeois intellectuals”.1
In the face of the strength of the radical’s position, moderates under Zhou 
Enlai appear to have been unable to challenge the basic leftist line. Beginning 
in 1971 Zhou did launch a concerted move to raise the question of the quality 
of the new students enrolling under the system of recommendation. Supported 
by Peking University professor, Zhou Peiyuan, Zhou called for more emphasis 
to be placed on theoretical teaching and laboratory work. The radical Left were 
forced to address this issue and countered criticism of the academic quality of 
the new students by saying that they had already proven their ability to work 
hard and overcome any obstacle. Limited reforms were carried out to the 
enrollment procedure, including the introduction of a new exam, however 
media reports emphasized that this was only one part of the overall procedure, 
which would still be based primarily on political factors.
Even these limited reforms prompted a strong response from the radicals. In 
July 1973 they manipulated an incident in which Zhang Tiesheng, a sent-down
1 Jiaoyu dashiji, pg.438.
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youth, claimed to have failed the new entrance exam as he had not had time to 
prepare because he was involved in harvest work. The Left used this incident 
to criticize the renewed emphasis on academic standards and claimed Zhang’s 
actions in complaining were “overflowing with the revolutionary spirit of going 
against the tide”.2 Radical attacks on the moderate line in higher education 
continued through 1973 and 1974.
The 4th National People’s Congress, held in January 1975, marked a 
temporary turning point in higher education policy. Significantly, the Congress 
approved a decision to disband the SEG and re-open the Ministry of Education. 
Together with Deng Xiaoping, the newly appointed Minister of Education, Zhou 
Rongxin, played a leading role in trying to introduce more comprehensive 
reforms in higher education. Zhou Enlai’s speech to the Congress, in which 
he called for the completion of the Four Modernizations was also significant as 
it was used by the moderates to reinforce their calls for further reforms in 
education. The practical emphasis of the four modernizations undermined the 
significance of political education and placed the emphasis firmly on technical 
ability.
In the period to October, Zhou Rongxin gave a series of speeches in which 
he launched several stinging attacks on education policy since the end of the 
mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolution. He also called for stronger 
resolve on the part of officials within the ministry. In a speech given at a 
meeting of the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Railways, convened to 
discuss education, Zhou directly linked the importance of training qualified 
personnel to completing the four modernizations.
Whatever the intention of reformers like Zhou and Deng, their efforts to 
improve the situation in higher education were undermined by Mao’s fears that 
their policies would harm the so-called "fruits” of the Cultural Revolution. The
2 Yang Pu, "The spirit of going against the tide”, in the Renmin Ribao, 16 August, 1973, 
pg.3.
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Campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, launched in 
February 1975, had already criticized the idea that schools were focusing 
exclusively on transmitting knowledge. The radical Left launched a new model, 
the Chaoyang Agricultural College, whose students returned to work in the 
fields following the completion of their courses, rather than seek an 
advantageous position because of their education. Ultimately, it appears to 
have been Mao’s displeasure with the attempted reforms to education policy 
that led to the downfall of the moderate line, and also to Deng’s eventual 
dismissal in January 1976. However the intensifying political conflict in the 
wake of Zhou Enlai’s death meant that the radical Left were unable to 
effectively use their new position to promote their policies.
In the period following Mao’s death, Hua Guofeng adopted a somewhat 
contradictory line: He supported the reforms introduced in higher education 
during the Cultural Revolution, including the idea that candidates for university 
should be recommended by the masses, but he also recognized the need to 
increase the numbers of trained graduates to support his ambitious industrial 
policy. As the wider debate shifted (under Hua’s leadership), to recognizing 
that less ideological restraints should be placed on economic and social policy, 
supporting higher educational policies introduced during the Cultural 
Revolution looked more and more anachronistic.
Following his return in August 1977 (and even before his formal 
rehabilitiation), Deng Xiaoping placed considerable emphasis on reforming 
higher education. Like Hua, Deng tied his comments to the need to modernize 
China and train scientists and technicians to take part in the four 
modernizations. However, unlike Hua, Deng was willing to argue that China 
had to go beyond the Cultural Revolution reforms, or rather that China should 
return to the policies implemented before the Cultural Revolution. He felt that 
policies such as key-point schools could be justified because they were the 
only way China was going to modernize successfully. In a series of speeches
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in 1977, Deng also strongly condemned the "two-assessments" of 1971.
Hua’s position continued to be that he wanted to retain some of the elements 
of the line introduced during the Cultural Revolution, particularly the improved 
access for students from a worker or peasant background. However, by early- 
1978, Deng Xiaoping appears to have built up a broad consensus on the need 
for reforms to entrance procedures and the need to re-establish key-point 
schools. At the National Educational Work Conference, held in Beijing in April- 
May 1978, a series of reforms along the lines proposed by Deng were 
introduced. This meeting, rather than the third plenum held in December 1978, 
was significant for higher education policy, and the line it adopted remained in 
place until the end of the period under study in this thesis.
Agriculture
In direct contrast to developments in higher education, the chapter on 
agricultural policy highlights how the senior leadership sought to restrict the 
impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution in rural areas. 
There was a clear understanding of the economic and social importance of 
agriculture, both for feeding China’s population and generating the raw 
materials for industry. I noted that a September editorial in the Renmin Ribao 
banned Red Guards from “interfering in rural politics” and shortly after this, the 
Central Committee issued the “Regulations of the CCP Central Committee 
Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Below the County 
Level”. The “Directive" specifically prohibited Red Guards from travelling to 
communes and brigades below the county level and in article two warned that 
efforts should be focused on agricultural tasks during the forthcoming harvest 
season.
Underlining the importance of agriculture, this research has shown that a 
clear cyclical pattern emerged in agricultural policy which can be seen almost 
throughout the period under study and which served as a background to
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overall policy-making. This pattern was characterized by periods of 
retrenchment during seasons of peak activity in agriculture, namely in the 
spring and autumn at times of planting and harvesting when the destabilizing 
effects of radical policies would be felt the most, followed by the re- 
radicalization of policy when these periods had passed. Key examples of 
retrenchment and re-radicalization can be seen in the period from September 
1966-April 1967 and in the spring of 1971.
In the spring of 1967 large numbers of PLA troops entered the countryside 
as part of a movement to carry out spring farm work. Some authors have linked 
this presence to a radical upsurge in agricultural policy which began in 1968 
and which was associated with Lin Biao. This research found no direct 
evidence linking Lin with this upsurge, suggesting instead that it was the 
indirect result of the policies to prepare for a possible war with the Soviet Union 
and of the political campaigns that were conducted in rural areas in 1968 and 
1969 which led rural cadres to spontaneously implement a more radical line. 
During this period there were numerous reports of the confiscation of private 
plots, the introduction of the Dazhai system of allocating work points, and 
attempts to raise the level of accounting to the brigade and commune-level.
At the start of 1970, and with spring planting looming, these developmets 
came in for criticism in a series of media articles. On 1 May, 1970, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry was established (some five years before the Ministry 
of Education would be re-opened). The moderate trend was confirmed at the 
Northern Districts Agricultural Conference, held from June-October 1970 which 
emphasized the continuing importance of the “60 Articles”, the moderate 
document that had been introduced in the wake of the Great Leap Forward to 
restore agricultural production. The Conference’s final report also emphasized 
the importance of private plots, sideline industries and opposing egalitarianism, 
key elements of the moderate line. While the conference was meeting, an 
editorial on the model brigade at Dazhai launched a new stage in the
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campaign “ In agriculture study Dazhai” . Interestingly the editorial took a more 
radical line, and following its publication there were further reports of a radical 
upsurge in the countryside, in contrast to the policies being discussed at the 
Northern Districts Conference. However, at the beginning of 1971, senior 
leaders took a series of measures to end these trends, and the period from 
1971-1973 was characterized by a more moderate line.
Following the promotion of members of the radical Left to the Politburo at the 
10th National Party Congress, there was renewed contention over the 
formation of agricultural policy. With little influence within leading bodies 
overseeing agricultural policy, the radical Left utilized political campaigns such 
as the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius to mobilize rural cadres 
and peasants. Although these campaigns had little impact on agricultural 
policies per se, they were part of a wider radicalization of Chinese politics and 
their focus on political criteria led to a renewed attack on phenomenon such as 
private plots and sideline industries. The radical Left even set up their own 
model brigade, at Xiaoqinzhuang on the outskirts of Tianjin, to promote their 
policies.
A study of agricultural policy during this period is significant as it highlights 
the role of Hua Guofeng in policy-making on this issue, both before and after 
Mao’s death. It is clear that by 1975, a coalition of actors had formed around 
Hua which included leading figures associated with the Dazhai brigade such 
as Chen Yonggui. Their policies were based on Hua’s role in managing 
agricultural mechanization since his move to Beijing in 1971, and their 
interpretation of the experiences of the movement to study Dazhai. In contrast 
to the moderate line, this group continued to emphasize the importance of 
raising the level of ownership and accounting within the commune, however, 
unlike the radicals, who emphasized political education, this group stressed the 
importance of mechanization and large-scale field construction which would 
bring rewards to the peasants and boost their enthusiasm for collective
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agriculture.
While the radical Left continued to focus their criticism on the moderate line 
throughout 1974 and 1975, it was Hua’s group that emerged victorious from the 
First National Conference on "In Agriculture Study Dazhai”, held in December
1975. With Mao’s support, Hua and Chen Yonggui dominated the proceedings 
at this meeting, and the conference adopted policies based on their line. 
Although these policies subsequently came in for attack from the radical Left, 
they remained the basis of agricultural policy upto Mao’s death, and formed a 
core element of Hua’s overall line in the period from 1976-1978.
Hua’s strength in this field is apparent in the way he used agriculture and the 
conflict with the Gang of Four over agricultural policy to bolster his position.
Hua used the debate over agricultural policy to launch a strong critique of the 
Gang’s activities and he and his supporters focused especially on events at the 
First Dazhai Conference and efforts by the Gang to stop the publication of Hua 
Guofeng’s speech at that meeting. Hua’s first major act following the Gang’s 
arrest was to convene a second Dazhai conference which repeated the 
importance of the twin tasks of basic field construction and achieving 
mechanization as the main issues in agricultural policy. This remained the 
basic line in agriculture up to the eve of the third plenum in December 1978. 
This period saw an enormous mobilization of rural labour to engage in capital 
construction projects and an on-going emphasis on raising the level of 
collectivization.
From late-1977, Hua’s line began to be challenged by a group of moderate 
figures under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and including Anhui Province’s 
Party Secretary Wan Li. Anhui was the site of a number of experiments in 
organizing agriculture, including the first major use of contract responsibility 
systems that would subsequently be adopted at the third plenum. The 
moderate fine developed through 1978~to incorporate a number of elements. 
Firstly, it emphasized the “sovereignty” of production teams, the lowest of the
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three levels of commune ownership, and warned against excessive and 
inappropriate transfer of resources away from the production team to facilitate 
capital construction projects. Secondly, it emphasized the use of material 
rewards to boost peasant enthusiasm and increase productivity. Thirdly, the 
moderates placed far greater importance on respecting local conditions. This 
was used to downplay the significance of Dazhai as a national model. Finally, 
on mechanization, the moderates advocated far lower targets than Hua 
Guofeng.
This line was adopted at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, 
which saw a fundamental shift in the Party’s overall line. The post-Hua 
leadership have portrayed the plenum as a major turning point in agricultural 
policy, although it did not mark a complete break with Hua’s line. The 
documents adopted by the meeting contained a number of elements of Hua’s 
policies, including the importance of mechanization and developing local 
industries in support of agriculture. Significantly, the meeting had specifically 
forbidden contracting with individual households, despite the fact that 
experimental projects had been underway in Anhui Province since the autumn 
of 1978.
Foreign policy
The final chapter on foreign policy showed that like higher education, foreign 
policy-making was severely effected by the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. The withdrawal of China’s ambassadors, together with the actions 
of junior diplomats and students studying overseas, who sought to proselytise 
in the name of Mao, severely effected China’s relations with other countries. 
Domestically, radical activity peaked in the summer of 1967, with Red Guard 
attacks on the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi and the occupation of the Ministry itself 
and the burning of the British Embassy.
These developments, together with the deterioration in China’s foreign
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relations with key allies such as Cambodia and Burma appear to have been 
essential in convincing Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai that the radical influence 
needed to be brought under control within the foreign affairs system. New 
regulations were introduced on the day of the attack on the British Embassy 
restricting Red Guard activities in the diplomatic quarters in Beijing. 
Significantly, these moves received support from key members of the radical 
Left, including Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing.
The impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution both 
domestically and with regards to China’s international relations, led to a 
concerted effort in the first half of 1969 to restore effective functioning within the 
Ministry. More urgently, this chapter has shown how escalating border clashes 
with the Soviet Union in March and April 1969 forced China’s senior leadership 
to review its international position and led directly to China’s renewed 
overtures to the US.
A number of writers have suggested that Lin Biao opposed China’s 
rapprochement with the US, but this research could find no evidence to support 
this theory, rather, those comments by Lin that are available suggest his views 
were in line with those of other leaders. This consensus on China’s foreign 
policy continued throughout the period under study, and meant that there were 
no major policy initiatives following China’s move to improve Sino-US ties in
1969. As this chapter has shown, a major factor in this consensus was the 
control exerted by Mao, Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders, who tended to 
keep the decision-making authority over foreign policy in their own hands. 
Outside of this handful of senior figures, few other leaders had any input into 
the policy-making process, and dissent was stifled by the control exerted by 
Mao, Zhou, Deng and Hua.
The policy of differentiating between the two superpowers formed the basis 
of China’s foreign policy throughout the period under study and lay behind 
many other issues such as China’s policy towards southeast Asia and its
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position with regards to the Third World. Again, these policies remained stable 
thoughout the period under study and it is not the intention of this chapter to 
review them in detail again.
The one issue over which there was some contention between the radical 
Left and moderate figures was over China’s economic relations with other 
countries. This issue allowed the radicals to criticize Deng Xiaoping and other 
moderates for apparently going against Mao’s stated policies of self-reliance 
and seff-reqeneration. However on theoretical issues and on issues of China’s 
relations with the two superpowers, statements by the radical Left essentially 
follow the overall line. Significantly, the death of Zhou Enlai and the 
subsequent purge of Deng Xiaoping did not effect the position of moderate 
figures within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Qiao Guanhua, who 
continued to serve as Foreign Minister, in stark contrast to the fate of Zhou 
Rongxin the Minister of Education.
Following the death of Mao Zedong, both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping 
continued to emphasize the importance of Mao’s basic foreign policy line, 
embodied in the Three Worlds Theory. Although China’s isolation during the 
Cultural Revolution has sometimes been overstated, Hua did move to increase 
trade and educational contacts with other countries. These policies were non- 
contentious as they were based on Denc^s comments from 1974-1976." Deng’s 
stature meant that he eclipsed Hua in the field of foreign policy decision­
making even while Hua was still in office, however, there was little change in 
the basic line as there was broad consensus on its correctness.
The Compartmentalization of Policy-making
The three core chapters, together with these summaries clearly demonstrate 
the variation in policy-making discussed in the introduction to this thesis:
Firstly, it is apparent that there is variation in the relative strength of the 
various groups in setting the agenda in each of the three issue areas, so that
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while the radical Left were a dominant influence in higher education policy, this 
was not matched by a similar influence in agricultural and foreign policy. 
Similarly, while Hua Guofeng dominated agricultural policy-making from at 
least 1975-77, they had less influence over policy in higher education at that 
time.
Secondly, it is apparent that the relative strength of the various groups in 
setting the agenda for each of the three issue areas also varies over time, but 
not to a uniform degree. This research has highlighted some general trends, 
such as the move to moderate policies in the wake of the death of Lin Biao, an 
upsurge in radical activity following the Tenth Party Congress, and moves to 
reform policy after Deng Xiaoping’s rehabilitation in 1977. However it is clear 
that these developments proceeded at different rates in different policy areas. 
(As there was broad consensus amongst the senior leadership with regards to 
foreign policy, the main indications of this variation can be seen in the variable 
pace of reforms in agriculture and higher education).
One of the clearest examples of this pattern can be seen in Zhou Enlai’s 
efforts to introduce reforms in agriculture and higher education in 1971-72. The 
chapter on agriculture has demonstrated that as early as August 1971, 
moderates under Zhou dominated the formation of agricultural policy. Criticism 
of leftist excesses in agricultural policy culminated with the publication of the 
Central Committee’s “Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in the 
Rural People’s Communes’’ on 26 December, 1971. This document supported 
key elements of the moderate’s line, including sideline activities, maintaining 
the principle of “to each according to his ability and to each according to his 
work” and boosting peasant incomes.3 In direct contrast to these 
developments, in August 1971 the radical Left published a summary of the 
National Educational Work Conference which contained the ‘2-Estimates’
3 "Directive Concerning the Question of Distribution in Rural People’s Communes”, in 
Jurgen Domes, Socialism in the Chinese Countryside, pp. 159-164.
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discussed above. While reforms in agriculture proceeded apace in 1972, Zhou 
Enlai and other moderates were only able to introduce limited reforms in higher 
education. Other examples can be seen with the attempt by the radical Left to 
further radicalize agricultural and higher education policy in the wake of the 
Tenth Party Congress, and Hua Guofeng’s reform programme following Mao’s 
death.
In highlighting these variations across the three issue areas, this study has 
suggested that policy-making in each of these areas had its own coherent logic 
and followed a pattern largely independent of other issue areas.
Developments in agriculture, higher education and foreign policy appear 
insulated from each other to a much higher degree than previously thought.
This research has identified the assessment of risk by senior leaders of the 
consequences of failure in any given policy area as the leading variable 
explaining these variations. In addition I have suggested that membership of 
leading decision-making and administrative bodies and previous experience 
could act as intervening variables effecting policy outcomes.
The Assessment of Risk and the Role of Senior Leaders
This research has suggested that the most important factor in the 
compartmentalization of policy-making was that senior leaders such as Mao, 
Zhou and Deng, made an assessment of the risk of failure which set variable 
parameters on the extent to which that policy area was allowed to become 
radicalized. The three studies of policy-making in agriculture, foreign policy 
and higher education have highlighted how concerns amongst the Party and 
government leadership as to the possible consequences of radical policies 
introduced in the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution impacted in 
different ways in each of the three issue areas.
This thesis has highlighted a number of examples of such an assessment 
being made. Perhaps the clearest example is in foreign policy where the
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escalating risk of a war with the Soviet Union led to a moderation in policy. The 
on-going threat of war throughout the period under study appears to have 
acted as a restraint on policy-making in this area. The economic and social 
importance of agriculture was such that China’s leaders also sought to protect 
rural areas from the impact of the mobilizational phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. Although there were periods of radicalization in agricultural policy 
it is also noticeable that there was a clear cycle of retrenchment at times of 
peak agricultural activity in an attempt to protect output.
In contrast, it is apparent that higher education was seen largely as a cause 
for a greater good, with few immediate costs if policy were allowed to become 
radicalized. It was only following Mao’s death when greater emphasis was 
placed on economic reform, that education’s role in training people who could 
take part in economic construction was recognized and reforms to higher 
education introduced.
In examining this assessment of risk by the senior leadership, this thesis 
recognizes the important role of Mao Zedong, but does not except that he was 
able to dominate other Chinese leaders to the degree suggested by authors 
like Frederick Teiwes. Mao’s role in the assessment of risk was often pivotal, 
but it varied across issue areas. There were also times when Mao took a back­
seat in policy-making. This thesis has identified the ambivalence in Mao’s own 
thinking, which sought to both “protect” the successes of the Cultural Revolution 
and promote economic reforms and suggested that this gave scope to both 
“radicals” and “moderates” to promote their own views. Other leaders who can 
be identified as having some input into the process of risk assessment are 
Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Wan Li, Ye Jianying, Lin Biao, Hua Guofeng, and 
members of the radical Left.
Membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies
In part, membership of leading decision-making and administrative bodies
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was influenced by the assessment described above. As I noted in the 
introduction, there had been a substantial redistribution of positions during the 
mobilizational phase and this continued into the period covered in this study in 
part this redistribution was dictated by the awareness of the consequences of 
failure in each area. However, this thesis has highlighted how individual and 
groups of actors were able to use membership of leading decision-making and 
administrative bodies to “capture” part of the policy-making process to promote 
their own policies. It could even give them some ability to resist the will of 
senior figures like Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai.
In higher education, the radical Left’s control of the SEG and leading 
academic institutions such as Peking, Tsinghua and Fudan universities was a 
significant factor in their ability to resist efforts by moderates like Zhou Enlai and 
Zhou Rongxin to introduce reforms. Elsewhere, Zhou Enlai’s position as the 
head of the State Council was also significant as it appears to have given him 
the opportunity to dilute or stall implementation of some of the radical Left’s 
policies. Membership of decision-making bodies became increasingly 
important as China re-established Party and government organizational norms. 
In particular, in the post-Mao period, the gradual promotion of supporters of 
Deng Xiaoping to the Politburo was effective in sidelining Hua Guofeng.
I have suggested that membership of these bodies implies that policy­
making in the PRC during this period was more of a mixture of formal and 
informal strucutres than has been previously understood. This research 
suggests that membership of formal organs was an important means of 
mobilizing support for policy positions and could form the structure around 
which informal factional conflict was waged, with competing groups each 
seeking to place their “men” into leading positions on key decision-making and 
administrative bodies.
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Previous experience
The final intervening variable highlighted by this research is the importance 
of previous experience. This study has suggested that the radical Left’s lack of 
experience in the field of agriculture was a significant factor in their inability to 
dominate this area in the way they had higher education. Elsewhere, Hua 
Guofeng’s role in promoting agricultural mechanization following his promotion 
to the centre in 1971 appears to be an important factor in his subsequent 
control of this area. This was in stark contrast to his lack of experience in either 
higher education or foreign policy, areas where he more readily conceded 
control to Deng Xiaoping.
I have suggested that previous experience in a particular field was probably 
significant as it allowed an individual or group of actors to develop a network of 
personal ties in that particular area, or xitong, that could be used at a later date 
to mobilize support for new policy initiatives. This informal relationship 
balances the role of formal position noted above and suggests that both were 
important factors in influencing policy outcomes.
By undertaking this study of three separate issue areas, this thesis has been 
able to offer radically new insights into the policy-making process in the PRC 
between 1969 and 1978. In contrast to earlier broad-band studies and studies 
of single issue areas, this thesis has generated detailed information on three 
issue areas, highlighting the variations in the policy-making process both 
across these areas, and through time. This model, suggesting the 
compartmentalization of the policy-making process with developments in each 
issue area being largely isolated from each other, is in clear contrast to those 
works that see the policy-making process in this period as being characterized 
either by across-the-board radicalization or moderation, or as a process of 
balancing by senior leaders between the various coalitions. Policy-making has 
also been shown to be more interactive than has generally been understood,
343
with individual or groups of actors dominating or “capturing” parts of the 
decision-making process in some of the issue areas, gaining a role in policy­
making in that area.
This research also offers new insights into the Cultural Revolution itself. 
Although it does not cover the mobilizational phase of the Cultural Revolution 
in detail, it is apparent that the compartmentalization of the policy-making 
process was important in restricting the impact of the burgeoning movement in 
rural areas, suggesting a more rational prosecution of this stage of the 
movement than has previously been assumed. Elsewhere, the picture 
generated in this research suggests that we cannot simply identify periods of 
radicalization and moderation. The Cultural Revolution was not a wave like 
movement, with peaks and troughs of radicalization, rather it progressed at a 
different pace in different areas. Finally, although almost all of this subject 
matter has been covered in earlier studies, this thesis has generated new 
information on the late Cultural Revolution period and in particular the role of 
Hua Guofeng. This period, which formed the backdrop to Deng’s eventual rise 
to power, has been highlighted as an important area for further study.
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